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7Introduction
Increasing levels of migration will have a sig-
nificant influence on Nordic societies in the near 
future. New forms of diversity and multicultural-
ism are expected not only to shape politics and 
policy-making, but also to influence urban forms 
and structures. The emerging ethnic diversity is 
likely to affect residential decisions, and the ways 
in which residents interact in neighbourhoods, 
schools, playgrounds and workplaces. Such in-
teraction, in turn, has direct bearings on social 
cohesion and intergroup understanding and toler-
ance (Andersson 2008; Wessel 2009). All in all, 
these processes are key elements fuelling interest 
in ethnic residential segregation.
There has been extensive research on ethnic 
residential segregation based on mapping and 
statistical indexes (e.g., Huttman et al. 1991; 
Musterd et al. 1998), but less is known about 
the complexities and dynamics behind spatial-
ly and statistically observable segregation pat-
terns. Most studies on recent societal changes 
and increasing levels of international migration 
focus on questions related to the development 
of social structures, particularly professionalisa-
tion and polarisation, or more directly related 
to urban poverty (Sassen 1991; Hamnett 1994; 
Mollenkopf and Castells 1991). Another line of 
research concerns social cohesion and social or-
der. What seems to be lacking, however, is a fo-
cus on the processes behind country- and city-
specific forms of ethnic residential segregation, 
such as the links between welfare-state, housing 
and integration policies. 
Although there is a vast body of Nordic re-
search (e.g., Andersson 1998, 2007; Søholt 2001; 
Heikkilä 2005; Musterd et al. 2008; Skifter An-
dersen 2010) on issues related to immigration 
and integration, much of the existing theory 
on segregation and settlement, and on housing 
choices among immigrants, still derives from 
the US experience. Furthermore, much of the 
interpretation and political implementation still 
reflect those experiences, even if the relevance 
of US and even European experiences in rela-
tion to the Nordic welfare states continue to be 
questioned. Previous research has shown that the 
causes and effects of segregation are highly con-
text-dependent. Settlement and segregation pat-
terns, processes and outcomes are shaped by a 
number of factors, including national immigra-
tion and integration policies, volumes of immi-
gration, demography, the degree of urbanisation, 
housing and labour market structures, and hous-
ing, planning and welfare policies (e.g., Musterd 
et al. 1998; Vranken & Burgers 2004; van Kem-
pen et al.2006; Musterd et al. 2008). 
There seems to be relatively wide theoretical 
and political agreement on the existence of the 
Nordic Welfare Model and how it differs in many 
ways from other welfare models (Esping-An-
dersen 1999; Kautto 2001; Bergh 2004; Castles 
& Himanen 2002; Sipilä et al. 2009). The main 
features of the Nordic Model include compre-
hensive social policy, strong state involvement, 
and a high degree of de-commodification and 
universalism in terms of both costs and gains. 
Given the structural similarities within the Nor-
dic model, and the differences from the US and 
European models, it could be hypothesised that 
the Nordic countries are also able to success-
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fully tackle issues related to immigration and 
residential segregation. Nevertheless evaluation 
of Nordic policy practices and their effects re-
mains scarce. 
This is where our project began. The aim of 
the NODES research project11is to capture and 
analyse the links between Nordic welfare state 
policies and trajectories of social and spatial in-
tegration. Our overall research question is two-
fold: How are the Nordic welfare states shaping 
the conditions for ethnic residential segregation 
and de-segregation, and how are the patterns 
and processes of segregation affecting the wider 
social and spatial developments in the different 
host societies? These questions are addressed in 
five multidisciplinary subprojects. The first of 
these is the subject of this background report, 
which explores the similarities and differences 
in welfare, housing, immigration and integra-
tion policies, and provides an overview of mi-
gration flows and immigrant settlement patterns 
in the Nordic countries. The findings have yield-
ed some preliminary hypotheses on the linkages 
between the welfare policies and processes of 
segregation, which will be further explored and 
tested in the other subprojects during the four-
year research period. 
This report comprises four country reports 
describing the policy framework and the devel-
opment of recent immigration and segregation 
processes in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and 
Finland, respectively. The country reports ex-
pose the basic postulations of Nordic welfare 
and housing policies to empirical comparison. 
National-level politics, affected by the dialogue 
and shared experiences among the Nordic Coun-
cil of Ministers, have had a profound influence on 
the respective political systems. The creation of 
the four welfare states relied on a certain level of 
1  Nordic welfare states and the dynamics and effects 
of ethnic residential segregation. The NODES project 
is a four-year comparative research project funded by 
NORFACE’s Research Programme on Migration.
national uniformity. Thus, the top-down political 
approach to issues related to welfare, segrega-
tion and housing is deep-seated and has a long 
tradition. The ideological cornerstone behind the 
Nordic system is equality among individuals re-
gardless of their demographic, socio-economic 
and ethnic characteristics. As Magnusson Turner 
(2010: 12) points out, the welfare policy is “com-
prehensive, i.e. it includes everybody in contrast 
to residual welfare regimes”. It is said that strong 
universalism is a prerequisite for the strong pub-
lic support of welfare policies. However, as the 
Danish case indicates, this universalism has been 
under attack during the recent period of expan-
sion in ethnic diversity. 
A number of external and internal pressures 
have challenged the basic pillars of the Nordic 
Welfare Model during the last two decades. Eco-
nomic restructuring and recession have affected 
all European countries and unemployment has 
thus also become an issue in the Nordic coun-
tries. Having been used to full employment, they 
now face a quite different societal situation. At 
the same time, income differences have begun 
to widen ˗ or at least there has been an increase 
not only in the proportion of the wealthier popu-
lation but also in their distance from the average 
income. This has a direct bearing on the housing 
market, and poverty has become an issue. These 
changes are coincident with the ageing of the 
population and the growth in immigration and 
cultural differentiation.
However, as Figures 1 and 2 show, the four 
Nordic countries are still coping well compared 
with the rest of Europe. Income differences re-
mained relatively small from the mid-1980s un-
til the mid-2000s, and the same is observable in 
terms of the risk of poverty. Indeed, the poverty 
risk was even higher than the EU average before 
the social transfers, but notably lover thereafter. 
The Nordic Welfare Model still seems to hold 
from these perspectives.
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Figure 1. Income inequality from the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s (OECD 2010, see Vaattovaara et 
al. Chapter  1.2.3. in this publication)
Figure 2. At-risk-of-poverty before and after the social transfers introduced in 2007 (Eurostat, 2007, 
(see Andersson et al. Chapter 1.2.4. in this publication) 
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All the Nordic countries have ratified the 
1951 UN Convention related to the status of 
refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and have rela-
tively long traditions of engaging in international 
refugee-protection activities. However, the num-
bers of refugees and immigrants differ quite sig-
nificantly in the different countries (Figure 3). 
Whereas immigration in Sweden and Denmark 
has a long history, it started relatively late in Nor-
way, and especially in Finland. Figure 3 shows 
the historical trends in immigration to the Nordic 
countries from the 1950s to the present, whereas 
Figure 4 illustrates the changes in net migration.
The numbers of immigrants have grown rap-
idly during the last ten years, increasing by 105 
per cent in Sweden, 81 per cent in Finland and 
Figure 3. Immigration to the Nordic countries in 1950˗2009 (Statistics Denmark, Statistics Finland, 
Statistics Norway, Statistics Sweden)
Figure 4. Net migration to the Nordic countries in 1950˗2009 (Statistics Denmark, Statistics Finland, 
Statistics Norway, Statistics Sweden)
11
Introduction
56 per cent in Norway. In Denmark, despite the 
big changes in the immigration laws in 2001, 
the declining trend in 2001˗2003 was reversed 
into a 34-per-cent increase by the end of 2009. 
There are differences among the Nordic coun-
tries in the main origins of the immigrants and 
in the entry categories. Immigration currently 
comprises both labour migration based on free 
movement among EU countries, and refugee im-
migration and family reunification.
Immigrants often belong to low-income 
groups. This limits their choice in the housing 
market. Moreover, they often lack good contacts 
with landlords, have difficulties in finding out 
about the housing market, and also sometimes 
experience discrimination. Thus, the large dif-
ferences in regulation and support for different 
forms of tenure in the four countries is of major 
significance in the development of ethnic seg-
regation. Immigrants’ housing options depend 
on the affordability and accessibility of differ-
ent forms of tenure, and on systems of alloca-
tion in particular. 
Housing has traditionally occupied a central 
position in the Nordic model. The political ambi-
tion behind the socially oriented housing policy 
has been to provide good housing for all regard-
less of income, and to disrupt the link between 
income and housing outcomes. The means of 
achieving this goal have included a subsidised 
housing sector, a soft rent-control system, hous-
ing allowances, and in some countries a large 
public-housing sector. However, the respective 
housing policies have followed different paths 
since WWII.
Consequently, the distributions of immi-
grants in the various housing-tenure-types dif-
fer considerably in the four countries. Most im-
migrants in Denmark and Finland are in social 
housing, whereas a large proportion in Norway 
are homeowners. Denmark is the only country 
in which immigrants are underrepresented in pri-
vate rental accommodation and co-operatives. 
These differences are attributable to the regula-
tion of the rental market in Denmark, the very 
small social-housing sector in Norway, and the 
special subsidies for homeowners especially in 
Norway, but also in Sweden and Finland.
Whereas housing policies and housing-mar-
ket structures influence immigrant settlement 
patterns, immigration policies directly influence 
the amount and structure of immigration. Fur-
thermore, immigration and integration policies in 
the Nordic countries are strongly interconnected. 
Successful integration and inclusion are under-
stood as immigration regimes that do not threaten 
social cohesion or economic sustainability. The 
main objective of the integration policies in all 
four countries is to improve immigrants’ partici-
pation in working life as a means of maintaining 
self-respect, economic independence and a sense 
of shared responsibility. Despite the many simi-
larities in the respective policies, there also are 
clear differences. For example, the acquisition of 
citizenship differs in terms of both eligibility and 
tests and ceremonies. In relation to the resident 
population, Sweden and Norway both approve 
a higher number of citizenship applications per 
inhabitant than Finland and Denmark: in 2008, 
Sweden was on top in the EU 27, with Norway 
just behind, whereas both Finland and Denmark 
were below the EU average. 
The political approaches to the explicit goals 
of integration procedures also differ among the 
four countries. Whereas Sweden and Norway 
have traditionally been strong supporters of mul-
ticultural policies, with the active recognition of 
various ethnic subgroups, Finland joined this pol-
icy trend rather late. Later reforms have moved 
Sweden towards “civic integration”, with no rec-
ognition of ethnic sub-groups, whereas Denmark 
is moving towards “ethnic assimilation”. 
All four countries have developed some kind 
of education and labour-market-integration pro-
12
Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States
grammes for refugees and they all have refugee-
distribution plans and programmes. Refugees are 
settled in municipalities according to an annu-
ally decided state-municipal placement agree-
ment scheme. Some of the countries give refu-
gees and asylum seekers little choice in where 
to live, and in many cases the host municipali-
ties have no choice, either. According to vari-
ous Swedish studies, the compulsory refugee-
dispersal policy pursued from 1985˗1994 was 
counterproductive in relation to labour-market 
integration. The Norwegian experience has been 
somewhat different, however. Our intention is to 
examine this question in other Nordic countries 
in subsequent studies. 
Due to the active dispersal policies, a large 
majority of refugees are initially settled through-
out the various regions in the Nordic countries, 
although the majority of them tend to relocate to 
cities in the south. The country reports show the 
concentrations of immigrants in the metropoli-
tan regions, although concentration to the capital 
region varies in the different countries and im-
migrant categories. In Norway, the proportion of 
all immigrants, regardless of their background, 
increased in Oslo in the period 1970˗2007, al-
though there was a percentage decrease in the 
numbers of immigrants with a non-western back-
ground (Texmon and Brunborg 2009). With re-
gard to ethnic groups, 82 per cent of Somali 
speakers in Finland are concentrated in the Hel-
sinki metropolitan area, whereas only 41 per cent 
of the Russian-speaking population have settled 
there. In Sweden, the Stockholm County houses 
over 60 per cent of all immigrants born in Peru 
and Eritrea, 50 per cent or more of immigrants 
born in Turkey, Greece, Chile, Morocco and Ethi-
opia, but only around 10 per cent of immigrants 
born in Vietnam, Bosnia and other parts of the 
former Yugoslavia. These differences are con-
nected to the migration period, the reasons for the 
migration, and the placement policies in force.
All the above features affect the local socio-
spatial structures. Ethnic residential segregation 
is a hot political topic in all four countries, and 
especially in the larger cities. Poor immigrant 
households in Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
are concentrated not only in particular places and 
neighbourhoods but also in particular housing-
market segments (social/public housing). Resi-
dential segregation and tenure coincide in Nor-
way, too, but the pattern is different, given the 
small size of the public rental sector.
Each of the four country reports ends with a 
section describing the basic features of residen-
tial segregation in the respective capital region. 
Neighbourhoods and city districts heavily domi-
nated by native residents are typical features in 
all four countries. Earlier research has focused on 
sorting processes from the perspective of ethnic 
minorities and their behaviour. Our aim in the 
subsequent subprojects is to give a more com-
plete picture of the causalities related to segrega-
tion by investigating not only the housing careers 
of minorities, but also the migratory behaviour 
of the ethnic majority. Research conducted on 
the international level, and confirmed for Swe-
den (Andersson & Bråmå 2004; Bråmå 2006) 
has shown that phenomena such as white flight, 
white avoidance, and blocking strategies exer-
cised by majority residents and institutions, have 
a profound impact on patterns of ethnic residen-
tial segregation.
The following chapters of this research re-
port comprise four country cases followed by a 
common comparative assesment. Each country 
case is divided into six subsections, which con-
textualise the policy framework and immigration 
flows and settlement patterns that are hypothe-
sised to shape and affect the processes of ethnic 
residential segregation in the Nordic countries. 
The country cases are written by the respective 
research teams, who are responsible for the con-
tent and the conclusions. Terje Wessel (welfare 
13
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in the Nordic countries), Hans Skifter Andersen 
(housing policies and outcomes), Saara Yous-
fi (the development of immigration), Susanne 
Søholt (integration and settlement policies) and 
Roger Andersson (migration flows and settle-
ment patterns) are the responsible authors for the 
comparative conclusions reported in Chapter 6. 
Ethnic segregation ˗ in social, economic and 
spatial terms ˗ has significant societal, practical 
and policy relevance throughout Europe. There 
has been intense political debate in all four Nor-
dic countries concerning immigration-related is-
sues, such as refugee reception (dispersal) sys-
tems, citizenship and minority rights, the finan-
cial costs and benefits of immigration, and eth-
nic residential segregation. The role of welfare 
states and multicultural policies has also been 
addressed. This research report, and the four sub-
sequent subprojects, will contribute to the con-
temporary political and theoretical debate on the 
causes, meanings and effects of ethnic residential 
segregation, and the links to the welfare, hous-
ing and immigration policies. 
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1.  The Swedish 
welfare system
In the welfare regime classification developed 
by Esping-Andersen (1990), Sweden is identi-
fied as a typical representative of a social demo-
cratic welfare state. This implies a strong public 
service sector distributing welfare goods to all 
families having needs, such as work, housing, 
day care, elderly care and so forth. Even free 
of charge education from elementary school to 
university is an important part of the Swedish 
welfare system. One of the ideological corner-
stones of the Swedish welfare state is the idea of 
equality between different families despite de-
mographic, socio-economic and ethnic charac-
teristics as well as geographical location. Another 
concept used for the Swedish welfare policy is 
that it is comprehensive/universal, i.e. includes 
everybody in contrast to the delivery in so called 
residual welfare regimes.
Housing has traditionally been a core element 
of the Swedish welfare state, characterised his-
torically by tenure neutrality and a ‘unitary’ rental 
system (Kemeny 1995). A fundamental part of 
the welfare is also the use of active labour mar-
ket policies, and a social security system requir-
ing high levels of employment. This obviously 
necessitates high levels of female employment.
1.1. Facts on the social 
security system 
The social security system is mainly funded 
through payroll taxes. However, taxes in Swe-
den have decreased since 2007 when the Gov-
ernment introduced lower tax on income from 
work compared to income from pensions, un-
employment benefits etc. This has had conse-
quences for the welfare system. In general, the 
welfare system has become less generous dur-
ing the last years for those in real need. It is also 
difficult for persons with a higher income than 
18,700 SEK per month to receive assistance. And 
it is really problematic for those whose period 
of benefits has expired; many security systems 
(used when being sick, unemployed etc) now 
have a time limit.
1.1.1.  Social insurance ˗ health 
insurance and unemployment benefits
Social insurance is a key part of the Swedish wel-
fare system and everyone that lives or works in 
Sweden is eligible to get benefits from it. It pro-
vides financial protection for families and chil-
dren, for persons with a disability and in con-
nection with illness, work injury and old age 
(Försäkringskassan 2010).
The total expenses for the social insurance 
system in 2008 (latest available information) was 
460 Billion SEK. Just about 55 per cent are dif-
ferent forms of financial protections and pensions 
for elderly and survivors, 20 per cent comprise 
health insurance and another 10 per cent child 
allowances and parental benefits. Housing al-
lowances is in monetary terms a tiny part of the 
social insurance system but of significant im-
portance for households in need (see chapter 2). 
It is recurrently confirmed that housing allow-
ances have a clear redistributive effect across 
households with different incomes (Magnusson 
Turner 2010).
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Assistance to people in case of illness or dis-
ability is one component of the social insurance 
system. A person ill-stricken can receive ordi-
nary sickness benefits for at most 364 days dur-
ing a 450-day period at a level of 64 per cent 
of previous salary. If the illness last for more 
than seven days, the person will normally be 
expected to produce a medical certificate in or-
der to continue to receive sick pay or sickness 
benefit. If the person’s work capacity is still re-
duced after one year, it is possible to apply for 
extended sickness benefit. In case of a very seri-
ous illness, it is possible to apply for continued 
sickness benefits. There is no limit to the length 
of time that continued sickness benefits can be 
paid for (Försäkringskassan 2010).
The health insurance is under debate, mainly 
because ill-stricken persons perceive that they 
more or less are forced to work even if they have 
a medical certificate. The health insurance office 
has to take into consideration a person’s working 
capacity and not the degree of illness, in relation 
to the entire labour market, not just in relation 
to the person’s previous occupation or educa-
tion. In a Budget Bill 2010 (Prop. 2009/10:1) 
the Government describes the relative generous 
health insurance system as detrimental for get-
ting people back to work and as an obstacle for 
people to obtain rehabilitation. The Government 
also argues that the insurance system has been 
misused in regions with a high unemployment 
rate. People have been put onto early retirement 
schemes, instead of receiving active assistance 
to get a new job.
The unemployment insurance system is an 
independent insurance financed by membership 
fees and payroll taxes. To receive unemployment 
benefits, people have to be a member of an unem-
ployment benefit fund. Which fund depends on 
education or occupation, and the amount of fee 
for participating depends on the average risk for 
unemployment in that particular sector. In 2008 
the Swedish Government decided to increase the 
fee, which resulted in a severe loss of members 
for the unemployment benefit funds. To obtain 
support a person must have been a member of 
an unemployment benefit fund during 12 months 
and have been working at minimum 80 hours/
month during 6 months during a 12 months pe-
riod. This makes it complicated for young adults 
just having finished an education, as well as for 
newly arrived immigrants, to get support from an 
unemployment fund in case of unemployment. 
For them, the risk of poverty is severe.
The unemployment rate in Sweden has in-
creased during the financial crisis, from 5.7 per 
cent in October 2008 to 8.1 per cent in 2009. 
The real problematic situation is for young adults 
(15-24 years) whose unemployment rate has in-
creased from 18.5 per cent in October 2008 to 
25.7 per cent one year later (SCB 2009). It is 
worth noticing that Statistics Sweden (SCB) fol-
lows ILO standard and counts students who are 
applying and prepared to take a job as unem-
ployed.
Former social democratic governments have 
had political ambitions to create a high rate of 
employment combined with a generous welfare 
system. Some argue that the system was too gen-
erous and created disincentives for employers to 
hire workers and for individuals to accept em-
ployment offers. The present liberal/conservative 
Government has a clear focus on combating un-
employment and the social security system has 
therefore become less generous. One argument 
presented by the Government is that they want 
to get rid of obstacles and incentives that reduce 
employment.
The Government states that a well-function-
ing labour market and an efficient labour market 
policy are important prerequisites for both eco-
nomic growth and stabile welfare. During the 
last year, and with reference to the global eco-
nomic crisis, the Government has also put extra 
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resources into labour market policy measures. 
They emphasize that the unemployment insur-
ance should function as readjustment insurance 
and that it is important to effectively bring to-
gether those seeking a job with those seeking 
labour (Government Offices of Sweden 2010). 
One way of achieving this is to facilitate labour 
force mobility, both locally and regionally. In 
that respect also the housing market can some-
times be a problem. It is an economic challenge 
for unemployed individuals to move from weak 
labour markets to strong labour markets, espe-
cially if they have to sell a single family house, 
since a weak labour market also implies a weak 
housing market. For those who are not able to 
solve the housing situation on the market where 
they can find a new job, long distance commut-
ing may turn out to be the only solution.
1.1.2.  Housing allowances
Housing allowances is another component of 
the social insurance system. Housing allowanc-
es were introduced in 1967-1968. There existed 
in fact some economic support for families with 
many children as early as in the 1930’s. Families 
with children, lone parents, young adults (18-
29 years) and elderly are the target groups for 
the contemporary housing allowance scheme. If 
someone qualifies for allowances depends on a 
combination of number of children, dwelling size 
(number of rooms), housing costs and income. 
However, housing allowances are predominantly 
given to families with children. In 2002, more 
than 80 per cent of all single parents received 
housing allowances (Åhren 2004). In order to 
be able to apply for housing allowance, a per-
son must be living in Sweden and registered in 
the Population Register (RTB). As a rule, the 
person must also be registered and permanently 
be living in the accommodation for which the 
allowance is applied for. The rules for housing 
allowances are set nationally.
Housing allowances are tenure neutral, and 
cover rent in rented dwellings and part of mort-
gage, part of heating, other utilities, site-lease rent 
and municipal real estate fees (only for owner 
occupation) in cooperative and owner occupa-
tion. Since 1997, the system has also become less 
generous. For example, the total mortgage is no 
longer included in the housing cost.
The amount payable depends on the size of 
household, income, housing costs and size of 
accommodation. The marginal effect is 20 per 
cent. The system is based on norms for different 
types of households and has constraints concern-
ing dwelling space and housing costs.
Housing allowance is a preliminary payment 
and it is based on the expected income during 
the entire calendar year. The final allowance is 
not established until actual income for that year 
has been assessed for tax purposes. If the provi-
sional allowance was too low, the household will 
receive a supplementary payment with interest. 
But if the provisional allowance was too high, the 
household will have to repay. As a consequence 
some people hesitate to apply for housing allow-
ances; they are simply afraid they cannot afford 
to repay in case of having received a too high 
provisional allowance. From 2006 it is possible 
to get a new type of support for families with 
shared custody. Families with children may re-
ceive a contribution to cover housing costs; a 
separate grant for children living at home and 
an extra allowance for children who sometimes 
live at home (alternating between two parents 
after a divorce). These changes are signs of an 
adaptation to new family constellations.
In 2007 well over 10 per cent of all individ-
uals in Sweden lived in households receiving 
housing allowances. Among those individuals 
living in households receiving housing allow-
ances, groups in rented dwellings stick out. Well 
over 24 per cent of individuals in that tenure form 
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receive allowances compared to four per cent of 
individuals in owner occupation. And close to 60 
per cent of lone parents and 35 per cent of pen-
sioners in rented dwellings receive housing al-
lowances. Lone parents in owner occupation also 
receive allowances to a greater extent than other 
type of households (Magnusson Turner 2010). 
Housing allowances hardly ever cover the 
total housing costs. Instead housing allowances 
have been and continue to be regarded as a con-
tribution to the household income in order to se-
cure a decent level of housing (quantitatively and 
qualitatively). For all households receiving hous-
ing allowances, the allowances cover on average 
just over four per cent of the housing costs. The 
distribution among households and tenure form 
follows the same pattern as described above. 
Housing allowances are rare in owner occupa-
tion and go predominantly to lone parents and 
pensioners in that tenure form. However, in these 
households housing allowances cover a minor 
share of the housing cost. For lone parents and 
pensioners housing allowances have a substantial 
effect and cover 16.7 respectively 19.7 per cent 
of the housing costs (Magnusson Turner 2010).
1.2.  Socioeconomic 
development in Sweden
1.2.1.  Employment and unemployment
One feature characterising the Swedish welfare 
system is the occurrence of dual earner house-
holds. In an international comparison a very high 
per centage of Swedish women belong to the 
labour force. The employment rate in 2008 in 
age group 20-64 years was 80 per cent. Corre-
sponding figures for men was 83 per cent and 
for women 77 per cent. However, not all women 
work full time.
In the 1970’s the Swedish labour market was 
characterised by a high employment rate and a 
low level of unemployment (Table 1). One ex-
planation was the steady increase in female em-
ployment rates. In the 1980s, Sweden still had 
a high employment rate, to be followed in the 
early 1990’s of a dramatic reduction in employ-
ment rates and a subsequent increase in unem-
ployment rates. In only 18 months time during 
1991 and 1992, more than ten per cent of all 
jobs were lost. In the 2000’s the economy re-
covered and employment rates started to increase 
again, but they have not reached the levels of the 
1980’s. During the 2000s the unemployment rate 
has also varied at a comparatively high level. 
Halleröd and Larsson (2003) stress that Swe-
den has experienced a high economic growth, 
but still has a lower employment rate during the 
beginning of the new millennium compared to 
the 1980s. Their explanation is changing policy 
priorities; from combating inflation rather than 
unemployment.
Today labour market policy is a hot topic in 
Sweden. The liberal/conservative Government 
is an instigator of the flexicurity approach, with 
tax reforms, benefit reforms and promoting self-
employment. Even if labour market policy has 
a longer history in Sweden than in many other 
countries, active inclusion is a word of honour 
in today’s political rhetoric in Sweden. 
1.2.2.  Dependency ratio
Dependency ratio is an age-group related con-
cept. It expresses the relation between the de-
pendent part and the productive part of a popu-
lation, i.e. those usually not in the labour force 
and those usually in the labour force. Statistics 
Sweden calculates the dependency ratio as a quo-
ta between the population in age groups 0-19 
years and over 65 years, and the population in 
age group 20-64 years. Since 1970 the depend-
ency ratio has varied around 70 to 75, which 
implies 70 to 75 not in the labour force per 100 
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in the working-age population (Table 2). The 
prediction for the future is a dependency ration 
close to 90. This forecast is based on the pre-
diction of increasing numbers of elderly from 
around year 2030.
Dependency burden is another out of several 
measures used to describe how much the work-
ing-age population needs to produce to support 
the entire population. There are different ways to 
calculate the dependency burden. Statistics Swe-
den calculates the dependency burden as the ratio 
between total population and employed individu-
als in age group 20-64 years. The dependency 
burden is expected to increase up to 2030, despite 
an assumption of increased labour force partici-
pation among foreign born persons, women and 
persons in age group 55-64 years. The increase 
is explained by an increased average length of 
life and an increased number of retired persons.
1.2.3.  Income inequality and poverty
Sweden belongs to a group of OECD countries 
characterised by “very low” income disparities. 
According to OECD, Sweden had a Gini coeffi-
cient value in the mid-2000s of 0.234 compared 
to 0.311 for OECD-30 (OECD 2009).
Nevertheless, income disparities have in-
creased in Sweden (see table 3). The recession 
in the Swedish economy 1992 to 1994 was se-
vere but the overall economic standard improved 
every year from 1995 onwards. However, the gap 
between high and low income households has 
increased (SCB 2009). The share of households 
in Sweden with a disposable income below the 
norm for receiving cash social allowances de-
creased from the end of 1970s until the beginning 
of 1990s. Between 1990 and 1996 this trend was 
reversed but remains rather constant after 1996. 
Table 1. Employment and unemployment rate in Sweden, 1970 ˗ 2009.
1) Statistics Sweden; AkU 1970-2009 Statistic Sweden’s database (2010-02-17). Age group 16-64 years. In 
2005 it is a break in series. 
2) Eurostat. Age group 15-64 years. 
3) No information about employment and employment 1980 due to a labour market conflict in Sweden.
1) Statistics Sweden AkU 1980-2005. 
2) Statistics Sweden, Prognosinstitutet 2008-2009. 
3) Statistics Sweden, www.scb.se/BE0401. 
Table 2. Dependency burden and dependency quota in Sweden, 1970 -2009.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 20082) 20092)
Dependency 
burden1) 2.12 2.07 2.01 2.27 2.2 2.18 2.13 2.14
Dependency 
quota3) 70.7 73.7 74.7 73.6 73.4 72.5 70.4 70 70.5 71
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The increase between 1991 and 1996 meant a 
doubling of the number of poor households.
Statistics Sweden elaborates with both differ-
ent definitions of disposable income and ways 
of adjusting incomes for comparing households 
having different compositions. Most important 
is that Sweden includes capital gain in the cal-
culation of disposable income. Including cap-
ital gains have had a significant effect on the 
Gini coefficient during the late 2000s. Part of 
the explanation is raising prices on housing and 
a positive trend on the stock market. For exam-
ple, conversion of rented dwellings into coopera-
tive dwellings in attractive locations has allowed 
households to make profit if they choose to sell 
and capitalize the value of the converted dwell-
ing. However the profit is largely concentrated 
to households with the highest incomes (SCB 
2009). According to SCB (2009) the Gini coef-
ficient in 2007 with capital gains included was 
0.307, and with capital gains excluded, 0.257.
If incomes are divided into deciles (equal-
ised disposable income and capital gains exclud-
ed), polarization is evident; people in the poor-
est decile (1) get poorer and while those in the 
upper decile (10) see income gains. It is also 
evident from the interquintile share ratio (S80/
S20) that income disparities have increased in 
Sweden, even if the ratio is moderate compared 
to OECD-30 (OECD 2009). In mid-2000s that 
ratio was 5.3 compared to 3.3 for Sweden.
1.2.4.  Poverty levels and trends in Sweden
According to the poverty definition12 stated by 
EU, 12 per cent of all individuals in Sweden 
in 2007 lived in households at risk of poverty 
(Eurostat 2009). However, this is the proportion 
after social transfers. Before social transfer the 
proportion is 28 per cent (Eurostat 2009). It is 
obvious that the social security system in Swe-
den has a strong effect on individuals’ welfare 
and more so than in any other EU-country; the 
system clearly reduces the risk of poverty. The 
effect of the social security system is similar in 
the other Nordic welfare states. The effect is il-
lustrated in figure one where countries in EU-
27 along with Norway and Iceland, are listed 
according to the difference between at-risk-of-
poverty rate before and after social transfers. If 
the social security system has a strong effect on 
reducing poverty in Northern Europe, the effect 
is the opposite in Southern Europe, in countries 
like Greece, Italy, and Spain. The social secu-
rity system has also a limited effect in Eastern 
European countries.
Figure 1 provides a powerful characteristic of 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) well known typology 
1  OECD scale: the share of persons with an equivalised 
disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, 
which is set at 50 % of the national median equivalised 
disposable income (after social transfers).
1 EU scale: the share of persons with an equivalised 
disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, 
which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised 
disposable income (after social transfers).
Table 3. Measures of income dispersion in Sweden, 1980s ˗ 2000s.
1) Income year 1983, 1995 and 2004. OECD 2009 
2) SCB 2009
Mid 1980s Mid-1990s Mid-2000s
Gini coefficient1) 0.197 0.211 0.234
Gini coefficient2) 0.201 0.213 0.231
Interquintile share ratio 
(S80/S20)1) 2.7 2.9 3.3
Decile 12) 4.4 4.2
Decile 102) 18.8 19.9
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of welfare regimes. Esping-Andersen’s typology 
is an ideal-type categorisation focusing on labour 
market and tax/social security systems. Esping-
Andersen distinguished between:
Liberal regimes: characterised by a dereg-
ulated labour market and mean tested benefits 
paid at low levels.
Corporatist regimes: characterised by a regu-
lated labour market and an earnings related so-
cial insurance system.
Social democratic regimes: characterised by 
a strong devotion to universalism in social and 
public service. The costs of the benefits require 
a very high level of employment.
Another two regimes have been added to Es-
ping-Andersen’s typology (Stephens et al, 2010):
Mediterranean (rudimentary) regime: char-
acterised by combining a weak social security 
with strong market regulation. 
Socialist and post-socialist regime: charac-
terised by the workplace in the state-enterprise 
system as a locus of much welfare.
The risk of poverty in Sweden decreased dur-
ing the 1970s and the 1980s. But, by the end of 
the 1980s, the trend was reversed. Since the be-
ginning of 2000s the risk of poverty has been 
stable around 10 to 12 per cent (Table 4).
It is obvious that one of the key factors ex-
plaining this development is the overall employ-
ment rate. During longer periods of high employ-
ment levels, trade unions are strong, and tax rev-
enues make it also possible for the public sector 
to uphold fairly high ambitions in different pub-
licly funded social systems. When the reverse 
happens, more people will be affected by un-
employment and by cuts in public expenditures.
Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty before and after social transfer in 2007. Eurostat, 2007.
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The risk of poverty according to the EU defi-
nition varies between different household groups 
(Figure 2). Lone parents and single households 
have the highest risk of poverty in Sweden. 
Among single households, especially single 
women have a high risk of poverty. Previous 
research indicates that an increased risk of pov-
erty is a reality primarily for elderly women with 
a low pension and for young adults (Magnusson 
and Andersson 2005). There is also a difference 
between female headed single parent households 
and male headed households. The risk of pov-
erty is almost 50 per cent higher among female 
headed compared to male headed households. 
However, this difference disappears when the 
children grow older (Geosweden 2009). When 
discussing poverty risk it is important to take in-
to account possibilities to be on parental leave, 
child allowances, and also the right for all chil-
dren above four years to get a place in a day 
care centre. That makes it possible to continue 
to work after becoming a parent. Nonetheless, 
the risk of poverty increases with number of chil-
dren in the household. Having several children is 
unavoidably an economic burden, and the pos-
sibilities to work full time are also reduced, at 
least for some time.
Table 4. Relative poverty rate, Sweden 1967 ˗ 2005. LIS Key Figures (selected on 30 April 2010.
Figure 2. Risk of poverty among different household types in 2008, per cent (Eurostat 2009).
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2.  The Swedish 
housing market
2.1.  The composition of the 
Swedish housing stock
Sweden has about 4.5 million dwellings, i.e. 486 
dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants (Bostads- och 
byggnadsstatistisk Årsbok 2010). The housing 
stock is relatively evenly distributed over mul-
tifamily housing (55 per cent) and single fam-
ily housing (45 per cent). There are three domi-
nant tenure forms; owner occupation, cooperative 
housing and (public and private) rental housing. 
Sweden does not have social housing.
The share of owner occupied (single family) 
housing in Sweden is about 41 per cent, coopera-
tive dwellings 20 per cent, private rented dwell-
ings 17 per cent and public rented dwellings 22 
per cent (Table 5). The proportion is however 
different if we calculate the share of the popula-
tion living in different tenure forms. Due to larger 
average household size in home ownership, more 
than half the population reside in this tenure form. 
Tenure form in Sweden is highly correlated 
with housing type. Renting is almost exclusive-
ly restricted to dwellings in multifamily houses; 
only 13 per cent of those living in rental dwell-
ings are found in single family houses (Bergen-
stråhle 2006). Dwellings in multifamily houses 
are rented either from a municipal housing com-
pany or from a private landlord. Tenant owners 
in housing co-operatives own collectively their 
flats, but have an exclusive right to live in one of 
the dwellings. Most co-operative dwellings are 
in multifamily houses, only 15 per cent of those 
living in cooperatives are found in single housing 
(Bergenstråhle 2006). Owner occupied dwell-
ings have until now been single family houses. 
But since May 2009 owner occupied dwellings in 
multifamily houses is a new tenure form in Swe-
den, but first and foremost in new construction. 
The trend in Sweden today is towards a de-
creasing proportion of rental dwellings and in-
creasing shares of tenant-owned (cooperative) 
dwellings (table 5). This is caused both by the 
composition of new constructions and by con-
version of rented dwellings into tenant- owned. 
Tenure conversions have mainly taken part in 
the Stockholm metropolitan area and have been 
intensively discussed and criticised in the public 
and political debate. Without doubt, they have 
contributed to a residualization of the public 
housing stock and thus also to the segregation 
as well segmentation processes (Magnusson and 
Turner 2008).
The overview here presents the general trend, 
but the structure of the housing market varies 
1) Statistic Sweden Census 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990, 
2) Statistic Sweden, Estimated housing stock 2006-12-31
Table 5. Tenure type in Sweden in 1975 ˗ 1980, per cent (Statistics Sweden).
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greatly among the 290 Swedish municipalities. 
For example: the share of public rental housing 
is slightly less than 16 per cent at an average but 
vary between type of municipalities ˗ highest in 
metropolitan areas and larger cities, and lowest 
in rural municipalities. A low proportion of pub-
lic housing is normally associated with a high 
proportion of owned single family houses, i.e. 
a housing market dominated by owner occupa-
tion. A high proportion of public housing implies 
on the other hand a more mixed housing market 
with owner occupation and co-operative dwell-
ings, competing with a sometimes dominating 
rental sector, which is evident in metropolitan 
areas and in some of the larger cities.
2.2.  Residents’ distribution 
over tenure
The Swedish housing market is segmented, as 
different household types are unevenly distrib-
uted over different tenures. Figure 3 show that 
the higher income the less probability to reside 
in the rental sector. There is also a sorting on the 
housing market according to demographic and 
ethnic variables, see table 6.
2.3.  Housing standard in Sweden
By the end of 1990 most of the housing stock 
had been rehabilitated to a modern standard. Af-
ter that the focal point in data collection by Sta-
tistic Sweden has been on changes in the size of 
the housing stock and distribution of dwellings 
of different size, rather than on modernisation.
The housing standard in Sweden is in gener-
al considered as good. On the other hand, over-
crowding has once again become a problem, 
especially in tight housing markets. For some 
households this is a preferred choice. For some 
households it might be the case that residing in 
an inner city area is more important than having 
enough space in relation to a given norm. But 
for many other households overcrowding is an 
Figure 3. Income deciles in different tenures (Geosweden 2008).
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inexorably reality, in particular for recently ar-
rived refugees. 
Sweden operates with two official norms for 
overcrowding. Norm 2 states that a household is 
overcrowded if there are more than two persons 
per room, kitchen and living room not included. 
Norm 3 states that a household is overcrowded if 
there are more than one person per room, kitchen 
and living room not included. Norm 3 also states 
that a couple can share bedroom but each child 
shall have an own bedroom (Table 7).
Overcrowding has been analysed in a re-
cently published research report from the project 
Study on housing and exclusion: welfare policies, 
housing provision and labour market, support-
ed by the European Community Programme for 
Employment and Social Solidarity (2007-2013). 
The project examines the relationship between 
welfare regimes and housing systems in six coun-
tries representing different regimes: Germany, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and 
the UK. One issue is the impact of poverty and 
housing policy on housing outcomes, and an-
other issue the impact of employment status on 
Table 6. Share of households in different types of tenure 1980/81 ˗ 2007, Sweden.
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housing outcomes. Overcrowding is one aspect 
of housing outcome. The share of individuals liv-
ing in overcrowded accommodation in Sweden 
in 2007 was 21.5 per cent in public and private 
rented dwellings but only 3.4 in owner occu-
pation. Overcrowding is of rare occurrence in 
owner occupation, except for lone parents and 
singles in working age. 
Despite different objective norms for over-
crowding reported in the EU-project (defined by 
Eurostat) and in the present study it is worth 
noticing an evident overcrowding gap between 
poor and not poor households. Overcrowding is 
almost four times as frequent among poor house-
holds compared to not poor households. That ra-
tio is highest in the Netherlands and in Sweden 
and lowest in Hungary and Portugal.
A more general description of housing stand-
ard among poor and not poor people states that 
Sweden and the Netherlands have the lowest lev-
el of failure on the physical housing quality indi-
cator, but the Netherlands records very low ob-
jective overcrowding rates and Sweden records 
a rather high figure. The ‘failure’ rate of poor 
people on housing standard indicators is higher 
than among the population as a whole, but the 
overall pattern compared to other countries is 
similar to the population as a whole. Again this 
suggests that the housing standard of the popu-
lation as a whole have a strong influence on the 
housing standards of the poor. However, Swe-
den and the Netherlands do perform poorly on 
affordability. They record the greatest increases 
in poverty caused by housing expenditure and 
the Netherlands has a notably high level of poor 
people with a housing expenditure burden ex-
ceeding 40 per cent of net income. Among the 
poor, Sweden performs poorly on objective over-
crowding but performs well on physical quality; 
the Netherlands retains its good performance on 
objective overcrowding and poor performance 
on neighbourhood quality. The two countries 
have the lowest dissatisfaction rates among the 
poor as they do among the population as a whole. 
From a welfare perspective it seems to be a trade 
off between affordability on the one hand and 
overcrowding and regular standard on the other 
(Stephens et al. 2010).
2.4.  Access to different 
housing segments 
On average, Swedish households spend about 
23 per cent of their total expenses on housing. 
Home owners spend less on housing than house-
holds in the rental sector (Andersson et al. 2003: 
24). According to Eurostat data, nine per cent 
of Swedish households spend more than 50 per 
cent of their disposable income on housing and 
26 per cent of the households spend between 
25 and 49 per cent (Normann et al. 2009: 172-
174). To access owner occupation or a coopera-
tive dwelling, a cash input is needed, and most 
people also need a housing loan. To be granted 
a housing loan you usually need to have a sta-
ble job. The market price varies greatly region-
ally and so does the amount spent on housing. 
Thus the rental market is the most accessi-
ble segment of the Swedish housing market; no 
cash input is needed to get access and both the 
Table 7. Overcrowding in Sweden, 1980/1981 - 2007. BHU, various years.
Year
1980-1981 1984-1985 1990-1991 1994-1995 2000-2001 2004-2005 2006 2007
Norm 2 3.7 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.6 1.7 2.6
Norm 3 19.6 15.4 14.2 15.3 14.4 14.8 13.1 14.2
Country report for Sweden
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private and public rental housing sector are open 
to all kinds of households and neither have con-
straints in terms of upper income levels. Sweden 
still has a soft rent regulation system that aims 
at equalizing rents between houses built in dif-
ferent time periods. The public rental stock has 
also been rent leading, also for the private rental 
stock. The geographical location has only played 
a minor role in rent setting. There are intense dis-
cussions regarding this system and many ˗espe-
cially private owners of rental housing˗ argue for 
introducing market rents. This would of course 
affect accessibility of rental housing at least in 
some locations.23 
Although the rental sector is considered to 
be an open sector, there are no common rules on 
how vacant rental dwellings are distributed. Only 
a few municipalities have a housing mediation 
system, and allocation is sometimes based on 
queuing time (as in the Stockholm metropolitan 
Housing service) and sometimes on other more 
vague or subjective criteria, where the “right 
apartment is to be matched with the right ten-
ant” (as in Gothenburg’s metropolitan Housing 
service). Who might be the right tenant and who 
decides upon this is not transparent. The own-
ers of private rental are not obligated to use the 
Housing service when allocating vacant apart-
ments, and thus contacts and recommendations 
are important in order to access private rental 
housing. The landlords also have the right to set 
up specified criteria on who will be eligible for a 
vacant apartment. It is common to have criteria 
regarding income, for example that a household 
income must be based on work and not social 
allowances or student loans. It is also common 
that the proportion between household income 
and rent level is specified; often the yearly in-
come is requested to be three or four times yearly 
2  The conservative government put forward a bill in 
March 2010 that was accepted by parliament. A big 
step towards market rents has thereby been taken, see 
prop. 2009/10:185.
rent payments. Some also have regulations con-
cerning a tenant’s number of children or con-
cerning the total number of household members. 
Although the criteria of course cannot be legally 
discriminatory there is evidence that the Swedish 
housing market indeed has such problems (see 
for example Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2008; DO 
2008:3, Bråmå 2007; Diskriminerings...2010).
The new construction of houses also impacts 
on accessibility. Both the volume of new con-
struction and the tenure and housing type fo-
cus have varied greatly over the years. In the 
1960s about 60,000 multifamily dwellings were 
produced every year and about 20,000 single 
housing dwellings per year. In the mid 1980s 
about 20,000 of both multifamily and single fam-
ily dwellings were produced each year. In the 
1990s the volume of new construction dropped 
and less than 10,000 of both single and multi-
family dwellings were produced annually. This 
production crisis has proven difficult to recover 
from and the volume has continued to be ex-
tremely low up to this date. In that perspective, 
2007 can be considered as a “high production” 
year but still only 35,000 new dwellings were 
completed. The variation in production levels 
and not least the historically low level of new 
construction have of course caused problems, 
such as excessive demand, especially in met-
ropolitan regions, causing production costs and 
property prices to increase far beyond the rate of 
inflation. The uneven distribution of tenure forms 
in new construction has also had its impacts on 
the housing stock. As mentioned earlier, coop-
eratives have increased their share of the hous-
ing market while rental housing has decreased, 
especially in metropolitan areas (Statistics Swe-
den 2010; SCB 2009).
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2.5.  Policies to increase 
accessibility, affordability 
and creditworthiness
The field of housing policy has traditionally been 
an area characterized by state interventions and 
subsidies. Housing policy has definitely been 
a key part of the welfare state. The foundation 
has been interest subsidies for new construction, 
housing allowances, rent regulation and a public 
housing sector that is also rent setting. Since the 
1980s, when the housing (and credit) market was 
deregulated, a lot of changes have been made in 
housing policies. The housing policy area has de-
veloped from mainly focusing on producers to 
focusing on consumers, and policies have also 
become less general. Almost all housing subsi-
dies to new construction are abolished, and this is 
not compensated by increased allowances. Hous-
ing expenditure has thus increased and the vol-
ume of new construction has decreased (Turn-
er and Whitehead 2002). The amount spent on 
housing allowances has decreased and the public 
housing companies are not favoured anymore; 
they have to act on the same terms as the pri-
vate rental sector. As discussed above, the rent 
setting role of public housing is also questioned 
(Prop. 2009/10:185). Since the late 1990s, the 
state budget for housing actually gives a net in-
come to the State instead of being a substantial 
expenditure item (Magnusson Turner 2010: 24). 
Despite less generous housing allowances, 
they continue to be the most influential policy on 
affordability, partly because other subsidies have 
been totally abolished. Housing allowances also 
affects accessibility as they are tenure neutral. 
Housing allowances are predominantly targeting 
single households and households with children. 
Housing allowances have however undergone 
major changes and their share of GDP has de-
creased; in 1990 expenditures for allowances as 
per centage of GDP were 0.66 and in 2004 they 
were down to 0.57 (Åhrén 2007: 215). Enström 
Öst (2010: 12) has shown that a reform in hous-
ing allowances in 1997, which imposed tougher 
constraints regarding floor space, decreased the 
number of recipients by 50 per cent. The reform 
also increased the rate of overcrowding among 
single parents. 
Taxation also influences the housing market. 
Despite the fact that the goal has been to uphold 
tenure neutrality, this has been more on a rhetori-
cal level than something put into practice. Only 
home owners are for example allowed to do de-
duct interest payments. Some stakeholders assert 
that the taxation system indeed favours’ home 
owners. Differences in taxation on different ten-
ures are seen as one reason for the low produc-
tion of rental housing during the two last decades 
(Fastighetsägarna, Hyresgästföreningen, SABO 
2010). Both transactions of properties and the use 
of properties are subject to taxation. The proper-
ty tax was 1.3 per cent of GDP in 1999 but this 
tax was abolished by the liberal government in 
2008. Instead they introduced a municipal fee 
with a maximum ceiling, (at 600 SEK). This 
tax policy change lowered the tax expenditure 
for households with houses having a high rate-
able value, and it reduced revenues for the state 
(Baunkjær 2004: 155-178; Över... 2010). In or-
der to finance this change the capital gains tax 
has been increased and the right to roll over the 
tax from gains in a new house is reduced and 
also imputed with an interest rate. 
The rather unique Swedish model of pub-
lic housing and soft rent regulation on all rental 
housing is an important feature influencing both 
accessibility and affordability. All rents in Swe-
den are set in negotiations between the tenants 
(tenant organizations) and the property owners. 
The system is called Bruksvärdessystemet (the 
use value system) and aims at achieving market 
equilibrium rents, thus even out effects of exces-
sive demand and housing shortage while keep-
ing rents low and stable (Turner and Whitehead 
Country report for Sweden
31
2002; Bengtsson and Rothstein 1997). The rent 
mirrors several values and thus not only (geo-
graphical) attractiveness on the market. The rent 
level for public housing is the same as for private 
rental. In June 2010 the sitting government voted 
in favour of a proposition (Prop. 2009/10:185) 
that will change the rent setting system. The mu-
nicipal owned public housing companies are not 
to be rent leading and the new system will be 
more in line with market rent.
Public housing companies have also been 
key actors in implementing housing policies, as 
they are politically driven. Due to the fact that 
public housing actors now compete on the same 
terms as private actors and also because some 
municipalities have sold out the entire public 
housing stock, their influence tends to decrease 
in contemporary housing policy debates. 
When the liberal government came to pow-
er in 2006 they introduced two new, consumer 
oriented, subsidies that would influence credit-
worthiness. One is called Kreditgarantier för 
förstagångsköpare (investement support for first 
time buyers) and the other Hyresgarantier (rent 
guarantees). However, these subsidies have al-
most not been used at all. From the introduc-
tion of rent guarantees July 1st 2007 until the 
end of 2008 only 127 households had obtained a 
firsthand contract on a rental apartment as a con-
sequence of the rent guarantee system (Kredit-
garantier...2009). 
2.6.  Housing outcomes
According to an OECD index, Sweden is one of 
the most segregated countries in Europe when it 
comes to ethnic segregation (DO 2008: 3). It is 
however important to say that Sweden like many 
other European countries does not have any large 
mono-ethnic clusters of immigrants but rather 
Swedish mono-ethnic clusters. It has been ar-
gued that areas dominated by immigrants should 
be called Swedish-scarce rather than immigrant-
dense. The reason is that ethnic residential segre-
gation to a large extent is caused by the majority 
Swedes settlement decisions. (Andersson 1998; 
Andersson and Molina 2003; Bråmå 2006). 
Table 8 highlights the overall distribution 
of Sweden- and foreign-born across neighbour-
hoods with different immigrant densities. In 
2006, 144 neighbourhoods (defined as SAMS 
areas) in Sweden had a majority of foreign-born 
residents. Eleven years earlier (1995), the num-
ber was 58. While in 1995, 6.7 per cent of all 
foreign-born lived in this type of environment, 
the proportion had increased to 10.6 per cent in 
2006. The number of foreign-born in this cat-
egory increased by 61,000 over this period, so 
that 123,000 first generation immigrants lived 
in high immigrant concentration areas in 2006. 
This means that 25 per cent of the expansion of 
foreign-born in the country fell into high immi-
grant dense areas. If we add also the expansion 
of the 40 to 50 per cent neighbourhood category, 
which grew from 80 to 133 areas, resulting in 
a net increase of 42,700 immigrants, it is clear 
that immigrants over time have come to live in 
much higher immigrant densities than they did 
only a decade ago. This is of course expected in 
the sense that the overall increase in the number 
of foreign-born in the country at large by cheer 
logic means that neighbourhoods will get more 
immigrant-dense.
Also Swedes are affected by this but to a 
much lesser degree. The proportion of Swedes 
in high immigrant concentrations (above 50 per 
cent foreign-born) almost doubled 1995 to 2006 
(most of these are second generation immigrants, 
i.e. children of two foreign-born parents), but 
there are nevertheless the case that in 2008, only 
1.1 per cent of all Sweden-born lived in these 
neighbourhoods. If we sum up the three neigh-
bourhood categories that have highest share of 
foreign-born (30 to 100 per cent), we find that 
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5.2 per cent of all Swedish-born reside in such 
a neighbourhood while 28.2 per cent of all for-
eign-born live there. Eleven years earlier the cor-
responding figures were 3.0 and 19.3.
Almost 60 per cent of native Swedes live in 
neighbourhoods where the vast majority (90 per 
cent or more) of the nearby population is also 
Swedish. The immigrant dense neighbourhoods 
almost always comprise many different nation-
alities; sometimes more than 100 nationalities 
are represented among the residents. There are 
also signs of ethnic hierarchies in the sense that 
immigrants from Africa and Western Asia and 
other “visible minorities” are much more likely 
to live in immigrant dense areas compared to 
immigrants from any of the Nordic or EU coun-
tries (SCB 2008: 12, 56). Immigrant dense areas 
are often located geographically near the urban 
fringe, where a large part of the less attractive 
large scale housing was built within the Million 
homes program (Andersson et al. 2003). We will 
return to the segregation issue in chapter 4 and 5.
Residential segregation is of course related to 
segmentation, i.e. the uneven distribution of ten-
ure forms across demographic, socio-economic 
and ethnic categories. The segmentation pattern 
according family type (see table 9) is to a large 
extent explained by the close correlation between 
housing type and tenure. As owner occupation is 
only found in single housing and because larger 
dwellings are found in single housing, owner oc-
cupation is the preferred tenure for most fami-
lies with children and for couples, while single 
parents and single households to a less degree 
live in home ownership. 
There is also a clearly marked segmentation 
according to ethnicity. Bråmå (2006) has shown 
that residents of Swedish background have 80 
per cent higher probability to live in a single 
house than residents born in Asia or Northern 
Africa. Table 10 shows the segmentation pat-
tern in 2008 based on country background. It 
Table 8. The overall distribution of Sweden- and foreign-born residents over neighbourhoods having 
different proportions of immigrants, 2006 (Andersson 2008).
Table 9. Segmentation according to family type, 2008, per cent (Geosweden 2008).
% Foreign-born Number of Born in Born Born Foreign- Diff. (N)
in neighbourhood n'hoods Sweden abroad in Sweden born 1995 to 2006
(SAMS) (N)  (N) (%) (%) Foreign-born
50 or more 144 91.000 123.000 1.1 10.6 61.000
40 to 50 133 114.000 92.700 1.4 7.9 42.700
30 to 40 248 214.000 113.000 2.7 9.7 46.000
20 to30 529 547.000 173.000 6.9 14.8 46.000
10 to 20 2.039 2.347.000 371.000 29.6 31.8 52.000
5 to 10 3.287 2.977.000 233.000 37.6 19.9 19.000
0 to 5 2.595 1.636.000 63.000 20.6 5.3 -26000
Total 8.975 7.926.000 1.169.000 100.0 100.0 240.000
Tenure form Marrided/partner Married w. Single Single
without children children parents households Total
Home ownership 69 73 40 27 53
Cooperative 14 12 18 26 18
Public rental 9 8 22 22 14
Private rental 8 8 20 24 15
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Country report for Sweden
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is clear that home ownership is more common 
among those with Swedish or a western country 
background. One category ˗ sub-Saharan Africa˗ 
has a very low ownership level and a majority 
of these residents are found in public housing. 
Also close to every second person from West-
ern Asia, Turkey and Northern Africa resides in 
public housing.
Tenure type and housing type, as well as 
housing type and dwelling size, are strongly con-
nected in Sweden. Many cities have ˗ contrary to 
the general aim of housing mix˗ reinforced seg-
regation by allowing new construction to form 
rather homogeneous neighbourhoods and hous-
ing estates; they too often consist of the same 
housing type and/or tenure. Hence, it is not sur-
prising that segmentation and segregation pat-
terns interact and overlap. To give one example: 
about 85 per cent of all single housing units have 
at least four rooms while only 24 per cent of the 
cooperatives and 16 per cent of rental housing 
consist of dwellings with four or more rooms 
(Bergenstråhle 2006: 12).
Table 11 summarises the remaining policies 
influencing the Swedish housing market in the 
21st millennium. Important to remark is that as 
the rent setting system for the rental stock is under 
construction the current rent control will prob-
ably become much weaker or even abolished.
Table 10. Tenure segmentation341according to country background, 2008, per cent (Geosweden 
2008).
3  Unfortunately, when the population register of 2008 is matched with the real estate and property register, 554,000 
individuals (6%) do not match. The table is therefore based on 8.7 Million people. Immigrants are slightly over-
represented (7.8% lack information on tenure), but this does not seriously alter the overall picture emerging from 
this table.
Table 11. Summary of remaining housing policies.
Home Coop. Public Private Other
Country of birth ownership housing rental rental forms Total
Sweden 59 16 12 13 0 100
Rest of Nordic countries 47 24 15 13 1 100
Rest of Western European countries 44 21 17 18 1 100
Eastern European 28 21 30 22 0 100
Sub-Saharan Africa 9 10 58 23 0 100
Western Asia incl Turkey and N Africa 14 14 46 26 0 100
Eastern Asia 35 21 23 22 0 100
Latin America incl Central Am. & Mexico 23 21 32 23 0 100
North America, Australia, New Zeeland 47 24 11 17 0 100
Unknown 21 17 40 22 1 100
Total 55 17 14 14 0 100
Public 
housing
Private 
renting
Co-operatives 
etc
Owner-
occupied
Individual (demand) 
support
yes yes yes yes
Supply support no no no no
Tax support no no yes yes
Rent/price control yes yes no no
Regulation of access no no (yes) no
Supported finance no no no no
(yes) means partly
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3.  Immigration flows, 
immigration policies and 
practices in Sweden
3.1.  The longer view
The proportion foreign-born is high in Swe-
den, 14.3 per cent. The other Nordic countries 
have lower shares; Norway 9 per cent, Iceland 
8 per cent, Denmark 7 per cent and Finland 2 
per cent. Few industrialized countries reach the 
Swedish level. Some of the well-known immi-
gration countries like France, The Netherlands 
and the UK have a lower share of foreign-born. 
The United States has approximately the same 
share as Sweden (13 per cent in 2008). Howev-
er, well into the 1940s, Sweden like the rest of 
the Nordic region was one of Europe’s ethnical-
ly most homogenous countries. Other European 
countries, in particular in Central and Eastern 
Europe, had until then been much more affect-
ed by conflicts due to mass migration of people 
(Widgren 1980: 9) Some ‘elite immigration’ oc-
curred during medieval times and later, for ex-
ample merchants from Germany (12th-14th cen-
tury), businessmen and craftsmen from Scotland, 
the Netherlands and France (17th century), Wal-
lonian blacksmiths from southern Belgium (17th 
century). Also the Savolax Finns, forest-farmers 
who settled in sparsely populated areas close to 
the Norwegian border, should be mentioned as 
a category that settled early in Sweden (during 
the 16th and 17th century). From 1780, also some 
Jews were entitled to settle in Sweden, and by 
the end of the 19th century they had increased 
in numbers to around 1,000. Roughly speaking, 
about one per mill of Sweden’s population in 
1880 had a non-Swedish citizenship. 
The period 1800-1930 was marked by a sub-
stantial emigration from Sweden. In total, some 
1.3 million people left the country and most of 
them settled in the United States. In 1910, three of 
the world’s top 10 Swedish-speaking cities were 
found in the U.S.: New York, Chicago, Minneap-
olis (SNA Population). When the U.S. immigra-
tion policy changed during the 1920s, Swedish 
net emigration gradually shifted towards immi-
gration surplus. This surplus initially consisted 
of returning Swedish-Americans but soon there-
after ˗connected to WWII developments˗ Swe-
den became a more permanent net-receiver of 
international migrants. Widgren (1980) points 
out three basic reasons for this shift. First of all, 
Widgren mentions reasons connected to foreign 
policy. Sweden had not taken part in the war and 
‘had a moral obligation’ to keep its borders open 
for refugees from the neighbouring countries (all 
of them occupied and/or involved in the war). 
Some 30,000 refugees from Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania came to Sweden in 1943-1945, as did 
about 60,000 from Denmark and Norway, and 
70,000 children from Finland. Somewhat later, 
the so-called Bernadotte action resulted in an in-
flux of about 34,000 refugees from the continent 
(many from concentration camps). Many of the 
war refugees returned home already in the sum-
mer of 1945, or they moved on to the U.S. and 
other countries after the war, but a large number 
remained in Sweden.
Secondly, Widgren points out a ‘population 
policy’ factor. During the 1930s, birth rates in 
Sweden had dropped to a very low level, result-
ing in a changing age structure. As manufacturing 
industry was left unaffected by the war, demand 
for Swedish goods was at a very high level af-
ter the war. Despite the war refugees, despite a 
rapid increase in female labour market participa-
tion rates, and despite a rapid rationalisation of 
production methods in the rural sectors, leading 
to urbanisation, the industry faced growing la-
bour shortage (Widgren 1980: 12).
The third factor, closely related to the second 
one, was of an economic nature. Unemployment 
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had dropped to about 2 per cent after the war and 
the demand for Swedish goods (primarily invest-
ment goods like machinery) increased rapidly. 
The firms and the employers’ organisations iden-
tified labour import as the only possible solution 
if inflation should be controlled and economic 
growth should be sustained. Immigration started 
and the most important instrument was the step-
by-step introduction of a free movement space 
within the Nordic region from 1946 to 1954. 
This especially resulted in increasing mobility 
between Finland and Sweden. It is estimated that 
about 60 per cent of all intra-Nordic migrations 
that took place between 1954 and 1980 (about 
one million registered moves) were done be-
tween Finland and Sweden (Widgren 1980: 12). 
At the same time, immigration from non-Nordic 
sources also increased. In 1947, a special labour 
market commission was set up by Government 
and it immediately started to recruit workers in 
Italy, Hungary and Austria. In the 1950s, recruit-
ments were made also in West Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Belgium and Greece. 
However, numbers were rather small and only 
some 5 per cent of the total influx in the 1950s 
came from non-Nordic countries (12,000 out of 
258,000). But it is important to point out that 
this non-Nordic immigration is the starting point 
for the modern history of Swedish immigration 
policy. At the time, very few thought about the 
potential consequences of the immigration for 
the immigrants, their families, or for Swedish 
society in general. Sweden had immigration but 
no immigrant policy. It was not until the early 
1960s that Swedish population forecasts took 
immigration into account. By then, the coun-
try had had an immigration surplus for 30 years 
with a total surplus of 279,000 people (39,000 
in the 1930s, 134,000 in the 1940s, 106,000 in 
the 1950s) (Widgren 1980: 13.).
3.2.  Labour market immigration
During the second phase of post-war immigra-
tion to Sweden, commencing in the mid-1960s 
and ending in 1973, the number of immigrants 
increased and the ‘immigrant issue’ became 
more widely discussed. A public inquiry ar-
gued in 1965 that Sweden should commence 
a more active ‘guest worker’ strategy. It fore-
casted scarcity of labour in Europe. However, in 
the very same year many Yugoslavs and Turks 
arrived in Trelleborg in southern Sweden, and 
the country also went rapidly into an economic 
recession. Together this brought with it a reac-
tion from the trade unions, which demanded a 
regulated labour immigration policy. The Social 
Democratic government introduced such regula-
tions in March 1967, and thereafter all non-Nor-
dic immigrants needed a work permit, a specific 
job and accommodation before entering Sweden 
(SOU 1982/49). This meant that permits were 
only granted when the country was in need of 
that particular type of foreign labour. If there 
were unemployed persons in Sweden capable of 
performing the job in question, no permit was 
granted. But the following groups were exempt 
from labour market checks: 
• Nordic citizens, who since 1951 had enjoyed 
the right to settle and work wherever they 
liked in the Nordic area without special per-
mission of any kind 
• Refugees 
• Close relatives wishing to be united or re-
united with their families in Sweden.
Even if the 1967 decision made non-Nor-
dic immigration more regulated, the govern-
ment continued to favour collective labour re-
cruitment abroad. Agreements were signed with 
Yugoslavia in 1966 and with Turkey in 1967 
(SOU 1982/49: 77). Swedish firms continued to 
recruit labour, assisted by the Board of the Labour 
market (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS) and the 
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Ministry of Labour (Lundh and Olsson 1994; Ap-
pelqvist 2000, 185). In fact, the regulations did 
not reduce the number of immigrants coming to 
Sweden. On the contrary, the economic boom of 
the late 1960s brought with it an all-time-high in 
immigration numbers. Between 1968 and 1970 
some 100,000 Finns went to Sweden, causing a 
net loss of population numbers in Finland (many 
of them returned only a few years later). 
The political reforms in the 1960s (see chap-
ter 4) that was the result of labour market im-
migration are one reason for identifying the mid 
1970s as the beginning of a new period. But 
besides this important shift, immigration also 
changed, and it changed dramatically.
3.3.  Refugee immigration and 
family reunion migration
The Swedish labour immigration policy effec-
tively ended in 1972 (due to changing policy but 
also due to the economic recession following in 
1973). The very same year did, however, witness 
an increased influx of a new type of refugee: non-
European political refugees. This started already 
in 1966, when the UN High commissioner asked 
Sweden to accept a group of Lebanon-based As-
syrians, but it was soon followed by Asians from 
Uganda, who in late 1972 were thrown out by 
Idi Amin and had to leave the country within 90 
days. Most of these ended up in the U.K. but a 
total of 800 arrived in Sweden via the U.K. and 
refugee camps in Italy and Austria. The year af-
ter, 1973, the world witnessed a brutal military 
coup in Chile during which president Allende 
was murdered and many thousands of socialists 
were killed or persecuted. The Swedish Embassy 
played an important role in trying to assist peo-
ple in Santiago immediately after the coup, and 
the Swedish PM Olof Palme obviously played 
a key role in the decision to invite and accept 
Chileans and other Latin Americans to stay in 
Sweden as political refugees. From 1973 to 1978 
between 6,000 and 7,000 Latin Americans came 
to Sweden, later to be followed by many more by 
reason of family ties and continued hardship in 
Chile under the dictatorship. There are currently 
(2006) 109,200 Latin Americans in Sweden. Of 
these, 67,000 were born in Latin America and 
42,000 were born in Sweden having at least one 
Latin American-born parent.
The 1970s also witnessed an increase in 
‘spontaneously arriving refugees’ in Sweden. 
Between 1968 and 1981 it is estimated that 
such non-planned refugee immigration was in 
the range of 36,000 (SOU 1982/49: 127). All 
in all, refugee immigration to Sweden 1950 to 
1980 was dominated by people originating in 
Hungary, followed by Chile, Yugoslavia, Poland, 
and Turkey.
Towards the mid 1980s, refugee immigra-
tion and family reunion migration to Sweden 
took on new proportions. In 1980, 7.5 per cent 
of the Swedish population were foreign-born. 
In 2009, the proportion had increased to 14.3 
per cent. If one includes people who are born in 
Sweden having two foreign-born parents, 18.6 
per cent now have a foreign background. If one 
includes Swedish-born with one Swedish and 
one foreign-born parent, the proportion increases 
with about 7 per cent (SCB Demographic reports 
2004: 5, 118 and Demographic reports 2010: 2). 
According to the earlier definition of the concept 
“foreign background”, thus 25 per cent of the 
country’s population qualify.
Table 12 charts basic population data 1960 
to 2009. It has been estimated that the entire 
population increase since 1970 is due to immi-
gration (the contribution of net immigration and 
the immigrants’ children born in Sweden). Al-
though fertility rates for most immigrant cate-
gories seem to converge rather rapidly towards 
the natives Swedes, they are still rather high for 
people originating in Africa and parts of Asia 
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*The definition of foreign background was changed in the early 1990s. Earlier data are based on a definition saying that a child born in Sweden with one 
foreign-born parent should be regarded to have foreign background (in the statistics). The current definition requires two foreign-born parents.
Table 13. Age-specific fertility rates by country of birth and citizenship of mother, 2002 (SCB 
Befolkningsstatistik del 4, 2002, Tabell 3.13).
Table 12. Population statistics, Sweden 1960 to 2000 (Statistics Sweden).
Population Statistics
2009 2008 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 1975 1970 1960
Population 31 december (in 1000s) 9 341 9 256 9 048 8 883 8 837 8 591 8 358 8 318 8 208 8 081 7 498
Men 4 649 4 604 4 487 4 393 4 366 4 244 4 127 4 120 4 081 4 036 3 740
Women 4 692 4 653 4 561 4 490 4 471 4 347 4 231 4 198 4 127 4 045 3 758
Age 0-17 1 921 1 925 1 934 1 938 1 967 1 880 1 844 1 977 2 013 2 007 2 046
Age 0-17, percentage of total population 20,6 20,8 21,4 21,8 22,3 21,9 22,1 23,8 24,5 24,8 27,3
Age 65- 1 691 1 645 1 565 1 531 1 543 1 526 1 454 1 362 1 251 1 113 888
Age 65-, percentage of total population 18,1 17,8 17,3 17,2 17,5 17,8 17,4 16,4 15,2 13,8 11,8
Foreign citizens (in 1000s) 603 562 480 477 532 484 389 422 410 411 191
Percentage foreign citizens 6,5 6,1 5,3 5,4 6,0 5,6 4,6 5,1 5,0 5,1 2,5
Foreign-born (in 1000s) 1 338 1 282 1 126 1 004 936 790 656 627 550 538 300
Percentage foreign-born 14,3 13,8 12,4 11,3 10,6 9,2 7,8 7,5 6,7 6,7 4,0
Born in Sweden, two foreign-born parents (in 1000s) 396 379 338 284 224
Percentage foreign background* 18,6 17,9 16,2 14,5 13,1
Births (in 1000s) 112 109 101 90 103 124 98 97 104 110 102
Total Fertility Rate 1,94 1,91 1,77 1,55 1,74 2,14 1,73 1,68 1,78 1,94 2,13
Deaths (in 1000s) 90 91 92 93 94 95 94 92 88 80 75
life expectancy, men 79,4 79,1 78,4 77,4 76,2 74,8 73,8 72,8 72,1 72,2 71,2
life expectancy, w omen 83,4 83,2 82,8 82,0 81,5 80,4 79,7 78,8 77,9 77,1 74,9
Immigration (in 1000s) 102 101 65 59 46 60 33 39 44 77 26
Immigrants per 1000 inh. (beginning of year) 11,0 11,0 7,2 6,6 5,2 7,0 4,0 4,7 5,4 9,6 3,5
Emigration (in 1000s) 39 45 38 34 34 25 22 30 27 29 15
Emigrants per 1000 inh. (beginning of year) 4,2 4,9 4,2 3,8 3,9 3,0 2,6 3,6 3,3 3,6 2,0
Population growth (in 1000s) 84 73 36 21 21 64 16 15 32 77 36
Population grow th per 1000 (beginning of year) 9,1 8,0 4,0 2,4 2,4 7,5 1,9 1,8 3,9 9,5 4,8
Swedish citizenships (in 1000s) 30 30 40 43 32 17 20 21 17 12 8
Mother's country of birth Mother's age Fertility Relative
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 rate* to total
Nordic country 5,6 41,2 107,7 111,4 46,0 8,2 0,3 1602 0,97
Thereof Sw edish citizens 5,4 40,7 107,8 111,6 45,8 8,1 0,3 1598 0,97
Thereof Foreign citizens 13,2 58,9 106,2 106,5 52,2 9,0 0,5 1732 1,05
EU15 except Denmark and Finland 8,9 34,6 67,5 107,0 60,4 11,3 0,3 1450 0,88
Thereof Sw edish citizens 5,8 21,9 82,2 88,6 43,2 8,8 0,7 1255 0,76
Thereof Foreign citizens 13,1 42,9 60,8 113,8 68,6 12,9 - 1561 0,94
Africa 14,4 110,7 156,8 142,3 83,4 30,2 3,2 2704 1,64
Thereof Sw edish citizens 8,4 57,0 134,8 124,3 76,1 21,6 1,6 2119 1,28
Thereof Foreign citizens 23,6 153,5 175,5 166,0 99,0 57,5 9,3 3422 2,07
South America 11,6 54,5 99,4 103,5 50,8 14,8 0,4 1675 1,01
Thereof Sw edish citizens 9,8 47,8 87,1 104,8 44,5 12,7 - 1534 0,93
Thereof Foreign citizens 18,1 77,5 126,8 101,7 59,2 18,3 1,4 2015 1,22
Asia 17,0 104,2 128,1 112,6 62,4 15,8 1,6 2208 1,34
Thereof Sw edish citizens 7,3 53,7 106,1 99,8 53,1 11,2 1,4 1662 1,01
Thereof Foreign citizens 39,3 180,8 156,3 131,1 78,9 26,5 2,3 3076 1,86
Iraq 22,1 164,2 170,7 153,6 86,4 28,0 0,6 3128 1,89
Thereof Sw edish citizens 8,0 73,7 120,5 127,6 70,1 20,7 - 2103 1,27
Thereof Foreign citizens 30,2 202,3 193,8 170,4 100,7 36,1 1,4 3674 2,22
Iran 4,7 40,2 87,9 96,3 51,6 11,6 1,7 1470 0,89
Thereof Sw edish citizens 2,0 19,1 67,8 88,7 45,2 8,1 1,4 1162 0,70
Thereof Foreign citizens 19,4 104,6 120,9 110,4 73,0 30,2 3,5 2310 1,40
Total Sweden 6,6 47,7 109,2 110,7 47,3 8,9 0,3 1653 1,00
Thereof Sw edish citizens 5,6 41,8 107,3 110,2 46,0 8,3 0,3 1598 0,97
Thereof Foreign citizens 26,9 121,0 128,1 116,1 63,6 16,0 1,1 2364 1,43
* Total number of children during the fertile period per 1000 females.
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(see also table 13), contributing further to higher 
overall fertility in the country.
As will be discussed more in detail in chapter 
4, the type of refugee migration that has domi-
nated immigration to Sweden and many other 
countries since the 1970s, gave rise to different 
types of policy developments. 
3.4.  In and out migration 
composition
Before getting deeper into these questions, let us 
outline some key demographic and socio-eco-
nomic features of immigrants in Sweden over 
the past 60 years. Three quarters of the entire 
population growth since 1945 is due to immigra-
tion surplus. From 1945 to 2003 net migration 
surplus, including children born to immigrants, 
was 1,840,000 people and the total population 
growth was 2,380,000 (Statistiska entralbyrån 
2004). Figure four displays immigration and 
emigration numbers 1945 to 2009. Two aspects 
should be pointed out. Firstly, the numbers in-
crease over time but, secondly, immigration and 
to a lesser degree emigration sometimes vary 
quite substantially from year to year. All in all, 
2.89 Million people have immigrated during the 
period while 1.62 Million have emigrated, giv-
ing a net migration figure at around 1.28 Million 
people. If we combine the first and second peri-
od of post-war immigration (war-related refugee 
migration and labour migration, 1945-1972) the 
net migration figure is 443,000 while the third 
period (refugee migration after 1972) contrib-
utes with 834,000. Immigration has been all time 
high 2006-2009, resulting in the influx of around 
100,000 each year and 398,000 in total. For the 
first time ever, annual immigration exceeds one 
per cent of the population stock.
Naturally, the combination of much larger 
numbers and different country origins for the 
third period compared to the first and second peri-
ods has resulted in a substantial shift in the com-
position of immigrants in Sweden. Figure five 
charts the overall increase in immigrants’ num-
bers residing in Sweden and their broad compo-
sitional change 1950 to 2008. People born out-
side of Europe now comprise 45 per cent of all 
immigrants in Sweden. Meanwhile, both the ab-
solute number and in particular the proportion 
of Nordic country people have decreased (from 
roughly 50 per cent in 1980 to 21 per cent in 
2008). However, if we study the current migra-
tion exchange not by regions but by individual 
Figure 4.  Immigration and emigration, Sweden 1945 to 2009 (Statistic Sweden).
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countries, Finland, Denmark and Norway con-
tinue to be present among the top five countries. 
Table 14 summarizes the current composi-
tion of immigrants in Sweden according to world 
regions. Tables 15 and 16 give country-specific 
information concerning origin and destination 
countries for the 1990 to 2006 period.
Immigration and emigration movements ob-
viously involve also the native population. Table 
17 presents details concerning international mi-
gration movements 1990-2008, specified for na-
tives and immigrants and also specified accord-
ing to parents’ origin. As can be seen, Sweden 
makes a net loss of people born in Sweden and 
most of these also have a Swedish background. 
The average yearly loss is about 4,300 people 
and Swedish-born having two Swedish-born par-
ents comprises 3,200 of these.
People born abroad contribute to 83 per cent 
of all immigration movements and very few of 
these immigrants have Swedish ancestry. Their 
propensity of leaving Sweden is not as high and, 
Figure 5. The number and composition of foreign-born in Sweden 1950-2008 (Statistics Sweden).
Table 14. Composition of the stock of foreign-born in Sweden, 2008 (Geosweden/Statistics Sweden).
country/world region Frequency Percent
Born in Sw eden 7963577 86,2
Rest of Nordic countries 268419 2,9
Rest of Western European countries 131702 1,4
Eastern European 298371 3,2
Sub-Saharan Africa 74971 ,8
Western Asia incl Turkey and N Africa 292052 3,2
Eastern Asia 114123 1,2
latin America incl Central America & Mexico 70484 ,8
North America, Australia, New  Zeeland 22205 ,2
Unknow n 610 ,0
Total 9236514 100,0
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Table 16. Destination countries 1990-2006 for emigrants from Sweden, by country of birth 
(Geosweden database).
Table 15. Origin countries for immigrants to Sweden 1990-2006, by country of birth (still in Sweden 
2006) (Geosweden database).
Foreign-born Sweden-born
Country Numbers % Country Numbers %
Finland 37288 15.2 Norw ay 38379 18.6
Norw ay 31994 13.1 USA 27161 13.2
Denmark 21642 8.8 Denmark 14067 6.8
USA 15258 6.2 United kingdom 11318 5.5
Germany 9411 3.8 Germany 9950 4.8
United kingdom 7962 3.2 Spain 9115 4.4
Spain 5571 2.3 Finland 8435 4.1
Greece 5376 2.2 France 6918 3.4
Iceland 4846 2.0 Belgium 5534 2.7
Chile 4218 1.7 Sw itzerland 4821 2.3
France 4216 1.7 Australia 4777 2.3
Australia 3173 1.3 The Netherlands 3530 1.7
The Netherlands 2617 1.1 Italy 3334 1.6
Canada 2479 1.0 China & Taiw an 2544 1.2
Poland 2452 1.0 Canada 2450 1.2
Iran 2410 1.0 Greece 2426 1.2
All other 84115 34.3 All other 51693 25,0
Total 245028 100.0 Total 206452 100.0
Foreign-born Sweden-born
Country Numbers % Country Numbers %
Bosnia-Herzegovina 49160 7.6 Norw ay 25963 18.6
Iraq 41748 6.5 USA 16296 11.7
Finland 37012 5.7 Denmark 9991 7.2
Norw ay 35890 5.6 Germany 7088 5.1
Denmark 33696 5.2 United kingdom 6746 4.8
F. Yugoslavia 29338 4.5 Finland 6489 4.7
Poland 23242 3.6 Spain 6335 4.5
Iran 22701 3.5 France 4324 3.1
Germany 22021 3.4 Belgium 3919 2.8
Turkey 17721 2.7 Sw itzerland 3156 2.3
USA 17216 2.7 Australia 2913 2.1
Thailand 14480 2.2 The Netherlands 2377 1.7
lebanon 13229 2.0 Italy 2162 1.6
Somalia 12600 2.0 Greece 1623 1.2
China & Taiw an 11734 1.8 China & Taiw an 1550 1.1
Russia 11529 1.8 Canada 1549 1.1
All other 252519 39.1 All other 36876 26.5
Total 645836 100.0 Total 139357 100.0
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in fact, about 40 per cent of all emigration move-
ments are carried out by people with a Swedish 
background (born in Sweden having at least one 
Sweden-born parent).
3.5.  Residence permits and 
reasons for immigration
We end this section on immigration to Sweden 
by giving an account of the official reasons for 
granting permissions to stay given by the Swed-
ish authorities for the 1980 to 2008 period. More 
details are available but we have grouped the rea-
sons into six categories (see table 18). Two of 
these six heavily dominate the picture. Approx-
imately 30 per cent of all 1.16 Million permis-
sions have been granted to refugees, mostly on 
humanitarian grounds, and about 46 per cent of 
all to relatives (family ties). Most refugees ac-
quire a permission to stay after having asked for 
asylum. Table 19 summarizes the number of ap-
plicants per country (1984-2008). About a third 
of all applications have been made by individuals 
from former Yugoslavia, primarily during 1992-
94 (the war in Bosnia) and 2000-2002 (Kosovo). 
Iraqi applicants are more dispersed over the en-
tire period but with a noticeable peak in 2007 
(18,600 out of a total of 86,000). Applications 
Born in Sweden
w ith tw o one Sw eden- both parents Total 
Migration Sw eden-born born born abroad number
direction Year parents parent Sw eden-born
Immigrated 1990-2008 113340 25969 25735 165044
% of all 11.5 2.6 2.6 16.8
Emigrated 1990-2008 174315 39195 32926 246436
% of all 32.3 7.3 6.1 45.7
Migration net 1990-2008 -60975 -13226 -7191 -81392
Yearly net average 1990-2008 -3209 -696 -378 -4284
Born abroad
w ith tw o one Sw eden- both parents Total 
Migration Sw eden-born born born abroad number
direction parents parent Foreign-born
Immigrated 1990-2008 4929 9487 803864 818280
% of all 0.5 1.0 81.7 83.2
Emigrated 1990-2008 2064 5377 285828 293269
% of all 0.4 1.0 53.0 54.3
Migration net 1990-2008 2865 4110 518036 525011
Yearly net average 1990-2008 151 216 27265 27632
Total
w ith tw o one Sw eden- both parents Total 
Migration Sw eden-born born born abroad number
direction parents parent
Immigrated 1990-2008 118269 35456 829599 983324
% of all 12.0 3.6 84.4 100.0
Emigrated 1990-2008 176379 44572 318754 539705
% of all 32.7 8.3 59.1 100.0
Migration net 1990-2008 -58110 -9116 510845 443619
Yearly net average 1990-2008 -3058 -480 26887 23348
Table 17. Immigration and emigrations statistics 1990-2008 according to country of birth and parents’ 
country of birth (Geosweden database).
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from Iran mostly date back to the Iran-Iraq war 
in the 1980s. The breakdown of Somalia due to 
and subsequent to war has generated refugee ap-
plicants since around 1990, but with three years 
of quite many applications; more than 3,000 in 
2003, 2007 and also in 2008. It is however worth 
mentioning that almost all conflicts in the world 
have generated requests for a safe haven in Swe-
den. The number of countries represented in the 
ranks of refugee applicants is very high and most 
of the countries listed in table 20 continue to 
generate refugee migrants.
3.6.  characteristics of 
the immigrants
3.6.1.  Gender, age and family types
Migrants differ almost without exception from 
non-migrants with respect to gender and age 
composition. How they differ might vary but 
males at least used to be over-represented among 
international migrants. However, exceptions to 
this generalization nowadays tend to be more 
common. Many researchers have noticed a clear 
Year All Refugees* Relatives** Labour Guest Adoption EES
thereof migration*** students treaty****
refugee
1980 13 617 4 062 7 786 .. 948 821 ..  
1981 13 104 3 857 7 938 .. 918 391 ..  
1982 14 055 6 266 6 440 .. 983 366 ..  
1983 10 925 3 668 6 149 .. 632 476 ..  
1984 13 861 5 413 6 561 .. 237 509 1 141  
1985 16 206 7 314 6 944 498 98 478 1 372  
1986 23 039 11 486 9 670 1 491 171 467 1 245  
1987 28 649 14 042 12 387 2 503 222 678 1 320  
1988 33 333 16 125 15 093 3 692 257 855 1 003  
1989 44 683 24 879 18 029 5 430 167 821 787  
1990 37 383 12 839 22 221 5 189 263 1 143 917  
1991 42 248 18 663 21 230 6 869 300 969 1 086  
1992 34 817 12 791 19 662 7 112 215 1 233 916  
1993 58 928 36 482 19 796 7 553 159 1 611 880  
1994 78 987 44 875 25 975 13 508 127 1 086 884 6 040
1995 32 486 5 642 19 707 8 040 190 1 504 794 4 649
1996 31 664 4 832 18 816 3 908 274 1 771 807 5 164
1997 36 565 9 596 18 910 3 785 433 2 376 694 4 556
1998 39 433 8 193 21 673 4 612 363 2 665 804 5 735
1999 37 376 5 597 21 681 4 122 343 2 802 879 6 074
2000 45 164 10 546 22 840 3 538 433 3 073 876 7 396
2001 44 505 7 941 24 524 4 104 442 3 989 758 6 851
2002 44 664 8 493 22 346 4 632 403 4 585 869 7 968
2003 46 857 6 460 24 553 4 763 319 5 509 782 9 234
2004 50 491 6 140 22 337 3 085 209 6 021 825 14 959
2005 55 990 8 076 21 908 2 004 293 6 837 805 18 071
2006 76 095 20 663 26 668 3 799 349 7 331 623 20 461
2007 76 655 18 290 28 975 7 691 543 8 920 540 19 387
2008 76 240 11 173 33 184 10 665 796 11 186 503 19 398
Total 1 158 020 354 404 534 003 122 593 11 087 80 473 22 110 155 943
*Temporary permissions not included.
**Relatives to key personell excluded after 2004.
***Only permanent permissions.
****From May 1st, 2006 permissions for third country citizens residing in other EU country.
Table 18. Number of granted permissions to stay in Sweden 1980-2008 (Board of Migration/Statistics 
Sweden).
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feminization of international migration (Morri-
son, Schiff & Sjöblom 2008), sparked by in-
creasing demand for household workers in many 
countries (the Gulf States being examples of this) 
in combination with difficulties for females find-
ing jobs and earning cash income in many devel-
oping countries. Furthermore, many countries in 
the world experience demographic imbalances, 
i.e. a shortage of females (China is the prime 
example), a phenomenon that has made “love 
migration” and marriage brokers common phe-
nomena in many parts of the world. Also with-
in developed countries such imbalances tend to 
emerge. The rural regions in the Nordic countries 
face this particular challenge, and many men in 
the north seek partners abroad (in Russia, Thai-
land etc). 
Table 20 displays the proportion females 
per broad immigrant category in Sweden. If all 
foreign-born are grouped together (see bottom 
line), females are slightly over represented. This 
over representation is due to female dominance 
among some of the larger immigrant categories, 
such as people from the Nordic countries, Eastern 
Europe, and in particular Eastern Asia. On the 
other hand, male immigrants dominate among 
Country Total Country Total
Yugoslavia (former) 188.420 Syria 9.254
thereof Bosnia-H. 54.371 Afghanistan 7.924
Kosova 1.031 Poland 6.348
Serbia & Montenegro 103.200 Peru 3.855
Iraq 86.840 Bangladesh 3.419
Iran 43.427 Pakistan 2.596
Somalia 25.339 Uganda 2.202
lebanon 15.560 Cuba 2.128
Chile 12.642 Sri lanka 1.945
Turkey 12.506 India 1.815
Russia 11.389 China 1.471
Ethiopia 10.188 Togo 696
Bulgaria 9.928 Other 88.434
Rumania 9.666 Unknow n 21.402
Total 584.453
Table 19. Asylum seekers to Sweden 1984 to 2008 by origin country (Rikspolisstyrelsen RPS, 
1984˗juni 1987; Board of Migration, July 1987˗2008).
country of Birth Males Females
Born in Sw eden 49.9 50.1 7.963.577
Rest of Nordic countries 43.4 56.6 268.419
Rest of Western European countries 54.9 45.1 131.702
Eastern European countries 45.9 54.1 298.371
Sub-Saharan Africa 52.1 47.9 74.971
Western Asia incl Turkey and N Africa 55.0 45.0 292.052
Eastern Asia 36.8 63.2 114.123
latin America incl Central America & Mexico 49.0 51.0 70.484
North America, Australia, New  Zeeland 54.3 45.7 22.205
Unknow n 53.8 46.2 610
Total 49.7 50.3 9236514
All immigrants 48.3 51.7 1.272.937
Sex
Total
Table 20. Proportion of men and women in different immigrant categories, 2008 (Geosweden 
database).
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immigrants from Western countries, Western 
Asia and Northern Africa. In terms of particu-
lar countries, Thailand stands out. Four out of 
five Thai residents in Sweden are females; the 
proportion females are high also for Philippines 
(78 per cent) Russians and Japanese (67 per cent), 
Chinese (64 per cent) and South Koreans (62 per 
cent). Of these female-dominated nationalities, 
the Thai are most numerous (25,800), followed 
by Russians (13,400). There is however also an-
other 19,500 registered as born in the former So-
viet Union and these are also female-dominated 
(62 per cent). And, also worth mentioning, close 
to 60 per cent of all 174,000 Finnish-born are 
females. On the other hand, 69 per cent of all 
Pakistani and about two thirds of all immigrants 
from Ireland, Italy, UK, Tunisia, Egypt and Alge-
ria are males. Of these male dominated nationali-
ties, immigrants from the UK are most numer-
ous (19,200), followed by Pakistani (7,600) and 
Italian (7,100). It is of course often the case that 
gender imbalances implies greater proportions 
of inter-marriages. 
It is an accepted fact among migration re-
searchers that international migrants as migrants 
in general tend to have a skewed age distribution. 
They are often in their 20s and 30s and there-
fore tend to rejuvenate populations in receiving 
Table 22. Family types according to region of origin, 2008 (Geosweden database).
Family type
Born in 
Sw eden
Rest of 
Nordic 
countries
Rest of 
Western 
European 
countries
Eastern 
European
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
Western 
Asia incl 
Turkey and 
N Africa
Eastern 
Asia
latin 
America incl 
Central 
America & 
Mexico
North 
America, 
Australia, 
New  
Zeeland Unknow n Total
Married/partner w ithout children 20 26 20 18 9 11 12 10 16 15 20
Married/partner w ith child under 18 19 14 23 27 28 43 28 20 30 31 20
Married/partner w ith child 18+ 7 6 6 8 2 7 6 7 4 2 7
Co-habiting, no child 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Co-habiting w ith child under 18 10 6 6 5 6 3 7 10 6 4 9
Co-habiting w ith child 18+ 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
lone father w ith child under 18 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 1
lone father w ith child 18+ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
lone mother w ith child under 18 3 3 3 5 11 5 7 8 3 6 4
lone mother w ith child 18+ 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 4 2 1 3
Single 34 39 38 31 38 27 37 37 38 42 34
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(N) 4752187 201217 94799 233498 57022 233685 88087 58369 15592 418 5734874
Table 21.  Age and sex distribution of different immigrant categories, 2008 (Geosweden database).
Age Gender 
Country of birth Sex 0-15 16-24 25-44 45-64 65+ Total (N) proportion
Sw eden Males 20 12 25 26 16 100 3.975.918 49.9
Females 19 12 24 25 20 100 3.987.659 50.1
Western countries Males 6 5 28 36 25 100 201.710 47.5
Females 5 4 22 37 32 100 223.356 52.5
Eastern European Males 6 14 37 29 14 100 136.853 45.9
Females 4 12 37 32 15 100 161.518 54.1
Rest of the w orld Males 10 15 46 25 4 100 275.530 50.2
Females 10 14 49 21 5 100 273.738 49.8
All Males 19 12 27 26 16 100 4.590.011 49.7
Females 17 12 26 26 20 100 4.646.271 50.3
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countries. For countries having a large proportion 
of immigrants that have arrived rather recently, 
we can therefore expect immigrants to be differ-
ent not only when it comes to their age profile 
but also in terms of family types and household 
composition. This, in turn, will affect housing 
consumption, housing preferences, labour mar-
ket participation, income, education, etc. Table 
21 shows the age distribution per gender group 
for three broad categories of foreign-born. It is 
clearly the case that many migrants arriving in 
Sweden in big numbers over the past 30-35 years 
(from outside Europe) are in the 25 to 44 age span 
while there is still a rather small proportion that 
has reached retirement age. On the other hand, 
some of the early labour immigrant nationali-
ties, such as the Finns, comprise a fast growing 
proportion among the elderly. This has caused 
some worries and debates in Sweden concern-
ing issues related to how to care for those elderly 
people who tend to lose the ability to speak and 
understand Swedish. Should care be arranged 
on an ethnic/language basis or should care fa-
cilities try to integrate people with many differ-
ent backgrounds?
Table 22 shows the distribution of family 
types across world regions. Some of the differ-
ences emerging here is definitely due to differ-
ences in age composition. There is a clear over-
representation of married people with younger 
children among those originating in Western Asia 
and Northern Africa while a relatively small pro-
portion of them are single. Couples cohabiting 
while having children are fairly common in most 
categories but the least common in this particular 
group. One might also notice the clear over-rep-
resentation of lone mothers among people born 
in Sub-Saharan countries and, to a less extent, 
in Latin America and Eastern Asia.
3.6.2.  labour market participation, 
education and income
It was said above that the developments of the 
1980s and early 1990s led to intensive debates on 
integration issues. By now it had become clear 
that the integration outcome during the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s had changed dramatically. In 
the early post-war period, immigrants did very 
well on the labour market. The Swedish econo-
mists Ekberg and Gustavsson (1995) have cal-
culated that the average labour market partici-
pation rates (LMPR) for foreign citizens at that 
time was about 20 per cent above the level for 
native Swedes (see figure 6).
However, from the 1950s onwards immi-
grants have performed less well decade by dec-
Figure 6. Relative labour market participation rates for immigrants in Sweden 1950-2000 (Ekberg and 
Gustavsson 1995. Data for 2000 added by the author. See also Rapport Integration 2003).
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ade so that their average LMPR stood at 0.58 rel-
ative the native workforce in the mid 1990s. This 
development ˗ based on LMPR values ˗ standard-
ized for gender and age differences between the 
native and the immigrant population˗ is worri-
some in itself but even more so when put into 
the perspective of the substantial increase of the 
immigrant population. We will not go into pos-
sible explanations to this development but it is 
definitely of key importance for understanding 
subsequent political debates in Sweden. The rela-
tive weak position on the labour market does of 
course translates into substantial income differ-
ences, and more so for work incomes than dis-
posable incomes (the welfare state is still quite 
effective in compensating individuals and house-
holds having low work incomes). Table 23 dis-
plays income deciles sorted by country of birth 
for the working age population in Sweden.
The concentration of foreign-born into the 
bottom two deciles is obvious (see table 23). In 
2008, 45 per cent of all born outside of Europe 
were concentrated into the bottom quintile (20 
per cent segment) and the corresponding values 
for Western and Eastern Europeans were 35 per 
cent. Western Europeans are a polarized category 
and their representation in the upper decile ap-
proaches the proportion hold by native Swedes. 
The other two immigrant categories, however, 
are heavily under-represented among high in-
come earners. 
On a structural level one might expect that 
the position on the labour market and its subse-
quent effects for work incomes is due to educa-
tional differences. Education does indeed mat-
ter but it pays off less for immigrants. Table 24 
shows that educational differences ˗in terms of 
number of years of schooling˗ are small when 
we aggregate immigrants into broad world re-
gions. The differences are however quite sub-
stantial when we disaggregate and analyze the 
distribution across specific nationalities (see bot-
tom part of table 24). Disproportionally few of 
those born in Chile, Somalia and former Yugo-
slavia have a high level of education while im-
migrants originating in India, Iran and Poland 
are well represented in the 15+ year category. It 
is worth noticing that the level increases quite 
rapidly over time for all nationalities but not for 
the Somalis and the Iraqi. Both these countries 
country of birth Work income deciles Percent
Year 1+2* 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 > median Total
Born in Sw eden 2000 16.8 9.8 10.1 10.3 10.4 10.6 10.6 10.7 10.8 100.0 53.0 4480347
2005 16.4 9.8 10.1 10.3 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 100.0 53.5 4493971
2008 15.8 9.6 10.2 10.3 10.6 10.7 10.8 11.0 11.0 100.0 54.1 4479323
Western countries 2000 31.6 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.6 8.8 8.9 8.7 8.5 100.0 43.5 288715
2005 34.1 7.7 8.0 7.8 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.3 8.8 100.0 42.3 276694
2008 35.0 8.2 7.7 7.6 7.8 8.1 8.3 8.3 9.1 100.0 41.6 276521
Eastern European 2000 41.5 11.3 8.9 8.1 7.6 7.0 6.5 5.0 4.2 100.0 30.3 168845
2005 36.9 11.3 9.6 9.5 8.7 7.9 6.7 5.1 4.3 100.0 32.7 192675
2008 35.6 11.9 9.9 9.8 8.7 8.1 6.7 5.3 4.2 100.0 32.9 226276
Asia w ith Turkey, and 2000 47.2 15.0 10.1 7.7 5.5 4.5 3.8 3.3 2.8 100.0 19.9 274584
Africa, latin America 2005 45.5 14.0 10.1 8.5 6.4 5.0 4.1 3.4 3.0 100.0 21.9 359835
2008 45.1 13.9 10.0 8.3 6.2 5.3 4.3 3.7 3.1 100.0 22.7 445287
Total population 2000 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 100.0 50.0 5212491
2005 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 100.0 50.0 5323175
2008 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 100.0 50.0 5427407
*About 15 percent of all aged 20 to 64 lack w ork income. Bottom tw o deciles are therefore merged.
Table 23. Work income deciles in 2000, 2005, and 2008 by country of birth (age 20 to 64) 
(Geosweden database).
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have more than doubled their presence in Swe-
den since 2000. One conclusion is that the more 
recent Somali and Iraqi migrants have lower lev-
els of education compared to those having ar-
rived earlier. Another is that in particular the So-
mali migrants have an educational profile that is 
very unfavourable in the context of the Swedish 
labour market.
It is not only that some immigrant groups 
have a relatively low level of education, it is 
indeed the fact that many highly educated im-
migrants, in particular from Non-Western coun-
tries, have much lower incomes than could be 
expected. According to the EU Migrant Integra-
tion Policy Index, Sweden scores highest among 
25 member states and three non-EU countries 
(Migrant integration... 2010). This may be true 
but it says perhaps more about the situation in 
other countries and/or about the difficult chal-
lenge that face also countries trying to pursue an 
ambitious integration policy. There is no need for 
Sweden to be very proud about the integration 
outcome over the past 30 years. In the perspec-
tive of a more general integration failure, it is 
particularly worrisome that this failure applies 
also to the well educated part of the immigrant 
population (see figure 7). While seven per cent 
of all highly educated Swedish-born are found 
in the bottom income quintile (20 per cent seg-
ment), the proportion is five times as big (37 per 
cent) for highly educated from the category Asia 
with Turkey, Africa and Latin America.
 
Table 24. Educational level 2000, 2005, 2008 by region of birth, age group 20 to 64 years 
(Geosweden database).
Year Missing less than 12 ys 12 to 14 ys 15+ years Total
Region of birth Numbers % Numbers % Numbers % Numbers % Numbers %
Born in Sw eden 2000 16244 0,4 2269273 50,6 1515971 33,8 678859 15,2 4480347 100,0
2005 17588 0,4 1965095 43,7 1666050 37,1 845223 18,8 4493956 100,0
2008 18650 0,4 1795216 40,1 1747294 39,0 918145 20,5 4479305 100,0
Western countries 2000 16396 5,7 159982 55,4 68227 23,6 44110 15,3 288715 100,0
2005 18730 6,8 132163 47,8 68894 24,9 56898 20,6 276685 100,0
2008 22963 8,3 119356 43,2 69686 25,2 64508 23,3 276513 100,0
Eastern European 2000 9031 5,3 71554 42,4 60754 36,0 27506 16,3 168845 100,0
2005 9333 4,8 76888 39,9 68097 35,3 38355 19,9 192673 100,0
2008 17948 7,9 83294 36,8 77203 34,1 47827 21,1 226272 100,0
Asia w ith Turkey, 2000 23105 8,4 126082 45,9 85419 31,1 39978 14,6 274584 100,0
Africa, latin America 2005 27395 7,6 158218 44,0 112342 31,2 61864 17,2 359819 100,0
2008 34106 7,7 191710 43,1 135372 30,4 84080 18,9 445268 100,0
Total 2000 64776 1,3 2626891 50,8 1730371 33,5 790453 15,3 5170820 100,0
2005 73046 1,4 2332364 43,8 1915383 36,0 1002340 18,8 5323133 100,0
2008 93667 1,7 2189576 40,3 2029555 37,4 1114560 20,5 5427358 100,0
Individual countries
Chile 2000 436 2,0 12162 56,1 7345 33,9 1749 8,1 21692 100,0
2005 483 2,0 12319 50,6 8849 36,3 2707 11,1 24358 100,0
2008 413 1,7 12163 48,8 9132 36,6 3237 13,0 24945 100,0
Somalia 2000 1798 20,3 3974 44,8 2513 28,3 588 6,6 8873 100,0
2005 2156 18,4 6061 51,6 2855 24,3 672 5,7 11744 100,0
2008 3704 20,9 9735 55,0 3420 19,3 843 4,8 17702 100,0
F. Yugoslavia (excl. Bosnia) 2000 2930 5,7 29018 56,1 16027 31,0 3783 7,3 51758 100,0
2005 1617 2,9 30875 56,1 17991 32,7 4600 8,4 55083 100,0
2008 1097 2,0 30660 55,1 18798 33,8 5065 9,1 55620 100,0
Poland 2000 944 3,0 11685 37,7 11909 38,4 6463 20,8 31001 100,0
2005 2413 6,6 12221 33,3 13090 35,7 8938 24,4 36662 100,0
2008 7404 14,6 14985 29,5 16763 33,0 11626 22,9 50778 100,0
Iraq 2000 4701 14,0 12017 35,7 10260 30,5 6693 19,9 33671 100,0
2005 4627 9,0 22488 43,5 14913 28,9 9613 18,6 51641 100,0
2008 6955 8,8 34606 43,8 22301 28,2 15156 19,2 79018 100,0
Iran 2000 2114 5,3 12185 30,3 17960 44,7 7949 19,8 40208 100,0
2005 1823 3,8 13998 29,5 20524 43,2 11181 23,5 47526 100,0
2008 1762 3,4 14522 28,2 21258 41,2 14008 27,2 51550 100,0
India 2000 455 6,5 2374 34,0 2812 40,2 1349 19,3 6990 100,0
2005 1363 12,6 2613 24,2 4198 38,9 2617 24,3 10791 100,0
2008 1690 13,3 2751 21,7 4715 37,2 3511 27,7 12667 100,0
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4.  Swedish integration policy
4.1.  Introduction
This chapter will sum up key aspects of Swed-
ish integration policies. It should be stressed that 
immigration policy and integration policy are 
very much connected to each other. The type of 
policy regime regulating immigration has both 
direct and indirect effects on integration policies. 
If a country pursues a very restricted policy on 
immigration, for instance accepting only highly 
skilled labour migrants or entrepreneurs to en-
ter, integration problems are both perceived dif-
ferently and can be hypothesized to be less se-
vere compared to a country pursuing a relatively 
generous refugee immigration policy. It is also 
common that a country changing its policy on 
immigration changes also integration policies, 
for instance combining a more restrictive im-
migration policy with measures making it eco-
nomically less attractive for migrants to aim for 
this particular country. 
The strong relation between immigration and 
integration policies has been pointed out by the 
political scientist Karin Borevi, analysing the 
Swedish case: “In 1968, the Government offi-
cially declared that policies towards immigrants 
should be guided by the goal of equality. At the 
same time, a regulation of immigration was in-
troduced. The regulation was regarded as a pre-
requisite for upholding the principle of equali-
ty. Immigration had to be accommodated to the 
capacity of society to provide immigrants with 
employment, housing, social care and education 
on the same terms as the rest of the population” 
(Borevi 2010: 29).
4.2.  Integration policy development 
In order to acknowledge this tight relationship 
between immigration and integration policy we 
have summarized the key developments in these 
two policy fields in table 25 (the period 1939-
Figure 7. Highly educated (15+ years) distributed over work income deciles and country of birth, 2008 
(Geosweden database).
Country report for Sweden
49
1970) and table 26 (1971 to present). The vol-
ume and characteristics of immigration have 
been dealt with in chapter three but these two 
tables offer a condensed summary also of key 
immigration policy developments.
The Swedish debate on immigration and im-
migrants took off in the mid-1960s, and the rea-
son was not only the big influx of immigrants 
but also a series of newspaper articles address-
ing the issue of assimilation of, and the living 
conditions for, the immigrant population. Should 
immigrants be assimilated, integrated, or what? 
(Widgren 1980: 14-15).The labour immigration 
influx resulted in a debate in the 1960s (see chap-
ter 3) which in turn lead to the first steps towards 
an explicit formulation of Swedish immigrant 
policy, taken in 1965 to 1968. A 1965 decision 
meant that Swedish language courses for im-
migrants could be provided without a cost for 
the adult study organisations that arranged such 
courses. In 1966, the Government set up a work-
ing group which later proposed how information 
and interpretation services should be organised. 
In the same year, the first municipal bureau for 
immigrant services was established (in Stock-
holm), soon to be followed by many more in 
other municipalities. Somewhat later decisions 
were taken in order to improve possibilities for 
immigrant children to learn Swedish in schools. 
In 1969, the Swedish Board of Immigration was 
set up in order to take care of many immigration 
and immigrant-related issues. One of its man-
dates was the responsibility to organise the re-
ception of refugees. Finally, a new public inves-
Table 25. Overview of key developments concerning immigration and integration in Sweden 1939 to 
1970.
Period
Main 
characteristics
Key changes in 
immigration policy Origin countries
Integration Policy and 
institutional reforms Comments
WWII 
migration
Refugee 
migration
Gradually increasing 
possibilities to enter Sw eden 
as a refugee
1943-1945; receiving 160,000 
w ar refugees from Estonia, 
latvia, lithuania, Denmark, 
Finland. Immigration net in the 
1940s: 134.000. No explicit integration policy
1945 to 1954
Refugee and 
start of labour 
migration
"The Bernadotte action", 
rescue of people from 
concentration camps.                                                                                                                           
The Employment Board gets 
directives to assist f irms in 
recruiting foreign labour.                                                                                                
Construction of the common 
Nordic labor markets 
(f inalized in 1954).                                 
Sw eden signed the Geneva 
convention in 1951.
Influx of 34,000 refugees, 
many of Jew ish origin, from
concentration camps.  
Another 10.000 follow ed 1945 
to 1949.                                            
Nordic migration period but 
also some recruitment from 
Italy, Hungary and Austria. 
Total immigration net in the 
1950s: 106.000. No explicit integration policy. 
1955 to 1970
Active labour 
market 
immigration policy 
and some 
refugee migration
Sw eden ratif ied the New  
York Protocol (regulating the 
legal status of refugees) in 
1967.                                                            
The Social Democratic 
government introduced 
tougher regulations on labour 
immigration in March 1967, 
and thereafter all non-Nordic 
immigrants needed a w ork 
permit, a specif ic job and 
accommodation before 
entering Sw eden.
Political developments in 
Eastern Europe (like the 
protests in Warzaw , 
Budapest and later in Prague) 
result in refugees giving 
permission to stay. In the 
1950s, labour recruitments 
w ere made also in West 
Germany, Italy, Austria, 
Belgium and Greece, 
Yugoslavia and later also from 
Turkey.                                                                                                                                                                   
A new  type of refugee 
emerges: non-European 
political refugees. This started 
already in 1966, w hen the UN 
High commissioner asked 
Sw eden to accept a group of 
lebanon-based Assyrians.                                       
Net immigration in the 1960s 
amounted to 197.000 people.             
1950 to 1969: The Sw edish 
Employment Board has the overall 
responsibility for monitoring labour 
immigration. No explicit integration 
policy (not a guest w orker policy 
but an implicit assimilationist 
strategy).                                                            
During the 1950s and 1960s, 
those granted refugee status 
w ere placed w ithin the same 
general framew ork as labour 
migrants.                                                 
In 1965, the first formulations of 
immigrant/integration policy 
(Government-initiated 
investigations).                           
1966: the f irst municipal bureau 
for immigrant services.                                                                       
In 1969, the Sw edish Board of 
Immigration w as set up, w ith 
responsibilty for both immigration 
and integration issues. 
The administrative 
responsibility for collective 
transfers of refugees to 
Sw eden w as betw een 1950 
and 1969  placed on the 
authority for labour market
issues (AMS) in cooperation 
w ith the Sw edish Board for 
Health and Social Affairs 
(Medicinalverket/Socialstyrel
sen), a commission on
Foreigners (in 1969 
transformed into the Board 
of Immigration) and the 
Police. 
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tigation was launched in 1968, with the directive 
to propose a coherent immigrant policy. 
The long-term integration issue was investi-
gated by The Immigrant Investigation, set up in 
1968. When it finally made public its proposals 
(SOU 1974/69; SOU 1974/70), a more active 
immigrant policy begins. The parliament voted 
in 1975 in favour of the Government Bill ˗ which 
was based on the proposals made by the com-
mission˗ and Sweden thereby declared itself a 
multiethnic country. 
The policy was based on three concepts: 
Equality, Freedom of choice, and Cooperation. 
The equality goal underlines that immigrants 
should have the same opportunities, rights and 
obligations as the rest of the population (struc-
tural integration). It also means that everybody 
is entitled to preserve and learn his or her na-
tive language and cultural affiliation. The state 
should be neutral with respect to identity issues. 
Freedom of choice means that everybody can 
make a choice with respect to assimilation (cul-
tural pluralism). Assisting immigrants in keeping 
the traditions is said to make a future decision 
on staying or returning easier. The cooperation 
goals are primarily about reciprocal tolerance and 
solidarity between immigrant groups and the na-
tive population.
The launching of this multicultural policy 
was followed by a series of reforms, such as 
the ‘home language’ reform in 1976 (giving all 
children/parents the right to demand from a mu-
nicipality some education in the language spo-
ken at home), and the introduction of the right 
for foreign citizens to take part in local elections 
(1976) (Widgren 1980: 16). Of the three over-
all goals the “freedom of choice” (valfrihet) was 
most difficult to interpret and to agree upon. This 
particular goal was also re-formulated in a 1986 
parliament decision, where the primacy of some 
key “Swedish values” was clearly stressed. The 
values mentioned were gender equality and the 
rights of children. These values cannot be com-
prised with arguments based in religious or cul-
tural belief systems (SOU 1997/82: 20).
Karin Borevi points out that this decision in 
practice meant that Sweden from 1986 no long-
er should be classified as a country pursuing an 
ideal-type multicultural policy. Borevi (2010) 
makes a distinction between “demos” and “eth-
nos” and between whether or not there exists ac-
tive recognition of ethnic sub-groups. Combin-
ing these dimensions she gets four ideal types: 
(1) Ethnic assimilation (primacy of ethnos over 
demos and no recognition of ethnic subgroups), 
(2) Ethnic segregation (primacy of ethnos but in 
combination with recognition of sub-groups), (3) 
Civic integration (combination of demos, i.e. not 
stressing ethnicity as the key element of nation-
al identity but instead a civic notion of the na-
tion, with no recognition of ethnic sub-groups), 
and finally (4) Multiculturalism (demos with an 
active recognition of ethnic sub-groups). While 
the reforms and declarations of the mid-1970s 
placed Sweden in the fourth category, the 1986 
decision moved Sweden to category three (where 
the country has remained). 
The concept of integration enters Swedish 
policy discussions in the 1990s. The Integration 
Policy Committee, reporting in 1996, discusses 
the concept and uses it when analyzing structur-
al features of the society (employment, political 
representation, health etc).
The political focus concerning integration 
has most often been placed on how to organ-
ize the introductory period, i.e. on the institu-
tional division of responsibilities. It should be 
noted that the rather comprehensive introduc-
tion programmes (18 to 24 months) never have 
been compulsory in Sweden and that they aim in 
particular at recently arrived refugees and fam-
ily members arriving rather close in time to per-
sons admitted on either humanitarian grounds (in 
need of protection) or because they are given a 
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refugee status according to international agree-
ments. Anyhow, the overall aim of the introduc-
tion programme is to assist newcomers in the 
integration process by providing relevant infor-
mation on the Swedish society, offering Swedish 
language courses, medical services, vocational 
training and advice regarding job opportunities 
and housing. There has been an agreement that 
work is the key to a successful integration and 
most of the critique concerns the poor outcome 
in terms of employment. In short, it has since the 
beginning of large-scale refugee migration tak-
Table 26. Overview of key developments concerning immigration and integration in Sweden 1971 to 
2010.
Period
Main 
characteristics
Key changes in 
immigration policy Origin countries
Integration Policy and institutional 
reforms Comments
1971 to 1984
Refugee 
immigration, in 
particular from 
the developing 
w orld.
Sw eden continues to accept 
refugees by Governmental 
decisions and decisions taken 
by the Board of Immigration. 
Uganda-Asians in 
1972, Chileans and 
other latin 
Americans 
subsequent the 
military coup in Chile 
in 1973; Iranians 
f leeing the 
dictatorsship; 
kurdish refugees 
from Turkey and 
Iraq).
The Sw edish multicultural policy w as 
established in 1974/75 as the 
overriding principle for dealing w ith 
immigration/integration (Equality, 
Freedom of Choice, Cooperation). 
Important reforms: 1976 home 
language reform (requires that schools 
have to offer language training in the 
pupils mother tongue); 1976 right for 
foreign citizens to take part in local 
elections
1982 The Commission on 
Immigrant Policy reports 
(residential segregation of 
immigrants mentioned as a 
problem)
1985 to 1994
Refugee 
immigration and 
family re-
unif ication.
Introduction of the refugee 
dispersal model in 1985, 
launched partly to cope w ith 
increasing numbers of asylum 
seekers.                                      
In 1989, political asylum 
applications f iled in December 
1989 or later w ould be 
treated strictly in accordance 
w ith the 1951 Geneva 
Convention; humanitarian 
grounds for asylum w ould no 
longer be used.                                                    
In 1994, Reform of the 
dispersal policy,  (less 
restrictions on settlement 
decisions)
Continued 
immigration from the 
Middle East, latin 
America and Africa. 
In the 1990s also 
from the Balkans.
The integration policy comprises 
several components w ith most 
emphasis being placed on the 
introductory programme, including 
Sw edish language courses (SFI) and 
vocational training, health investigation 
and medical treatment, housing 
provision, and labour market integration 
programmes. A constant debate 
regarding the eff iciency of these 
services. Refugees as w ell as other 
recently arrived get a cash benefit 
equal to the social allow ance benefit.
1984 launching of the 
refugee dispersal policy as a 
w ay to avoid further 
geographical concentrations 
of recently arrived 
immigrants in metro areas.                                   
In the 1991 General election, 
an anti-immigration populist 
party takes seats in 
Parliament but is sw ept out 
three years later.
1995 to 2010
Refugee 
immigration and 
family re-
unif ication. 
Increasing labour 
immigration from 
Eastern European 
countries.
1995 Sw eden becomes 
member of the European 
Union and in 1996 member of 
the Schengen agreement 
(opens up for free 
movements of people w ithin 
the union)                                     
2004/2005 Eastern European 
countries enter the EU; 
Sw eden decides (along w ith 
Ireland and the Uk) not to 
impose transitional regulation 
on free movement of labour 
from these countries.                                       
2008 The Sw edish regulation 
on labour migration from non-
EU countries is reformed, 
opens up for larger volumes 
of labour migrants.
Continued 
immigration from the 
Middle East, latin 
America and Africa. 
In the 1990s also 
from the Balkans. In 
the new  millenium 
refugees arrive in 
large numbers from 
Iraq, Somalia, 
Pakistan/Afganistan 
and some of the 
former Soviet 
republics.                                                            
labour migrants 
arrive from Poland 
and the Baltic 
countries. Seasonal 
w orkers also from 
Thailand and Eastern 
Asian countries.
1995 The Committee on Integration 
Policy is set up, reports in 1997: 
Mainstreaming of "civic integration" 
(ethnic diversity should be 
acknow ledged by all actors in society.) 
1998 A new  state board (Board of 
Integration) is set up to support and 
monitor integration processes in the 
municipalities. 1999 launching of a 
State-funded urban area-based 
programme w ith the aim to break 
segregation (targeted 24 immigrant-
dense housing estates in 7 
municipalities). Some programmes 
before 1999 and the policy continues 
until today but w ith no direct State 
funding after 2005.                                                                   
2006 Change of government leading to 
a 2007 decision to close dow n the 
Board of Integration.                                                          
2007  Board of Integration closed 
dow n. Responsibilities transferred to 
the County Boards.                                                          
2010 Sw edish Public Employment 
Services gets the overall responsibility 
for a reformed integration strategy, 
focusing even stonger on employment.
Several parliamentary 
commisions w ork during 
1995 to 1998 w ith analysing 
different aspects of the lack 
of integration in housing and 
in the labour market, 
including a strong focus on 
immigrant-dense 
neighbourhoods, i.e. the 
committee on metropolitan 
development, the committee 
on housing policy and the 
committee on integration 
policy.                             
Citizenship is based on the 
ius sanguinis principle.  
Immigrants and their children 
are encouraged to naturalize 
and the requirements are not 
very restrictive. 
Requirements for 
naturalization are f ive years 
of permanent residence in 
Sw eden; refugees need four 
years w hile Nordic citizens 
need just tw o years.
The periodisation of immigration to Sw eden can be done partly different from the one used here. Charles Westin proposes the follow ing: 
(see http://w w w .migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=406)
1) Refugees from neighboring countries (1938 to 1948)
2) labor immigration from Finland and southern Europe (1949 to 1971)
3) Family reunif ication and refugees from developing countries (1972 to 1989)
4) Asylum seekers from southeastern and Eastern Europe (1990 to present) and the free movement of EU citizens w ithin the European Union. 
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en too long time for immigrants to get a strong 
foothold on the Swedish labour market and all 
reforms over the past 25 years have at least rhe-
torically been launched in order to improve this 
situation. 
During the introductory period, an immigrant 
is entitled to economic support, which equals the 
standard of living for others in need of cash so-
cial benefits. The law regulating this was estab-
lished in 1990 and in 1992 (SFS 1990:927 and 
1992:1068). It stipulates that this is a municipal 
issue, meaning that the introductory allowance 
is paid for by the municipalities. However, for 
those who follow an introductory plan, the mu-
nicipality can apply for State funding (until 2010 
at the Board of Migration). In 2010, the regu-
lation stipulates 187,600 SEK for adult persons 
aged 16 to 64, 115,200 for children under age 
16 and 69,200 for the elderly.
This State compensation to the municipali-
ties is given for a two year period but it is meant 
to cover extra costs for about three and a half 
years. To be eligible for introductory allowance 
the individual migrant needs a permanent right to 
stay in Sweden and he or she has to take part the 
introduction activities (for instance SFI; Swed-
ish for immigrants).
Immigrants given permission to stay due to 
family ties cannot claim the introductory allow-
ance but are instead given the normal cash social 
allowance (i.e. same economic level). Asylum 
seekers are not entitled to take part in the intro-
ductory programme. Their economic support is 
regulated by LMA (the law on refugee reception, 
from 1988) and the compensation level to wait-
ing refugees is set somewhat below the national 
norm for cash social benefits.
4.3.  Policy on citizenship 
and naturalisations 
The legal definition of citizenship is usually de-
fined as the formal relationship between an in-
dividual and a state with regard to rights and 
obligations. Since 1st of July 2001, Sweden per-
mits dual citizenship, which means that an in-
dividual can become a Swedish citizen while 
also retaining her or his prior citizenship if that 
country permits it.
The differences between having Swedish cit-
izenship and a permanent residence permit are:
• Only Swedish citizens have an absolute 
right to live and work in the country and 
only Swedish citizens have the right to vote 
in the elections for the Swedish Parliament. 
• Only Swedish citizens can be elected to the 
Swedish Parliament. 
• Only Swedish citizens may join the police 
or armed forces. There are also other occu-
pations which are only available to Swed-
ish citizens. 
• As a Swedish citizen, you will find it easier if 
you wish to work in other EU Member States.
• Beyond this, in principle, foreign citizens 
who have a permanent residence permit 
(PUT) and who are registered in Sweden 
have the same rights and obligations as 
Swedish citizens.
Citizenship legislation in different countries 
is based on one of two basic principles:
• The principle of descent ó the child assumes 
the citizenship of its parents. 
• The territorial principle ó the child assumes 
the citizenship of its country of birth.
• Swedish citizenship legislation is based on 
the principle of descent. This means that it 
is the parents’ citizenship which determines 
the citizenship of the child (see Swedish citi-
zenship 2010).
Requirements to obtain citizenship
To be eligible for Swedish citizenship a per-
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son must document the following: 
• The identity should be confirmed and docu-
mented (the so called identity requirement) 
• The person must be at least 18 years old (the 
age requirement) 
• The person must have a permanent permis-
sion to stay in Sweden 
• The person must have been living in Swe-
den for five years or more. For refugees, 
four years is enough. For Nordic citizens, 
two years is the requirement. 
• The person should have behaved well (no 
crime record). Waiting time for a person hav-
ing committed a crime varies with the degree 
of criminality (one year for minor penalties 
and ten years for a person sentenced to 6 
years in prison).
It should be noted that the Board of Migra-
tion carries treats every application individually 
and that exceptions can be made (for instance 
for children aged 15 to 17 and for a person liv-
ing together with a Swedish citizen).
Sweden does not require a language test or 
a knowledge test of any kind as part of the re-
quirements for obtaining Swedish citizenship. 
The number of people obtaining Swedish citi-
zenship is 15,000 to 20,000 per year.
4.4.  Effects of the 
integration policies 
It is not easy to summarize the experience of 
several decades of integration policy but few, in-
cluding former and present members of Govern-
ment and politicians in general, would say that 
the policies have been successful. Some might 
explain the failure by stating that the task is very 
challenging, not least because of the overall la-
bour market development (less job opportunities 
for low skilled workers from the 1980s onwards) 
in combination with the influx of large num-
bers of refugees (comprising both highly skilled 
and well educated people but also many without 
much schooling).
A State investigation in 1997 identified and 
summarized the problems concerning the intro-
duction that existed at that time, and we judge 
that this criticism is still valid. (SOU 1997/82: 60) 
First of all, the report states that the introduction 
activities do not have clearly stated objectives. 
Without clearly stated national goals, evaluation 
of the outcome is difficult. Secondly, there are 
several types of information problems between 
different State and municipal agencies. Thirdly, 
all participants should be treated individually (an 
individual plan), but it happens too often that the 
immigrant does not even know the existence of 
a plan. Fourthly, it is difficult to plan activities 
in such a way that the individual does not have 
to wait too long between different stages in the 
process; waiting time results in feelings of pas-
sivity and is discouraging. Fifth, the health con-
dition of immigrants is often poor and treatment 
is not always early enough or of the right quality. 
Sixth, the labour office has an important but diffi-
cult role in advising and assisting the immigrant. 
Most other institutions complain that the labour 
office constitutes the weak link in the process of 
getting immigrants onto the labour market. Sev-
enth, the economic support model whereby the 
immigrant gets a sum of money without having 
to be active (which is mostly due to system fail-
ure in the sense that the introductory programme 
is ineffective, delayed etc) may lead to long term 
marginalization and that people get stuck in the 
cash social allowance system.
Besides these seven points of criticism, one 
more should be mentioned. Little integration 
related activities have experienced more criti-
cism than have the languages courses (Swed-
ish for immigrants, SFI). The criticism concerns 
most aspects, such as efficiency, organization, 
planning, and above all lack of individualiza-
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tion (for instance not separating highly educated 
immigrants from those having little education 
and not separating those speaking different lan-
guages from one another). Improvements have 
been made over time but SFI continues to be 
discussed as a major problem.
4.5.  The role of municipalities 
There have been a large number of evaluations, 
and also quite a lot of research, looking into ge-
ographical variations in the integration outcome 
(See Sandberg 1998). While integration on the 
labour market seems to be functioning rather well 
in certain parts of Sweden ˗in particular in low 
unemployment municipalities like Gnosjö in the 
county of Småland˗ metropolitan regions see big 
problems. The municipalities have always had a 
very important role to play in relation to integra-
tion, but the refugee dispersal policy launched in 
1984 meant a radically increased importance for 
the municipality level in administrating the pro-
cess, i.e. organizing the reception and designing 
and operating the introductory programme. We 
will get back to this in the next chapter. 
In terms of obligations, the Swedish munic-
ipalities can decide whether or not to make an 
agreement with the State (earlier the Board of 
Migration, now the county boards) concerning 
refugee immigration. Most municipalities do 
sign such yearly agreements but those who do 
not are often accused of not taking their share of 
a common responsibility. The political scientist 
Marie Bengtsson studied the development over 
time (1985 to 2000) of the central-local State re-
lations in the field of refugee reception and inte-
gration, and she draws the following conclusion 
(Bengtsson 2002, Summary)
“The basic paradox within this area is that the 
central government grants the refugees asylum 
but cannot give them a place to live without the 
permission of the local government. This permis-
sion is accomplished through voluntary agree-
ments signed between the National Integration 
Office and the local governments. It is then the 
local governments that integrate the refugees to 
Swedish society by providing housing, educa-
tion, healthcare and so on while the central gov-
ernment is giving the local government a grant 
to cover the expenses. The central government 
has lacked political, informational and authority-
related resources. The resource used to compen-
sate for this has been the financial resource. By 
economic incentives the central government has 
encouraged local governments to increase their 
refugee reception. This has been the central gov-
ernment’s universal weapon and has been used 
to reduce its vulnerability as well as its sensi-
tivity. For local governments, authority-related 
and financial resources have been lacking. The 
resource that the local governments have had, 
all the way through the time period studied here, 
is the organisational resource. This is something 
that the central government simply cannot pro-
vide and this is why there is a relationship of 
interdependence ˗ just as only the central gov-
ernment has authority in its power base, the lo-
cal level is the only one with organisational re-
sources.”
Most Swedish municipalities have a certain 
part of the administration that has responsibility 
for introduction activities. This could be a sepa-
rate unit or it could be a part of for example the 
section for social affairs. In Stockholm, having a 
decentralised structure with 14 city districts, each 
district has its own contact person and a group of 
civil servants that work with these issues.
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5.  Migration flows and 
settlement patterns 
5.1.  The refugee dispersal 
policy 1985-1994 
5.1.1.  Background
Statistics Sweden has data on immigration and 
emigration since about 1875 but it was not un-
til 1968 that population registers were improved 
to allow for special analyses of employment and 
housing statistics based on citizenship and coun-
try of birth information. The regional distribution 
of immigrants was seldom discussed or analysed 
before the late 1970s. The Commission of Immi-
grant Policy (appointed by Government in 1980), 
reporting in 1982, summarises almost every as-
pect of the immigration to Sweden and the de-
velopment in migration and immigrant policy 
up to that date. It is, however, difficult to find 
any information in the report indicating that the 
domestic geographical dimension of labour or 
refugee immigration had ever been considered. 
The issue is sometimes briefly brought up in 
relation to aspects of housing, for example in a 
Government Bill from 1968:
“Immigrants should have the same housing 
standard as the native population. This 
has not always been the case so far; the 
development has sometimes resulted in a 
concentration of foreigners to special districts, 
especially in the larger cities. This trend must 
be reversed” (Translation of Government Bill 
1968:142, cited in SOU 1982/49: 80).
The 1968 Bill, which was approved by the 
Swedish Parliament (Riksdag), regulated labour 
immigration policy and ˗among other things˗ it 
stipulated that decent accommodation had to be 
arranged before permission to enter Sweden for 
work could be issued by the regional labour mar-
ket authorities (Länsarbetsnämnderna), respon-
sible for deciding on such applications. Many 
cities faced severe housing shortages in the late 
1960s, and this directive did hardly affect the geo-
graphical distribution of immigrants. The guide-
lines concerning the treatment of refugees on the 
housing market were repeated in a 1975 Govern-
ment Bill. Here it is stated that “improvements of 
the housing conditions for immigrants should be 
handled within the general housing policy frame-
work and not by selective treatment” (Govern-
ment Bill 1975:26, cited in SOU 1982/49: 235). 
By and large, both labour and refugee im-
migrants were concentrated in the metropolitan 
regions and this concentration was even more 
pronounced for refugees. The labour immigrants 
were often recruited for a specific job in a specific 
firm in a particular city or town, which resulted in 
an influx of immigrants not only into the major 
cities but also into smaller urban sites, predom-
inantly in the southern and central parts of the 
country (sites relying on textile, pulp- and paper, 
mechanical and/or iron- and steel production). 
The refugees normally stayed in or close to the 
points of entry (airports and ferry harbours in the 
south of Sweden), leading to a growing concen-
tration of refugees especially in the Stockholm 
and Malmö region. Data from the Police dis-
tricts published in September 1981 showed that 
the wider Stockholm region (including the two 
neighbouring counties) received about half of all 
refugees, the Malmö region about 20 per cent 
and Gothenburg 14 per cent. (SOU 1982/49; In-
vandringspolitiken, Bilaga 8: 372.) This is prob-
ably a relevant estimate of the unregulated set-
tlement pattern that existed in the late 1970s and 
early 1980.
The 1980 Commission on Immigrant Policy 
pays particular attention to “waiting refugees”, 
i.e. persons waiting for a decision on their ap-
plication for permanent residence in Sweden. 
“Although it is not a result of immigrant policy 
considerations, the municipalities have the re-
Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States
56
sponsibility for taking care of waiting refugees”, 
declares the commission (SOU 1982/49: 226), 
and continues: “Waiting refugees are very une-
venly distributed over the country, which implies 
that some municipalities carry a large share of 
the responsibility”. A bit further on, the commis-
sion also tries to explain this unevenness: “Sev-
eral factors guide the refugee’s choice of resi-
dence. The Board of Immigration has investi-
gated this (based on interviews with local profes-
sionals within the Police and the municipalities) 
and draw the conclusion that the primary reason 
for the residence decision seems to be the ex-
istence of fellow countrymen in a municipality. 
It is normal that waiting refugees find their first 
accommodation where they have a relative or 
friend. Furthermore, it is natural that many end 
up in or nearby the arrival site. Finally, it seems 
like education opportunities can play a significant 
role for the choice of residence.” (Translation of 
SOU 1982/49: 228-9). The study referred to here 
also concludes that the housing issue is indeed 
very difficult for those municipalities which re-
ceive many refugees. Sigtuna municipality north 
of Stockholm is the location for Arlanda Interna-
tional Airport and the municipality complained 
already in 1980, that it had big problems find-
ing housing and providing for the many refugees 
who settled there.
It has been estimated (Andersson and Solid 
2003) that around 80 per cent of the refugees 
arriving in the early 1980s settled in the three 
metropolitan regions which otherwise comprise 
about half the Swedish population. If one also 
takes into account that the distribution within 
each one of these regions was very uneven, the 
imbalance takes on greater proportions. This is 
one important background for the growing local 
and national concern over the immigrant’s settle-
ment pattern that eventually led to the dispersal 
policy launched a few years later. The other fac-
tor was however the growing gap between the 
native and immigrant population with respect to 
labour market participation rates. A growing un-
employment rate in especially recently received 
refugee groups hardly affected the overall Swed-
ish economy but it definitely produced notice-
able local effects. 
The organisation of refugee reception was 
reconsidered at the beginning of the 1980s. 
The Board for Labour market issues (Arbets-
marknadsstyrelsen, AMS) ˗which had been re-
sponsible for reception of quota refugees since 
the early 1950s˗ wanted to concentrate their ef-
forts on its core issue (labour market policy meas-
ures). AMS therefore proposed to the Govern-
ment that the responsibility for refugee reception 
should be taken over by another authority. As 
mentioned above, many larger municipalities had 
received increasing numbers of asylum seekers 
and demanded that the State had to take more 
responsibility for these people. A working group 
established within the Ministry of Labour (‘The 
Working Group for the responsibility for Refu-
gees’, with the Swedish acronym AGFA) pro-
posed a model for “local reception”. The sugges-
tion had two basic components. Firstly, the mu-
nicipalities should be responsible for the intro-
duction of refugees who had received their per-
mission to stay in Sweden. Secondly, the Board 
of Immigration should be the state authority in 
charge and responsible for accommodating asy-
lum seekers and for negotiating their placement 
in a municipality after a residence permit had 
been issued (SOU 1996/55; Sverige, framtiden 
och mångfalden: 201-2.).
These proposals from the AGFA group were 
realised through a 1983 Parliament decision, and 
the Sweden-wide policy of refugee reception 
therefore commenced in 1985.
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5.1.2. The compulsory dispersal period454
One of the basic ideas with the concept of ‘local 
reception’ was to direct refugees to settle away 
from the metropolitan areas. In the spring of 
1985, SIV signed agreements with 137 out of 
Sweden’s 284 municipalities, providing for the 
reception of 8,800 refugees. However, the in-
crease in refugee immigration continued˗many 
came from the war between Iran and Iraq˗and 
a majority of these people received (permanent) 
permission to stay in Sweden. Plans needed to be 
expanded even more; only in 1985, the munici-
palities received 14,000 refugees. For the follow-
ing year, agreements were signed with 210 mu-
nicipalities concerning the reception of 12,500 
refugees. The actual receptions turned out to be 
somewhat greater (14,000). At the beginning of 
1987 it was pretty obvious for SIV that agree-
ments in the range of 9,000 to 14,000 would 
be inadequate due to the continuing increase of 
asylum seekers. The situation was problemat-
ic as waiting times at the SIV camps increased 
dramatically. The agency turned to the Minister 
of Immigration in a call for a reaction at the top 
political level (in order to increase the number 
of reception places in the municipalities), but 
no such actions were taken. (It should be noted 
that ministers in Sweden do not have the right 
to directly intervene in the work done in differ-
ent State boards.) The number of receiving mu-
nicipalities increased even more during this year 
and about 14,400 places were negotiated (and 
18,600 refugees were finally received). 1987 is 
in many ways the first year in which almost all 
Swedish municipalities became involved in the 
reception programme. 
In the mid-1980s, asylum-seekers from Iran 
and Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Eritrea had 
begun to increase in number throughout West-
4 This section is based on Andersson and Solid (2003). 
ern Europe. Towards the end of the decade, peo-
ple from Somalia, Kosovo and several of the 
former states of East Europe began to join the 
queue of asylum-seekers. The number of Swed-
ish municipalities taking part in the local recep-
tion strategy increased year by year. However, 
waits for asylum cases in Sweden to be settled 
grew ever longer, the number of refugee cen-
tres increased steadily, and more and more peo-
ple had their applications turned down as it was 
not always persecution that had caused them to 
flee their countries. 
The municipalities that signed reception con-
tracts with the SIV numbered between 270 and 
280 (out of around 286 in total at that time) dur-
ing most years of the first phase of the ‘Sweden-
wide’ policy for refugee reception (1985-1994). 
It is important to note that what would later be-
come known as the Sweden-wide strategy was 
only partly an intended policy. The idea was to 
disperse new refugees but not to involve all mu-
nicipalities throughout the country. The shift in 
organisation and launching of the new placement 
strategy occurred at a time when the number of 
asylum seekers expanded beyond all planning-
based estimates. The term ‘All-of-Sweden’ or 
‘Sweden-wide’ was coined by The Swedish Na-
tional Audit Office (Riksrevisionsverket) in an 
evaluation of the local reception of refugees pub-
lished in 1988. The rather extreme degree of dis-
persal that characterised the reception was prima-
ry caused by increasing numbers of refugees but 
also other factors influenced the outcome. Many 
municipalities own a substantial rental housing 
stock (public housing but not social housing). 
During the 1980s many municipalities had emp-
ty dwellings, leading to high costs and budget 
constraints. By placing refugees in these dwell-
ings (with the rent paid by the State), the refu-
gee-receiving municipalities also solved part of 
their financial problems ˗ at least in the short term 
(SOU 1996/55: 203).
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At the beginning of the 1990s, asylum im-
migration reached the proportions of the Second 
World War. The reason was the wars emerging in 
former Yugoslavia, which caused some 84,000 
people to apply for asylum in Sweden in 1992. 
The SIV ran eight camp facilities in 1985, 24 in 
1990 but an astonishing number of 290 in 1993! 
(SIV: Mångfald och ursprung 1997: 25). Howev-
er, the reception circumstances and opportunities 
for finding a job and to integrate in the Swedish 
society became worse than ever before due to 
economic stagnation, a financial crisis and rap-
idly growing unemployment (1991-93). 
The ‘Sweden-wide’ policy was already from 
its first day discussed from many points of de-
parture. One of the issues concerned the morality 
dimension, namely whether or not it was demo-
cratic and just to command or influence refugees 
to settle in places they had not chosen themselves. 
Even if the answer might be a yes, it was never-
theless obvious that the State’s control was only 
temporary, and perhaps illusionary, as the refugee 
could choose to migrate whenever (s)he wanted. 
Secondary migration was analysed already in the 
1988 evaluation by the Swedish National Audit 
Office. The Government and Parliament decided 
to increase the individual refugee’s responsibil-
ity for his or her settlement decision, and from 
July 1st 1994 any refugee that could arrange his 
or her own accommodation was entitled to do 
so. This soon turned out to be a radical change of 
the reception policy as more and more refugees 
managed to find their own housing, avoiding 
long waiting times at a refugee camp and ˗hav-
ing eventually received a positive reply on the 
permission to stay application˗ a placement in an 
unknown or undesired municipality. In the inves-
tigation preceding the new asylum reception law 
(LAM; Lagen om mottagande av asylsökande) 
it was suggested that perhaps ten per cent of 
the refugees would choose this option. It turned 
out to be more than half of them, an outcome 
that made the situation in the metropolitan areas 
very problematic. 
The introduction of this ‘own housing’ op-
tion has been criticised by metropolitan munici-
palities since then but it was welcomed by the 
refugees and it reduced costs for the State. The 
discussions have continued, and further State in-
vestigations have been initiated. When the last 
investigation reported in 2009 (SOU 2009/19), 
the own housing option was preferred by 56 % of 
all asylum seekers while 44% were housed with 
assistance from the Board of Migration. The pre-
sent government, elected in 2006, immediately 
closed down the state Board of Integration and 
the responsibility for introduction programmes 
has thereafter been discussed and investigated by 
a committee (Utredningen om nyanländas Ar-
betsmarknadsetablering IJ 2007:02). The Gov-
ernment decided in December 2009 that the over-
all responsibility for immigrants’ introduction, 
including advice on settlement, will be trans-
ferred during 2010 from the Board of Migration 
and the municipalities to the Board of Public Em-
ployment service (from December 1st, 2010). The 
municipalities will continue to have responsibil-
ity for housing issues. The County administration 
will coordinate settlement and housing issues in 
each county. Many had wished for a return to 
the Sweden-wide policy for refugee reception 
and perhaps a decision to make it mandatory 
for municipalities to accept refugees. However, 
the government points out that a municipality 
cannot be forced to accept refugees. Settlement 
will be based on volunteer agreements between 
the State and each municipality but it will be 
based on some sort of fixed annual number for 
each county, which in turn will be based on the 
conditions on the labour market (Regeringens 
proposition 2009/10:60). Whether or not these 
reforms ˗ in many ways a return to the division of 
responsibility that existed during the labour im-
migration period in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s˗ 
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will have any effect on integration levels and/or 
settlement patterns remain to be seen. 
5.2.  Urban area-based policies: the 
metropolitan development initiative565
The type of refugee migration that has domi-
nated immigration to Sweden and many other 
countries since the 1970s, gave rise to differ-
ent types of policy developments. Firstly, as de-
scribed above, the geography of immigration, i.e. 
the immigrants’ settlement patterns, became an 
important political issue. Secondly, labour mar-
ket integration of the newcomers seemed to be 
a much bigger problem compared to earlier ex-
periences. Thirdly, discrimination emerged as a 
new and seriously discussed problem. These is-
sues were brought together in the directives giv-
en to a new committee, set up by the Govern-
ment in 1995.
The Committee on Immigrant Policy was 
given a mandate to clarify all relevant aspects of 
immigrant policy, and to address (both empiri-
cally and theoretically) such issues as the fail-
ure of the integration of the labour market, the 
increasing amount of ethnic residential segre-
gation, geographical mobility and regional set-
tlement patterns, the country-wide strategy for 
refugee reception, religious factors, immigrants’ 
involvement in politics and organisations, lan-
guage policies, return migration, and the eco-
nomics of immigration (Andersson 1999). In 
the commission’s final report it recommended 
that immigrant policy should be restricted to a 
maximum period of five years after immigra-
tion and that thereafter immigrants should be 
seen as “ordinary Swedish citizens” and that 
they should not be targets of selective policy 
measures . However, the absence of a selective 
policy necessitates, according to the committee, 
5  This section is based on Andersson (1999, 2003, 2006) 
and Andersson, Bråmå, Holmqvist (2010).
that cultural diversity must be regarded as the 
backbone of all policies (mainstreaming). Final-
ly, the commission stated that the current situa-
tion calls for short-term special actions regarding 
labour market integration and residential segre-
gation. Among these special actions, the com-
mittee argued for state support for finding new 
methods regarding ways of counteracting social 
exclusion in “immigrant-dense” neighbourhoods 
(SOU 1996/55). The committee’s proposals be-
came active policy by a parliament decision in 
1997.The big city policy, or officially called Mu-
nicipal Development initiative, were a program 
that was active from 1998 to 2006. It targeted the 
three metropolitan areas of Stockholm, Gothen-
burg and Malmö (Öresjö et al. 2004)
When the Metropolitan Development Initia-
tive (MDI) was launched in 1998, it represented 
something new in the Swedish context, name-
ly the notion that not only peripheral regions 
with decreasing populations and related eco-
nomic problems needed extra support, but also 
the three largest city regions (Stockholm, Goth-
enburg and Malmö). In a globalised world, in-
creasingly characterised by competition between 
countries, regions and cities, the ‘growth motors’ 
of the Swedish economy needed financial sup-
port in order to stay competitive and to attend 
to problems that might threaten long-term eco-
nomic growth.
A reading of the government Bill where the 
MDI was proposed (Proposition 1997/98:165) 
makes it clear that the grounds for initiating the 
policy were many (see also Andersson 1999, 
2001). The main reason, however, was increased 
problems during the 1990s with segregation and 
social polarisation, in the wake of the in-migra-
tion of several hundred thousand refugees to the 
large MP housing estates of the metropolitan sub-
urbs. The overall aim of the policy was to ‘break’ 
segregation and to work for equal and compa-
rable living conditions for the inhabitants of the 
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three largest cities. This overall aim was also 
reformulated into eight more specific goals, ad-
dressing subjects such as unemployment, welfare 
dependency, education and health. In the Bill, the 
understanding of segregation is mainly that of 
social, or class, segregation; it is social polari-
sation, and the risk of this resulting in a divided 
society, that is emphasised. However, the gov-
ernment also acknowledged that the social and 
ethnic dimensions of segregation were becom-
ing more and more intertwined, or as they put it: 
‘class society has taken on ethnic characteristics’ 
(Proposition, 1997/98:165, p. 8).
A new body, the Commission on Metropoli-
tan areas, was established in 1999 and was given 
the task of developing and co-ordinating the new 
urban policy (Proposition, 1997/98:165). More 
specifically, the work of the Commission had 
two aims: (1) to promote economic growth and 
more effective planning in the metropolitan re-
gions; and (2) to represent the state when Local 
Development Agreements (LDAs) were negoti-
ated between the state and selected municipalities 
in the metropolitan areas. The introduction of the 
LDA model of support signified a departure from 
the general and universal approaches tradition-
ally preferred by the Swedish Social Democrats 
in tackling unemployment and social exclusion. 
One reason for launching this rather un-ortho-
dox approach in order to tackle the appearance 
and growth of localised ‘pockets of poverty’ was 
probably that the adjustment to the EU monetary 
regime in the early 1990s made the scope for tra-
ditional Keynesian policy measures much more 
limited. Officially, however, the motive was that 
the new situation called for un-orthodox solu-
tions. A preliminary version of the new policy 
was launched in 1995, with the explicit aim of 
developing new methods for dealing with unem-
ployment and the social exclusion of immigrants 
(Budgetproposition 1994/95:100).
There are many similarities between the MDI 
and area-based urban programmes that have been 
in operation in other EU countries (see Burg-
ers and Vranken 2004; De Decker et al. 2003; 
van Gent, Musterd and Ostendorf 2009). First, 
the policy was selective, in the sense that a lim-
ited number of neighbourhoods were targeted, 
and also limited in time to bout three years. The 
first round of LDAs involved a total of 24 poor, 
immigrant-dense neighbourhoods in seven mu-
nicipalities (Stockholm, Botkyrka, Haninge, 
Huddinge and Södertälje in the Stockholm re-
gion plus Gothenburg and Malmö), that shared 
SEK 2 billion (220 million Euro) over a three-
year period (Regeringsbeslut 21 January 1999, 
Tillsättande av en storstadsdelegation). The local 
development agreements were negotiated over 
a couple of years and were subsequently rene-
gotiated and also extended to several more mu-
nicipalities. 
Second, the programme was run under a co-
funding, cost-sharing principle, where the state 
and local actors provided a similar number of 
resources. Once agreed upon, each neighbour-
hood programme was regulated by a signed con-
tract (the LDA) between the state and the mu-
nicipality, a method that has been practised at 
least in other Nordic countries. Third, the policy 
involved an integrated effort to simultaneously 
address several issues such as education, em-
ployment, health, democratic participation and 
culture, all with a neighbourhood focus. In do-
ing that, it aimed to create partnerships between 
different local actors. The residents were also en-
couraged to take an active role in the planning 
and realisation of the programme.
One crucial difference, however, between 
the MDI and urban area-based policies in most 
other Western countries was its lack of physical 
measures. Even though one of the eight speci-
fied MDI goals was to increase the attractiveness 
of the targeted neighbourhoods, the programme 
did not include investments in housing aimed 
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at creating a more attractive housing stock. The 
reason was primarily that very few people be-
lieved that the physical structure of the estates, 
let alone the quality of housing, were important 
factors in the reproduction of ‘racialised’ social 
exclusion. The targeted suburban estates had, and 
still have, a weak relative position on the urban 
housing markets, and this is related to the con-
centration of socio-economically weak house-
holds. The general understanding was that this 
is primarily a social and not a physical prob-
lem. Thus, the other goals were mainly social 
and economic, and expressed in terms of the 
macro-level development of the resident, e.g. to 
raise employment rates and to reduce benefit de-
pendency rates in the targeted neighbourhoods. 
As such, the policy was more loosely fixed to 
the neighbourhood, and the outcome was more 
dependent on the achievements of the residents, 
and on whether or not they chose to remain in 
the neighbourhood if their socio-economic situ-
ation improved (Andersson and Bråmå 2004).
Several evaluations of the MDI show that 
progress was made in relation to some of the 
policy goals, notably in the employment, benefit 
dependency, and educational fields. (Bak et al. 
2004; Bevelander et al. 2004; Bunar 2004; Hos-
seini-Khalidjari 2003; Integrationsverket 2002; 
Törnquist 2004) However, most analyses show 
that the relative improvements in terms of em-
ployment and reduction of welfare dependency 
rates were not due to the programme as such but 
to improved macro-economic conditions. Levels 
of ethnic segregation were hardly affected by the 
area-based programme.
Even more importantly, the analyses here 
show that progress for the targeted population 
might very well be compatible with a failure 
vis-a`-vis the targeted neighbourhoods. The rea-
son is simply selective migration (Andersson and 
Bråmå 2004). ‘Selective migration’ means that 
the composition of the out-migrants differs from 
that of the in-migrants, and that of those staying 
in the neighbourhoods. In this case, the neigh-
bourhoods lose those residents who are relatively 
better off, and the in-migrants who replace them 
are poorer and more marginalised. In the study 
here, it was possible to show that this was indeed 
been the case in the distressed neighbourhoods 
of the Stockholm region during the 1990s. Those 
who moved into the distressed neighbourhoods 
had lower incomes and were more likely to be 
unemployed and dependent on social benefits 
than those who left the neighbourhoods and those 
who stayed there. As long as the areas targeted are 
affected by this kind of selective migration, the 
area-based urban policy might succeed in helping 
individuals, but it will not succeed in changing 
the socio-economic profile or the structural po-
sition of the targeted areas. It will therefore also 
fail in achieving the overall goal of ‘breaking’ 
segregation (see also van Gent 2009).
5.3.  The geography of 
immigration 1980 to 2008
It is the increasing geographical concentration 
of immigrants in particular localities and neigh-
bourhoods in combination with social marginali-
zation that have been identified as a sign of inte-
gration problems and this has generated policy 
responses such as refugee dispersal programmes 
and urban area-based interventions. The rather 
dramatic settlement effects of the Sweden-wide 
policy for refugee reception have been analyzed 
elsewhere (Andersson 1998; Andersson and Sol-
id 2003). In short: despite a massive secondary 
migration from smaller to larger municipalities 
it turned all municipalities in Sweden more eth-
nically diverse during the period 1980 to 1995 
(see figure 8). 
The overall distribution does not change 
much but the relative growth in immigrant den-
sity is much faster outside of the pre-reform con-
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centrations. Figure 9 illustrates the migration fre-
quencies in 1998, i.e. after the end of compulsory 
placement, but it can nevertheless be seen as in-
dicative of the very high mobility that especially 
more recent immigrants have. The Somali and 
Iraqi had three times as high mobility rate as the 
native Swedes and they moved more often at all 
scales (within neighbourhoods, cities and coun-
ties but also across county borders). It is likely 
the case that the placement policy contributed ˗ at 
least to some extent˗ to the high overall mobility 
rate among recent refugees, but it has also been 
shown that mobility rates were almost as high 
during the years before the reform (Andersson 
2000). One conclusion is therefore that recent im-
migrants will show very high levels of migration 
irrespective of the type of steering and placement 
policy that a country tries to implement. They 
are ˗irrespective of their age˗ in this sense rather 
similar to young adults who seek their paths on 
housing markets, educational markets and labour 
markets, while being very mobile.
Figure 8. Relative representation in Swedish municipalities of the foreign-born population 1980 and 
1995, and the relative change per municipality 1980 to 1995 (Andersson 1998: 402).
Country report for Sweden
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We will now focus on the more recent devel-
opment, 2000 to 2008. The overall question is of 
course whether or not dispersal has continued; 
has the own housing option introduced in 1994 
led to geographical concentration to already im-
migrant-dense regions and municipalities?
In terms of absolute numbers in 2008, Stock-
holm municipality had 170,000 foreign-born 
residents, Gothenburg 106,000, Malmö 82,000, 
Uppsala 30,000 and Botkyrka in the southern 
part of the Stockholm region had 28,000. These 
are followed by Södertälje, Lund, Västerås, Hud-
dinge and Örebro, all having 18-25,000 foreign-
born. Of these ten, Uppsala has the lowest share 
of immigrants (14.8 per cent) while Botkyrka 
has the highest (35.7 per cent). Of the three big-
gest municipalities, Malmö has 29 per cent, fol-
lowed by Gothenburg and Stockholm (both 21 
per cent). The relative growth of foreign-born 
in these municipalities 2000-2008 ranges be-
tween 22 per cent in Botkyrka and 36 per cent 
in Malmö, to be compared with the overall na-
tional growth of 27 per cent (+269,000). This 
means that although these ten municipalities 
(having the largest absolute number of immi-
grants) have increased their number of foreign-
born from 436,000 to 531,000 in eight years, 
their share of all foreign-born in Sweden de-
clined from 43.5 per cent to 41.7 per cent. In 
other words: the relative growth of Sweden’s 
foreign-born population was faster outside of the 
largest concentrations. Table 27 charts the over-
all development based on data on Sweden’s 290 
municipalities (289 in the table; one municipal-
ity was split into two in 2003).
19 municipalities had an above average share 
of immigrants in 2008 and experienced an above 
average rate of increase of foreign-born inhab-
itants 2000 to 2008. Eight of these are in the 
South (Skåne, Malmö included), four are in the 
Stockholm region (not Stockholm itself) and one 
is in the Gothenburg region. None is north of 
Örebro. Only five out of 289 experienced de-
creasing numbers of foreign-born, all of them 
small and their combined loss were less than 
300 immigrants.
Figure 9. Annual migration frequencies for a selection of foreign-born categories in Sweden, 1998 
(Andersson 2000).
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Figure 10 shows the distribution across mu-
nicipalities (left) and the relative change 2000-
2008 (right). First of all, 35 municipalities have 
a proportion foreign-born exceeding 16 per cent 
(national average was 13.8 per cent in 2008). 
Beside some border municipalities (along the 
Norwegian and Finnish borders) we find con-
centrations also in regions that experienced la-
bour migration in the 1950s and 1960s, such as 
Västerås, Eskilstuna and Olofström. However, 
most of these 35 are found in the three metropoli-
tan regions, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. 
Muncipalities/type of change 2000-2008
Municipalities/ Decreasing Increasing Increasing Share of Share of Change 
Proportion of below  average above average Total total the foreign- For.-born
immigrants 2008 rate (27%) rate (27%) population born 00-08
Above national mean (13.8%) 2 30 19 51 41.8 61.9 158827
Below  national mean 3 97 138 238 58.2 38.1 110306
Total 5 127 157 289 100.0 100.0 269133
Share of total population 0.4 54.0 45.6 100.0
Share of foreign-born 0.4 57.6 42.0 100.0
Change for.-born 00-08 -277 123657 145753 269133
Table 27. Number of municipalities below/above national average for immigrant density 2008, and 
their trajectory of change with respect to immigrant growth 2000 to 2008 (Geosweden).
Figure 10. The per centage foreign-born in Sweden’s municipalities, 2008, and relative change 2000-
2008 (Index, 2000=100) (Geosweden).
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Table 28. Population numbers and population change according to country of birth and municipality 
types 2000 to 2008 (Geosweden database).
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Figure 11. The relative distribution of six nationalities, 2008 (Geosweden database).
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Secondly, many more municipalities, 125, have a 
proportion foreign-born clearly below the nation-
al average. These are predominantly small, rural 
municipalities in the northern part of Sweden.
The map showing relative change 2000-2008 
tells an interesting story. It seems like many of 
these small, rural municipalities have continued 
having a rather fast expansion of immigrants. 
This message is corroborated by table 28, show-
ing population change according to country ori-
gin and type of municipality. People born in Swe-
den is the only category decreasing in sparsely 
populated municipalities, while those born in 
Eastern Europe (many with Bosnian and Rus-
sian origin) and countries outside of Europe more 
than double their numbers during this rather short 
period of time. The increase is from low levels 
and it can only compensate for about half the 
loss of native Swedes. 
The vast majority of new immigrants per-
sistently end up in the three metropolitan re-
gions and in the larger cities. Immigrants com-
prise about 75 per cent of the total population 
increase in these two municipality types. Subur-
ban municipalities mostly expand due to reloca-
tion of native Swedes.
The national geographical distribution for six 
different minority categories is shown in figure 
11. All tend to be relatively strongly concentrat-
ed to larger cities in the southern part of Swe-
den. The Iraqi is most numerous and they com-
prise 108,000. 22 municipalities have more than 
1,000 Iraqi residents; 15,000 lives in Stockholm 
city, 9,800 in Gothenburg, 8,600 in Malmö and 
6,000 in Södertälje (in the south western part of 
the Stockholm region). More than half (53 per 
cent) of all Iraqi are found in the ten most Iraqi-
dense municipalities. 
The next biggest category of these six is the 
Poles (63,000). They are slightly more dispersed 
so that the ten largest municipality concentra-
tions of Poles account for 48 per cent of all. 
Like other Eastern European groups, the Poles 
are well represented in the south (Malmö, Hels-
ingborg and Lund). Stockholm is however the 
largest concentration (9,300 Poles). The Irani-
ans counted to 57,000 in 2008. About 10,400 
reside in Gothenburg and 9,700 in Stockholm, 
followed by Uppsala (3,300) and Malmö (3,100). 
The top ten Iranian-dense municipalities account 
for 60 per cent of all Iranians. The Somali pop-
ulation (about 25,000) is the most concentrated 
one. Four municipalities have more than 1,000 
Somali-born people (Stockholm 6,000, Goth-
enburg 3,400, Malmö and Örebro 1,100 each). 
62 per cent of all Somali are found in the top 
ten municipalities. The Russians (about 33,000) 
differ from all other categories mapped here in 
the sense that they are fairly well dispersed over 
the country. The top ten Russian-dense munici-
palities account for 42 per cent of all Russians. 
This is a female-dominated category and many 
are married to or cohabitate with Swedish men 
in the northern part of Sweden. Finally, the Chi-
nese (19,000) are mostly found in the main urban 
areas; Stockholm has 3,400, Gothenburg 2,200, 
and Solna (in the Stockholm region) 1,100. 56 
per cent of all Chinese-born people are found in 
the top ten Chinese-dense municipalities.
5.4.  Residential patterns 
in the capital region
We will end this section on Sweden by present-
ing some key data on residential segregation in 
the capital region. It should be said that the pat-
terns and processes analyzed for Stockholm are 
rather similar also in other large cities in Sweden. 
In fact, a recent publication by Statistics Swe-
den concludes that “an analysis of all 72 labour 
market regions in Sweden shows that there are 
not one single region that could be identified as 
a good example in terms of housing careers for 
refugees being granted permission to stay on asy-
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lum grounds.” (Statistics Sweden 2008b: 55) It 
is of course far from all immigrants that live in 
Sweden for such reasons (asylum) but the finding 
is indicative of the problems facing a substantial 
part of the immigrant population.
What makes segregation partly different in 
Stockholm is on the one hand the scale and com-
plexity and on the other hand the administrative 
fragmentation that characterizes a large city re-
gion. The Stockholm labour market region has 
25 independent municipalities, all with different 
socioeconomic compositions, different housing 
markets and their own housing policy agenda. 
A profound lack of administrative coordination 
across the region is one obstacle for reversing 
segregation processes. We will define the region 
here as the county of Stockholm. The city it-
self (core municipality) is far too integrated with 
surrounding areas to be studied as an isolated 
phenomenon. This is particularly true when it 
comes to analyses of housing and labour mar-
ket developments. We could choose the labour 
market region but this is a bit too mechanical to 
be fully suitable in this case. We argue that the 
Figure 12. The distribution of Swedish-born in-movers to the Stockholm region 2003-2006 relative to 
foreign-born in-movers (Geosweden).
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present delimitation of the Stockholm LM re-
gion includes municipalities (west and north of 
Uppsala) which are not functionally integrated 
into the Stockholm housing market.
We will focus on four key aspects of seg-
regation in Stockholm County. Firstly, we will 
show that the basic geographical pattern is very 
stable over time and secondly that immigrant-
dense neighbourhoods are economically poor. 
Thirdly, we will demonstrate that ethnic specif-
ic differences in geographical distributions be-
tween groups can be understood in terms of an 
ethnic ˗ some would argue race-based˗ hierarchy, 
i.e. that categories living more at distance from 
the native Swedes, i.e. living in economically 
poor neighbourhoods, tend to be “visible minor-
ity” refugees from the Middle East and Africa. 
Fourthly, we will emphasize that despite the fact 
that immigrant-dense areas are reproduced over 
time, they are indeed also highly dynamic plac-
es. Stable patterns do not mean that individuals 
remain for longer periods of time in the same 
neighbourhood. 
In 2008, 20.1 per cent (397,000 out of 
Figure 13. The per centage of foreign-born in Stockholm County neighbourhoods in 2006 (quintile 
distribution) (Andersson, Amcoff and Niedomysl 2008)
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1,974,000) of all residents in Stockholm coun-
ty were foreign-born. However, 160 of all 879 
neighbourhoods have an immigrant propor-
tion exceeding 25 per cent. There are also quite 
many, 39 to be precise, having an absolute ma-
jority of immigrant residents. These 39 areas 
have 120,000 people, out of which 70,000 are 
foreign-born. Most of the remaining 50,000 are 
Sweden-born having one or two foreign-born 
parents. Clearly, many immigrants live clustered 
among other immigrants and at a distance from 
native Swedes in the region. 
Let us start this overview by focusing on 
one of the most decisive factors sustaining and 
reinforcing ethnic residential segregation in the 
capital region, patterns of in-migration. Figure 12 
shows over- and underrepresentation of Sweden-
born in-migrants per neighbourhood in relation 
to foreign-born in-migrants. Areas coloured in 
red have over-representation of in-migrants with 
Swedish background while blue areas are more 
common destinations for immigrants. The two 
categories have a similar size during the 2003 to 
2006 period, 70,000 to 75,000 in-moving people. 
It is clearly the case that immigrant newcomers 
are over-represented in some of the suburban 
parts, i.e. in the areas already having a substan-
tial presence of earlier arrived immigrants. The 
native Swedes, on the other hand, dominate in-
migration to the core areas of the region. 
Figure 13 shows the population composi-
tion of neighbourhoods in 2006. The overlap 
between the two maps is obvious. Newly ar-
rived immigrants tend to move into already im-
Table 29. Tenure composition of Stockholm County neighbourhoods according to immigrant density, 
2008 (Geosweden database).
Tenure 2008
Percent foreign- Home Coop. Public Private Other Total (N)
born in n'hood ow nership housing rental rental
0-5% 94 3 0 1 2 100 5102
5-10% 89 8 1 2 0 100 283892
10-20% 36 37 10 17 0 100 1002002
20-30% 15 36 30 18 0 100 268298
30-40% 11 26 43 21 0 100 111708
40-50% 9 21 43 27 0 100 101597
50-100% 3 15 50 32 0 100 113248
Total 36 29 18 16 0 100 1885847
Table 30. Work income composition of Stockholm County neighbourhoods according to immigrant 
density, 2008 (Geosweden database).
Percent foreign- Work income decile 2008
born in n'hood 1--2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
0-5% 17 12 11 11 9 9 9 10 12 100
5-10% 13 8 8 7 7 8 10 13 25 100
10-20% 16 9 8 7 7 9 10 13 20 100
20-30% 21 10 10 9 9 10 10 10 10 100
30-40% 27 12 11 10 9 9 8 8 5 100
40-50% 32 14 11 9 8 8 7 6 5 100
50-100% 43 15 11 9 7 6 5 4 2 100
Total 19 10 9 8 8 9 10 11 17 100
Country report for Sweden
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migrant-dense neighbourhoods, reproducing and 
reinforcing residential segregation. So what char-
acterizes these neighbourhoods, except from the 
absence of native Swedes?
Well, most of them were built in the 1960s 
and 1970s, many as part of the so-called Million 
Homes Program. They are predominantly but not 
exclusively public housing neighbourhoods and 
they were early on inhabited by working class 
people moving into to these modern dwellings 
from other parts of Stockholm, or other parts of 
Sweden, or from abroad. It can be estimated that 
they had an above average share of (labour) im-
migrants from the outset but of course nothing 
close to the proportion they step by step accumu-
lated during the 1980s. In most cases, their po-
sition as immigrant-dense neighbourhoods was 
achieved already in the 1990s. Hence, rather few 
have been added to the list over the past decade. 
Table 29 shows the distribution of tenure forms 
for areas having different proportions of foreign-
born. Table 30 shows the decile income distribu-
tion using the same neighbourhood classification. 
It is obvious that Swedish-dense neighbourhoods 
in terms of tenure almost entirely comprise home 
ownership and very seldom public rental hous-
ing. Neighbourhoods with a high proportion of 
foreign-born are heavily dominated by low in-
come people; 43 per cent of all inhabitants in 
immigrant majority neighbourhoods belong the 
lowest income quintile (20 per cent poorest). It 
should however be noted that the poor immi-
grant-dense neighbourhoods do have some high 
income residents. They are thus socially mixed 
but it is a mix that is clearly skewed towards the 
bottom of the income ladder.
Figure 11 shows the number of foreign-born 
per neighbourhood category broken down by na-
tionalities (based on country of birth). Studies 
have repeatedly shown that all Swedish cities 
have a distinct ˗and similar˗ ethnic hierarchy, 
meaning that different immigrant categories 
live more or less segregated from the majority 
Swedes. According to figure 14, more than half 
of all immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and 
from Western Asia reside in the most immigrant-
dense neighbourhoods. Other immigrants, for in-
stance those from Eastern Asia and Latin Amer-
ica, are less concentrated to these areas (30 to 
40 per cent live in immigrant-dense neighbour-
hoods). Finally, immigrants from Nordic coun-
tries and other Western countries are even less 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
North America, Australia, New Zeeland
Born in Sweden
Total Stockholm County
Rest of Nordic countries
Rest of Western European countries
Eastern Asia
Eastern European
Latin America incl Central America & …
Western Asia incl Turkey and N Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 14. Per cent per nationality (country of birth) residing in Stockholm County neighbourhoods 
having 30 per cent immigrants or more, 2008 (Geosweden database).
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concentrated to these areas (10 to 20 per cent). 
Table 31 shows the ethnic hierarchy measured 
as index of dissimilarity (each category is com-
pared to the Sweden-born population). This hi-
erarchy is very stable over time but the overall 
tendency is decreasing levels of segregation for 
all but more recently arrived nationalities. 
Levels of mobility are high in many parts 
of the Stockholm region. In general, levels are 
higher in rental housing (often around 15 per 
cent annually), followed by cooperative hous-
ing (around 11 per cent) and they are lowest in 
home ownership (below 8 per cent). The un-
even proportion of these tenure forms result in 
geographical variation in turnover rates so that 
areas having almost entirely rental housing will 
experience a high turnover rate. It has further-
more been shown (see section 5.3) that immi-
grants, especially during some years after having 
immigrated, have a clearly higher level of geo-
graphical mobility compared to the native popu-
lation. We can therefore expect rental dominated 
housing estates comprising a high proportion of 
relatively recent immigrants to show very high 
turnover rates. This is also the case. Table 32 
shows that about 45 per cent of all people mov-
ing in to eight immigrant-dense areas in Stock-
holm 1999 to 2002 (four years) have left the 
area in 2006. Some of those who left their area 
moved to one of the other seven areas listed in 
the table, i.e. they will still be in an immigrant-
dense area. However, most of the movers have 
found other types of destinations in the region.
The immigrant-dense areas can be character-
ised as stable if we measure the proportion of 
immigrants in them over time. They are however 
very dynamic places seen from the perspective 
of individual residents. Although it is possible 
to find many who lack alternatives on the very 
tight Stockholm housing market, and therefore 
are more or less stuck in a particular housing es-
tate, the typical pattern is that people do found 
their way out of the areas. It has been shown 
elsewhere (Andersson and Bråmå 2004) that this 
process is highly selective and that immigrant-
dense areas lose over time their more success-
ful residents, including immigrants having spent 
many years in Sweden, while they constantly at-
tract new recently arrived refugee migrants. The 
difference in labour market participation rates 
between out-movers and in-movers is very big, 
often around 30 per centage points.
6.  conclusions
Sweden has a rather long history of welfare 
policies, where the state traditionally has been 
involved in people’s life from cradle to grave. 
Already in the beginning of the 1930s the first 
political steps towards a welfare approach were 
Table 31. Index of Dissimilarity according to 
country of birth in 2000 and 2008 for Stockholm 
County (Geosweden database).
Country of birth 2000 2008
Somalia 0,80 0,78
Syria 0,73 0,68
Turkey 0,67 0,64
Iraq 0,65 0,65
lebanon 0,65 0,58
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0,64 0,55
Ethiopia 0,62 0,61
Chile 0,51 0,46
Greece 0,50 0,46
Iran 0,50 0,42
China and Taiwan 0,48 0,43
Russia and Soviet Union 0,48 0,37
Rest of Africa 0,46 0,47
Poland 0,28 0,36
USA 0,27 0,26
Estonia 0,26 0,26
Uk 0,23 0,21
Finland 0,22 0,22
Denmark 0,19 0,20
Germany 0,16 0,17
Norway 0,16 0,16
*Stockholm County comprises about 900 
neighbourhoods (SAMS). SAMS units in this region 
have an average population of around 2000 people.
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taken. The fundamental pillar of the welfare state 
is employment and the norm is a dual earner 
household. The state is obliged to step in with 
economic compensation, when a citizen is unable 
to work (in case of sickness, child care, unem-
ployment and retirement). The Swedish welfare 
system was from the beginning both generous 
and universal. Over time this model has been 
questioned both from economical and ideologi-
cal points of view. In times with a harsher eco-
nomic climate, with high unemployment rates 
and in the context of a globalized economy, a 
generous and universal welfare state has obvious-
ly been harder to maintain politically. In the lib-
eral/conservative ideology a universal and gen-
erous welfare state is thought to create disincen-
tives to employment. Sweden has also changed 
from being an emigration country to an immi-
gration country. A large influx of refugees could 
also challenge the rhetorical logic of a universal 
welfare state. 
Over the last decades Sweden has experi-
enced an increased polarisation in incomes and 
an even more pronounced polarisation between 
richer and poorer housing estates in metropolitan 
regions (Andersson, Bråmå, Holmqvist 2010). 
Unemployment rates are substantially higher to-
day compared to 20 years ago and the dependent 
ratio is also increasing. The welfare state still has 
a major impact on the risk for people to avoid 
poverty, but some household types have higher 
risk, as single parents, young and immigrants.
Today, the welfare system is less generous 
and not as universal as it used to be. The big-
gest changes are to be found in relation to hous-
ing. Housing has always been primarily a market 
good, but the state earlier used correctives and 
spent tax money in order to make it relatively 
affordable and accessible to most households ir-
respective of income. Rhetorically, the State also 
declared a social mix ambition to decrease hous-
ing segregation. The housing market has been 
deregulated step by step from the 1980s onwards 
and the state correctives have become fewer and 
weaker. Housing subsidies, state loans and other 
policies influencing new construction have been 
abolished. The public housing sector is compet-
ing on the same terms as the private sector and 
housing allowances are given to fewer house-
holds and are less generous. The soft rent reg-
ulation system where public rental companies 
have a key role is now undergoing changes and 
will most probably lead up to market rents in 
the future. New construction is mainly targeting 
the owner segment of the market and the rental 
sector (both the public and private) is decreas-
ing in size. The housing outcomes are further 
housing segmentation and increasing or at best 
non-changing levels of residential segregation. 
We have analyzed immigration and integra-
Moved to another Other area Other Moved Died Total Numbers
Main immigrant Remained immigr.-dense in Stockholm part abroad
concentration areas in 2006 area in Stockh. county of Sweden
Järva 60.2 7.4 18.1 6.1 7.8 0.4 100.0 12.700
E4 Syd 57.8 6.0 23.4 7.3 4.9 0.5 100.0 6.000
Immigrant-dense Södertälje 60.8 2.4 22.7 9.2 4.1 0.7 100.0 4.800
Immigrant-dense Botkyrka 55.4 7.5 24.8 6.3 5.6 0.3 100.0 5.200
Hässelby area 45.7 8.1 31.8 10.0 3.8 0.7 100.0 3.200
Rågsved area 47.4 7.2 31.7 9.5 3.8 0.4 100.0 2.800
Hallonbergen area 46.4 4.1 29.6 13.4 6.1 0.4 100.0 1.700
Immigrant-dense Solna 34.5 4.5 37.1 15.4 8.4 0.2 100.0 1.200
Total eight areas 55.6 6.4 23.8 7.9 5.9 0.5 100.0 37.500
Table 32. All individuals moving into eight major immigrant-dense areas in Stockholm 1999 to 2002. 
Where do they live in 2006? (Geosweden database).
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tion policy since World War II and we identify 
some important moments when changes have 
been more profound. Due to the fact that Sweden 
was not directly involved in the war activities, the 
country played a role for giving refugees from 
the neighbouring countries a safe haven. After 
the war, the country’s export oriented firms saw 
rapidly increasing demand for their products and 
needed more labour than was available within 
the country’s borders. The labour immigration 
period therefore started almost immediately after 
the war and it continued until around 1970. Since 
then most of the immigrants have been granted 
permission to stay on refugee or humanitarian 
grounds (and family ties), and most of those ar-
riving have had their origin outside of Europe. 
Sweden has recently taken steps to open up also 
for non-European labour migrants.
In terms of integration policy, the 1970s were 
formative. In 1975, multiculturalism was estab-
lished as a core value for the State’s view on im-
migrants in Sweden. Immigrants were granted 
the rights to take part in local elections, their cul-
tural organizations were given State and munici-
pal economic support, immigrant school children 
were entitled to get education in their mother 
tongue etc. About ten years later, in 1986, an im-
portant modification or clarification was done in 
relation to one component of this multicultural 
policy, namely the “freedom of choice” compo-
nent. It was then declared that some core “Swed-
ish” (universal) rights ˗for women and children˗ 
could not to be compromised with reference to 
cultural or religious differences. However, Swe-
den has yet not embarked on an assimilation poli-
cy route and the country has so far had a relatively 
generous attitude towards immigration and im-
migrants’ rights. According to the European Mi-
grant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), Sweden 
ranks at the top among 28 countries when sum-
marizing over 100 different policy indicators (see 
Migrant integration... 2010). Surveys aiming at 
studying national differences in attitudes on im-
migration and immigrants also show that Swedes 
are the most pro-immigrant country in Europe 
(See European Social Survey 2010).
There are currently (Sept. 30, 2010) 1 
357,000 foreign-born individuals living in Swe-
den (14.4 per cent of the total population, 9.4 Mil-
lion). Most of these are well integrated in Swed-
ish society and make important contributions to 
the Swedish economy and to social and cultural 
life in general. However, integration problems 
are also a reality: many, especially those having 
arrived during the past 25 years from non-Euro-
pean countries, have subordinate positions on the 
labour and housing markets. The efficiency of 
the introductory programme (including the SFI, 
Swedish for immigrants) has been questioned 
since the 1980s and many institutional reforms 
have been launched in order to make integra-
tion faster and better; still without much result.
The chapter on settlement patterns shows that 
immigrants in Sweden ˗like in other countries˗ 
have a much more urban oriented settlement pat-
tern in comparison with the native-born popu-
lation. The tendency is however that the rapid 
relative growth of the immigrant population over 
the past three decades affects most parts of the 
country. The relative growth is fastest outside 
of the metropolitan regions. This is not only an 
effect of the refugee dispersal policy launched 
in 1984. The trend continues also after the im-
portant reform of this policy in 1994, when the 
“own housing option” (EBO) was introduced. 
Ethnic residential segregation is a salient 
feature of all larger Swedish cities. Larger cit-
ies normally comprise more than 15 per cent 
foreign-born and more than every fifth resident 
has a foreign background. Many neighbourhoods 
in these cities have a much higher proportion 
of immigrants and sometimes, like in Stock-
holm, Gothenburg and Malmö, several housing 
estates have a majority of immigrant residents. 
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Schools in these areas have subsequently few 
native Swedish-speaking pupils.
Ethnic residential segregation is also some-
thing that has attracted much political and re-
search interest over the past 20 to 30 years. Dif-
ferent policy measures have been launched in or-
der to aim at a more regionally balanced situation 
concerning immigrants’ (in particular refugees’) 
settlement and also to improve the social situ-
ation in the immigrant-dense neighbourhoods. 
Both the refugee dispersal policy and the Met-
ropolitan development initiative were introduced 
as means that were thought to be able to affect 
ethnic segregation in metropolitan areas. Neither 
has been successful in the sense that the level of 
segregation has decreased in any noticeable way. 
We have pointed out some key features of 
the ethnic residential segregation in Stockholm 
County. Firstly, that the basic geographical pat-
tern is very stable over time and secondly that im-
migrant-dense neighbourhoods are economically 
poor. Thirdly, we have demonstrated that ethnic 
specific differences in geographical distributions 
between groups can be understood in terms of 
an ethnic ˗some would argue race-based˗ hier-
archy, i.e. that categories living more at distance 
from the native Swedes and also are living in 
economically poor neighbourhoods, tend to be 
“visible minority” refugees from the Middle East 
and Africa. Fourthly, we have emphasized that 
despite the fact that immigrant-dense areas are 
reproduced over time, they are indeed also highly 
dynamic places. Stable patterns do not mean that 
individuals remain for longer periods of time in 
the same neighbourhood. 
In the next step of this research project we 
will focus much more in detail on all these four 
aspects. We will study housing careers and neigh-
bourhood dynamics and compare the develop-
ments in Stockholm with those in Copenhagen, 
Helsinki and Oslo. Hopefully, we will be able to 
see both similarities and differences and to bet-
ter understand the particularities of each city and 
country, i.e. the importance of the different hous-
ing systems and integration policies for shaping 
and re-shaping residential segregation.
References 
Ahmed, A. M. & Hammarstedt, M. (2008). Discrimi-
nation in the rental housing market: A field experi-
ment on the Internet. Journal of Urban Econom-
ics, Elsevier, 64:2, 362-372. 
Åhren, P. (2004). Housing allowances, In Lujanen, 
M. (ed.) Housing and housing policy in the Nor-
dic countries. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of 
Ministers.
ÅhrÉn, P. (2007). Housing allowance systems in Swe-
den. In Kemp, P. (eds.): Housing allowances in 
comparative perspective. The Policy Press, Bristol 
Andersson, R. (1998). Socio-spatial dynamics: Ethnic 
divisions of mobility and housing in Post-Palme 
Sweden. Urban Studies, 35:3, 397-428.
Andersson, R. (1999). “Divided cities” as a Policy-
based Notion in Sweden. Housing Studies, 14: 
5, 601-624.
Andersson, R. (2000). Segregerande urbanisering? 
Geografisk rörlighet i Sveriges storstadsregioner. 
Hemort Sverige, Norrköping: Board of Integra-
tion, pp. 149-182.
Andersson, R. (2001). The Swedish Area-based Ur-
ban Strategy. In: I. Christofersson (ed) Swedish 
Planning in Times of Diversity, pp. 11-15. Gävle: 
Plan, The Swedish Society for Town and Country 
Planning.
Andersson, R. (2003). Urban development pro-
grammes in a Scandinavian welfare state: a top-
down approach to bottom-up planning? In: Pascal 
de Decker et al, On the origins of urban develop-
ment programmes in nine European countries, pp. 
165-181. Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Garant. 
Andersson, R. ( 2006). “Breaking Segregation” - Rhe-
torical Construct or Effective Policy? The Case of 
the Metropolitan Development Initiative in Swe-
den, Urban Studies 43:4, 787-799.
Andersson, R. (2008). Skapandet av svenskglesa 
bostadsomrÅden. In Lena Magnusson (ed.): Den 
delade staden, 115-153. Boréa, Umeå.
Andersson, R., Amcoff, J. & Niedomysl, T. (2008). 
Inflyttningen till stockholmsregionen 1994-
2006 i ett etniskt perspektiv. Befolkningsprog-
nos 2008˗2017, Rapport 2008:3, Regionplane 
och trafikkontoret. Stockholms läns landsting. 
Electronic publication: http://www.rtk.sll.se/
Global/Dokument/Statistik/Befolkningsprog-
Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States
76
noser/2008_3_Inflyttningen_till_stockholmsre-
gionen.pdf (English: In-migration to the Stock-
holm region 1994-2006 from an ethnic perspec-
tive)
Andersson, R. & Bråmå, Å. (2004). Selective migra-
tion in Swedish distressed neighbourhoods: can 
area-based urban policies counteract segregation 
processes? Housing Studies, 19:4, pp. 517˗539.
Andersson, R., Bråmå, Å., Holmqvist, E. (2010). 
Counteracting Segregation: Swedish Policies 
and Experiences. Housing Studies 25: 2, 237-256.
Andersson, R. and Molina, I. (2003). Racialization 
and migration in urban segregation processes. Key 
issues for critical geographers. In K. Simonsen & 
J. Öhman (eds.): Voices from the North, 261-282. 
Ashgate, Aldershot.
Andersson, R., Molina, I., Öresjö, E., Siwertsson, C. 
& Pettersson, L. (2003). Large housing estates in 
Sweden. Overview of developments and prob-
lems in Jönköping and Stockholm, RESTATE 
Report 2i, Utrecht.
Andersson, R. & Solid, D. (2003). Dispersal policies 
in Sweden. In V. Robinson et al (eds.): Spread-
ing the ‘burden’? A review of policies to disperse 
asylum seekers and refugees. Policy Press, Bristol. 
Appelqvist, M. (2000). Flyktingmottagandet och 
den svenska välfärdsstaten, In SOU 2000/37, 
Välfärdens förutsättningar, Fritzes Offentliga 
Publikationer, Stockholm.
Bak, M., Gunnarsson, L., Lassbo, G. & Ljungvall, 
B. (2004). Samtal pågÅr. SprÅkutveckling och 
skolresultat, Available at: http://www.goteborg.
se/prod/storstad/dalis2.nsf/vyFilArkiv/samtal_
pagar_sprakutv_skolresultat.pdf/$file/samtal_
pagar_sprakutv_skolresultat.pdf (accessed 18 
November 2004).
Baunkjaer, C. F. (2004). Housing taxation, in Lujanen, 
M. (ed.) Housing and housing policy in the Nor-
dic countries. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of 
Ministers 
Bengtsson, B. & Rothstein, B. (1997). Precisions-
bombningens problem ˗ välfärdsstaten och 
bostadspolitiken. In Andersson Å. (eds.): Bost-
aden på 2000-talet, SNS Förlag, Kristianstad.
Bengtsson, M. (2002). Stat och kommun i makt(o)
balans. En studie av flyktingmottagandet. Lund: 
Statsvetenskapliga institutionen. Lunds univer-
sitet. 
Bergenstråhle, S. (2006). Boende och välfärd 1986-
2003, Hyresgästföreningens skriftserie 2:2006, 
Stockholm.
Bevelander, P., Broomé, P., Carlson, B. & Lind-
berg, G. (2004). Variationer på framtidsmelodi. 
Storstadssatsningen i Malmö. Utvärdering av 
lokala arbets- och utvecklingscentra (Malmö : 
Malmö stad).
Boverket (2009). Konkurrens på bostadsmarknader-
na˗ ett nedslag i 14 kommuner. Karlskrona.
Borevi, K. (2010). ‘Dimensions of Citizenship: Eu-
ropean Integration Policies from a Scandinavian 
Perspective’, pp. 19-46 in Bo Bengtsson, Per 
Strömblad & Ann-Helén Bay (eds) Diversity, 
Inclusion and Citizenship in Scandinavia. New-
castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Bråmå, Å. (2006). Bostadsmarknadens institutioner 
och grindvakter i den etniskt segmenterade staden 
˗ exemplen Stockholm och Uppsala. Rapport In-
tegration 2005, Bilaga. Integrationsverket, Nor-
rköping.
Bråmå, Å. (2007). Etnisk diskriminering på bostads-
marknaden - en forskningsöversikt, Working pa-
per No. 55, Institute for Housing and Urban Re-
search, Uppsala University, Uppsala.
Bunar, N. (2004). “Det går bra, men det ser fortsatt 
dåligt ut”. Organisationen och tillämpningen av 
lokala utvecklingsavtal i Stockholms kommun. 
Utvärderingar av den nya storstadspolitiken: 
Storstadsarbete/Storstadssatsningen nr 12 (Stock-
holm, Södertörns högskola).
Burgers, J. & Vranken, J. (Eds) (2004). How to make 
a successful urban development programme. Ex-
periences from nine European countries. UGIS 
Working Paper (Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Garant).
De Decker, P., van Nieuwenhuyze, I. & Vranken, J. 
(2003). Enforced by the electorate. The rise of an 
urban policy in Flanders, in: P. de Decker, J. Vran-
ken, J. Beaumont & I. van Nieuwenhuyse. On 
the Origins of Urban Development Programmes 
in Nine European Countries (Antwerpen-Apel-
doorn: Garant).
Diskriminering på bostadsmarknaden (2010). Dis-
kriminerings ombudsmannen. 15.11.2010 <http://
www.do.se/Documents/Material/Rapporter/
Diskriminering%20p%C3%A5%20bostads-
marknaden.pdf>
Ekberg, J. & Gustafsson, B. (1995). Invandrare på 
arbetsmarknaden. Stockholm: SNS förlag.
StockholmEnström Öst, C. (2010). Housing policy 
and family formation, Economic studies 123, Dep. 
Of Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala.
Esping- Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of 
welfare capitalism. Polity, Cambridge.
European Socail Survey (2010). 15.11.2010 <http://
www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>
Eurostat statistics (2010). <http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/>
Fastighetsägarna, Hyresgästföreningen and SABO 
(2010). Balanserade ekonomiska villkor ˗ En 
skattereform för hyresrätten, Stockholm.
Försäkringskassan (2010). <https://www.forsakring-
skassan.se>
Government Offices of Sweden (2010). <http://www.
sweden.gov.se/> 
Hammar, T. (1992). The Sweden-wide strategy, In 
R.Black and V.Robinson (eds.): Geography and 
Refugees, 104-118. Belhaven, London.
Country report for Sweden
77
Hosseini-Kaladjahi, H. (2003). Stora fiskar äter 
fortfarande små fiskar. Helhetsutvärdering av 
storstadssatsningen i Botkyrka kommun (Bot-
kyrka: MÅngkulturellt centrum).
Integrationsverket (2002). På rätt väg? Nationell slu-
tutvärdering av Storstadssatsningen, Integrations-
verkets rapport nr 5 (Norrköping: Integrationsver-
ket, The Swedish Board of Integration).
IJ 2007:02 Effektiva insatser och incitament för snab-
bare arbetsmarknadsetablering för nyanlända fly-
ktingar m.fl. Stockholm: Regeringskansliet.
Kemeny, J. (1995). From Public Housing to the Social 
Market. London: Routledge.
Kreditgarantier under byggtiden (2009). Statens 
bostadskreditnämnd. Nyhetsbrev 1. <http://www.
bkn.se/upload/nyhetsbrev/BKN_Nyhetsbrev1.09.
pdf>
Lujanen, M. (eds.) (2004). Housing and housing pol-
icy in the Nordic countries, Nord 2004:7, Nordic 
council of ministers, Copenhagen.
Lundh, C. & Ohlsson, R. (1994). Från arbetskrafts-
import till flyktinginvandring, SNS Förlag, Stock-
holm. 
Magnusson, L. and Andersson, E. (2005). Kon-
sekvenser av ekonomiska och sociala förändrin-
gar i Europa. Svensk sammanfattning av det 
EU-finansierade forskningsprojektet SOCOHO. 
Uppsala universitet, Institutet för bostads och ur-
banforskning. Working Paper No. 47.
Magnusson, L. & Turner, B. (2008). Municipal Hous-
ing Companies in Sweden˗ Social by Default, 
Housing Theory and society 25:4 275-296.
Magnusson Turner, L. (2010). Study on housing and 
exclusion. Country report for Sweden.
Migrant integration policy index (2010). British 
Council and Migration Policy Group (MPG). 
15.11.2010 <www.integrationindex.eu/>
Morrison, Schiff & Sjöblom (2008). The International 
Migration of Women. The World Bank, Wash-
ington.
Normann, T. M., Rønning, E. and Nørgaar, E. (2009). 
Challenges to the Nordic Welfare State - Com-
parable Indicators, Nordic Social Statistical Com-
mittee (NOSOSCO), Copenhagen.
OECD Statistical database (2009). <https.www.oecd.
org/statsportal>
Ombudsmannen mot etnisk diskriminering (2008). 
Diskriminering på den svenska bostadsmarkan-
den. ˗  En rapport från DO:s särskilda arbete under 
Åren 2006-2008 kring diskriminering på bostads-
marknaden, DO:s rapportserie 2008:3.
Öresjö, E., Andersson, R., Holmqvist, E., Pettersson, 
L., Siwertsson, C. (2004). Large Housing Estates 
in Sweden. Policies and practices. Restate report 
3i. Urban and Regional Research Centre. Faculty 
of Geosciences. University of Utrecht. 
Över 220,000 småhusägare får högre fastighetsskatt 
nästa År (2010). Villaägarnas riksförbund. <http://
www.villaagarna.se/pls/portal/docs/1/650488.
PDF>
Proposition 1994/95:100, Budgetpropositionen. 
Swedish government.
Proposition 1997/98:165, Utveckling och rättvisa en 
politik för storstaden på 2000-talet. Stockholm: 
Regeringskansliet. 
Proposition 2009/10:185, Allmännyttiga kommunala 
bostadsaktiebolag och reformerade hyressättning-
sregler. Stockholm: Regeringskansliet.
Proposition 2009/10:1 Budgetpropositionen för 2010 
(Budget Bill 2010). Stockholm: Regeringskan-
sliet.
Proposition 2009/10:60, Nyanlända invandrares ar-
betsmarknadsetablering ˗ egenansvar med pro-
fessionellt stöd. Stockholm. Stockholm: Reger-
ingskansliet.
Robinson, V., Andersson, R. & Musterd, S., 2003, 
Spreading the “burden”? A review of policies to 
disperse asylum seekers and refugees. Bristol: 
Policy Press. 
Sandberg, A. (1998). Integrationens arenor: En studie 
av flyktingmottagande, arbete, boende, förenings- 
och församlingsliv i tre kommuner [a study of 
refugee policy, employment, housing, and social 
and community affiliations in three Swedish mu-
nicipalities]. Geografiska regionstudier no 36. Up-
psala: Dept. of Social and Economic Geography, 
Uppsala University.
SNA (National Atlas of Sweden), 1991, The Popula-
tion. Stockholm: SNA Publishing.
SOU 1982/49: Invandringspolitiken, Bakgrund. Del-
betänkande av invandrarpolitiska kommittÉn, 
Liber, Allmänna Förlaget, Stockholm.
SOU 1974/69, Invandrarutredningen 3. Stockholm.
SOU 1974/70, Invandrarutredningen 4. Stockholm.
SOU 1982/49: Invandringspolitiken, Bakgrund. Del-
betänkande av invandrarpolitiska kommittÉn, 
Liber, Allmänna Förlaget, Stockholm.
SOU 1996/55: Sverige, framtiden och mÅngfalden. 
Slutbetänkande frÅn Invandrarpolitiska kommit-
tÉn, Fritzes, Stockholm.
SOU 1997/82 Lika möjligheter. Betänkande av Utred-
ningen om introduktion för nyanlända invandrare 
samt en ny myndighetsstruktur för det integration-
spolitiska området, Fritzes, Stockholm.
SOU 2009/19. Aktiv väntan ˗ asylsökande i Sverige. 
Betänkande av Asylmottagningsutredningen. Frit-
zes, Stockholm.
Statens bostadskreditnämnd (2010). 3.9.2010. <http://
www.bkn.se/upload/nyhetsbrev/BKN_Nyhets-
brev1.09.pdf>
Statens Invandrarverk (SIV) (1997). Mångfald och 
ursprung, Board of Immigration, Norrköping.
Statistics Sweden (SCB) (2004). Immigration and 
emigration in the postwar period, Demographic 
Reports 2004:5. Statistiska centralbyrÅn.
Statistics Sweden (SCB) (2008). Integration ˗ en 
Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States
78
beskrivning av läget i Sverige, Integration: Rap-
port 1, Statistiska centralbyrån.
Statistics Sweden (SCB) (2008b). Invandrades flytt-
mönster, Demographic reports 2008:4. Statistiska 
centralbyrån.
Statistics Sweden (SCB) (2009). Bostads- och byg-
gnadsstatistisk årsbok 2009 (Yearbook of Hous-
ing and Building Statistics 2009), Statistiska cen-
tralbyrån.
Statistics Sweden (SCB) (2010). Bostads- och byg-
gnadsstatistisk årsbok 2010 (Yearbook of Hous-
ing and Building Statistics 2010), Statistiska cen-
tralbyrån.
Statistics Sweden (SCB) Born in Sweden ˗ but still 
different? The significance of parents’ country 
of birth. Demographic reports 2010:2, Statistics 
Sweden.
Stephens, M. et. al (2010). Study on housing and ex-
clusion: welfare policies, housing provision and 
labour markets. Working paper.
Swedish citizenship (2010). Migrationsverket, Board 
of Migration. <http://www.migrationsverket.se/
info/779_en.html>
Turner, B. & Whitehead, C. (2002). Reducing hous-
ing subsidy: Swedish housing policy in an inter-
national context, Urban studies 39:2, 201-217.
Törnqvist, A. (2004). Storstadssatsningen i ett om-
rådesperspektiv (Gothenburg: City of Gothen-
burg).
van Gent, W. (2009). Realistic regeneration. Housing 
contexts and social outcomes of neighbourhood 
interventions in Western European cities. Acade-
misch proefscrift, University of Amsterdam.
van Gent, W., Musterd, S. & Ostendorf, W. (2009). 
Disentangling neighbourhood problems; area-
based interventions in Western European cities, 
Urban Research & Practice, 2, pp. 53˗67.
Widgren, J. (1980). Svensk invandrarpolitik, Liber 
Läromedel, Stockholm.
II
contextualising ethnic residential segregation in 
Denmark: welfare, housing and immigration
Hans Skifter Andersen
Danish Building Research Institute, Aalborg University
Country report for Denmark
Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States
80
Country report for Denmark
81
1.  The Danish welfare State
Like the other Nordic countries Denmark can be 
characterised as a welfare state. There is wide 
theoretical and political agreement over the fact 
that the Nordic Welfare Model exists (see Nor-
dic welfare... 2010) and in many fundamental 
ways differs from other welfare models (Cas-
tles 2004). The main features of the NWM are 
the following ones:
a. Comprehensiveness of social policy: encom-
passing social security, social and health 
care services, education, housing, employ-
ment etc.
b. Strong state involvement and extensive public 
responsibility in different social policy areas.
c. High degree of universalism: all pay and all 
benefit.
d. High degree of de-commodification and de-
familisation through social policies.
e. Well-established gender equality policies bas-
ing on state feminism.
f. High level of social service provision: the no-
tion of ‘public social services state’.
g. Social rights basing on citizenship.
h. Uniformity of service provision: middle and 
upper classes use same services as others.
i. Municipalities responsible for providing ser-
vices and partly also financing them.
j. Benefits are largely tax financed.
k. Strong political and popular support to the 
NWM and universalism in particular.
l. Active labour market policy.
Due to these and other features social rights of 
citizens are more extensive in the Nordic wel-
fare societies than in other countries; and, the 
NWM decommodifies labour power and pro-
motes gender equality more effectively than most 
other models. It has succeeded in distributing 
resources between rich and poor so that only 
a small minority of residents in these countries 
lives in poverty. There are less children and so-
lo mothers living in poverty than in other coun-
tries. The NWM has created opportunities for 
women to act as both paid workers and carers 
by reconciling work and family responsibilities. 
Many economists have shown that high social 
expenditure and the high level of taxation closely 
attached to the model has not been an obstacle 
to economic growth and competitiveness in the 
global economy. There is also some evidence 
that the NWM promotes active citizenship in 
terms of political and social participation not to 
speak of labour market participation of both men 
and women. Finally, the NWM has proved to be 
fairly stable in spite of periods of economic re-
cession and high unemployment (e.g. Kautto et 
al. 1999; Kautto et al. 2001).
Universalism, tax financing and strong popu-
lar and political support seems to strengthen each 
other. Universalism as an ideal and principle of 
redistribution has been important both for so-
cial democracy (cross-class solidarity) and wom-
en’s movement (gender equality) in smoothening 
economic inequalities and creating equal oppor-
tunities. It has also favoured regional equality, 
which explains strong support given to univer-
salism by Agrarian and Centre parties.
contextualising ethnic residential segregation in 
Denmark: welfare, housing and immigration
Hans Skifter Andersen
Danish Building Research Institute, Aalborg University
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1.1.  Income inequality and poverty 
A comparison of welfare payments in the Scan-
dinavian countries in 2002 (Bonke et al. 2005) 
showed that Danish welfare payments have 
been somewhat more generous than in Norway 
and Sweden. Especially because of the relative 
high income transfers and the general character 
of these transfers income inequality is lower in 
Denmark than in most other countries. Meas-
ured among the total population Denmark has 
the lowest Gini coefficient after taxes and trans-
fers among the Nordic countries (according to 
OECD 2010). When comparing incomes among 
the working age population 18-65 years, Den-
mark does not differ much from the other coun-
tries. This point to that income transfers have a 
greater effect on the general income inequality 
in Denmark.
Table 1 shows figures on the development 
in incomes and income dispersion in Denmark 
since the mid-1980s based on OECD figures. 
While the Gini coefficient for the total popu-
lation before taxes and transfers has increased 
somewhat from 0.37 to 0.42, there has only been 
small changes in the coefficient for incomes af-
ter taxes and transfers, which is about 0.23. The 
coefficient is the same among the working age 
population, but this coefficient has increased a 
little since the 1980s. Among the retirement age 
population the effects of transfers are very high. 
While the coefficient before transfers and taxes 
is about 0.7, it is only 0.2 after taxes and trans-
fers. There has only been small changes over 
the years.
There are different methods used to measure 
the poverty rate of a country. One is the persons 
with an income below 50 per cent of the median 
income are poor. In Table 2 is shown the figures 
for Denmark compared with the other Nordic 
countries calculated by OECD.
According to this measure 5.3 per cent of the 
Period
mid-80s around 
1990
mid-90s around 
2000
mid-2000s
Age
Income and population
measures
Real mean income 1) 164 597 174 901 179 968 189 519 200 130
Real median income 1) 157 671 167 078 172 230 179 541 188 751
Gini coefficient (after taxes 
and transfers) 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.23
Gini coefficient (before 
taxes and transfers) 0.37 0.4 0.42 0.41 0.42
Real mean income 1) 175 889 186 769 192 719 202 745 213 348
Real median income 1) 168 868 178 976 185 042 192 927 202 679
Gini coefficient (after taxes 
and transfers) 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23
Gini coefficient (before 
taxes and transfers) 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.37
Real mean income 1) 110 763 119 826 125 442 133 880 144 916
Real median income 1) 96 811 105 451 111 586 116 552 126 393
Gini coefficient (after taxes 
and transfers) 0.2 0.2 0.19 0.2 0.2
Gini coefficient (before 
taxes and transfers) 0.7 0.71 0.71 0.7 0.68
Total 
population
Working 
age 
population: 
18 - 65
Retirement 
age 
population: 
above 65
1) Dkk constant prices of mid 2000s.
Table 1. The development in incomes and income dispersion in Denmark (OECD 2010).
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Danish population is beyond the poverty line. 
The figure fell from mid-1980s to mid-1990s, but 
has increased in the last ten years. Compared to 
the other Nordic countries Denmark has, together 
with Sweden, the lowest poverty rate.
From 2004 welfare payments have been re-
duced for families on long term help. The total 
welfare support for a family, paid as welfare, 
housing allowances and others, must be below 
a certain limit called ‘kontanthjælpsloftet’. If the 
limit is exceeded some of the support will be re-
duced. This change especially hits families who 
get housing allowances, which will be considera-
bly reduced. Because of this the poverty rate must 
be expected to having increased in recent years.
1.2.  Employment and unemployment
Denmark is one of the countries in the 
world with the highest labour market participa-
tion, mainly because of the high participation 
by women. But the growing number of older 
and retired people will reduce this in the future. 
In table 3 is shown the development in the pro-
portion of Danes that are on the labour market 
compared with the other Nordic countries, the 
European Union and OECD.
More than half of the Danish population is 
on the labour market. This is at nearby the same 
level as the other Nordic countries, a little lower 
that Norway and Sweden but higher that the av-
erages for EU and OECD.
mid-80s around 1990 mid-90s mid-2000s
Denmark 6 6.2 4.7 5.3
Finland 5.1 4.9 7.3
Norway 6.4 7.1 6.8
Sweden 3.3 3.6 3.7 5.3
around 2000
5.1
6.4
6.3
5.3
*) 50 per cent of the current median income
Table 2. Poverty rate*) after taxes and transfers (OECD 2010).
Table 3. Total labour force as per cent of population (OECD 2010).
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Denmark 53.4 53.4 53 52.9 53.4 53.1 53.4 53 53.3
Finland 50.4 50.6 50.6 50.3 50 50.3 50.7 51 51.3
Norway 52.3 52.3 52.4 52 51.9 51.9 52.5 53.2 54.3
Sweden 49.8 50.2 50.2 50.2 50.2 51.2 51.4 52.9 53.1
European 
Union 48 47.9 47.8 48 48.2 48.7 48.6 48.8 49.1
OECD - Total 47.4 47.3 47.4 47.4 47.6 47.9 48.2 48.1 48.3
Table 4. Rate of Unemployment as per cent of Civilian labour Force (OECD 2010).
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Denmark 4.6 4.8 4.8 5.6 5.7 5 4.1 4 3.4
Finland 9.8 9.1 9.1 9.1 8.8 8.4 7.7 6.9 6.4
Norway 3.5 3.6 3.9 4.5 4.5 4.6 3.5 2.5 2.6
Sweden 5.9 5.1 5.2 5.8 6.6 7.8 7.1 6.2 6.2
European 
Union 9.2 8.6 8.9 9 9.2 8.9 8.2 7.1 7
OECD - Total 6.1 6.2 6.8 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.1 5.6 5.9
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There have not been substantial changes in 
the last ten years before 2008, but the recent eco-
nomic crisis may have expelled someone from 
the labour market.
The unemployment rate among the labour 
force is quite low in Denmark compared with 
other countries (Table 4). In 2008 is was only 3.4 
and only Norway had a lower unemployment. 
It has been falling from 2003 to 2008, but has 
increased somewhat in recent years due to the 
economic crisis.
1.3.  Government spending 
and social expenditures
Denmark had a gross national income per capita 
on 37.000 $ in 2008, which is one of the highest 
in the world. It is at the same level as Sweden 
and Finland but somewhat lower than Norway. 
But a large part of the national income is used 
as government expenditure, a large part of it as 
social expenditures. In table 5 is shown the de-
velopment in GDP and government expenditures 
in Denmark and their level is compared with 
the other Nordic countries and OECD average.
Since 1980 GDP has increased in Denmark 
with more than 70 per cent. Government expen-
ditures have had a little lower increase. Govern-
ment expenditures constitute a little more than 
half of GDP. The share increased from 1980 to 
1995 but fell a little from 1995 to 2005. Social 
expenditures constitute 27 per cent of GDP. On-
ly Sweden has higher social expenditures than 
Denmark while they are lower in Finland and 
especially in Norway. 
2.  Housing policy and 
housing market in Denmark 
2.1.  Denmark in the Nordic context
Bengtsson et al. (2006), finds that there are some 
principal differences between the Nordic coun-
tries. The Danish and Swedish housing policies 
are characterised as more general and universal-
istic in the sense that they to a greater extent are 
pointed at housing for the whole population and 
not only for vulnerable low-income groups. This 
means that support for housing to a great extent 
also is available for middle and higher income 
groups, especially tax subsidies and social hous-
ing. On the other hand the Finnish policy is de-
scribed as much more selective and to a greater 
extent a part of social policies, where support is 
more limited and means tested. Norway is as-
cribed a position in between. 
The general social goals for housing policy in 
the countries do not, according to Bengtsson et 
Table 5. The development of GDP and government expenditures in Denmark compared with other 
countries (OECD 2010).
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
GDP mill. DKK at 2000 prices
438 193 520 562 560 199 665 643 693 219 725 802
GDP index 100 114 123 138 158 169
Government expenditure index 100 119 128 152 158 166
Gov. Exp. As % of GDP 54 56 56 59 54 53
Social expenditures % of GDP 25 23 25 29 26 27
Social expenditures % in other countries
    Finland 18 22 24 31 24 26
    Norway 17 18 22 23 21 22
    Sweden 27 29 30 32 29 29
    OECD - Total 16 18 18 20 19 21
Government expenditure DKK 2000 prices
816 424 933 493 1 001 381 1 124 052 1 293 964 1 377 414
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al. (2006), seem to differ substantial.176But such 
objectives always tend to be very general. Hans-
en and Skifter Andersen (1993) pointed to some 
marked differences in the way housing was per-
ceived in the countries, which have influenced 
the actual policies. They tried to identify the posi-
tion in the countries concerning two main ques-
tions (as discussed above):
1.  Should housing be seen as a private or a 
public good? Should individual financial 
resources be entirely deciding for housing 
consumption or should housing of a certain 
standard be available for all household.
2.  Should housing mostly be provided by the 
market or by the public sector?
There is some connection between these two 
questions as those who have the opinion that 
housing is a private good also find that it should 
be provided by the market. But the position al-
so exist that housing to some degree is a public 
good, but should be provided by a subsidised 
and regulated market. 
Besides general conceptions of housing pol-
icy arising from these positions there has been 
different opinions in the countries concerning the 
desirability of different housing tenures. This is 
not only a question about which tenures are ei-
ther most market oriented or have social quali-
ties, but more on what is the best kind of hous-
ing for people in general. In some cases home-
1  In Børresen et al. 1997 (p 45) the overall goals for 
housing policy in the countries are cited as: 
Sweden: The whole population should be offered healthy, 
well designed and well equipped dwellings of good 
quality at affordable costs
Denmark: Policies should secure good and healthy 
dwellings for all. This should be obtained by a versatile 
supply of housing that give all groups in the population 
the possibility to find a suitable dwelling in accordance 
with their needs and financial ability
Norway: Everyone should be in possession of a good and 
reasonable dwelling in a good housing environment.
Finland: All groups in society should have access to 
an affordable dwelling, which fulfils certain criteria 
concerning size and standard, and is located in a good 
and functional environment.
ownership is seen as the most desirable kind of 
housing because it promotes savings and gives 
optimal possibilities of disposition.
Lujanen et al. (2004) points to three phases 
in the development of housing policies in the 
Nordic countries after the Second World War. 
The first phase up to the first half of the 1970s 
was largely concerned with satisfying quantita-
tive need for housing. During the second phase 
more intention was given to the qualitative as-
pects of housing and urban renewal gained more 
importance in Denmark, Norway and Finland 
(Sweden had already done a lot in the first phase). 
In the third phase from the mid-1980s reduction 
of tax subsidies for homeownership, privatisation 
of housing and especially state controlled hous-
ing finance (in Sweden, Norway and Finland) 
came into focus.
Bengtsson et al. (2006) points to the same 
phases called 1. The construction phase, 2. The 
administration phase and 3. The phase-out phase. 
While the two first phases can be explained by 
the structural dynamics of the housing sector, 
the last one, where housing policies are disman-
tled, is explained as a consequence of ideologi-
cal political changes that demanded a general 
withdrawal of the welfare state. 
Denmark has had strong social objectives 
for housing but not as pronounced as in Swe-
den (Hansen and Skifter Andersen 1993). More 
weight has been put on the market and less state 
control, especially of housing finance. General 
tax subsidies, which have strengthened home-
ownership, have been extensive. But there has 
also been a considerable support for social hous-
ing and the sector is strong. Despite the general 
market orientation there has been a strong rent 
control in the private rented market, which is 
still functioning.
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2.2.  Housing stock and 
housing conditions
Denmark has about 2.5 million dwellings corre-
sponding to 460 dwellings per inhabitant. More 
than half of the dwellings have four or more 
rooms as can be seen by table 6. The average 
number of rooms per inhabitant is 1.7.
The housing conditions are thus quite favour-
able in Denmark. In a survey made by Eurostat 
(Table 7) it was shown that only 8.3 per cent of 
that respondent households found that they lived 
in an overcrowded dwelling. More than 25 per 
cent found their dwellings very spacious. Nearby 
60 per cent of the dwellings are in detached or 
semi detached single family houses (Table 8).
2.3.  Housing costs and expenses 
Like many other European countries Denmark 
had an increase in property prices during the 
economic boom from the middle of the 1990s 
followed by a decline after 2007. But the fluc-
tuations in Denmark were especially strong. In 
Figure one is shown the development in sales 
prices per square meter for respectively single 
family houses and owner-occupied flats.
Especially the sales prices for flats increased 
from about 6,000 DKK per square meter in 1995 
to nearby 24,000 in 2006 followed by a decline 
to 17,000 in 2009. The prices on single family 
houses increased from 4,600 in 1995 to 14,000 
in 2007 and declined to 12,000 in 2009. It is es-
pecially the period from 2004 that have peen tur-
bulent, mainly because the government in 2004 
allowed new types of loans without paying in-
stalments. 
Because of this development the prices be-
came very high and it became much more diffi-
cult for first time buyers to afford a home. These 
difficulties are especially found in the Capital 
Region as can be seen from table 9. There are 
especially differences between the prices for sin-
gle family houses. It can that there are some 
differences in rents between social housing and 
private renting, and between the Capital Region 
and the rest of the country.
In a survey from Eurostat a population of 
Danes has been asked about to what extent they 
feel their housing costs as a strain. As shown in 
table 10 nearby 60 per cent of the respondents 
found that the financial strain was high or very 
high. This figure is high compared to other coun-
tries in the study and very high compared to the 
other Nordic countries.
2.4.  Tenures on the housing market
In all the countries a number of distinct hous-
Distribution of dwellings %
 1 room with kitchen 4
 2 rooms with kitchen 18
 3 rooms with kitchen 23
 4 rooms with kitchen 24
 5+ rooms with kitchen 29
 Not stated 2
 Total 100
Number of dwellings/1000 inhabitants 462
Average rooms per inhabitant 1.7
Source: The Nordic Statbank, Eurostat
Table 6. Dwellings distributed on number of 
rooms as per cent, number of dwellings per 1000 
inhabitants and average rooms per person 2008.
Over-
crowded
Somewhat 
spacious
Very 
spacious
Total n
Denmark 8.3 66.5 25.2 100 5 711
Table 7. Households distributed on overcrowded 
and spacious dwellings as per cent (Eurostat 
EU-SIlC).
Table 8. Dwellings distributed on type of building 
as per cent (The Nordic Statbank).
Denmark
One- and two family houses 59
Apartment blocks 38
Other dwellings 3
Total 100
Country report for Denmark
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ing tenures has been designed, which are sub-
ject to specific legislation and sometimes public 
support. These tenures are not quite alike in the 
countries but can be divided into five groups:
• Owner-occupied houses: Dwellings in build-
ings that constitute one property, mostly in 
detached single family houses
• Owner-occupied flats etc.: Dwellings in 
blocks of flats with separate ownership
• Co-operatives: Dwellings in blocks of flats 
with joint ownership
• Private renting: rented dwellings owned by 
private landlords based on general market 
conditions
• Social housing: Housing owned by the pub-
lic or by non-profit housing companies con-
trolled by local authorities
The composition of the housing market in 
Denmark is seen in table 11. 
Compared to many other countries the share 
Figure 1. The development in house prices in Denmark 1995 ˗ 2010 in DKK per square meter (The 
Association of Danish Mortgage Banks).
Table 9. Sales prices and rents per square meter, euro (Statistics Denmark).
Table 10. Households distributed on housing cost strain as per cent, Nordic countries, 2006 (Eurostat 
EU-SIlC).
Average for the country Average for the capital region
Sales prices
Detached houses 1 735 2 646
Flats 2 522 2 927
Rents 100 square meter
Social housing 785 870
Private renting 859 1 055
Low Medium High Very high All n 
Denmark 3.8 36.6 43.8 15.8 100 5 711 
Table 11. Dwellings distributed on tenures in 
2007 in Denmark, per cent.
The share of total
Owner-occupied houses 48
Owner-occupied flats etc. 5
Co-operatives 7
Private renting 19
Social/public housing 21
All 100
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of owner-occupied dwellings is quite low. The 
rented sector is about 40 per cent and divided 
into two sectors of nearby equal size as social 
housing and private rented housing. Finally there 
is a relatively small co-operative sector, which, 
however, are strong in the municipality of Co-
penhagen, where it constitutes about 25 per cent. 
The Danish housing policy can be characterised 
as shown in table 12.
2.4.1. Owner-occupied housing
In Denmark housing finance has been privatised 
since the early 1960s. For many years special so-
called ‘real credit associations’ had monopoly on 
giving loans with security in real estate. In recent 
years these associations have been privatised and 
sold to banks or have become normal joint-stock 
companies. And banks have also been given the 
permission to give loans. Earlier the only condi-
tion for loans was the value of the property and 
the loan could be up to 80 per cent of the es-
timated value. After the fiscal crisis in the last 
part of the 1980s, however, personal economic 
capabilities of the debtor came increasingly in 
focus, especially after the financial crisis in 2008. 
So the evaluation of the financial situation and 
solidity of the potential borrower, made by the 
banks, increasingly determines who can get loans 
for buying a home.
There are no supported loans and no supply 
or individual subsidies for owner-occupation in 
Denmark (except for some tax advantages for 
pensioners). Earlier tax subsidies were very high 
because all capital costs could be deducted from 
the taxable income. This has been very much 
reduced since the beginning of the 1990s and 
now only about 30 per cent of the costs can be 
deducted. Moreover, owner-occupied housing is 
due to a property value taxation, which is one 
per cent of the taxable value.
Prices has increased very much in the period 
1995-2007, which has made it increasingly dif-
ficult for the middle class to buy a home near 
the big cities. Since 2008 prices and interests has 
fallen somewhat, but at the same time it has been 
more difficult to obtain a loan. 
2.4.2. Co-operatives
Co-operatives are a small sector in Denmark and 
most of it is older housing that has been trans-
ferred from private renting. This is because there 
has since 1981 been legislation saying that, when 
a private landlord wants to sell his property, he 
has to offer it to the tenants as a co-operative at 
the same price as the offer he gets from other 
potential buyers. Especially in the City of Co-
penhagen co-operatives have expanded and is 
now the largest tenure with about 25 per cent 
of dwellings. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s there has, 
(yes) means partly
Social 
housing
Private 
renting
Co-
operatives 
etc
Owner-
occupied
Individual support yes yes (yes) no
Supply support yes no no no
Tax support no no (yes) yes
Rent/price control? yes yes (yes) no
Regulation of access? yes no (yes) no
Supported finance yes no (yes) no
Table 12. Characterisation of the Danish housing policy.
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however, been public financial support for build-
ing of new co-operatives with certain limits on 
the size and costs of the dwellings. This support 
has since 2000 been reduced to a public guar-
antee on loans.
There are no supply subsidies for the old-
er co-operatives and there is no individual sup-
port, except for pensioners, in co-operatives as 
a whole. Capital costs on individual loans to fi-
nance the share contribution can be deducted in 
the taxable income, but loans taken by the co-
operative can not.
The prices of co-operatives are subject to reg-
ulation. In principle the share value of a dwelling 
should be calculated based on the difference be-
tween the taxable value of the property and the 
mortgages on it. The taxable value of co-opera-
tives is calculated as the value of a comparable 
rented property. Because of rent control these 
values have been rather low which for a long 
period resulted in that a co-operative was much 
cheaper to buy and live in than owner-occupied 
flats. This resulted in queues and most co-op-
eratives had waiting lists with different rules, 
which had been decided locally. As a result co-
operatives to a large extent has been populated 
with people being in family with each other or 
being friends. To some extents co-operatives has 
been a closed sector for outsiders, especially im-
migrants, who do not have personal relations to 
the residents living there.
In recent years this situation to some extent 
has been changed. It has been allowed that co-
operatives get a specific evaluation of the value 
of the property by a real estate agent as basis 
for calculation of the share value. As prices on 
rental property has skyrocketed and the agents 
been happy to make a high value, share prices 
in some properties has increased to what can be 
seen as a market value comparable with owner-
occupied flats. Co-operative dwellings are in-
creasingly sold on the market and not distributed 
by waiting lists. But it is very difficult for house 
hunters to see through the economic conditions 
of co-operatives and some people have burned 
themselves by buying a too expensive dwelling.
Parts of the co-operative sector are still rela-
tively cheap, but the access to these dwellings is 
more than ever conditioned by social relations 
to the present residents. An increasingly part is 
purchased free at market price level, but as leg-
islation has become obsolete this involves some 
financial risks.
2.4.3. Private renting
Private renting is a somewhat diverse sector 
where different parts of it are subject to different 
kinds of regulation. About half of all private rent-
ed dwellings are subject to a strict rent control. 
Rents are in principle determined by the costs 
involved in running the properties (not includ-
ing capital costs) plus a so-called capital yield 
calculated in accordance with certain rules. The 
rest of the sector is subject to a more weak con-
trol saying that the rent should not exceed ‘the 
value of housing service’, which is determined by 
courts by comparing with other rents in the local 
area. The result of rent control is that rents tend 
to be below the market level. In an earlier report 
(Lejelovskommisionen 1997) it was estimated 
that rents were 40 per cent below the market 
level. In a more recent report (Skifter Andersen 
2008) it was reported that private landlords in 
average only expected a ten per cent increase in 
rents if rent control were abolished. But in the 
big cities rents are more below market level than 
in less urbanised areas.
As a consequence of this there is a surplus 
demand for private renting, especially in the cit-
ies. This means that landlords often can pick 
and choose between the applicants for dwell-
ings. Less than half of new tenants are found 
through advertisement (Skifter Andersen 2008). 
Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States
90
More than 20 per cent of landlords puts weight 
on that they know the tenant in advance. More-
over, 18 per cent of landlords do not want to let 
out to immigrants.
Tenants in private renting can get housing al-
lowances. There are two kinds of allowances for 
respectively pensioners and other tenants, where 
the allowance for pensioners is much more fa-
vourable. The size of the subsidy is dependent 
on the size of the rent, the size of the dwelling, 
household income and household size.
2.4.4. Social housing
In Denmark social housing is organised in non-
profit housing associations. In principle the as-
sociations are private autonomous organisations 
but they are subject to a strict public regulation 
and under surveillance of local authorities.
Rents in social housing are fixed in accord-
ance with principles of financial balance between 
earnings and expenses on every housing estate. 
As the historic costs and capital costs vary be-
tween estates build in different time periods this 
means that rents varies in a way that is not in ac-
cordance with the variation in quality and loca-
tion. Some estates are very cheap and some are 
very expensive. These differences are to some 
extent levelled out because especially the old-
er estates are paying contribution to a central 
fond called ‘Landsbyggefonden’. But the system 
causes that some estates have difficulties in com-
peting on the housing market and are vulnerable 
to distress and depravation.
New social housing is subsidised and under 
controlled costs. The local authorities have until 
recently been obliged to contribute with 14 per 
cent of the funding (now seven per cent). Two 
per cent comes from contributions from the ten-
ants and 84 per cent comes from the private re-
al credit institutes at market conditions. Earlier, 
when interests in Denmark were higher, there 
was a support bringing down capital costs to a 
certain interest level, about 3.4 per cent. Ten-
ants in social housing can get housing allow-
ances with the same rules as for private renting. 
Tenants can also get guaranteed loans to cover 
the deposit.
In principle all kinds of households can get 
access to social housing. On some estates with 
larger dwellings there can be principles about 
giving preference to families with children but 
this priority can be cancelled if dwellings are 
vacant. As a main rule vacant dwellings on an 
estate are allocated to people on a waiting list 
in the specific housing association. But there are 
also several other means of allocation. One is that 
the local authorities can dispose of 25 per cent 
of vacant dwellings. These are often used for 
poor families in urgent need of a dwelling and 
for refugees. Another system is an internal wait-
ing list in the association where residents, who 
can move out and release a dwelling, are given 
preference. Finally there, in connection with ur-
ban policies trying to change the social compo-
sition of deprived neighbourhoods, have been 
introduced other allocation systems giving pref-
erence to people in education or employment.
Especially in Copenhagen there has been a 
high pressure on the social housing sector and 
the normal waiting lists have been very long re-
sulting in many years of waiting time. It has thus 
been difficult for many immigrants to get access 
to social housing and they have only succeeded 
if they have accepted to wait for several years. 
Most Danes have given up the waiting lists, so 
a relatively large proportion of people on the 
lists are immigrants. A study from 2004 (Skifter 
Andersen 2004) showed that many immigrants 
used the internal waiting lists to upgrade their 
housing situation. Some of them also used this 
system to move to estates with a higher concen-
tration of immigrants.
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2.5.  Segmentation of 
the housing market
Dependant on how tenures are designed the hous-
ing market can be more or less ‘segmented’. Seg-
mentation of the housing market is a concept that 
has been used to describe the way different peo-
ple are allocated to different parts of the hous-
ing market (Lindberg and Lind’n 1989; Olson 
Hort 1992) or that different parts of the housing 
market are designed to meet different kinds of 
demand (Rothenburg et al. 1991). Segmentation 
is created when different tenures to a great extent 
are made available and attractive for different 
households, for example divided by income and 
family situation. Segmentation often means that 
high-income groups are concentrated in certain 
parts of the housing market, mostly owner-occu-
pied detached housing, while low-income groups 
mostly reside in poor rental housing or social 
housing. Segmentation has mostly been a result 
of the way subsidies are designed (tax subsidies 
in owner-occupation is most favourable for high-
income groups while only low-income groups 
can get housing allowances in rental housing) or 
by the way access to tenures is regulated (some-
times only low-income groups can get access to 
subsidised social housing). 
In Denmark there has been an increasing seg-
mentation of the housing market in the last 30 
years in the sense that there has been a steady 
increase in the difference in average household 
incomes between the owner-occupied and the 
rented sector (Skifter Andersen 2005). In table 
13 is shown the average household incomes in 
different tenures in 2008.
It can be seen, that the household income in 
owner-occupied houses is more than twice the 
Table 13. Average household incomes in 
different tenures in Denmark 2008 (SBi database 
based on data from public registers).
Table 14. Households divided in income deciles distributed on tenures in Denmark 2008, and 
calculated segmentation indices281(SBi database).
2  Segmentation index for tenure x = sum i=1-10 ( numeric(share of decile no. i in tenure x – share of all households in tenure x)/10) 
Total index: sum x=1-m (index for tenure x * share of dwellings in tenure x)/100
Share of 
housing
Average 
household 
income in 
euro per year
Relative 
deviation 
from all 
households 
%
Owner-occupied 
houses 46 75 078 34
Owner-occupied 
flats etc. 6 58 495 5
Co-operatives 8 44 569 -20
Private renting 21 38 003 -32
Social/public 
housing 20 33 868 -39
All 100 55 957
Owner-
occupied 
houses
Owner-
occupied 
flats etc.
Co-
operatives
Private 
renting
Social/public 
housing
Income deciles
1 11 3 8 42 36
2 16 3 9 34 39
3 26 5 10 29 32
4 31 6 10 26 27
5 37 8 11 22 22
6 47 8 10 18 17
7 62 7 7 13 12
8 73 5 5 9 8
9 78 5 4 8 5
10 81 6 3 8 3
All households 46 6 8 21 20
Segmentation index 22 1 2 10 11
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income in social housing, which is at the lowest. 
This can partly be explained by people living in 
social housing are more often singles. Also in-
comes among households in private renting are 
quite low. Residents here are often young sin-
gles (Skifter Andersen 2007). The incomes in 
co-operatives are higher than in rented housing 
but still far below the owner-occupied sector.
To get a more detailed picture all households 
are divided into income deciles and their distri-
bution on tenures is shown in table 14. A seg-
mentation index is for each tenure calculated as 
the sum of the numerical deviations between the 
deciles and the whole population divided by ten. 
This index shows to what extent a broad segment 
of the population is living in the tenure or not.
The table shows that owner-occupied houses 
is the most segmented tenure with an calculated 
index on 22. Social and private rented housing is 
next, mainly because an overrepresentation of the 
lowest income groups. Co-operatives and own-
er-occupied flats are the least segmented. In co-
operatives the middle-income groups are over-
represented, while owner-occupied flats have a 
quite equal distribution in all deciles. 
3.  Immigrants in Denmark 
3.1.  The historic development 
of immigration policies 
and immigration
For centuries there have been different kinds of 
immigration to Denmark from other European 
countries, but it was never felt as something that 
should need special integration initiatives. The 
first time this came on the agenda was when 
Denmark received around 1,000 refugees from 
Hungary in 1956. At this moment an organisa-
tion ‘Dansk flygtningehjælp’ was organised to 
take care of refugees and measures of integration 
was established by the government.
In connection with the high economic growth 
in the 1960s Danish firms actively searched for 
labour in countries like Italy, Portugal, Yugosla-
via, Turkey, Pakistan and Morocco. In this pe-
riod it was very easy for foreigners to get per-
mission to come to the country and search for 
work. This was changed in 1973 when the up-
coming economic crisis and increasing unem-
ployment motivated the government to make a 
stop for immigration of migrant workers. It was 
expected that the labour immigrants would return 
to their home country in case of unemployment, 
Figure 2. Immigration to Nordic countries per 1000 inhabitants (Nordic Statistical Databank).
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but they did not. In stead most of them had their 
family moved to Denmark as family reunifica-
tion, which was granted them in the legislation.
Denmark also felt it as a responsibility to 
receive refugees. The country received refugees 
from Chile and Vietnam in the 1970s and from 
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon (Palestinians), and Sri Lan-
ka in the 1980s. Besides these groups also refu-
gees from Yugoslavia and Somalia appeared in 
the 1990s. Also these groups had in many cases 
family reunification with their relatives from the 
homeland, which was granted them since 1983.
The number of immigrants from the so called 
‘labour immigration’ countries outside Western 
Europe (Turkey, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Mo-
rocco) living in Denmark increased from about 
40,000 in 1975 to 100,000 in 1996 (White pa-
per 1337, 1997). The number of people, who 
had come from the 12 largest refugee countries 
increased from 2,000 in 1980 to 56,000 in 1996.
In the last part of the 1980s a political debate 
was started about immigration as it became more 
evident that few immigrants formed their family 
by marrying Danes, but instead preferred to ‘im-
port’ partners from their homeland. Therefore in 
1992 the rules concerning family reunification 
were tightened (Stenild and Martens 2009). It 
was demanded that one should have lived in Den-
mark for at least five years. Moreover, one should 
have the economic means to support a family.
In 2001 a new government, depending 
on support from the right wing party ‘Dansk 
Folkeparti’ came to power. It had as one of its 
main objectives to reduce the number of immi-
grants from third world countries. The ‘de-facto’ 
rules, meaning that everyone who appeared in-
side the borders had the right to apply for asylum 
and stay until their case was solved, were abol-
ished. Moreover, new rules for family reunifica-
tion were introduced. One should be older than 
24 to be unified and there was a rule that the fam-
ily as a whole should have greater affiliation to 
Denmark than to any other country. In practice 
this rule is difficult to enforce and the adminis-
tration of it concerns many conditions like how 
long time each of the couple have lived in Den-
mark, if they have other family in the country or 
in other countries, if they have work or education 
in Denmark, how well they speak Danish and 
how long time they have spend in other countries. 
There is a lot of judgement in the administration 
of the rules and it has appeared that also people 
with a Danish background in some cases have 
not been able to marry a foreigner and settle in 
Figure 3. The development in residence permits to asylum and family reunification (Publications from 
the Danish Ministry of Integration).
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Denmark if the partner is less than 24 or if it is 
judged that the couple have a stronger affiliation 
to another country outside the EU because they 
both have lived there for some years. These rules 
do not apply to people who have been Danish 
citizens for more than 28 years or if they are born 
in the country and are more than 28. Moreover, 
the person living in Denmark must have a mini-
mum income which is judged to be big enough 
to support a family and his dwelling must have 
a certain minimum size.
These new rules led to a marked fall in im-
migration after 2001 in connection with asylum 
and family reunification, as shown in figure three. 
Residence permits for asylum had a peak with 
20,000 in 1995 because of many refugees from 
Bosnia, but after this the level in the last part of 
the 1990s stayed at about 5,000 per year increas-
ing to 6,300 in 2001. After 2001 the number of 
refugees given asylum decreased year after year 
to about 1,000 at the lowest level in 2006.
The number of residence permits in connec-
tion with family reunification was increasing in 
the 1990s from about 5,000 in the beginning of 
the decennium to 11,000 in 2001. Of these 6,400 
were persons who were reunified with other im-
migrants, while 4,600 were unified with people 
of Danish origin. After 2001 the total number of 
permits given in connection with family reunifi-
cation dropped to 3,500 in 2005. Reunification 
with immigrants dropped even more and was 
only 550 in 2008.
After 2001 the Danish unemployment rate 
dropped and there was a beginning shortage of 
labour in certain sectors of the economy. There-
fore immigration of skilled labour came on the 
political agenda. In 2002 a ‘green card’ arrange-
ment was introduced which made it easier for 
immigrants coming to work in certain sectors 
in accordance with a ‘positive list’. After 2007 
it was possible for everyone to come and work 
in Denmark provided that they would get a cer-
tain income. Immigrants with certain qualifica-
tions can get residence permit for a period of six 
months to seek employment. These rules were 
further developed in 2008 to make it possible for 
Danish firms to recruit labour from other coun-
tries. The income limit was reduced to 375,000 
Figure 4. All residence permits in Denmark 1993-2008 (Statistics Denmark).
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DKK per year and the green card arrangement 
was extended (Nilas 2009).
Of even greater importance was the extension 
of the EU with countries from Central Europe 
in 2004. In the first place immigrants from the 
new countries as a transitional agreement were 
covered by the general rules for labour immigra-
tion. These rules were relaxed in 2008 and from 
2009 citizens from the new EU countries are free 
to seek employment in Denmark.
As residence permits in connection with ed-
ucation also were extended, this meant that im-
migration to Denmark after a short fall in 2003 
increased very much in coming years (Figure 4). 
The total number of residence permits increased 
from 30,000 in 2003 to 70,000 in 2008.
Labour immigration increased from 2,000 in 
the beginning of the 1990s and 3,600 in 2000 
to 21,000 in 2007. Immigration from other EU 
countries (and EØS) increased from 3,000 in 
1993 to 6,000 in 2000 and 15,000 in 2007. In 
2008 immigrants from the new EU countries are 
encompassed by the EU rules why these permits 
have been much increased while labour permits 
have decreased.
3.2.  The national composition 
of immigration to Denmark
At the same time as the reasons for immigra-
tion to Denmark have been changed there has 
also been a shift in the national composition of 
immigrants as can be seen from figure five. In 
1980, 60 per cent of the immigrants came from 
other European countries and 13 per cent from 
North America. The Middle East (North Africa 
and Western Asia) stood for about ten per cent 
(2 900 immigrants). In 1985 this immigration 
increased to a peak of 7,500, mostly because 
of refugees from Iran and Lebanon (Palestians). 
Figure 5. The development in immigration to Denmark from different parts of the world (Statistics 
Denmark).
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From the middle of the 1980s to 2001 this immi-
gration varied up and down between 6,500 and 
3,000 per year. After 2001 it decreased gradu-
ally to a little more than 2,000.
Immigration from Eastern Asia has gradu-
ally increased all over the years from 2,600 in 
1980 to 9,400 in 2008. In the last years many 
of these immigrants has come to get education. 
The immigration from the rest of Africa has 
been somewhat smaller except for Somalis. It 
increased until a peak at 4,400 in 1996 and has 
after that decreased to less than 2,000 per year 
in recent years. 
The most fluctuating immigration has come 
from Eastern and Central European Countries. 
A large contingent of refuges was received from 
the former Yugoslavia in the years 1995-97. Be-
sides this, there was a steady increase in the im-
migration over the years from less than 1,000 in 
the beginning of the 1980s to the extension of 
the EU in 2004, where immigration exploded 
because of labour permits.
The most important immigration countries 
outside Europe and North America can be di-
vided into ‘labour immigration countries’ and 
‘refugee countries’. 
The most important of these labour immi-
grant countries have been Turkey (32,000 im-
migrants in the period 1980-2008), Pakistan 
(17,000) and Morocco (5,500). Immigration 
from these countries started already in the 1960s, 
but after 1973 almost all has been as family re-
unification except from Curd refugees from the 
Eastern part of Turkey. 
In figure 6 is shown the development in the 
immigration from these countries 1980 to 2008. 
Immigration from Turkey has been most exten-
sive and fluctuating with a peak in 1990 and 
a decrease after 2001. Immigration from Paki-
stan increased more steadily until 2001 also fol-
lowed by a fall. Immigration from Morocco has 
been modest during the whole period with a peak 
around 1990.
Figure 7 shows the development in immi-
gration from the seven largest refugee coun-
tries outside Europe and North America. Until 
1984 the number of refugees coming to Den-
mark was quite small. In 1985, however, about 
4,000 Iranian refugees came to the country fol-
lowed by 2 500 Palestinians from Lebanon in 
Figure 6. Immigration from the three largest labour immigration countries outside Europe and North 
America (Statistics Denmark).
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Figure 7. Immigration from the seven largest refugee countries outside Europe and North America 
(Statistics Denmark).
Figure 8. The development in immigrants and descendants31in Denmark (Statistics Denmark).
3 Descendants are defined as persons born in Denmark with both parents being immigrants. The number of immigrants 
and descendants in Denmark increased from 150,000 in 1980 to 490,000 in 2009. Some of these immigrants are 
permanent settlers while others are only temporary in the country.
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1985. In the following years the total number 
of immigrants from the seven countries fluctu-
ated around three to four thousand people. Im-
migration from Somalia increased to a peak of 
2,000 in 1996 followed by a steep decrease in 
the following years. Immigration from Iraq es-
pecially came after 1992 and peaked in the last 
part of the 1990s. The Afghans came after the 
NATO invasion in 2001. Immigration from all 
the countries has been diminished since 2001. 
Besides these refugee countries there has also 
been a stream of refugees from the former Yu-
goslavia. Between 1995-1997 Denmark received 
24,000 refugees from there.
3.3.  The development in the 
number of immigrants
Some of the immigrants leave Denmark after 
some years. This especially applies for people 
coming from the European countries but also for 
some of the immigrants coming from abroad for 
getting education or work for a period. The de-
velopment in the number of immigrants in the 
country thus does not have a strict connection to 
the development in immigration shown above. 
In figure 8 is shown how the immigrant popula-
tion in Denmark has developed since 1980. The 
figures include descendants born in Denmark.
Immigrants from the Middle East (North Af-
rica and Western Asia) more often have stayed in 
the country why their number have been steadily 
increasing over the years from 20,000 in 1980 
to 160,000 in 2009. The number of immigrants 
from other African countries rose from 2 200 
to 33,000 in the period. Also the amount of im-
migrants from Eastern and Central Europe and 
from Eastern Asia has been increasing, but in re-
cent years this to a greater extent are people who 
seek work or education. Many of these immi-
grants can be expected to leave the country again 
and cannot be seen as permanent settlers in the 
country. This is even more pronounced for immi-
grants coming from the Nordic Countries, from 
Western Europe and from North America etc.
In table 15 is shown the populations of the 20 
largest immigrant groups in Denmark in 2009. 
There are three Nordic countries (Norway, Swe-
den and Iceland), two Western European coun-
tries (Germany and Great Britain), three Central 
European countries (Poland, Bosnia and Kosovo 
etc.), six countries from the Middle East (Turkey, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan and Morocco), 
one from Africa (Somalia) and five from East-
ern Asia (Pakistan, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, China 
and Thailand).
The Turks are far the largest immigrant popu-
lation of nearby 60,000 people. Other important 
groups from the third world are Iraqis, Pakistani, 
Somalis, Iranians, Vietnamese, Afghans and peo-
ple from Sri Lanka.
Table 15. The 20 largest immigrant populations 
in Denmark 2009.
Note: Descendants are included
Immigrants 2009
Turkey 58 191
Germany 30 385
Iraq 28 917
Poland 27 198
Lebanon 23 563
Bosnia 22 093
Pakistan 19 880
Kosovo etc. 17 141
Somalia 16 689
Norway 15 956
Sweden 15 140
Iran 14 896
Vietnam 13 626
Great Britain 12 986
Afghanistan 12 187
Sri Lanka 10 663
Morocco 9 622
China 9 356
Thailand 8 844
Iceland 8 632
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3.4.  characterisation of immigrants 
from countries outside Western 
Europe and North America
This section is based on a Danish study of im-
migrants in Denmark in 2004 (Skifter Anders-
en 2006a) the grouping of immigrants is taken 
from this study. It only encompasses immigrants 
(and descendants) from countries outside West-
ern Europe, North America, Australia and New 
Zealand, who now make up about 16 per cent of 
the Danish population. These immigrants have 
been divided in the groups shown in figure 8. 
These immigrants have been distributed on 
households defined as persons living at the same 
address and the ethnic composition of the house-
hold has been analysed. The method has been to 
find the person in the household with the highest 
income, who has been named the ‘main person’. 
The households are in table 17 grouped after the 
background of this main person and the compo-
sition of the household.
The idea behind this analysis is to group im-
Number of persons 2004 Proportion of all %
All 289 615 100.0
Turkey 50 355 17 .4
Pakistan 18 075 6 .2
Arabic countries 63 645 22 .0
Iran 12 840 4 .4
Afghanistan 9 520 3 .3
Somalia 16 450 5 .7
Central and Eastern Europe 44 485 15 .4
Other Asiatic countries 58 790 20 .3
Other African countries 10 970 3 .8
Other countries 12 295 4 .2
Table 16. Grouping of immigrants in Denmark from countries outside Western 
Europe etc. 2004 (Skifter Andersen 2006a).
Number of 
households
Proportion 
of 
households
Share of all 
Danish 
households
Mixed household with Danes and 
immigrants
96.520 55 %
Descendants 2.575 1 %
Immigrants with Danish citizenship 30.890 18 %
Others immigrated before 1990 10.815 6 %
Others immigrated after 1989 34.305 20 %
All 175.105 100 %
Pure immigrants households 78.585 45 % 3,30 %
Mixed households, 'main person' is 
immigrant
12.095 7 % 0,50 %
Mixed households, 'main person' is 
Danish
84.425 48 % 3,50 %
Table 17. Households in Denmark with immigrants from countries outside Western 
Europe etc. 2004 (Skifter Andersen 2006a).
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migrant households after their expected degree of 
integration in society. It is expected that mixed 
households and descendants are more integrated 
than others. Moreover households with a main 
person, who are a Danish citizen, could be better 
integrated than those who are not. Finally immi-
grants who have lived fewer years in the country 
must be expected to have greater difficulties in 
adjusting to the conditions in the country.
It can be seen from the table that there are 
175,000 households in Denmark (out of 2.4 mil-
lion) with at least one person originating from 
countries outside Western Europe etc. But most 
of them also contain Danes. Only a little less 
than 80,000 are pure immigrant households. In 
more than 90 per cent of these all residents are 
from the same country. In 12,000 of the mixed 
households the main person is immigrant, while 
there are 84,000 mixed households with a Danish 
main person. The number of households, where 
the main person is a descendant is very small, 
only 2,500. But a quite large part of the pure im-
migrant households have a main person, who has 
Danish citizenship. As can be seen from figure 9 
there are considerable differences between immi-
grants coming from different countries.
In some of the ‘ethnic groups’ there are very 
few mixed households, few descendants and 
quite a few with citizenship. This especially ap-
plies to immigrants from Somalia and Afghani-
stan. On the other hand Immigrants from Iran 
towers as a group often living in mixed house-
holds and having citizenship. The only groups 
with some ‘descendant households’ are Pakistan-
is (12 per cent) and Turks (6 per cent). There are 
quite a lot mixed households with main persons 
coming from other African or Asiatic countries. 
Those who have Arabic background relatively 
often have obtained citizenship.
One can to some extent judge the degree of 
integration of the different groups from the size of 
the group ‘Others’. It points to that Somalis and 
Afghanis are the least integrated groups followed 
by immigrants from central and Eastern Europe, 
from Turkey and from Arabic countries. Con-
cerning immigrants from Eastern Europe and 
to some extent Turkey, an explanation could be 
that they always saw themselves as temporary 
Figure 9. Households 2004 with an immigrant as main person distributed on household groups after 
expected degree of integration (Skifter Andersen 2006a).
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labour migrants and therefore have not applied 
for citizenship.
The immigrant population has a very differ-
ent age distribution compared to the Danish aver-
age as can be seen from figure 10. Only 22 per 
cent of the whole population is younger than 18 
years and 44 per cent younger than 35 years. For 
some of the immigrant groups like the Somalis 
and Afghans half of the group are children and 
about 80 per cent are younger than 35 years. For 
Pakistanis, Arabs and Turks also 70 per cent are 
younger than 35 years. The Iranians are the group 
that is closest to the national average.
In Denmark 25 per cent of the households 
are families with children. Among immigrants 
households the proportion of families with chil-
dren typically is much higher as can be seen 
from figure 11.
Figure 10. Age distribution 2004 for immigrant groups coming from countries outside Western Europe 
etc. groups compared to the national average (Skifter Andersen 2006a).
Figure 11. Households in different immigrant groups coming from countries outside Western Europe 
etc. distributed on family situation 2004 compared to the national average (Skifter Andersen 2006a).
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Except for Iranians the proportion of families 
with children is especially high in all the largest 
immigrant groups. Among the Afghanis more 
than 60 per cent of households have children. For 
the other groups the figures are: Arabic countries 
58 per cent, Turkey 55 per cent, Somalia 53 per 
cent, Pakistan 46 per cent and Iran 39 per cent. 
Also immigrant groups from other parts of the 
world more often have children than the Danish 
average. Quite a few immigrants are living as 
singles. This especially applies to Pakistani and 
Turks, but also to Somalis and Afghanis. In many 
cases the households consist of several families 
(multifamily households), where more than one 
nuclear family is present. Especially Pakistani, 
Somalis and Turks often live in such households.
There are considerable differences between 
the employment status of immigrants from third 
world countries and the rest of the population as 
can be seen from figure 12. For the whole popu-
lation over 18 years old, 54 per cent are in em-
ployment, 21 per cent are pensioners, eight per 
Figure 12. Employment status 2004 for different groups of immigrants 18+ years coming from 
countries outside Western Europe etc. compared to the whole Danish population (Skifter Andersen 
2006a).
Table 18. Average household income (gross) in Dkk 2002 for immigrants coming from countries 
outside Western Europe etc. compared to households with a Danish background.
Danish 
background Immigrants
Relative 
difference
Single without children 202 156 77 %
Single with children 257 171 66 %
Couple without children 474 307 65 %
Couple with children 631 346 55 %
Mixed households 521 437 84 %
All 394 297 75 %
Country report for Denmark
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cent are students and 17 per cent are others not 
in employment. For all immigrants from coun-
tries outside Western Europe and North America 
etc. only 37 per cent are employed, while 50 per 
cent are unemployed (besides ten per cent stu-
dents and five per cent pensioners).
The employment rate varies very much be-
tween different ethnic groups. A very high unem-
ployment is found among Somalis and Afghanis 
followed by immigrants from Arabic countries. 
Also immigrants from the ‘labour-immigration 
countries’, Pakistan and Turkey have quite a high 
rate of unemployment (43 and 47 per cent). The 
figures point to the considerable problems for 
the Danish welfare state to create employment 
among immigrants.
As a consequence of the high unemployment 
immigrants in Denmark also have quite low in-
comes as can be seen from table 18. In average 
the household income among immigrants com-
ing from countries outside Western Europe etc. 
is only 75 per cent of the average income for 
Danes. Among nuclear families with children it 
is even lower. Couples with children only have 
55 per cent of the average income among Danes 
in the same family group. 
4.  Policies related to 
immigrants settlement 
and integration 
4.1.  The meaning of integration 
and integration policies
In two public ‘white papers’ the meaning of 
‘integration’ of immigrants and of ‘integration 
policies’ has been discussed. In the first one 
(Betænkning 1337, 1997) there was made a dis-
tinction between ‘cultural’ and ‘social’ integra-
tion. While social integration includes participa-
tion in the labour market, participation in social 
life and political participation, cultural integra-
tion demands the sharing of norms and values. 
In this white paper there was made an emphasis 
on social integration.
In a later government report (Tænketanken 
2006), which was made after the appearance of a 
new government based on support from a wright-
wing nationalist party, a change occurred. It was 
stated that greater emphasis should be made on 
fundamental values and norms. As an example 
was mentioned that a lack of equality between 
sexes among immigrants could hamper labour 
market participation and social integration. In the 
report seven objectives for a successful integra-
tion of immigrants were defined:
• Education and language skills
• Labour market participation
• Being self-supporting 
• Absence of discrimination
• Social contacts between Danes and immi-
grants in daily life
• Political participation both as voters and 
elected
Sharing fundamental values about democra-
cy, rights of freedom, respect for the law, human 
rights, equality between the sexes and tolerance 
to others values and norms
In the report was made an evaluation of to 
what degree these objectives had been reached 
in Denmark, which is referred last in this chapter.
Integration of immigrants is, however, only a 
means to fulfil other purposes. When it comes to 
what determines ‘integration policies’ two aims 
are of special importance. The first is the need 
of labour. Denmark has since the middle of the 
1990s had a low unemployment rate and a lack 
of labour in certain parts of the economy. There-
fore it has been of great importance to make use 
of the labour reserve among immigrants. The 
other important aim is to relieve the pressure on 
the public finances and taxes. It has been impor-
tant to move immigrants from being dependant 
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on welfare support to be greater contributors to 
tax incomes.
There has also been a dilemma between inte-
gration policy and immigration policy. The new 
right-wing government from 2001 had as one of 
its main objectives to reduce immigration. One of 
the ways to obtain this is to make life for newly 
arrived immigrants as unattractive as possible 
to make them go back where they came from 
and to discourage potential immigrants. There-
fore refugees should not from the beginning be 
allowed to establish a normal life; they should 
not get work and not be socially integrated in the 
Danish society. Objectives for immigration poli-
cies have thus overruled objectives for integra-
tion policies in the way that obstacles have been 
made for the integration of refugees.
The Danish integration policies can be di-
vided in the following subjects:
• Rights for asylum seekers and rules for get-
ting permanent residence permit
• Rules for getting citizenship
• Acknowledgement of education obtained in 
other countries
• Political rights 
• Procedures for location of refugees with resi-
dence permit
• Integration programmes on education and 
job training
• Special, lower, welfare support for immi-
grants 
4.2.  The historic development 
in integration policies
In 1986 it was decided to start a system of 
spreading refugees to different municipalities. 
Until 1998 the system was organised by ‘Dansk 
flygtningehjÆlp’. In principle there should be 
an equal share to each county but not necessar-
ily to each municipality and refugees could to 
some extent choose by themselves if they had 
relatives in the country. After 1998 the state has 
established a quota system for each county (now 
region) and the municipalities inside the region 
have to agree about the distribution of refugees.
In 1999 the first comprehensive law on inte-
gration of immigrants was passed by the parlia-
ment. It encompassed all refugees and family re-
unification. The responsibility was moved from 
Dansk Flygtningehjælp to the local authorities. 
The law included rules for a three year introduc-
tion programme with education and work train-
ing, which all new immigrants had to go through. 
In 2001 a separate ministry for integration of im-
migrants was established.
In 2002 it was decided that immigrants 
should receive less welfare payments to increase 
their incentives to get work. Later, in 2006, sub-
sidies to companies, who employed new immi-
grants, were introduced.
4.3.  The legislative 
framework for integration
4.3.1.  Handling of asylum seekers
Asylum seekers normally are placed in an asylum 
centre while their case is decided by the authori-
ties. If they have relatives in Denmark they can 
get permission to stay at their home. As a main 
rule they are not allowed to take work, which is 
different from the other Nordic countries. Chil-
dren in the age 7-16 years are offered teaching 
at the centres. Some of the asylum seekers have 
been living for more than ten years at the centres 
because there has been uncertainty about to what 
extent they could be viewed as refugees. This 
especially applies to refugees from Iraq where 
there are different opinions on how safe it is to 
return to the country. 
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4.3.2.  Rules for getting a 
permanent residence permit
When immigrants get a permission to stay in 
Denmark they in the first place only get a tem-
porary residence permit. After seven years they 
can get a permanent residence permit on the as-
sumption that:
• No ‘severe’ crime has been done (if there 
has the person can only get a permanent resi-
dence permit ten years after his release from 
prison)
• Courses in the Danish language and on the 
Danish society must have been accomplished 
with a passed examination
• Debt to the public must not exceed about 
10,000 Euro
Moreover, the government has decided in 
January 2010 that before getting permanent resi-
dency permit an applicant has to score a certain 
amount of points earned by passing examinations 
in Danish language and knowledge of the Dan-
ish society plus by having employment. If they 
have received welfare payments in the period 
before the application they will be refused. All 
foreign citizens can be expelled from the coun-
try if they commit serious crimes. 
For so-called ‘well-integrated immigrants’ 
there can be a permanent residence permit after 
five years. The conditions are that they have had 
employment in the latest three years, that they 
have not received any welfare payments in these 
three years and that they ‘have achieved a sub-
stantial affiliation to the Danish society’.
In general immigrants in Denmark must have 
been a longer time in the country to get a per-
manent residence permit than in the other Nor-
dic countries.
4.3.3.  Rules and procedures 
for getting citizenship
The fundamental principle for becoming a citi-
zen in Denmark is family relations. This is in 
opposition to principles in some other countries 
where place of birth is most important. A new-
born child is thus only automatically a Danish 
citizen if one of the parents is a Danish citizen. 
Other immigrants have to apply for citizenship 
and must be approved by the Danish parliament. 
A permanent residence permit requirements:
• As a main rule the applicant must have stayed 
in Denmark for nine years without a break. 
Nordic citizens only need to have stayed two 
years. Refugees eight years. Immigrant mar-
ried to Danish citizens between six and eight 
years depending of the length of the marriage
• Children immigrated before the age of 15 
years can in principle be citizens when they 
are 18 years no matter how long time they 
have stayed in the country
• Immigrants that have been sentenced to at 
least two years of prison cannot get citizen-
ship
• Other immigrants who have a criminal re-
cord must wait until a certain qualifying pe-
riod has expired. It depends on the severity 
of the crime
• The applicant shall pass examinations on lan-
guage skills and on knowledge on the Dan-
ish history and society
• There must not be a debt to the public in 
certain fields
• The applicant shall be self-supporting. He 
must not have received public help in the 
last year and only for six months within the 
last five years
• The immigrant shall submit a vow on alle-
giance and loyalty to Denmark and Danish 
legislation
• Adults shall as a main rule give up citizen-
ship in other countries.
A central condition is the rule about being 
self-supporting. It means that immigrants, who 
are outside the labour market, cannot become a 
Danish citizen and obtain the concomitant rights.
Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States
106
The political most sensitive part of the con-
ditions is the demands to pass examinations on 
language and Denmark. They have been de-
signed so difficult that even many Danes are 
not able to answer the questions properly. Af-
ter the examinations have been implemented it 
has been more difficult to get citizenship and as 
can be seen from figure 13 much fewer immi-
grants have achieved citizenship since 2000. The 
number of immigrants from non-western coun-
tries, who achieved Danish citizenship, fell from 
19,000 at the highest level in 2000 to 3,300 at 
the lowest in 2007.
In total about 41 per cent of all immigrants 
living in Denmark has received Danish citizen-
ship. But there are considerable differences be-
tween different ethnic groups as can be seen from 
Figure 14.
The proportion of immigrants, who have ob-
tained Danish citizenship, varies from only 21 
per cent of the Afghanis to 81 per cent among 
immigrants from Lebanon, who are mostly Pal-
estinians. Two factors seem to have special im-
portance here: duration of stay and reason for im-
migration. In general groups of immigrants, who 
came early, more often tend to be citizens, but 
Turks and Pakistanis, who came early as labour 
immigrants, only to a moderate degree have be-
come citizens. The highest extent of citizenship 
is found among the early refugees from Leba-
non, Sri Lanka, Iran and Vietnam. Citizenship 
has been obtained less often by the last refugee 
groups like Afghanis, Iraqis and Somalis, for 
whom it also has been more difficult because 
of the new rules since 2001. 
It has also something to do with the age dis-
tribution of the groups. In general about 60 per 
cent of the children in these immigrant groups 
are Danish citizens. Among the adults only about 
50 per cent have citizenship, mostly among the 
younger immigrants. 
Figure 13.  The development in the number of immigrants getting Danish Citizenship (Statistics 
Denmark).
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4.3.4.  Acknowledgement of education 
obtained in other countries
It is very important for immigrants’ possibility 
to make a working career that their education 
from the home land is acknowledged on the Dan-
ish labour market. In Denmark is established a 
centre in the Ministry of Education, which per-
forms an evaluation of qualifications on the basis 
of diplomas and certificates from foreign places 
of study. The decision of the centre is important 
for getting access to educations in Denmark, to 
trade unions and to certain kinds of trades. Ap-
proval of merits from former education, when 
seeking place at universities and other kinds of 
higher education, is decided by the universities 
themselves. It has shown to be quite difficult for 
immigrants to have their education from abroad 
acknowledged by these rules ˗ especially at the 
universities.
It is also possible for immigrants to have their 
qualifications proved at a so-called AMU cen-
tre or via labour work ability testing in a pri-
vate company.
4.3.5.  Political rights
Immigrants, who are not Danish citizens, cannot 
vote for the Danish parliament and for the EU 
parliament and cannot be elected as members. 
Immigrants from EU and the Nordic countries 
can from they arrive vote to the municipal coun-
cils. Other immigrants can do this when they 
have stayed in the country for more than three 
years before the election. They can also be elect-
ed as members of the councils.
4.4.  Direct measures of integration
4.4.1.  location of refugees 
with residence permit
Asylum seekers, who have obtained residence 
permit, are allocated to Danish municipalities 
in accordance with a quota system for regions 
that tries to make an equal distribution of im-
migrants to municipalities, not only for spread-
ing the costs of integration but also to avoid ge-
ographical concentrations of immigrants. The 
refugees are forced to stay in the selected mu-
Figure 14.  Proportion of immigrants in the most important groups, who have obtained Danish 
citizenship 2008 (Database on the Danish population established by the Danish Building Research 
Institute).
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nicipality at least for three years if they want 
to receive public support. Denmark is the only 
country which has such a systematic dispersal 
of refugees (Tænketanken 2004).
The local authorities are obliged to assign a 
dwelling for the incoming refugees. They must 
assign to a permanent dwelling and they most 
often use their power to assign dwellings in so-
cial housing. There are no demands on the size 
and quality of the dwelling.
An evaluation of the effects of the arrange-
ment for the location of refugees (Pohl Nielsen 
and Blume Jensen 2006) has showed that the 
rules have resulted in that many more munici-
palities have received refugees. And since the 
approval of the ‘law on integration’ in 1998 an 
increasing number of refugees choose to stay in 
the municipality where they were placed. How-
ever, many refugees still chose to move from the 
smaller towns to more urbanised areas with high-
er concentrations of immigrants. Another study 
(Skifter Andersen 2006a) has shown that this ap-
plies for all immigrants. It also showed (Skifter 
Andersen 2006b) that the main reason for these 
moves were an expectation of better opportuni-
ties for getting employment, but also that some 
immigrants wanted to move closer to family and 
friends in the cities.
4.4.2.  Integration programmes in 
accordance with the law on Integration
All new immigrants coming as refugees or by 
family reunion has to sign an ‘integration con-
tract’ with the local authority in the municipality 
where they settle. They are based on an evalu-
ation of the immigrants specific situation and 
needs in preparation for that the person in ques-
tion as fast as possible can be self supporting. 
Among the agreements in the contract is that 
the immigrant participate in an ‘introductionary 
programme’. The content and rules about this 
programme depends on to what extent the im-
migrants are self-supporting or not. If the immi-
grant does not follow the agreement he can be 
deprived of his public support.
As a part of the agreement immigrants are 
obliged to follow some courses in the Danish 
language and on the Danish society and pass 
an examination. The extent of these courses is 
greater than in other countries and Denmark is 
the only country, where examination is compul-
sory (Tænketanken 2004).
Another part of the ‘integration contract’ con-
tains agreements on upgrading of skills in prepa-
ration for employment or better jobs. It can be 
about education or practical training in private 
companies. Also in this case the immigrants can 
lose their public support if they do not follow the 
agreement. The local authorities are also obliged 
to offer stimulation to children in the use of the 
Danish language from the age of three years and 
arrange special courses in Danish for children 
in schools.
4.5.  Special economic conditions 
for immigrants - welfare payments
Important criteria for how to design welfare pay-
ments for immigrants in Denmark (Tænketanken 
2004 , 12) has been:
• If the living standard for immigrants living on 
public support is higher than in other coun-
tries, there is a risk of attracting more immi-
grants that are not able to support themselves. 
This will put a pressure on the public sector 
and the tax system
• If the difference between welfare payments 
and income from doing work is too small, 
the incentive for immigrants to ‘do the hard 
work’ to learn the language and seek work 
will be lower resulting in higher unemploy-
ment rates and public expenditures.
In 2002 was introduced a new rule for wel-
fare payments to immigrants, called ‘Start help’. 
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It was considerable lower than the welfare pay-
ments it replaced (table 19). All immigrants, who 
had not been living in the country for seven out 
of the last eight years, were directed to this sup-
port. In the report from ‘Tænketanken’ (2004) the 
following comparison was made for the value of 
this support compared with normal welfare pay-
ments and the payments in some other countries:
Besides these special rules for newer immi-
grants there have also been some changes in the 
general rules for welfare payments, which es-
pecially affect immigrants. From 2004 the total 
support for a family, paid as welfare, housing 
allowances and others, must be below a certain 
limit called ‘kontanthjælpsloftet’. If the limit is 
exceeded some of the support will be reduced. 
As immigrant families much more often than 
native Danes have two adults without work or 
unemployment support they are more often af-
fected by these rules.
4.6.  Effects of the Danish 
integration policies
In 2006 an evaluation of the Danish integration 
policy was made (Tænketanken 2006). It was 
based on a comparison of the situation in 2005 
compared to 1999, but without comparison with 
other countries. The evaluation was related to 
seven goals for integration formulated (cited in 
the beginning of the section). The conclusions 
were:
Education and knowledge of the Danish lan-
guage: There had been an improvement in lan-
guage skills but still one third of the immigrants 
did not have adequate skills. The proportion of 
young immigrants and descendants that get an 
education has increased but not as much as the 
Danish population as a whole and there is till 
a marked difference between Danes and immi-
grants.
Labour market integration: Despite an in-
crease in employment among immigrants there 
are still a large difference between the employ-
ment rate among immigrants (48 per cent in the 
age group 25-64 in 2005) and Danes (78 per 
cent). Descendants are doing better (67 per cent) 
but still worse than Danes.
Self support: There has been an increase in the 
proportion of immigrants who are self support-
ing, but it is still far below Danes (36 per cent in 
the age 25-64 compared to 59 per cent for Danes)
Discrimination: There has been a marked fall 
in the proportion of immigrants, who experience 
discrimination, but still 30 per cent express com-
plaints over this.
Social contacts between Danes and immi-
grants: One of the means for this has been to 
get more small children to join public child care. 
This has improved much. But it is concluded that 
Table 19. The Danish ‘Start help’ for immigrants compared to normal Danish welfare payment and 
payments in som other countries 2004 (Source: Tænketanken 2004).
*) Payments after taxes corrected for differences in purchasing power
Euro per month*) Compared to 'Start help' %
'Start help' 558 100
Welfare payments Denmark 816 146
Welfare payments Sweden 630 113
Welfare payments Holland 838 150
Welfare payments Germany 511 92
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the contact still is hampered because of segrega-
tion in housing and schools. A survey, however, 
showed that the proportion of immigrants that 
only had friends among other immigrants was re-
duced from 60 to 40 per cent from 1999 to 2005.
Political participation: Participation has im-
proved but is still far below the proportion of 
Danes voting at the elections and being elected.
Values and norms: A special study was made 
on the values and norms of immigrants (Tæn-
ketanken 2007). The survey showed that immi-
grants just as often as Danes support ideas on 
democracy and freedom of speech, that they are 
more tolerant to other religions, but that they to 
some extent have other values concerning equal 
rights of the sexes and on to what extent parents 
should decide for their children. It is concluded 
that the last values are an obstacle for integration.
A comparison with other countries was made 
in an OECD study of ‘THE LABOUR MAR-
KET INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN 
DENMARK’ (OECD 2006). The conclusions 
of the study were:
‘The labour market integration of immigrants 
in Denmark is not favourable. In no other 
OECD country are the differences between 
the employment rates of native-born and 
immigrants as large as in Denmark, and 
unemployment is more than twice as high 
among immigrants as among the native-
born. The gaps in employment rates vis‡- vis 
the native-born are particularly high for 
immigrants from non-OECD countries, which 
account for about half of the overall immigrant 
stock. However, gaps in employment rates are 
also high for immigrants from OECD countries 
and their offspring. This has to be seen in light 
of overall high employment rates in Denmark, 
particularly for women. Yet, even immigrants’ 
employment rates themselves are below those 
observed in other countries.
These disappointing outcomes have to be seen 
in the context of a doubling of the immigrant 
population over the past twenty years, with 
particularly high immigration in the second 
half of the 1990s. Among the EU-15, only the 
Southern European countries and Ireland 
experienced a larger increase in the immigrant 
stock in the past ten years. But the stock of 
foreign-born in the Danish population is still 
relatively low in international comparison: 
about 7 per cent of the working-age population 
compared with an EU average of about 12 
per cent. In addition, the composition of 
migration to Denmark has been dominated by 
humanitarian migrants. Such migrants tend to 
have relatively poor labour market outcomes in 
most countries, particularly in the early years 
of settlement. Indeed, entry-category effects far 
outweigh the employment impact of any other 
socio-economic characteristic. However, other 
factors are at work too since labour market 
outcomes are also not favourable for the 
foreign-born from OECD countries.
The observed high gaps in employment 
rates for all immigrant groups are not a new 
phenomenon. For more than two decades, gaps 
vis-‡-vis the native-born have been well above 
10 per cent, for both genders. This stands 
in contrast to a number of other European 
countries, where outcomes of immigrants were 
similar to those of the native-born until the 
early 1990s. This may be partly attributable to 
the fact that Denmark had less “guestworker” 
migration than other countries.
Against the background of persistently 
unfavourable outcomes and a growing 
immigrant population, integration of 
immigrants has taken an increasingly 
prominent place in the public debate. 
As a result, improving the integration of 
immigrants, and labour market integration 
in particular, has become a prime objective 
of the Danish government. It has tackled 
the issue by enhancing its efforts to improve 
the labour market integration of already 
resident immigrants and their offspring by a 
comprehensive set of integration measures, 
some of which are quite resource intensive 
and developed. Although data are not fully 
comparable, it appears that Denmark invests 
significantly more into integration than 
other countries, particularly with respect to 
language training and targeted labour market 
measures. At the same time, Denmark is trying 
to shift the mix of immigrants by facilitating 
labour-market oriented immigration and 
restricting entry policies for other categories 
of immigrants, particularly for family 
reunification, and by introducing selection 
criteria for its annual intake of quota refugees 
˗ whose current employment probability is 
particularly unfavourable. For recent arrivals, 
lower social assistance applies for seven years, 
and participation in a three-year introduction 
programme is obligatory for those migrants 
receiving social benefits after arrival.
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This mix of restrictive entry policies and 
obligatory measures on the one hand and of 
elaborate, non-obligatory offers on the other 
sends an ambiguous message to resident and 
potential immigrants. Much is being done to 
integrate them, and integration is doubtlessly 
in their own interest, but the nature of some 
of the policies in place reflects the view that 
immigrants may not be willing to integrate into 
the Danish economy and society.
The three-year introduction programme 
consists of extensive, modular and multitiered 
language training and tailored labour market 
integration offers. Particularly noteworthy 
in this respect is the strong focus on labour 
market integration, based on the view that 
employment is the single most important 
factor contributing to successful integration. 
Municipalities are in charge of implementing 
the introduction programme, and they enjoy 
substantial discretion in doing so. There 
is a highly developed scheme of financial 
incentives for municipalities to foster rapid 
labour market integration of new arrivals.
The strong focus on employment in the 
integration efforts, particularly for recent 
arrivals, seems to have increased the 
employment probability of immigrants, 
in particular among recent immigrants 
from non-OECD countries. As early 
labour market entry has a strong impact 
on future employment probability, this can 
be anticipated to contribute positively to 
future integration, although it is too early 
yet to evaluate the long-term effect of the 
measures taken. However, along with the 
increase in employment, a growing share of 
recent immigrants is unemployed. Indeed, the 
emphasis on early employment has the risk of 
neglecting those groups which face particular 
difficulties in labour market integration, and 
where employment might be expected to be 
a more distant objective. The increase in 
unemployment may well reflect the increase in 
participation and thus the success of activation 
schemes but may also point to persistent 
difficulties in finding employment, which 
benefit cuts will not resolve.
There is relatively quick convergence in 
employment during the first few years after 
arrival in Denmark, but this generally tapers 
off after 8-10 years, leading to less-than full 
convergence over the medium-term. The 
recent policies for new arrivals seem to have 
increased the speed of convergence for new 
immigrants, but the long-term effect is not yet 
clear. For women, there are even indications of 
an increase over the medium term.
Due to a well-developed statistical and 
research infrastructure, the integration of 
immigrants has been the subject of more 
study in Denmark than in many other 
OECD countries. There is a benchmarking 
system in place to monitor the success of the 
municipalities in the labour market integration 
of immigrants, and to measure the impact of 
specific policies on labour market entry. This 
system has shown that after accounting for 
the structural conditions of the municipalities 
and the personal characteristics of the 
immigrant intake, differences in the integration 
performance between most municipalities are 
small, despite the substantial discretion which 
municipalities enjoy in the application of the 
introduction programme.
Many immigrants tend to face high net 
replacement rates resulting from low expected 
earnings and relatively generous benefits at the 
bottom end. However, there is no evidence that 
immigrants react differently to the resulting 
disincentives than the native-born, yet the 
benefit levels for recent arrivals have been 
lowered substantially. On the demand-side, 
the relatively high collectively-bargained 
entry wages are a concern, and may be one 
explanation for employer hiring reticence in 
the case of information asymmetries or lower 
initial productivity. Indeed, there is evidence 
that wage subsidies are much more effective 
for immigrants than for the native-born. 
However, there appears to be little reason for 
lower minimum wages as a hiring incentive 
to employers if these are not compensated by 
payments to the immigrant. Such measures 
would tend to foster potential unemployment 
traps, and could intensify the problem of 
low returns to education which employed 
immigrants face.
The stylised labour market integration model 
(“stepmodel”) for unemployed immigrants 
in Denmark accounts for these barriers 
by a flexible combination of preparatory 
up-skilling including language training, 
on-the-job-training and subsequent initial 
wage subsidies, based on an assessment of 
the individual’s needs and the demands of the 
labour market. This seems to be an effective 
strategy as empirical analysis shows that 
among the labour market integration measures 
taken, enterprise-based job training (privat 
jobtrÆning) is most effective, followed by 
wage subsidies to employers. However, few 
migrants profit from these measures, and the 
stepmodel is not often applied. Measures 
should thus be undertaken to foster the 
provision of enterprise-based job training, and 
broader provision of wage subsidies could be 
considered. First steps in this direction have 
been taken by the June 2006 agreement on 
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welfare, which enhances the scale and scope of 
both of these measures. 
Denmark has a dispersal policy which 
aims to spread out immigrants more evenly 
across the country. However, some of the 
smaller municipalities did not have much 
experience with immigrants in the past, and 
with the declining numbers of humanitarian 
and family reunification immigrants, small 
municipalities have difficulties in offering the 
full range of integration measures. Indeed, 
some of the integration measures which 
seem particularly effective ˗ i.e. company-
based training combined with job-specific 
language training ˗ require a certain number 
of immigrants in order to generate scale 
economies. Some of these problems should 
be alleviated by the forthcoming municipality 
reform, which reduces significantly the number 
of municipalities. Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence suggests that dispersal may not 
always be effective, as it prevents immigrants 
from using their ethnic networks to get into 
employment. An equal geographic distribution 
should thus not be the sole objective and 
there are other factors to consider. Although 
the refugee’s preferences as well as his/her 
educational needs and employment chances 
are taken into account in the authorities’ 
location decisions, there seems to be a case for 
assessing the effectiveness of dispersal policy.
As in other OECD countries, the bulk of 
directly integration-related public spending 
is attributable to language training. The 
calculated norm is that immigrants in need 
of this may receive on average 2000 hours of 
such training. Although the actual average 
number of training hours is unknown, this 
clearly appears to be well above the levels 
in the other countries under review which 
provide typically between 500 and 900 hours. 
In contrast to the elaborate evaluations on 
integration measures in general, the labour 
market impact of language training has not 
been sufficiently investigated in Denmark. The 
available evidence to date suggests some lock-
in effects related to the relatively extensive 
language training, i.e. language training 
may be provided at a level that is no longer 
effective, let alone efficient. Given the high 
cost of this measure, it is urgent to undertake 
some rigorous pilot studies of what might be 
a more optimal intensity of language training 
and what types of language training work 
best for immigrants. A study is currently being 
prepared which should look into these issues.’
5.  Migration flows and 
settlement patterns 
within the country
A study on immigrants housing choices and 
moves in Denmark were conducted in 2006 
(Skifter Andersen 2006a). This section is based 
on the study.
5.1.  The spatial location 
of immigrants 
The Danish municipalities have been divided 
into five groups according to their degree of ur-
banisation. The groups are:
• Copenhagen City: The municipalities of Co-
penhagen and Frederiksberg.
• Copenhagen suburbs: Municipalities in the 
suburbs
• Odense, Aarhus, Aalborg: The three largest 
provincial cities
• Other municipalities with towns larger than 
15,000 inhabitants.
• Other municipalities
Below is analysed the geographical distribu-
tion of households in Denmark. Immigrants are 
defined as households where the person with the 
highest income is an immigrant or a descendant 
(see Chapter 2). Only immigrants coming from 
countries outside Western Europe and Northern 
America are included for analyses.
In table 20 is shown the distribution of im-
migrant households on the spatial defined groups 
of municipalities compared to the distribution of 
the whole population. It is shown to what extent 
immigrants are over-represented in the groups.
About half of the immigrants are settled in the 
capital region compared to only 28 per cent of 
the whole population. They are especially over-
represented in Copenhagen City, but also in the 
suburbs. They are also over-represented in the 
three largest provincial towns, but the actual pro-
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portion of immigrants living there is only 16 per 
cent. In total 65 per cent are living in the capi-
tal region and the three largest provincial cities. 
35 per cent are settled outside the larger cities, 
most of them in towns with more than 15,000 
inhabitants, while quite a few lives in the smaller 
towns, villages and the countryside compared to 
the whole population.
There are, however, big differences between 
the spatial location of different immigrant groups. 
In figure 15 is shown the proportion of different 
immigrant groups (households) living in the capi-
tal region and the three largest provincial cities. 
The highest concentration of immigrants liv-
ing in the larger cities (93 per cent) is found 
among the Pakistanis. They are both very over-
represented in Copenhagen city and in the sub-
urbs but not in Odense, Aarhus, and Aalborg.
High concentrations in larger cities are also 
found among Somalis, Iranians, Turks and Ar-
abs. The Somalis, and to some extent Iranians, 
are to a great extent over-represented in Odense, 
Aarhus and Aalborg, less in Copenhagen City 
and not in the suburbs. The Turks most often are 
settled in the suburbs of Copenhagen, but quite 
a lot of them also stay in provincial towns with 
more than 15,000 inhabitants. Arabs most of-
ten stay in Copenhagen City or Odense, Aarhus, 
and Aalborg. 
The groups mostly dispersed are Afghanis 
Immigrants Whole population Over-representation
Copenhagen City 27 13 108
Copenhagen suburbs 21 15 40
Odense, Aarhus, Aalborg 16 12 33
Provincial towns > 15.000 22 24 -8
Other municipalities 13 35 -63
Total 100 100
Table 20. Distribution of immigrant households from countries outside Western Europe 
and North America on urban location 2004 compared to the whole Danish population, 
measured by over-representation (Skifter Andersen 2006a).
Figure 15. Proportion of different immigrants groups (households) living in either the capital region or 
the three largest provincial cities 2004 (Skifter Andersen 2006a).
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and immigrants from Eastern and Central Eu-
rope, who in 2004 mostly were refugees from 
Bosnia, Kosovo etc. In both of these groups 
there are refugees coming lately to Denmark, 
which means that they have been encompassed 
by the refugee dispersal programme established 
in 1998, where new refugees were spread to all 
municipalities with the obligation to stay there 
for at least three years (see chapter 4).
5.2.  The internal migration 
patterns of immigrants 
There is a net movement of immigrants from 
the less urbanised parts of the country to the 
more urbanised as can be seen from table 21. 
In the table is shown the share of moving im-
migrants in 2002 who moved to a place located 
in places with different degree of urbanisation 
compared to all moves in Denmark. Moreover 
is shown the net migration rate for immigrants 
measured as the difference between the number 
of in-movers and out-movers as a share of all 
moves of immigrants. 
More than 40 per cent of all moving im-
migrants move to a place in the capital region. 
This is a much higher share than applies to all 
moves in Denmark. As a result there is a net 
immigration to the capital region. There is also 
net migration of immigrants to the three largest 
provincial towns. 
Immigrants especially move away from the 
least urbanised places in smaller towns, villages 
and the countryside. For middle-sized provincial 
towns there is a positive net migration even if 
the number of moves to the places is below av-
*) In-movers minus out-movers as per centage of all national moves.
Figure 16. Net migration rates to the capital region in Denmark 2002 for different immigrant groups 
(Skifter Andersen 2006a).
 The share as per cents Immigrants Whole 
population
Over-
repræsentation
Net immigration 
rate*), 
immigrants
Capital region 44 28 57 0,8
Odense, Aarhus, Aalborg 19 16 19 0,8
Provincial towns > 15.000 27 30 -10 0,2
Other municipalities 10 26 -62 -1,8
Total 100 100
Table 21. Distribution of moving immigrant households 2002 on their moving destination, compared to 
all moving household, plus net immigration rates for the destinations (Skifter Andersen 2006a).
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erage. An explanation could be that immigrants 
more seldom move inside these areas. The trend 
to move towards the capital region is, howev-
er, not the same for different immigrant groups 
as can be seen from figure 16. The movements 
towards the capital region are especially strong 
among Iranians and immigrants from African 
countries. Turks and Pakistani tend to leave the 
capital region.
5.3.  Immigrants settlement 
on the housing market
Immigrants in Denmark are to a very high degree 
concentrated in social housing as can be seen 
from table 22. More than 60 per cent of immi-
grant households (households were the person 
with the highest income is immigrant or descend-
ant) are living in social housing. This is three 
times as often as applies to the whole popula-
tion. On the other hand immigrants very seldom 
have obtained homeownership in detached or 
semi-detached houses. Their appearance in pri-
vate renting, co-operatives and owner-occupied 
flats is also lower but not so much as for home-
ownership. The degree to which immigrants are 
living in social housing varies between different 
groups, as can be seen from figure 17.
In general immigrants coming form countries 
with many refugees more often stays in social 
housing, but the picture is not quite clear as al-
so immigrants from labour-immigrant countries 
often live in the sector. Among the immigrants 
from Somalia only 20 per cent are living outside 
the social housing sector. Moreover, refugees and 
immigrants coming from Arabic countries very 
Table 22. Distribution of immigrant households from countries outside Western Europe and North 
America on housing tenure 2004 compared to the whole Danish population measured by over-
repræsentation, as per cents (Skifter Andersen 2006a).
Figure 17. Proportion of immigrant households from different countries living in social housing in 
Denmark 2004 (Skifter Andersen 2006a).
Immigrants Whole population Over-repræsentation
Social housing 61 20 205
Private renting and co-operatives 22 26 -16
Owner-occupied flats 5 5 -13
Homeownership 10 48 -78
Others 2 2 40
Total 100 100
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often live in social housing. But also especially 
Turks, and to some extent also Pakistanis, very 
often are settled in the social sector.
The least dependency on social housing is 
found among immigrants from Eastern Asia, oth-
er African countries and other countries (mostly 
Latin America). But the proportion living in the 
sector still is very high. There are also big dif-
ferences between the groups concerning to what 
extent they are homeowners (Figure 18).
Homeownership is most seldom found 
among the latest arrived immigrants coming 
from refugee countries. Very few Somalis, Af-
ghanis and Arabs are homeowners. A greater pro-
portion of long-term immigrants from the labour 
immigrant countries Pakistan and Turkey own 
their home. This also applies to immigrants from 
Iran and Eastern Europe. Ownership is, however, 
most often found among immigrants from East 
Asia. But also for this group the homeowner-
ship rate is less than half of the Danish average.
6.  conclusions
6.1.  The welfare state
A comparison of welfare payments in the Scan-
dinavian countries in 2002 (Bonke ed. 2005) 
showed that Danish welfare payments have 
been somewhat more generous than in Norway 
and Sweden. Especially because of the relative 
high income transfers and the general character 
of these transfers income inequality is lower in 
Denmark than in most other countries. Meas-
ured among the total population Denmark has 
the lowest Gini coefficient after taxes and trans-
fers among the Nordic countries. There have only 
been small changes in this since the 1980s. For 
the working age population, however, inequal-
ity has increased a little. 
Compared to the other Nordic countries Den-
mark has, together with Sweden, the lowest pov-
erty rate. It decreased from mid-1980s to mid-
1990s, but has increased in the last ten years. In 
recent years some change have been made in 
the welfare payments, which reduce payment for 
long term recipients and for immigrants. These 
Figure 18. Proportion of immigrant households from different countries who own their dwelling (as 
either owner-occupied flat or detached/semi-detached house) in Denmark 2004 (Skifter Andersen 
2006a).
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changes will in the cause of time lead to an in-
creasing poverty rate and increased inequality.
Denmark is one of the countries in the world 
with the highest labour market participation, 
mainly because of the high participation by wom-
en. But the growing number of older and retired 
people will reduce this in the future. More than 
half of the Danish population is on the labour 
market. This is at nearby the same level as the 
other Nordic countries, a little lower than Nor-
way and Sweden but higher than the averages for 
EU and OECD. There have not been substantial 
changes in the last ten years before 2008, but the 
recent economic crisis may have expelled some-
one from the labour market. The unemployment 
rate among the labour force is quite low in Den-
mark compared with other countries. It has been 
falling until 2008, but has increased somewhat in 
recent years due to the economic crisis.
Denmark had a gross national income per 
capita 37,000 $ in 2008, which is one of the 
highest in the world. It is at the same level as 
Sweden and Finland but somewhat lower than 
Norway. Large part of the national income is 
used as government expenditure (about 50 per 
cent), and as social expenditures (27 per cent). 
Only Sweden has higher social expenditures than 
Denmark while they are lower in Finland and 
especially in Norway. Since 1980 GDP has in-
creased in Denmark with more than 70 per cent. 
Government expenditures have had a little low-
er increase. 
6.2.  Housing market 
and housing policy
The Danish housing policy can be characterised 
as more general and universalistic than in other 
countries in the sense that it to a greater extent 
are pointed at housing for the whole population 
and not only for vulnerable low-income groups. 
This means that support for housing to a great 
extent also is available for middle and higher in-
come groups, especially tax subsidies and access 
to social housing. Denmark has had strong so-
cial objectives for housing but not as pronounced 
as in Sweden. More weight has been put on the 
market and less state control, especially of hous-
ing finance. General tax subsidies, which have 
strengthened homeownership, have been exten-
sive. But there has also been a considerable sup-
port for social housing and the sector is strong. 
Despite the general market orientation there has 
been a strong rent control in the private rented 
market, which is still functioning. 
Denmark has about 2.5 million dwellings 
corresponding to 460 dwellings per inhabitant. 
More than half of the dwellings have four or 
more rooms. The average number of rooms is 
1.7 per inhabitant. The housing conditions are 
thus quite favourable in Denmark. Only 8.3 per 
cent of households think that they live in an over-
crowded dwelling and more than 25 per cent that 
their dwelling is very spacious. Nearby 60 per 
cent of the dwellings are in detached or semi 
detached single family houses.
Like many other European countries Den-
mark had an increase in property prices during 
the economic boom from the middle of the 1990s 
followed by a decline after 2007. However the 
fluctuations have been large. Because of this de-
velopment the prices became very high and it be-
came much more difficult for first time buyers to 
afford a home. These difficulties are especially 
found in the Capital Region. There are also some 
differences in rents between social housing and 
private renting, and between the Capital Region 
and the rest of the country. A survey from Euro-
stat has shown that nearby 60 per of the Danes 
feel their housing costs as a high or very high 
financial strain. This figure is high compared to 
other countries in the study and very high com-
pared to the other Nordic countries.
Tenures in Denmark can be divided into five 
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groups: Owner-occupied houses, Owner-occu-
pied flats, Co-operatives, Private renting and So-
cial housing10. Compared to many other coun-
tries the share of owner-occupied dwellings is 
quite low. The rented sector is about 40 per cent 
and divided into two sectors of nearby equal size 
as social housing and private rented housing. Fi-
nally, there is a relatively small co-operative sec-
tor, which, however, is strong in the municipal-
ity of Copenhagen, where it constitutes about 
25 per cent.
There are not supported loans nor supply 
or individual subsidies for owner-occupation in 
Denmark (except for some tax advantages for 
pensioners). Earlier tax subsidies were very high 
because all capital costs could be deducted from 
the taxable income. This has been very much re-
duced since the beginning of the 1990s. 
Co-operatives are a small sector in Denmark 
and most of it is older housing that has been 
transferred from private renting. Since the be-
ginning of the 1980s, there has been public fi-
nancial support for building of new co-operatives 
with certain limits on the size and costs of the 
dwellings. This support has since 2000 been re-
duced to a public guarantee on loans. The pric-
es of co-operatives are, in principle, subject to 
regulation. As a result, co-operatives, to a large 
extent, have been populated by family members 
or friends of previous residents. To some extents, 
co-operatives have been a closed sector for out-
siders, especially immigrants, who do not have 
personal contacts to the residents living there. In 
recent years, regulation has been riddled for dif-
ferent reasons, and prices have increased to mar-
ket levels in some parts of the stock, but parts of 
the co-operative sector are still relatively cheap.
Private renting is a somewhat diverse sector 
where different parts of it are subject to differ-
ent kinds of regulation. About half of all private 
rented dwellings are subject to a strict rent con-
trol. The result of rent control is that rents tend 
to be below the market level. As a consequence 
there is a surplus demand for private renting, es-
pecially in the cities. This means that landlords 
often can pick and choose between the applicants 
for dwellings. Tenants in private renting can get 
housing allowances. There are two kinds of al-
lowances for respectively pensioners and other 
tenants, where the allowance for pensioners is 
much more favourable. The size of the subsidy is 
dependent on the size of the rent, the size of the 
dwelling, household income and household size.
In Denmark social housing is organised in 
non-profit housing associations. In principle the 
associations are private autonomous organisa-
tions but they are subject to a strict public reg-
ulation and under surveillance of local authori-
ties. Rents in social housing are fixed in accord-
ance with principles of financial balance between 
earnings and expenses on every housing estate. 
As the historic costs and capital costs vary be-
tween estates build in different time periods this 
means that rents varies in a way that is not in 
accordance with the variation in quality and lo-
cation. New social housing is subsidised and un-
der controlled costs. Tenants in social housing 
can get housing allowances with the same rules 
as for private renting. Tenants can also get guar-
anteed loans to cover the deposit. In principle 
all kinds of households can get access to social 
housing. As a main rule vacant dwellings on an 
estate are allocated to people on a waiting list in 
the specific housing association. However, there 
are also several other means of allocation. One 
is that the local authorities can dispose 25 per 
cent of vacant dwellings. Especially in Copen-
hagen there has been a high pressure on the so-
cial housing sector and the normal waiting lists 
have been very long resulting in many years of 
waiting time. It has thus been difficult for many 
immigrants to get access to social housing and 
they have only succeeded if they have accept-
ed to wait for several years. Most Danes have 
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given up the waiting lists, so a relatively large 
proportion of people on the lists are immigrants.
In Denmark there has been an increasing seg-
mentation of the housing market in the last 30 
years in the sense that there has been a steady 
increase in the difference in average household 
incomes between the owner-occupied and the 
rented sector. Household income in owner-oc-
cupied houses is more than twice the income in 
social housing. Also incomes among households 
in private renting are quite low. The incomes in 
co-operatives are higher than in rented housing 
but still far below the owner-occupied sector. 
6.3.  Immigration and 
immigration policies
In connection with the high economic growth in 
the 1960s Danish firms actively searched for la-
bour in other countries. In this period it was very 
easy for foreigners to get permission to come 
to the country and search for work. This was 
changed in 1973 when the upcoming economic 
crisis and increasing unemployment motivated 
the government to make a stop for immigration 
of migrant workers. Denmark also felt it as a re-
sponsibility to receive refugees from the begin-
ning of the 1970s. The number of immigrants 
from the so called ‘labour immigration’ coun-
tries outside Western Europe (Turkey, Yugosla-
via, Pakistan and Morocco) living in Denmark 
increased from about 40,000 in 1975 to 100,000 
in 1996. The number of people, who had come 
from the 12 largest refugee countries increased 
from 2,000 in 1980 to 56,000 in 1996. 
Many came by family reunion. The rules for 
both this and for asylum were tightened since the 
beginning of the 1990s and especially after 2001. 
As a result the number of immigrants given asy-
lum was reduced from 20,000 in 1995 to 1,000 
in 2006. Family reunions decreased from 6,000 
in 2001 to 550 in 2008.
Instead immigration from the EU and labour 
migration in general has increased since 2001. In 
2002 a ‘green card’ arrangement was introduced. 
After 2007 it became possible for everyone to 
come and work in Denmark in condition they 
provide that they would earn enough income for 
living. Of even greater importance was the ex-
tension of the EU with countries from Central 
Europe in 2004. The residence permits for edu-
cation were also extended, this meant that im-
migration to Denmark after a short fall in 2003 
increased very much. As a result of all this, total 
immigration to Denmark increased from 30,000 
to 70,000 from 2003 to 2008.
The number of immigrants and descendants 
in Denmark increased from 150,000 in 1980 to 
490,000 in 2009. Some of these immigrants are 
permanent settlers while others are only tempo-
rary in the country. Among the 20 largest im-
migrant groups in Denmark in 2009 are three 
Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden and Iceland), 
two Western European countries (Germany and 
Great Britain), three Central European countries 
(Poland, Bosnia and Kosovo etc.), six countries 
from the Middle East (Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Iran, Afghanistan and Morocco), one from Africa 
(Somalia) and five from Eastern Asia (Pakistan, 
Vietnam, Sri Lanka, China and Thailand). The 
Turks are the largest group followed by Ger-
mans, Iraqis and Poles. 
The immigrant population has a very differ-
ent age distribution compared to the Danish aver-
age. They are more often children, and also the 
adults are younger. There are considerable differ-
ences between the employment status of immi-
grants from 3’ world countries and the rest of the 
population with many more people outside the 
labour market. As a consequence of the high un-
employment immigrants in Denmark also have 
quite low incomes. Couples with children only 
have 55 per cent of the average income among 
Danes in the same family group.
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6.4.  Policies related to immigrants 
settlement and integration
Two objectives have been of special importance 
for integration policies in Denmark. One is that 
full employment has made it of great importance 
to make use of the labour reserve among immi-
grants. The other important aim is to relieve the 
pressure on the public finances and taxes. It has 
been important to move immigrants from being 
dependant on welfare support to be greater con-
tributors to tax incomes.
There has been a dilemma between integra-
tion policy and immigration policy. From 2001 
the government had as one of its main objectives 
to reduce immigration. One of the ways to ob-
tain this is to make life for newly arrived immi-
grants as unattractive as possible to make them 
go back where they came from and to discourage 
potential immigrants. Therefore refugees should 
not from the beginning be allowed to establish 
a normal life; they should not get work and not 
be socially integrated in the Danish society. Ob-
jectives for immigration policies have thus over-
ruled objectives for integration policies in the 
way that obstacles have been made for the inte-
gration of refugees.
In 1999 the first comprehensive law on inte-
gration of immigrants was passed by the parlia-
ment. It encompassed all refugees and family re-
unification. The responsibility was moved from a 
private organisation to the local authorities. The 
law included rules for a three year introduction 
programme with education and work training, 
which all new immigrants had to go through. In 
2001 a separate ministry for integration of im-
migrants was established. In 2002 it was decided 
that immigrants should receive less welfare pay-
ments to increase their incentives to get work. 
Later, in 2006, subsidies to companies, who em-
ployed new immigrants, were introduced. Im-
migrants in Denmark must have been a longer 
time in the country to get a permanent residence 
permit that in the other Nordic countries and the 
conditions for getting it are more difficult.
The fundamental principle for becoming a 
citizen in Denmark is family relations. This is in 
opposition to principles in some other countries 
where place of birth is most important. The rules 
for getting access to citizenship are very demand-
ing and have been tightened during the years. 
As a result the number of immigrants from non-
western countries, who achieved Danish citizen-
ship, fell from 19,000 at the highest level in 2000 
to 3 300 at the lowest in 2007. Only about 41 
per cent of all immigrants and descendents living 
in Denmark have received Danish citizenship.
After 1998 the state has established a quota 
system for each county (now region) and the 
municipalities within the region have to agree 
about the distribution of refugees. This system 
has in the first place resulted in that many more 
municipalities have received refugees. However, 
many refugees still chose to, after three years, to 
move from the smaller towns to more urbanised 
areas with higher concentrations of immigrants.
All new immigrants coming as refugees or 
by family reunion has to sign an ‘integration 
contract’ with the local authority in the munici-
pality where they settle. Among the agreements 
in the contract is that the immigrant participate 
in an ‘introductionary programme’. As a part of 
the agreement immigrants are obliged to follow 
some courses in the Danish language and on the 
Danish society and pass an examination. The 
extent of these courses is greater than in oth-
er countries and Denmark is the only country, 
where examination is compulsory. Another part 
of the ‘integration contract’ contains agreements 
on upgrading of skills in preparation for employ-
ment or better jobs. It can be about education 
or practical training in private companies. Also 
in this case the immigrants can loose their pub-
lic support if they do not follow the agreement.
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In 2002 was introduced a new rule for wel-
fare payments to immigrants, called ‘Start help’. 
It was considerable lower than the welfare pay-
ments it replaced. All immigrants, who had not 
been living in the country for seven out of the 
last eight years, were directed to this support. 
This reduces welfare payment for immigrants 
with more than 30 per cent and results in that the 
families come beyond the poverty line.
Despite an increase in employment among 
immigrants there are still a large difference be-
tween the employment rate among immigrants 
and Danes. There has been an increase in the 
proportion of immigrants who are self support-
ing, but it is still far below Danes. Descendants 
are doing better (67 per cent) but still worse than 
Danes. An OECD report concludes ‘The labour 
market integration of immigrants in Denmark is 
not favourable. In no other OECD country are 
the differences between the employment rates of 
native-born and immigrants as large as in Den-
mark’ and ‘This mix of restrictive entry policies 
and obligatory measures on the one hand and 
of elaborate, non-obligatory offers on the other 
sends an ambiguous message to resident and 
potential immigrants. Much is being done to in-
tegrate them, and integration is doubtlessly in 
their own interest, but the nature of some of the 
policies in place reflects the view that immigrants 
may not be willing to integrate into the Danish 
economy and society’.
6.5.  Migration flows and settlement 
patterns within the country
About half of the immigrants are settled in the 
capital region compared to only 28 per cent of 
the whole population. They are especially over-
represented in Copenhagen City and in the three 
largest provincial towns. There are, however, big 
differences between the spatial locations of dif-
ferent immigrant groups. The highest concentra-
tion of immigrants living in the larger cities (93 
per cent) is found among the Pakistanis. High 
concentrations in larger cities are also found 
among Somalis, Iranians, Turks and Arabs. 
There is a net movement of immigrants from 
the less urbanised parts of the country to the 
more urbanised. Immigrants especially move 
away from the least urbanised places in smaller 
towns, villages and the countryside. The move-
ments towards the capital region are especially 
strong among Iranians and immigrants from oth-
er African countries, followed by Somalis and 
Arabs. Turks and Pakistani tend to leave the cap-
ital region.
More than 60 per cent of immigrant house-
holds are living in social housing. This is three 
times as often as applies to the whole popula-
tion. On the other hand immigrants very seldom 
have obtained homeownership in detached or 
semi-detached houses. Their appearance in pri-
vate renting, co-operatives and owner-occupied 
flats is also lower but not so much as for home-
ownership. In general immigrants coming form 
countries with many refugees more often stays 
in social housing, but the picture is not quite 
clear as also immigrants from labour-immigrant 
countries often live in the sector.
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1.  Welfare in Norway
Terje Wessel
1.1.  Income inequality and poverty
Norway ranks close to the top of the OECD 
league in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), 
labour productivity and labour productivity 
growth (OECD 2009; St. meld. 9 2008-2009)). 
This favourable situation reflects, of course, a 
significant rise in oil and gas revenues. Currently, 
the petroleum sector accounts for more than 20 
per cent of total GDP and approximately half 
of total export. 
The implications of an open and growing 
economy are diverse and difficult to grasp. It 
has, no doubt, become harder to maintain egal-
itarian principles and practices. This is evident 
in several sorts of statistics, particularly income 
statistics. The country as a whole has experienced 
a marked growth of income inequality since the 
late 1980s. The Gini coefficient for household 
disposable income grew from 0.208 in 1986 to 
0.240 in 1996 and further to an average of 0.269 
during 2004-2007 (Table 1). The latter figure 
reflects huge fluctuations from year to year due 
to changes, and reported changes, in the capi-
tal gains taxation. The interplay between capital 
gains and capital gains taxation played a similar 
role in the early 1990s, when issues of econom-
ic inequality sparked a prolonged debate about 
distribution, equity and poverty. An often heard 
argument is that earnings inequality remains sta-
ble due to tripartite co-operation and long-term 
low-wage policies. This may have been true un-
til the late 1990s, but not any longer. The Gini 
coefficient for wage inequality among full-em-
ployed employees grew from 0.165 in 1997 to 
0.191 in 2007 (St.meld. 9 2008-2009). Equally 
important, a narrow focus on wage does not cap-
ture all premiums in the labour market. Many of 
the expanding sectors rely on low-priced shares, 
stock options and beneficial savings schemes as 
part of the reward structure. 
Norway has thus changed its position in the 
league tables of income inequality. Sweden, Den-
mark and Norway used to appear in one end 
of the OECD ranking, as the most equal socie-
ties. The latest report (OECD 2008), by contrast, 
places Norway behind 10 countries on a simi-
lar ranking and behind 13 countries on a rank-
ing based on the squared coefficient of variation 
(SCV). Much of the change in Norway has oc-
curred at the top end of the distribution, part-
ly through upward mobility and partly through 
increasing income in the upper stratum. These 
types of change are effectively captured by the 
SCV measure, which concentrates on differences 
from the mean. 
It might be seen as a mitigating circumstance 
that poor households enjoy a certain amount 
of protection in restless times (e.g. ‘industrial 
shift’, trade union decline, fluctuating interna-
tional markets, accelerating globalisation, etc.). 
The lowest decile has seen only a slight reduction 
(11 per cent) in its share of all incomes over two 
decades. A staggering 59 per cent of all incomes 
in the lowest decile are public transfers (St. meld. 
9 2008-2009), which clearly indicates the role of 
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government policies. Some experimental calcu-
lations show that the Gini coefficient increases 
by 0.154 if all taxable transfers are excluded, 
and by 0.022 if all tax-free transfers are excluded 
(NOU 2009:10).17 Another relevant comparison 
is the ‘risk-of-poverty rate’ before and after so-
cial transfers. Norway figures on this measure 
(2006) with the highest re-ranking effect of the 
Eurostat countries, followed by Sweden, Den-
mark and Finland.28 
Poverty varies a lot between demographic 
and social groups, and over time for these groups. 
A much applied approach in such research meas-
ures prolonged periods of low income, for in-
stance the per centage of people with less than 
50 per cent of median income (the OECD-scale) 
1  Taxable transfers include old-age pension, unemployment 
benefit, vocational rehabilitation benefit, disability 
benefit, sickness and maternity benefit, benefit to single 
parents and occupational pension. Tax-free transfers are: 
social security, housing allowance, child benefit, child 
support and cash benefit for parents of infants (one to 
three years). 
2  The ranking is based on tsis20 and tsis030 in the Eurostat 
series. Both estimates relate to equivalent disposable 
income. 
over a three year period. This share is quite low 
in Norway, but it hovers at a higher level than 
ten years ago. It has also grown among non-
western immigrants, although not since 2002-
2003 (Table 2). The level as such (20 per cent 
during 2004-2006, compared to 2.3 per cent in 
the whole population) reflects a combination of 
several factors: low participation in paid work, 
over-representation in non-standard employment 
and a large share of young adults respectively 
child-rich families. Looking forward, there are 
many positive signs. Young adults of non-west-
ern origin have a participation in work and edu-
cation (chapter 3) that is likely to trigger upward 
mobility. It is, on this basis, hard to see massive 
poverty and exclusion as a suitable scenario. 
Some other details emerge if we shift to 
the EU-scale, which gauges the proportion of 
people with permanent income less than 60 per 
cent of the median. A large number of old-age 
pensioners fall below this threshold. The trend 
among old-age pensioners, however, is positive 
(Table 2). New cohorts enter retirement age 
Early 80s Mid 80s Mid 90s Mid-2000s
Gini coefficient* 0.208 0.240 0.269
Gini coefficient** 0.234 0.256 0.276
Gini coefficient*** 0.243 0.230
Squared coefficient of variation** 0.278 0.301 0.456
Interquintile share ratio* 2.9 3.4 3.8
Interquintile share ratio** 3.4 3.8 4.0
Decile 1: share of all incomes* 4.5 4.2 4.0
Decile 10: share of all incomes* 18.1 21.1 24.1
*Students are excluded. Year of registration: 1986, 1996 and an average for 2004-2007. Equivalent income 
is based on the EU-scale, which consists of the following weights: 1.0 for the first adult, 0.5 for every 
additional adult and 0.3 for every child. Source: Statistikkbanken (Statistics Norway), Income statistics for 
households (http://www.ssb.no/iffor_en/) and St.meld. 9 2008-2009. 
** Students are included. Year of registration: 1982, 1986, 1995 and 2004. Equivalent income is based on 
the square root of the household size, without any distinction between adults and children. Source: OECD 
2008.  
*** Students are included. Year of registration: 1982 and 1986. Equivalent income uses the following 
weights: 1.0 for the first adult, 0.7 for every additional adult and 0.5 for every child. Source: NOU 1993:17.
Table 1. Measures of income dispersion. Household equivalent income between persons. 
Country report for Norway
129
with more pension points than the older, fading 
generation.39This group has also received special 
privileges through the tax system (e.g. a lower 
social security contribution and a specific allow-
ance for age and disability). A rather different pat-
tern exists for single parents and multiple-child 
families. Both of these groups have grown in 
numbers while simultaneously losing ground in 
the state budget.410Fortunately, both groups are 
compensated through the production and distri-
bution of municipal services (St. meld. 9 2008-
2009). They will also benefit from a pending 
improvement in the structural basis of the min-
imum pension. 
3  This is a classic cohort effect because older pensioners 
were unable to obtain supplementary pension points 
in a large part of their working carrier. The watershed 
year is 1967, when a national Insurance scheme was 
introduced in Norway.
4  The effect among multiple-child families depends on the 
age of the children. Some families have gained through 
an extension of the child benefit in 2000 (from 16 to 18 
years). Others have gained through the introduction of 
cash benefit for infants, starting in 1998. Many large 
families, however, are budget-losers because the child 
benefit has declined both in real and relative terms 
(Epland and Kirkeberg 2007). 
A final point concerns the urban dimension 
of inequality and poverty. The Gini coefficient 
for household disposable income grew by 8.8 per 
centage points in Oslo during 1986 to 1996, com-
pared to 3.5 in Norway as a whole. Later research 
has highlighted the importance of industrial shift 
and labour market dynamics. Rising inequality 
is closely linked to the growth of producer ser-
vices and, to a lesser extent, high-tech trade and 
high-tech manufacturing (Wessel 2005). There 
is also a clear-cut demographical pattern, where 
Norwegian men and immigrant men of western 
origin converge on the growing sectors, slowly 
followed by Norwegian women. Non-western 
immigrants and female western immigrants are 
increasingly over-represented in the stagnating, 
traditional sectors (Wessel 2010). These sectors 
are marked by a slow growth of factor income, 
a high degree of union density (‘unionisation’) 
and union coverage (number of workers covered 
by a union contract) and a stable level of income 
inequality. One could thus argue that economic 
change and labour market mobility combine to 
Table 2. Persistent low income in particular groups, measured in per cent (St. meld. 9 2008-2009). 
1997-1999 2000-2002 2002-2004 2004-2006
OECD-scale*
The whole population 2.3 2.7 3.6 3.8
Single parents 3 3 7 6
Couples with one child 1 1 1 2
Couples with three children + 3 4 8 6
Old-age pensioners 1 1 0 1
Young single adults 8 8 9 9
Non-western immigrants 15 21 24 20
EU-scale** 
The whole population 9.0 9.0 9.6 9.3
Single parents 9 7 17 14
Couples with one child 2 2 2 4
Couples with three children + 4 6 9 9
Old-age pensioners 28 25 22 18
Young single adults 17 21 22 22
Non-western immigrants 28 31 37 32
*More than 50 per cent below median income.
** More than 60 per cent below median income
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create a slightly ‘dualist’ economy. 
As for poverty, Oslo now appears as an out-
lier. The proportion of poor households is highest 
in Oslo whether one uses a country-specific or a 
region-specific definition of low income.511The 
latter approach includes housing costs, and was 
used by Langørgen et al. (2003), who found large 
differences among cities and regions/counties. 
Using the EU-scale, the largest cities had the fol-
lowing figures: Oslo: 8.3 per cent, Bergen: 3.7 
per cent, Trondheim: 3.7 per cent and Stavanger: 
3.6 per cent. A similar pattern appeared in a re-
cent report on child poverty. The share of chil-
dren living in poor households (the EU-scale) is 
14.7 per cent in Oslo, compared to 7.9 per cent in 
Norway as a whole (Nadim and Nielsen 2009). 
It is important to note that poverty rates vary 
enormously within the Oslo region. The figures 
above all relate to the municipality of Oslo. The 
surrounding hinterland (Akershus) has a level 
of child poverty below the national average.612 
1.2.  Employment and unemployment
The introduction of performance-based pay 
schemes and a ‘shareholder value culture’ in parts 
of the economy represents a profound challenge 
to the existing labour market system. A crucial 
feature of this system is a dense web of connec-
tions between confederations of trade unions, en-
terprise organizations and the government. 
Norway’s model of labour relations might be 
seen as a sub-type of the broader Nordic mod-
el. What differentiate Norway from its Nordic 
neighbours is a slightly greater state presence in 
bargaining, dispute resolution and the production 
of social welfare schemes. Some authors (Sives-
5  A regional frame of reference improves the comparability 
of living standards.
6  There is in this respect a difference between income 
inequality and poverty: rising income inequality, 
particularly top-end inequality, appears both in the inner 
and the outer city. 
ind et al. 1995) have suggested that Norwegian 
labour relations reflect a fragmented organiza-
tional structure, with a rich ecology of institu-
tions, ad hoc committees and work councils. A 
related point concerns the importance of late and 
limited industrialization. The Norwegian system 
grew out of a complex coalition between labour, 
farmers and fishermen (Rokkan 1987). Accord-
ingly, labour market policy in Norway is inti-
mately intertwined with regional policy. It re-
mains a key task to create jobs in all parts of 
the country, and thus to sustain a scattered pat-
tern of settlement.
The windfall gains in oil and natural gas has 
created a larger disparity between Norway and 
the Nordic neighbours. During the 1990s Nor-
way developed a ‘solidarity alternative’ policy 
which aimed to increase cost competitiveness by 
10 per cent over a five-year period (NOU 1992: 
26). Norway could thus maintain ‘old’ corporat-
ist policies in a period when Sweden and Den-
mark pursued a policy of decentralisation and 
sector-based co-ordination (Dølvik 2008). There 
is a distinct political touch to this course of ac-
tion: it was launched and implemented by a la-
bour government and it contrasted with liberal 
policies in the preceding decade. A ‘non-social-
ist’ government, which ruled from 1981 to the 
spring of 1986, introduced a policy of deregu-
lation, credit-financed private consumption and 
increased capital mobility. With falling oil prices 
and increasing private debt (negative household 
savings), the recession in the late 1980s hit Nor-
way hard. Investments in the mainland economy 
sunk by 30 per cent from 1987 to 1989 (Rødseth 
1997), and a long-term regime of full employ-
ment came to an end. 
The solidarity approach delivered impressive 
results in the mid 1990s. At its peak (August 
1993), unemployment reached a level of 6.8 per 
cent of the labour force, or 9.4 per cent if we count 
participants in active labour market schemes. At 
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the end of the decade, Norway was approaching 
a new era of great internal demand, favourable 
inflation713and low unemployment. This restora-
tion of an old path contrasted sharply with the 
major trend in advanced economies. Still, com-
paring the 1970s and the 2000s decade, a repeti-
tion story is misleading on several counts. First, 
unemployment is now fluctuating over a wider 
range than 30-40 years ago. The numbers in open 
unemployment have varied by up to 45 per cent 
on a yearly basis, compared to an almost flat level 
throughout the 1970s.1814Second, while Norway 
may be seen as a ‘success country’ (Freeman 
1997), it has not managed to avoid inter-union 
rivalry and a slow breakdown of the ‘solidarity 
alternative’. In other words, it has become harder 
to maintain order and agreement within the la-
bour movement, for instance between academics 
and poorly educated groups, or between stagnant 
and growing sectors. A case in point is the busi-
ness services sector. Approximately 5-6 per cent 
of employees in KIBS industries (‘knowledge-
intensive business services’) belong to a union 
within the Norwegian Confederation of Trade 
Unions (LO), compared to 33 per cent in the 
private sector as a whole (Andersen 2003; Neer-
gard and Aarvaag Stokke 2005). Dominating un-
ions in the KIBS segment are typically based on 
skill or profession, targeting lawyers, scientists, 
engineers, architects, business school graduates, 
economists, etc. Such unions have pushed to-
wards performance-based pay, which increases 
the tendency towards fragmentation and disrup-
tion. And, to drive the point further, a similar pat-
tern exists on the employers’ side: many KIBS 
firms refrain from joining the Confederation of 
Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO). 
7  Inflation varied between 4 and 12 per cent in the 1970s. 
Comparative figures in the rest of Europe were slightly 
higher. 
8 There is one minor exception: the unemployment rate 
grew from 0.6 per cent in 1974 to 1.1 per cent in 
1975. 
These changes have not yet threatened the 
legacy of egalitarianism in labour market poli-
cies. Moreover, Norway has managed pretty well 
during the current economic crisis. Unemploy-
ment was pushed up to 3.3 per cent in Novem-
ber 2009, but has not increased further. Like-
wise, there is hardly a pending transformation of 
actual unemployment into structural unemploy-
ment (i.e., the ‘hysteresis effect’). The problem 
of institutional change lies more with long-term 
competition and the ability to curb industrial con-
flicts and wage drift. This implies that ties and 
solidarity in the labour market, including the si-
lent contract between ‘employed insiders’ and 
‘unemployed outsiders’, depends more and more 
on state intervention. 
A somewhat diffuse part of the changing in-
dustrial relations concerns the ‘gender order’ (i.e. 
the patterning of gender in the labour market 
model). Norwegian men have, as noted above, 
moved swiftly towards high-growth and profit-
able sectors. There are some signs of a female 
‘catch-up effect’, but it remains unclear whether 
KIBS industries, or the broader KISA segment 
(‘knowledge-intensive service activities’), pro-
vide a platform for improved gender equality. A 
plausible hypothesis might be that gender segre-
gation ˗  the proportion of men and women in dif-
ferent occupations and sectors ˗  decreases. Young 
women are increasingly drawn towards male-
dominated occupations (Teigen 2006), even if 
they avoid money-spinning activities (Birkelund 
et al. 2000). 
The present pattern of gender relations is 
complex and multi-faceted. Rising female em-
ployment (Table 3) has not been followed by a 
comprehensive shift in women and men’s place 
in the occupational structure. Women dominate 
among salaried employees at low and middle 
levels, often in the public sector (Ellingsæter and 
Rubery 1997). This pattern is not unique for Nor-
way; it is rather a typical outcome in countries 
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that have made the transition to a dual bread-
winner system. What is peculiar, perhaps, is that 
gender segregation has persisted in a period of 
changing work-strategies: Norwegian women 
are increasingly seeking full-time work. The full-
time rate (i.e. the share of women working 37 
hours or more) grew from 47 per cent in 1980 
to 52 per cent in 1990 and further to 60 per cent 
in 2009. Young women, in particular, reject part-
time work, and are helped in their decision by 
three welfare state arrangements: an inclusive 
system of child care, a generous maternal/pater-
nal leave system and a tax system based on joint 
taxation for spouses. Important also, the gender 
wage gap between men and women who work 
in the same position and establishment is quite 
small (Petersen 2002). 
Female labour market participation is thus 
a long-run process which revolves around time, 
pay and skill. Summing up the post-war pe-
riod, one might identify three stages of inte-
gration. The first stage, roughly from 1945 to 
the late 1960s, had the following characteris-
tics: low employment rate, sharp occupational 
segregation, poorly developed services, crude 
employment regulation and significant gender 
wage inequality. The next stage covers one a 
half decade and is characterised by a massive 
growth in women’s employment (particular-
ly part-time employment),915extension of re-
productive rights, ‘normalization’ of part-time 
work,1016unionisation and increasing relative 
pay.1117Some structures remained intact, how-
ever. Women were still highly concentrated in 
specific industries and occupations (i.e. horizon-
tal segregation). Women were also poorly repre-
sented in upper-level positions (i.e. vertical seg-
regation). Finally, moving to the third stage, a 
dual work/family strategy emerged as the domi-
nating norm: the majority of mothers continued 
to work after child-birth, often in full-time po-
sition. Further developments in union participa-
tion, public services, individual rights and wage 
mobility have consolidated the existing order. 
9 Females account for 90 per cent of the growth in 
employment between 1970 and 1990. 
10 This process involved a transition from temporary to 
permanent employment, and, secondly, an improvement 
in contractual rights and working conditions (Ellingsæter 
and Rubery 1997).  
11 The overall gender wage gap has decreased since the 
early 1970s (Bojer 2005; 2009). 
*Source: Statistics Norway (StatistikkbankenStatistisk Årbok, Historisk Statistikk, 
Arbeidsmarkedsstatistikk). Age span for employment rate and ‘dependency ratio’: 16-66. Age 
span for ‘dependency burden’: 16-74 (i.e. employed persons between 16 and 74 years). 
** Source: Eurostat. Age span: 15-64. 
***Source: OECD 2009.
1970 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Overall employment rate* 66.9 70.4 72.2 74.3 70.6 76.5 76.6 74.5
Employment rate men* 87.8 82.5 81.4 81 75.6 81.7 80.3 77.2
Employment rate women* 45.8 58.2 62.9 67.4 65.5 71.1 72.9 71.6
Overall unemployment rate* 0.7 1.3 3.3 2.3 6 4.1 2.7 3.9
Unemployment rate men* 0.9 1.2 3.5 2.5 5.3 4.2 2.9 4.1
Unemployment rate women* 0.5 1.1 3 2 4.4 3.9 2.4 3.5
Overall employment rate** 77.5 75.1
Employment rate men** 81.3 77.9
Employment rate women** 73.6 72.2
Harmonised unemployment 
rate***
6.5 4.8 3.2 4.3
‘Dependency burden’* 1.38 1.14 1.1 0.99 1.13 1.05 0.97 1.01
‘Dependency ratio’ 58.7 57.7 55.4 53.2 53.3 53.8 53.7 52.4
Table 3. Employment statistics of Norway.
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It remains to see whether a fourth stage has 
commenced. The growing interest in male-dom-
inated occupations might suggest a future reduc-
tion in gender segregation. A legislative change 
in 2002 pushes and pulls in the same direction: 
from 2008 onwards all listed companies on the 
Oslo stock exchange have to fill 40 per cent of the 
board seats with women. A lot of noise has oc-
curred around this change, from stubborn resist-
ance to enthusiastic commitment. What is clear, 
at least, is that significant numbers of women are 
breaking through the glass-ceiling. 
Increasing female employment is usually dis-
cussed in terms of equality and participation. But 
it has some other meanings as well. It implicates, 
for instance, that a larger proportion of the pop-
ulation is contributing to measured productiv-
ity. The burden falling on employed labour to 
provide for ‘dependent’ sections of the public 
is improved or stabilized. This is brought out in 
the second last row of table 3. The ratio between 
non-working and working sections of the pub-
lic (‘the dependency burden’) follows a famil-
iar pattern of long-term decline punctuated by 
episodes of increase. The declining tendency is 
a side-effect of increasing female employment 
and decreasing younger cohorts. We also note a 
changing relation between people in ‘productive’ 
respectively ‘dependent’ ages. The ‘dependency 
ratio’ has declined since the mid 1960s, entirely 
due to falling birth-rates. The ‘old-age depend-
ency ratio’, by contrast grew steadily through-
out the 1960s and 70s, and has fluctuated over 
a 10 per cent range (i.e. below 1.5 per centage 
points) for the last 30 years.
1.3.  Social welfare
Labour market institutions are logically linked 
to particular welfare policies and expenditures. 
A useful distinction in this context relates to the 
redistributive and the insurance views of wel-
fare policy. The former is fundamentally about 
the redistribution from rich to poor, independent 
of labour activity. The second set, by contrast, 
reflects the need to protect against risks that pri-
vate insurance markets fail to cover (Moene and 
Wallerstein 2001). These views tend to co-exist 
in the same nations, and have opposite impli-
cations for the relationship between pre-tax in-
equality and redistributive policies. One would 
expect, theoretically, an increasing support for 
welfare spending when pre-tax inequality rises. 
Countries with equal wages would thus spend 
less on welfare programmes targeted at persons 
without employment. Such countries may, how-
ever, have a huge demand for social insurance 
spending. Responding to this demand, they there-
fore end up with a combination of compressed 
wages and generous benefit programmes (Moene 
and Wallerstein 2000).
Norway is a good example of social insur-
ance policies. The risk of income loss has re-
mained a dominating concern in Norwegian wel-
fare policy through upturns and downturns. A 
crude impression of this tradition is given in ta-
ble 4. Following Moene and Wallerstein (2001), 
‘insurance benefits’ cover six types of expendi-
ture: unemployment benefit, labour market pro-
grammes, sickness benefit, vocational rehabili-
tation benefit, disability benefit and survivor’s 
benefit.1218The ensuing category makes up 60 
per cent of public household support, and 10 
per cent of mainland-GDP. The share of main-
land-GDP has actually grown since 1980, largely 
due to expenditure increases in sickness bene-
fit, vocational rehabilitation benefit and disabil-
ity benefit. Unemployment benefit and labour 
market programmes represent a more fluctuat-
12 Moene and Wallerstein also include services for the 
disabled and elderly. It can be argued that this benefit 
aims at the whole population, given a mixture of 
functional and demographic criteria. Similar arguments 
exclude old-age pension, health care, housing benefits 
and education from the measure. 
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ing type of expenditure, which corresponds to 
labour market trends (see Table 3). A reduction 
in these costs explains the relative reduction in 
insurance benefits from 1995 to 2007. Moreo-
ver, and importantly, it is the main factor behind 
the changing balance between private and public 
activities (OECD 2003).
A focus on insurance benefits is obviously 
not sufficient. Redistributive policies and norms 
are highly important features, particularly in re-
lation to each end of the income scale. The rich 
face little risk of income loss, and may rely on 
private insurance, while the poor receive pre-
dictable transfer payments (Moene and Waller-
stein 2001).
There have been some changes in redistribu-
tive policies over the last decades. A more se-
lective approach has emerged in housing policy, 
social services and elderly care (Stamsø 2005; 
Hansen 2005). Such changes have often been 
supplemented by changes in the organizational 
and financial basis of public services. Some ser-
vices have been decentralized, others have been 
centralized. The ‘tool box’ also includes ‘new 
public management’, i.e. a set of reforms cen-
tring on cost-efficiency, privatization, adminis-
trative specialization and competition within the 
public sphere. Still, notwithstanding some efforts 
to depart from the beaten path, Norway remains 
a state-dominated welfare nexus. Pressures for 
reforms and new priorities tend to collide with 
existing practices and institutions, partly at a na-
tional and partly at a sub-national level. The risk 
of income loss is often at the centre of atten-
tion, and evokes strong feelings within the la-
bour movement. Thus, contrary to most Europe-
an nations, and contrary to requests from OECD, 
a full-scale sickness benefit (working from day 
one) is still enjoyed by all Norwegian employ-
ees. The criteria pertaining to disability benefit 
have been changed a couple of times, but these 
are minor adjustments. The expenditures in the 
sickness benefit system have kept rising, despite 
a huge effort to re-educate the labour force. To 
quote an OECD report (2006: 1), “public spend-
ing on sickness and disability benefits is higher 
than in any other OECD country”. 
Table 4. Welfare expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Statistics Norway: Historisk Statistikk 1994: 
Table 23.5; Statistikkbanken: Tables 03659 and 07335).
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007
Public household support: per cent of total 
GDP
11.3 11.7 15.8 15.4 13.3 13.3 12.3
Public household support: per cent of 
mainland GDP
13.7 14.5 18.4 18 17.5 17.8 16.1
Insurance benefits: per cent of total GDP 6.5 8.1 6.3
Insurance benefits: per cent of mainland 
GDP
7.6 10.8 9.5
Public expenditures: per cent of total GDP 41.3 41 48.8 45.5 37.9 41 39.8
Public expenditures: per cent of mainland 
GDP
50 50.9 57.5 53.3 50.3 55 52.3
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2.  Housing policy and 
housing market in Norway
Susanne Søholt and Terje Wessel
2.1.  Norwegian housing policy 
˗ Main characteristics
The overall research question for this project is if 
and how the Nordic welfare states are shaping the 
conditions for ethnic residential segregation and 
desegregation. Furthermore, how do the patterns 
and processes of segregation affect the wider so-
cial and spatial developments in the various host 
societies? The first step towards capturing the 
links between welfare state policies and trajec-
tories of ethnic spatial residential integration or 
segregation is to describe and analyse the nation-
al policies within the Nordic countries. Housing 
policy is believed to influence how and where 
people live. A housing policy which contributes 
to segregating people of different socioeconomic 
status and/or ethnic background could have seri-
ous and important implications for other policy 
areas such as education, social integration, tol-
erance, democracy and more. 
This chapter focuses on the ordinary hous-
ing policy. Special activities to integrate ethnic 
minorities into the housing market are further 
described in Chapter 4 ˗ Policy analysis related 
to immigrant settlement and integration. First, to 
establish the context in which immigrants and 
ethnic minorities have to settle, the main traits 
of the housing policy are described. Next, there 
is a description of the housing stock and the de-
velopment of tenures in line with policy changes. 
Thereafter, access to the main segments in the 
housing market is described in general, with a 
special focus on the ethnic minorities’ accessi-
bility. Lastly, the politics for increasing acces-
sibility, affordability and creditworthiness rele-
vant to ethnic minorities are presented before 
the conclusion. 
The primary objective of the Norwegian 
housing policy is that all inhabitants shall have 
an adequate and secure housing situation (White 
Paper no. 23: 2003-2004). In Norway, a secure 
home is associated with owner occupancy in 
some form, which has an historical basis. Af-
ter the Second World War, the main goal of the 
housing policy was that ordinary people should 
be masters in their own home. In 1951, former 
Prime Minister and representative of the Parlia-
ment, Trygve Bratteli, announced: “For me, this 
is a principal question and I will express myself 
clearly. In modern society there are some sectors 
where there is private business and other sec-
tors where there is no longer private business or 
where private businesses are phasing out, and I 
don’t accept that owning other people’s homes 
should be an area for private business”.1319 
In this research project, it is relevant to ask 
if and how a focus on homeownership is affect-
ing ethnic residential segregation or integration. 
This chapter does not answer this question, but 
presents and asks tentative questions based on 
available data. 
The main national strategy for obtaining the 
vision of decent housing through homeowner-
ship has been to adapt to a well-functioning hous-
ing market. According to the government, the in-
terest rate level is the most important economic 
factor which influences the housing market. This 
is why the government attaches such great im-
portance to a policy which secures a stable in-
terests rate over time. Nevertheless, the figure1 
13 The original quotation in Norwegian: “For meg er dette 
et prinsippielt spørsmål og jeg vil gjøre det tindrende 
klart. I moderne samfunn er det viss områder hvor det 
drives privat næringsdrift, og andre områder hvor det 
ikke lenger drives privat næringsdrift, eller hvor det er 
under avvikling, og jeg for mitt vedkommende godtar 
ikke som et område for privat nærngsdrift det å eie 
andre menneskers hjem”. Stortingsforhandlinger, bind 
7a, 1951, s. 455. 
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shows an increasing mismatch between housing 
prices and income. Even though interest rates are 
stable, housing costs are increasing. 
The figure 2 shows that a dual family in-
come is necessary to match housing prices. Sin-
gle parents and young adults moving out of their 
parent’s home will have difficulties in buying a 
home if they do not have additional economic as-
sets such as a heritage. To provide disadvantaged 
households with a decent home, it is known that 
the housing market is not sufficient. In addition 
to a well-functioning housing market in gener-
al, efforts have been made to provide adequate 
housing to targeted groups encountering difficul-
ties in the housing market. Since the White Pa-
per in 2003, more attention has been focused on 
groups with problems in the housing market. For 
example, reducing homelessness has received 
Figure 2. Development of yearly income after tax for some groups and the development of housing 
prices (Bård Øistensen, Temporary Director of the Norwegian State Bank. Presentation on October 
11, 2010).
Figure 1. Development of income per man labour year and development of housing prices. Indicators: 
1981=100 (Bård Øistensen, Temporary Director of the Norwegian State Bank. Presentation on 
October 11, 2010.)
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special political attention since the beginning of 
the 2000s, as has the promotion of good hous-
ing for refugees and immigrants. The Norwegian 
State Housing Bank has been given the main re-
sponsibility for implementing the national hous-
ing policy. The Bank works closely with local 
authorities and the private market to improve 
and adjust socioeconomic housing measures to 
changing housing challenges and conditions in 
both society and the housing market. Over the 
years, the Bank’s role has shifted gradually from 
being a general mortgage lending institution that 
supports new construction towards having more 
explicit welfare functions, in which cooperation 
with other welfare services is crucial. One exam-
ple is the Bank’s latest cooperation with the Di-
rectorate for Integration and Diversity. Together, 
they are developing a plan to see how the Bank 
can contribute in easing the municipalities’ set-
tlement of refugees and to ease refugees’ capa-
bilities in entering the homeownership market. 
Even so, housing has not really managed to 
be part of the welfare policy discourse in Norway 
(Torgersen 1987; The Norwegian State Housing 
Bank 2010). This is still the case, despite the 
last White Paper on housing explicitly express-
ing that a home and a place to stay are impor-
tant conditions for integration and participation 
in society. According to the White Paper, a home 
is one of the three fundamental elements in a 
welfare society, together with work and health 
(White Paper: 6). Still, housing is not a funda-
mental right by law in Norway. The municipali-
ties have an obligation to assist people with trou-
ble in the housing market, but the responsibility 
for the housing itself is on the individual house-
hold. The only exception to this is direct help to 
people in sudden/acute distress, who can obtain 
shelter for a few nights (see the Norwegian Act 
relating to social services). 
Housing was deregulated in the mid˗1980s. 
From that point on, market conditions have been 
the primary factors for housing supply, demand 
and distribution. An important consequence of 
the belief in the market is that the volume of so-
cial housing in Norway is minimal. Only about 
5 per cent of the housing stock consists of mu-
nicipal, social housing. A consequence of this is 
a housing policy that includes the private mar-
ket in solving housing problems for disadvan-
taged groups and households. A municipal hous-
ing policy has to take this option into account. 
As a result, many municipalities cooperate with 
the private rental market on market conditions to 
help to house disadvantaged households. 
The Norwegian housing policy is the same 
for all, including immigrants and refugees. How-
ever, refugees who are given permission to stay 
are given the opportunity to settle in a munici-
pality under the condition of “no or little choice” 
settlement. The refugees’ lack of finances gives 
them access to municipal assistance for housing. 
Housing allowances are given under the same 
conditions as other households, according to eco-
nomic need. When and if the refugees decide to 
move to another dwelling or municipality, they 
are obliged in principle to take care of their own 
housing situation. Other regular immigrants on-
ly receive access to economic and other types 
of municipal assistance if they are in need or 
cannot manage to take care of their own hous-
ing situation. 
2.2.  The Norwegian housing 
stock and tenures
The character of the housing stock is of impor-
tance for immigrants. What is available in the 
market has an influence on their welfare stem-
ming from housing conditions. The vast bulk of 
Norwegian housing, approximately 85 per cent, 
has been built after World War II. This fact means 
that most of the stock is quite modern and has a 
bathroom and toilets, which is different from the 
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conditions of the housing stock in the centre of 
the cities. The most intensive production period 
took place from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, 
when Norway built more housing per 1,000 in-
habitants than any other European country, com-
pleting up to 44,000 units annually. By the end 
of this period, housing production adjusted to a 
series of parallel changes: stagnating demand, 
shifting preferences (from ‘large-scale to ‘small-
scale’ housing), the emergence of a new aesthetic 
ideology (‘old is better’), and most of all, hous-
ing policy reforms. The exceptional production 
performance had been facilitated by a system of 
government subsidies (both direct and indirect), 
housing regulation, macroeconomic governance 
and credit control/regulation. Now, much of the 
system has been dismantled and substituted by 
a market-led approach to housing provision. A 
number of new (private) actors have entered the 
scene, and some of the older ones have switched 
from planning /management logic to a value-
driven logic. 
One immediate result of the policy reforms 
has been a massive growth in the condominium 
sector, largely through conversions to rental and 
cooperative housing (Wessel 1996). Other re-
sults have emerged in the long run, and are dif-
ficult to disentangle from changes in the social 
and cultural context. What we may notice are 
three or four differences from the previous pe-
riod. First of all, housing production has sunk to 
a lower level in concrete terms from an average 
of 41,100 units per year in the 1970s to 31,300 
in the 1980s, further to 19,700 in the 1990s and 
then up slightly to 24,900 in the 2000s (Statistics 
Norway: Historic statistics: Table 17.5). Second, 
housing prices have fluctuated much more than 
in the past. Norway experienced a credit-driven 
housing market bubble in the late 1980s, which 
burst in 1988. A reverse development in the early 
1990s had dramatic effects on the economy, with 
a collapsing banking sector and equally dramatic 
effects on the household sector, with magnified 
losses and stagnating mobility. A combination 
of oil revenues, fiscal policy and the ‘Solidarity 
Alternative’ (see above) set the nation on a new 
track, while the rest of Scandinavia was still in a 
slump. From 1993 to 1994 and onwards, a long 
boom of asset-price inflation evolved, peaking 
in 2004-2006. The financial crisis in 2007-2009 
brought an interregnum of declining prices (from 
roughly September 2007 to March 2009), fol-
lowed by a new boom dynamic in 2009 and 
2010 (ECON, 2010). Third, much of the current 
building activity has unfolded in the major cit-
ies, often in the city centre. There has also been 
a change in the composition of building activi-
ties, with renovation and transformation (i.e. the 
reuse of industrial properties) taking on a greater 
importance.1420 
By 2010, Norway had approximately 2.3 mil-
lion dwellings, of which almost 2.2 million were 
occupied (Statistics Norway, 2010; Families and 
household Tables 1 and 3). Over the past three 
years, the number of dwellings has increased by 
86,000, of which 60 per cent are in multi-dwell-
ing buildings. Due to centralisation, the largest 
increase has been in urban settlements. In 2008, 
the number of dwellings in urban areas increased 
by almost 34,000, while the number of dwellings 
in sparsely built-up areas decreased by 7,000. 
Households in Norway are small; in 2010, the 
average was 2.2 persons per dwelling. 
2.2.1.  Improved housing standards
In 2010, more than half the population live in 
detached, single family housing, while less than 
25 per cent live in multi-dwelling buildings (see 
Figure 3). It is a common perception that de-
tached single family homes are more attractive 
14  The latter changes have made housing provision a less 
tractable issue: one cannot squarely rely on housing 
statistics (Barlindhaug and Nordahl, 2005). 
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than multi-dwelling buildings. However, the di-
versity in lifestyles and life phases contributes 
to more diverse preferences. In addition, high-
standard and up-market multi-dwelling buildings 
are becoming a more common part of newly built 
housing, particularly in urban areas. 
In the table 5, the type of housing for the 
immigrant population is compared to the whole 
population.1521As the table shows, persons with 
immigrant backgrounds are adapting to the Nor-
wegian pattern over time. While living in mul-
ti-dwelling housing is increasing for the whole 
population, it is decreasing among those with 
an immigrant background. And while living in 
single family housing is stable over the 12-year-
period from 1995 to 2007 for the whole popula-
15 To be able to compare housing situations among the 
immigrant and the whole population, a weight system 
is applied in which the whole population is balanced 
according to the variables of gender, age and type of area 
(sparsely or densely populated) among the immigrant 
population. This weight system is used for Tables 1, 3 
and 4.  
tion, it is increasing by almost 50 per cent among 
the immigrant population. 
2.2.2. Decreased density 
The policy reforms of the 1980s coincided with 
an expansive economic climate and a wide-
spread public optimism. Many of the urgent 
housing problems had been, if not solved, sub-
stantially ameliorated. Below 10 per cent of the 
households lived in densely populated housing, 
according to the official threshold. Around 90 per 
cent had access to bathroom and toilet, and 76-
78 per cent was home-owners (table 6). 
The immigrant population lives in densely 
populated housing more often than the whole 
population. As shown below on the table 7, 
almost half the immigrant population lives in 
densely populated housing, while this is the case 
for less than 10 per cent of the whole population. 
This could be explained by a mismatch between 
Figure 3. Dwellings by type of building, January 1, 2009, Per cent (Statistics Norway, 
January 1, 2009).
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economic resources and prices in the housing 
market, whereas another explanation could be 
ascribed to preferences. However, the tendency 
is the same as among the whole population: a 
decrease in overcrowding over time. 
The housing conditions for the whole popu-
lation further improved in the 1980s and 90s as 
a result of high-quality production, private home 
improvements and professional renovation and 
demolition activities. The last major housing sur-
vey, which was conducted in 1995, documented 
a combination of high consumption and high 
social equality. Housing problems such as over-
crowding, substandard buildings and insecurity 
of tenure formed a dispersed rather than strati-
fied pattern. However, this favourable situation 
did not apply to the major cities, especially Oslo 
(Wessel, 1998). In these places, housing prob-
lems were still accumulating within the lowest 
occupational class. Of equal importance, new 
inequalities were detected at both the national 
and city level. The largest concentration of poor 
housing was found in the centre of the city, where 
the non-western immigrants were concentrated, 
controlling for all other characteristics (ibid.).
On the whole, housing issues in Norway of-
ten boil down to a question of tenure. Owner oc-
cupancy has been politically encouraged for dec-
ades, despite the egalitarian legacy. Reflecting on 
this combination of individualism and collectiv-
Table 6. Housing features. Whole population. Norway (Population censuses and the “level of living 
Survey” (2004), Statistics Norway). 
*More than one person per room (kitchen excluded), plus single adults in one-room dwellings.  
** More than one person per room (kitchen excluded). Single adults in one-room dwellings excluded.  
***Rental housing includes a “rest category” ˗ only 20 per cent (2001/2004) confirm that they rent a dwelling.
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2001 2004
Densely populated housing* 42 28 18 8 7 7 7
Densely populated housing** 3 3
Number of occupants per room 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Number of occupants per 
dwelling
3.5 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.3
Individual ownership 53 55 64 61 62
Cooperative ownership 13 19 17 14 14
Rental housing*** 34 26 20 24 24
Toilet 46 72 89 96 97 98
Bathroom 45 66 88 96 97 98
Table 5. Immigrant and whole population living in different types of housing. Persons age: 16-70 
years, Per cent (Statistics Norway. level of living among immigrants 1996 and 2005/2006. Survey 
to a representative selection among 10 groups. level of living in the whole population in 1995 and 
2007).
1996 2005/2006 1995 2007
Single family house 13 25 42 43
Small house 24 27 27 23
Multi-dwelling building 61 45 30 33
Other 3 1 1
Immigrant population Whole population
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ism, Tranøy (2008) characterises the nation as a 
“deviant case”. Similar arguments are presented 
by Stamsø (2009), who observes a striking simi-
larity between Norway, Italy and Greece: all three 
countries exhibit an unusual combination of large 
public activity and extensive homeownership. 
What is clear at least is that homeownership is 
the high road to a housing career in Norway. This 
applies to both the majority and ethnic minori-
ties in all parts of the country, with no excep-
tion for the major cities. The rental share in the 
four major cities (Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and 
Stavanger) is 29 per cent collectively (Statistics 
Norway, Statistics Bank, Table 05264). In addi-
tion, the rental market is quite expensive, unsta-
ble and difficult to access.1622
2.3.  Access to different segments 
in the housing market
Tenures, housing types and standards are un-
evenly distributed in regions, urban areas and 
neighbourhoods in Norway. In combination with 
prices, the conditions for access to the different 
tenures will therefore effect the housing situation 
for newcomers and households with limited eco-
nomic, social and informational resources. Fur-
thermore, the conditions for access may have 
implications for the social and ethnic composi-
tion of rural and urban neighbourhoods.
When describing access to housing, both for-
mal and informal access has to be taken into ac-
16  Many dwellings are exchanged between friends and 
family members (Gulbrandsen and Norvik, 2007).
count. In principle, all the housing segments are 
open to ethnic minorities of all types, regardless 
of background, reason for entry or social class. 
However, given that, the market is the main chan-
nel for the distribution of housing regardless of 
tenure and economic situation. In this context, 
attachments to the labour market become vital 
for the access and possibility of maintaining a 
decent housing situation. Moreover, when the 
market is the main channel of distribution, the 
supply side might have additional considerations 
other than pure profit in each transaction. 
As mentioned above, homeownership is the 
dominant tenure in Norway. About 80 per cent 
of the whole population is homeowners, living 
in either owner-occupied (69 per cent) or coop-
erative housing (11 per cent) (Level of living, 
Statistics Norway, 2007). Owner-occupied and 
cooperative housing have become more similar 
according to the law. Market prices are more de-
pendant of localisation, building type and stand-
ard than on tenure in the homeowners market. 
The table 8 compares the development of 
tenures between the whole population and the 
immigrant population over a 10-year-period, 
with two main trends being revealed. First, 
homeownership (owner-occupied and coopera-
tive housing) is increasing for both groups over 
time, though more among the minority popula-
tion. Second, among homeowners with a minor-
ity background, there is a shift from cooperative 
housing to owner occupancy over time. The main 
pattern is that the immigrant population is adapt-
ing to conditions in the housing market, i.e. from 
Table 7. Immigrant and whole population living in densely populated housing over time. Persons. Age 
16 ˗ 70. Per cent (Statistics Norway. Level of living among immigrants 1996 and 2005/2006. Survey 
to a representative selection among 10 groups. level of living in the whole population in 1995 and 
2007).
1996 2005/2006 1995 2007
Yes 53 45 13 8
No 47 55 87 92
Densely 
populated 
housing
Immigrant population Whole population
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being dominant in cooperative housing to be-
ing dominant in the owner-occupied market. In 
2005/2006/2007, the share of cooperative hous-
ing is balanced between the two groups. 
The policy in Norway is that rental is tempo-
rary. Policy to equalise renting with homeown-
ership is lacking when it comes to tax benefits, 
safety and the possibility for stability (contracts, 
lengths of stay). The rental market is dominat-
ed by small letters who have one or only a few 
dwellings for rent. The dwellings are on the mar-
ket as long as the owner or his/her family does 
not need to live in them. Municipal rental housing 
is limited and targeted towards the most disad-
vantaged. In 2007, only 12 per cent of the rent-
ers lived in municipal housing, and among im-
migrants 33 per cent of the renters rented from 
the municipality in 2005/2006.1723 
In Norway, all types of tenure can be found 
in all types of dwellings and housing. Coopera-
tive housing can be found in blocks and single 
family houses, as can private and social renting. 
When it comes to tenure, dwellings per se are not 
designed for ownership or rental. It is up to the 
owner to decide whether to live in, rent or sell 
the dwelling he or she controls. When a block of 
flats is owned by one party, the situation is the 
same. The owner can decide whether to rent or 
sell the dwellings, either on an individual basis 
17 Source: Statistics Norway. Level of living among 
immigrants 2005/2006 and level of living in the whole 
population 2007, cross section. 
or all together, with the only exception being co-
operative housing. Here, the single shareowner 
can sublet his/her flat for a certain amount of 
years, while as an organisation the cooperative 
cannot choose tenure. 
As different kinds of home ownership are the 
dominant tenure in Norway, access to this seg-
ment is of importance for immigrants’ integra-
tion into the housing market. Nevertheless, for 
newly arrived immigrants, for immigrants with 
an uncertain future in Norway and for people 
in difficult economic situations, renting a home 
might seem more relevant. 
2.3.1. Owner-occupied housing
The main condition for accessing the homeown-
ers market is the economic situation of the house-
hold. In combination with income stability over 
time, the more capital a household manages to 
invest when buying a house, the better the con-
ditions for obtaining a down payment from a 
bank. The banks consider the household’s total 
income and debt situation when offering housing 
loans. Moreover, it has been found that house-
holds can manage a 2-3 per cent increase in in-
terest. A study from 2003 finds that half of ethnic 
minorities had no debts when applying for a loan 
to buy a house, while only a third of the major-
ity was in the same situation (Barlindhaug and 
Dyb 2003:69). Housing prices vary in relation 
to attractiveness, which implies that a modest in-
1996 2005/2006 1995 2007
Home ownership 22 45 42 58
Cooperative housing 32 18 19 17
Rental or other 46 37 29 25
- Public renting 17 13 2
- Private renting 29 24 27
Immigrant population Whole population
Table 8. Tenure types. Immigrants and the whole population 1995-2007. Persons age 16-70 years, 
Per cent (Statistics Norway. level of living among immigrants 1996 and 2005/2006. Survey to a 
representative selection among 10 groups. level of living in the whole population in 1995 and 2007).
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come allows for different possibilities in differ-
ent localities. A study from 2003 on the use of 
loans from the Norwegian State Housing Bank 
showed that the proportion of income related to 
mortgage varied with the size of the household 
and the amount of income. The study also found 
that households obtaining loans from the Norwe-
gian State Housing Bank have a mortgage ratio 
far higher than what is recommended. One in-
terpretation is that households with low or mod-
est incomes are striving to get into the ordinary 
housing market, while another is that there are 
few alternatives to homeownership when look-
ing for a decent housing situation. 
2.3.2. Cooperative housing
Most of the cooperative housing in Norway is 
organised by housing associations and regulat-
ed by law, with access to cooperative housing 
being the most regulated and most transparent. 
Today, it is a mix of market, the highest bid and 
seniority. Before deregulation in the mid-1980s, 
prices were regulated and distribution followed 
seniority. In fact, for many years there was a need 
for membership in a housing association to gain 
access to a dwelling in a housing cooperative. 
This implies that deregulation was a benefit for 
immigrants, because market prices became more 
important. Even with a limited membership, both 
immigrants and others can attain access to coop-
erative housing if they have the highest bid and 
if the right to pre-emption among those already 
living in the actual cooperative is not used. The 
right to pre-emption when living in a coopera-
tive also implies that immigrants and others can 
make a housing career in the housing cooperative 
if they match the highest bid. As it is difficult for 
sellers of dwellings in housing cooperatives to 
discriminate, this segment of the owner’s mar-
ket is quite valuable for immigrants. All buyers 
have to be accepted by the board in a housing 
cooperative. However, the board can only refuse 
a buyer on the basis of fair treatment since what 
is accepted as fair is regulated by law. Ethnic-
ity, background, religion, citizenship, etc. are not 
regarded as fair. Prices and creditworthiness in 
the cooperative sector are much the same as in 
owner-occupied housing. 
Taking owner-occupied and cooperative 
housing together, approximately 80 per cent of 
the dwellings are owned by the household living 
there. To underscore the importance of owner-
ship in the Norwegian housing market, about 90 
to 95 per cent of the households become home-
owners during their lifetime (Gulbrandsen and 
Norvik, 2007 in Sandlie, 2010:97). 
2.3.3. Private renting
The private renting sector is quite disorganised 
in Norway. Few letters are professional compa-
nies, though that segment of the market seems 
to increase in the Oslo region. The professional 
letters are private companies, housing associa-
tions or housing associations for students. Indi-
vidual landlords who own a block or more of 
dwellings are decreasing in number. Many sold 
their blocks of dwellings to residents during the 
urban renewal period in Oslo (1977-1985). To-
day, the majority of letters are people with one 
or more dwellings for hire, often temporary ac-
cording to the household’s own needs. Roughly 
10 per cent of the homeowners own an additional 
dwelling that can be hired out if there is a lo-
cal demand (Gulbrandsen and Norvik 2007 in 
Sandlie 2010:97). This implies that immigrants 
and others have to look for rentals in a complex 
and weakly organised rental market. Much of the 
dwellings for rent are in the basement of single 
family houses. There are regulations against dis-
crimination, but it is hard to document such be-
haviour among small letters. Yet, if real estate 
agents are renting out private dwellings, there is 
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a code of conduct to avoid explicit discrimina-
tion, though how this is practised is not evalu-
ated. All rent regulations were abolished as of 
January1, 2010. The principle for rent setting 
for new contracts is the market. The minimum 
contract period is three years for ordinary rentals. 
During the contract period, the rent increase will 
follow the retail price index. Renting is the first 
choice for newcomers and immigrants who be-
lieve they are not going to stay long in Norway. 
Since demand surpasses supply in the urban 
renting market, letters can pick and choose their 
tenants to a large degree. A study from 2009 
confirms that letters use personal judgement and 
discretion when selecting tenants. The main cri-
teria used in the judgements were the letters per-
ception of the match between the actual dwell-
ing and the tenant’s household. Relevant factors 
were the tenant’s expected conduct and proper-
ness, economic situation, size of the household, 
ability and motivation to take care of the dwell-
ing, ability to communicate with the letter, ethnic 
background, and religion and name, as well as 
the letter’s intuition. The result was that appli-
cants with majority background were met with 
less prejudice than applicants with a minority 
background. Nonetheless, it must be emphasised 
that applicants with different ethnic backgrounds 
experienced different possibilities in the private 
rental market. While people with a background 
from Chile and Bosnia received access to the 
private rental market after an acceptable amount 
of trials, applicants with a background from So-
malia and Iraq encountered rougher conditions. 
More often than not, they only acquired access 
to substandard dwellings, weaker contracts and 
higher prices, if they got anything at all. Their ex-
periences were in line with the letters, who con-
firmed that they seldom rented out their dwell-
ing to people with these backgrounds (Søholt 
and Astrup 2009). 
2.3.4. Social housing
In Norway, social housing is most often munici-
pal rental housing reserved for people in need. 
Nobody has a right to housing, but the social 
services are obliged to assist people in need to 
get a home. Municipal rental housing is a scarce 
resource indeed. On average, Norwegian munici-
palities dispose 20 municipal dwellings per 1,000 
inhabitants (KOSTRA 2008). The scarcity has 
implied a need for prioritising applicants. When 
buildings are subsidised by the Norwegian State 
Housing Bank, the Bank has formulated criteria 
for distribution that have changed over the years. 
In 2009, rental dwellings supported by a supply 
grant from the Norwegian State Housing Bank 
were supposed to be prioritised to persons mov-
ing out of a prison or institution, to young people 
leaving public child welfare, to help settle refu-
gees and to ensure that nobody stays longer than 
three months in a temporary shelter. For groups 
in need of comprehensive municipal services, 
the grant is 40 per cent of the total construction 
costs, rehabilitation or acquisition of property, 
and the settlement of unaccompanied minors is 
also included among these groups. 
Apart from the guidelines set by the Norwe-
gian State Housing Bank, it is up to the munici-
palities as to how they practise the distribution 
of their housing stock. Where there is a lack of 
social housing, particularly in urban areas, the 
municipality can work out their own additional 
rules for prioritising applicants. A common rule 
is that you have to be a registered citizen in the 
municipality for two to three years before you are 
accepted as an applicant. Refugees who are set-
tled directly from asylum centres are prioritised, 
but if they want to move from their first dwelling, 
they are treated as all others with problems in the 
housing market. The immigrants’ share of mu-
nicipal housing is an indicator of their situation 
in the housing market. As mentioned above, 33 
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per cent of renters with immigrant backgrounds 
rented from the municipality, while only 12 per 
cent of all renters lived in municipal housing in 
2007 (Statistics Norway 2005/2006 and 2007). 
In the aforementioned study of ethnic minori-
ties, different treatment and the rental market, 
it was evident that households with immigrant 
backgrounds received municipal housing be-
cause they did not manage to access the private 
market by themselves (Søholt and Astrup 2009). 
The rent level in municipal social housing 
varies across municipalities. It is up to the mu-
nicipalities to decide on the principle for rent 
setting, be it market prices, covering costs or 
anything else. To cover the rent, the tenants can 
apply for housing allowances from the Norwe-
gian State Housing Bank, which is distributed 
by the municipalities. 
2.3.5. Regional distribution of tenures
Tenures are unevenly distributed in different re-
gions in Norway. As a result, conditions for ac-
cess to a decent home will vary by area of resi-
dence. The size of the whole population is about 
the same in densely and sparsely populated ar-
eas, a little more than one million people. The 
immigrant population has a different residential 
pattern. Although there are people with immi-
grant backgrounds all over Norway, this part of 
the population is more concentrated in dense-
ly populated areas. In 2010, 29 per cent of the 
immigrant population were living in the city of 
Oslo, 42 per cent in the Oslo region (Oslo and 
Akershus Counties) and 57 per cent in the five 
counties around the Oslo Fjord (Statistics Nor-
way, Immigrants and Norwegian born with im-
migrant parents). The uneven regional distribu-
tion of tenures and immigrant population implies 
that the conditions for access to housing vary 
according to place of residency. 
The tables 9 and 10 below highlight how ten-
ures are unevenly distributed in Norway. Not sur-
prisingly, owner-occupied housing is most wide-
spread in sparsely populated areas, while coop-
erative housing is almost non-existent in these 
areas. It is also not a surprise that rental housing 
is more widespread in densely populated areas 
and in the Oslo region. In the municipality of 
Oslo, the share of rentals is 26 per cent, which 
is also the average for densely populated areas. 
Since the immigrant population is more often 
tenants than the majority, access to this segment 
is of importance for the housing welfare of the 
group. As discussed above, access to the various 
parts of the rental market varies. The table below 
shows the ownership pattern of rental dwellings 
in Norway in densely and sparsely populated ar-
eas. The table 11 shows that family and friends, 
as well as private renting, are the most impor-
Table 9. Regional distribution of tenures. Norway and Oslo. Households. Row per cent (Statistics 
Norway 2007. level of living).
Table 10. Regional distribution of tenures. Densely and sparsely populated areas in Norway. 
Households. Row per cent (Statistics Norway. level of living 2007). 
Owner-occupied Cooperatives Rental housing Other
Norway 62 14 19 5
Oslo region 52 23 21 4
Owner-occupied Cooperatives Rental housing Others
Densely populated areas, 
100,000 or more inhabitants
42 29 26 3
Sparsely populated areas, less 
than 200 inhabitants
75 1 15 9
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tant channels for obtaining a contract. In sparsely 
populated areas, two-thirds of the contracts are 
distributed through family or friends (2007). Im-
migrants are vulnerable to this private distribu-
tion system if they are not part of a network in 
which others have dwellings for rent. The sur-
veys for the level of living among immigrants in 
2005/2006 compared to a similar study among 
the whole population in 2004 had interesting re-
sults. While one out of three among the whole 
population confirmed that the letter was a friend 
or a relative, the same was the case among only 
one of four immigrants. The implication of this 
is that immigrants are much more dependent on 
the letter’s individual priorities when choosing a 
tenant (Søholt and Astrup, 2009). 
The immigrant population is overrepresented 
in densely populated areas and more depend-
ent on private letters who are not part of their 
networks. A previous study of housing strate-
gies among three groups with different immi-
grant backgrounds in Oslo found that those who 
belonged to a group with surplus financial and 
housing resources were in a favourable position 
when it came to access to private renting (Søholt 
2007). From the table 11 above, it seems as if im-
migrants who want to rent a dwelling in sparse-
ly populated areas would increase their chances 
if they managed to be included in local social 
networks. According to the survey on the lev-
el of living, 65 per cent of the renters acquired 
a contract through personal, social networks in 
these areas. 
2.4.  Policies to increase 
accessibility, affordability 
and creditworthiness
National and local authorities have economic, 
judicial and distributional means to increase ac-
cessibility to and living conditions in the housing 
market for households in vulnerable positions. 
Examples of households in vulnerable situations 
are the poor of all kinds, people on welfare, immi-
grant households with many children, refugees, 
the homeless, people with disabilities, etc. Dis-
tributional means can be on both an individual 
and collective level. 
2.4.1.  Characterisation of economic 
support in the Norwegian housing policy 
As mentioned in the introduction, the nation-
al housing policy focuses on a well˗functioning 
housing market. To obtain this goal, the Norwe-
gian State Housing Bank offers support to de-
velopers and municipalities to help motivate an 
Table 11. Distribution of different types of letters in densely and sparsely populated areas 2007  
(Sandlie ed. 2010: 110). 
Public Firm/foundation Family/friends Private renting
Densely populated areas, 100,000 
or more inhabitants
10 21 24 45
Sparsely populated areas, less than 
200 inhabitants
9 4 65 23
Table 12. Economic means to support affordable 
and decent housing for all. 
Social 
housing
Private 
renting
Co-
operatives 
etc
Owner-
occupied
Individual support to 
housing costs (Housing 
allowance)
yes yes yes yes
Supply support (Developers, 
municipalities)
yes no yes yes
Tax support
no no yes yes
Rent/price control
no no no no
Regulation of access
yes no (yes) no
Supported finance 
(Individuals)
- - yes yes
(yes) means partially. Members after seniority are 
prioritised, as long as they have the highest bid. 
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increase in the supply of affordable housing (ta-
ble 12). Another important financial measure is 
the tax support to homeowners, making it much 
more economical to own than rent a home, as 
long as the household has the necessary econom-
ic means to access and stay in the owners market. 
Another important economic mean to ease poor 
people’s access to a decent home is the housing 
allowance, which provides individual support to 
help cover housing costs. After the last revision 
of the housing allowance system, this support 
is available for all types of tenure and housing. 
The main principle is to support poor households, 
whether singles or families. 
• Individual support to housing costs: Rent al-
lowance and deposit for rent. 
• Supply support: Support in the form of loans 
and grants from the Norwegian State Hous-
ing Bank to increase the supply of affordable 
housing. It goes to developers/municipalities 
and not to individual residents.
• Supported finance: Means-tested grant and/
or loan from the Norwegian State Housing 
Bank to individual households. 
A former study of supported finance revealed 
that the level of support was limited (Barlind-
haug and Dyb, 2003). The result was that the 
households had to buy a home in the cheapest 
areas. This implied that this economical mean 
supported people in helping to obtain a decent 
dwelling, but at the same time contributing to 
economic and ethnic segregation, especially in 
urban regions. 
The figure 4 shows that an increasing number 
of households have received housing allowanc-
es in order to help them pay their market-based 
housing costs. If the municipalities use market 
rents, the consequence is that most of the mu-
nicipal renters will have to apply for a housing 
allowance (state). The housing allowance is open 
for all poor people, regardless of tenure. The in-
crease in the number of recipients is a result of 
Figure 4. Housing allowances 2008 ˗2010 (increase in number of recipients) (Bård Øistensen. 
Temporary Director of the Norwegian State Bank. Presentation October 11, 2010).
Year Number of recipients Per cent immigrants Per cent descendants
2006 121,6 21 0.2
2007 129,7 28 0.4
2008 126,1 35 0.5
2009 136 38 0.6
(Immigrants are born abroad, while descendants are born in Norway with parents who 
were born abroad.)
Table 13. Housing allowance. Number of recipients in the whole population. Immigrants and 
descendants in per cent for the whole population receiving housing allowance (Proposition to the 
Storting (2010-2011). Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion). 
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both higher housing costs and new conditions 
for this support. 
Parallel to the increase in homeownership 
among ethnic minorities, there has been an in-
crease in the number of recipients of housing 
allowances. This increase is an expression of a 
tighter household economy among ethnic minor-
ities, as well as an expression of the integration 
of ethnic minorities into the welfare schemes. To 
receive a housing allowance, you have to know 
about the system and apply for the support. The 
table 13 below shows that descendants are much 
better off economically than their parents. 
2.4.2.   Judicial means to ease 
access to the housing market 
The most important judicial means for the im-
migrant population are the paragraphs from 2004 
against discrimination in all housing laws. Even 
though it is hard to prove that one is treated un-
equally when accessing the housing market, 
the laws are important flagships for the wanted 
norms of conduct. There have been a few cases in 
the owner-occupied market in which the buyers 
with immigrant backgrounds have won the cases. 
It is also of equal importance that the Association 
of Estate Agents has voted for a code of conduct 
that prohibits discrimination in all selling pro-
cesses. The rules for entry to cooperative hous-
ing are also important for immigrants’ access to 
this segment. The combination of the highest bid 
and seniority, together with the norms and rules 
for fair trade, contribute to avoiding individual 
discretion. Moreover, the transactions are taken 
care of by the housing associations, which hope-
fully help to secure a fair process. The possibility 
for having a housing career in the cooperative 
where one is living contributes to making this 
segment attractive for groups who are regarded 
as less attractive in the general market. 
2.4.3.  Redistributional means 
When the market is not effective in helping disad-
vantaged groups to secure decent housing, there 
is a need for a redistributional policy. In addi-
tion to economic and judicial means, the most 
important redistributional means are of course 
social housing of all kinds, in which households 
in difficulty are prioritised. Municipal housing 
for the homeless is just such an example. Early 
in the new immigration period (1976-1992), a 
state agency was established to assist munici-
palities and housing associations to include im-
migrants in their ordinary work and to inform 
migrants about conditions in the housing market 
(SIBO, State Agency for Immigrant Housing). 
As the agency worked to acquire dwellings all 
over Oslo, their activity contributed to helping 
to desegregate the immigrant population within 
the city (Blom, 2001). 
Area interventions in distressed urban neigh-
bourhoods are collective redistributional means 
that have proven to be important for the popula-
tion with immigrant backgrounds. For example, 
the urban renewal in Oslo (1977-1985) improved 
the physical housing conditions for people living 
in the older parts of the centre of Oslo. Because 
these areas had low standard, low rents and gave 
access to immigrants, they functioned as gather-
ing areas for a large part of the immigrants arriv-
ing in Norway before the halt on immigration in 
1975. With urban renewal they received better 
housing, the possibility of becoming homeown-
ers in cooperatives or in owner-occupied flats 
at subsidised prices, or to continue as tenants. 
To make it possible for people to stay in the ar-
ea, they received a special housing allowance to 
cover the increased housing costs if needed. The 
later action programmes in the same area and 
the suburbs of Oslo focused on improving the 
living conditions and the neighbourhoods. None 
of these redistributional means were developed 
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exclusively for the immigrant population. To the 
contrary, people with immigrant background and 
others were favoured because they lived in these 
areas. However, it was obvious from the start that 
these latest area programmes were developed, 
among other things, because of public concern 
for the concentration of ethnic minorities, the 
living conditions in the areas and a fear of the 
development of parallel communities. 
2.5.  conclusion
In this chapter, housing policy and housing con-
ditions are highlighted to contextualise ethnic mi-
norities’ possibilities and position in the Norwe-
gian housing market. Conditions in the housing 
policy and housing market most likely influence 
residential patterns both within and between eth-
nic groups. Even so, citizens of all kinds choose 
to live in centralised urban areas because of a 
belief in better possibilities for education, work, 
access to diversified urban lifestyles, social net-
works and more. This tendency works for all 
groups, but more so for the minorities than the 
majority, even though the housing prices in these 
areas are the highest. 
A Norwegian housing policy which favours 
homeownership for all social classes, in com-
bination with no right to housing and a welfare 
policy that builds on the premise that all citizens 
should take part in society and work if possi-
ble, may be an explanation for the high share 
of homeownership among the immigrant popu-
lation in Norway. Over time, it has been dem-
onstrated that the rental market does seldom of-
fers a safe and decent housing situation. The im-
migrant population’s concentration in some city 
districts in Oslo and some other municipalities 
might be further explained by a complexity of 
economic factors, rules for access and attractive-
ness. In the suburbs with an increasing immi-
grant population, one can get more housing for 
less money and rules for access to cooperative 
housing are non-discretionary. The city districts 
characterised by an increase in ethnic minorities 
are suburbs that include high-rise and multi-sto-
ry dwellings built after the Second World War, 
which appear to be less attractive for the white 
middle class. Moreover, cooperative housing is 
mostly well-kept. While the first generation of 
housing in the suburbs consists of small family 
flats, the dwellings from the 1970s and 1980s 
are more spacious and well suited for families 
with children. Conditions in relation to access, 
housing prices and a feeling of social acceptance 
all contribute in helping to explain the ethnic 
segregation patterns in the city districts of Oslo 
and some other urban areas. Likely important 
is the possibility for making a housing career in 
these districts, as the housing stock consists of 
blocks as well as of large- and moderate-sized 
single family houses. As these areas have gained 
increased public attention through action pro-
grammes, everyday area qualities are highlighted 
and improved, which is something that can attract 
and maintain the minority population. Housing 
careers in the cooperatives and other owner-oc-
cupied housing in the multiethnic city districts 
could be explained by a local belonging and so-
cial acceptance. Whether the residential patterns 
can be completely explained by ethnic prefer-
ences, as opposed to social capital and individ-
ual economic resources, remains to be explored 
in further studies. 
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3.  Immigration to Norway
Terje Wessel
3.1.  Historic background
People have been immigrating to Norway for 
hundreds of years. A long historical view (Kjel-
stadli 2003) reveals a diverse pattern of in-mi-
gration, relating to trade, agriculture/forestry and 
construction work. Such a view also pinpoints 
the importance of re-migration and refugee set-
tlement. The early 20th century, for instance, wit-
nessed a large influx of returning Norwegians 
from America. A concurrent settlement of Jews 
demands attention because it introduced a new 
type of urban diversity. Most of the Jews (close 
to 60 per cent) who arrived between 1890 and 
1940 settled in Oslo, where they formed a thriv-
ing community with synagogues, kosher shops 
and cultural activities.
The arrival of Jews, however, was a drop in 
the ocean compared with out-migration in this 
period. Approximately 863,000 Norwegians mi-
grated to overseas continents between 1840 and 
1940, putting Norway second to Ireland in terms 
of emigration volume as a proportion of the pop-
ulation. Emigration declined in the 1930s and re-
mained low in the 1940s and part of the 1950s. 
The 1960s was a decade of increasing migra-
tion, but still with a balance between immigra-
tion and emigration. A notable change occurred 
in 1971, when immigration exceeded emigration 
by 6 600 migrants. From now on a new pattern 
emerged, with fast-increasing immigration and 
slow-increasing emigration. Counting four dec-
ades, 1970-2009, immigration exceeds emigra-
tion by more than 400,000 people. An opposite 
pattern has existed for Norwegian citizens for 
fifty years (Table 14).1824
18 The statistics for the preceding decades, particularly the 
1940s, are deficient and less reliable. The main picture, 
however, appears to be the same: a net loss of Norwegian 
citizens through migration.
A breakdown on world regions reveals two 
major shifts in the composition of immigrants 
Table 15). The first one occurred in the 1970s 
and involved immigrants from Asia, Africa 
and Latin America. This category (previously 
called ‘culturally aliens’ and ‘non-Western im-
migrants’) increased its share from 20.2 per cent 
in the 1970s to 34.5 per cent in the 1980s. The 
second shift can be linked to the fall of the iron 
curtain in 1989-91. The emergence of new na-
tions (e.g. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and 
the regime change in older nations (e.g. DDR, 
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and 
Bulgaria) gave rise to a substantial influx of im-
migrants from Eastern Europe. A related but yet 
different type of movement emerged through en-
largement of the European Union in 2004 and 
2007. These latter changes set the stage for a 
new era of labour migration, with added effects 
in terms of family reunification. As a result the 
total number of migrants from Eastern Europe 
grew rapidly, from some 40,000 in the 1990s to 
108,000 in the 2000s. Yet, looking at relative 
figures we also observe large increases (84 re-
spectively 83 per cent) in the established flows 
from Africa and Asia.
The pattern of emigration is very different. 
Most emigrants (74 per cent during 1970-2009) 
head for Western destinations, particularly other 
Nordic countries. The sizes of these flows do not 
converge, but they share one feature: there is a 
tight link between inflow and outflow. New ar-
rivals are thus offset by departures, at least in the 
long term. The flows to and from Asia, Africa and 
Latin America (e.g. South and Central America) 
are, by contrast, marked by low emigration and 
sharply increasing net migration. 
The mismatch between incoming and leaving 
migrants also applies to single countries. The four 
largest sending countries during 1970-2009 are, 
in descending order, Sweden, Denmark, United 
States and United Kingdom. These countries ob-
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1960-69 133093 135058 -1965 56598 77009 -20411
1970-79 186225 146378 39847 104114 79894 -5357
1980-89 231707 172536 59171 70238 90786 -20548
1990-99 299729 204083 95646 95956 104114 -8158
2000-09 463212 240102 223110 86795 97500 -10705
Norwegian citizens
Net 
migration
Net 
migrationImmigration Emigration Immigration Emigration
Table 14. Migration volumes 1960-2009 (Statistics Norway).
Table 15. Immigration, emigration and net migration by world region (Statistics Norway).
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1970-09
Immigration
Nordic Countries 67924 92247 99190 317444
Rest of Western Europe 50452 50939 73624 223494
Eastern Europe 8259 42485 108537 163790
North America 23992 24068 19092 99836
South and Central America 10572 8911 12753 36048
Oceania 1989 2734 3874 11312
Eastern Asia 30663 29062 53163 124883
Western Asia, North Africa, Turkey 24112 29877 52488 119032
Sub-Saharan Africa 13580 18719 37319 78541
Unknown 164 687 3572 5956
Emigration
Nordic Countries 70337 71988 97669 293392
Rest of Western Europe 44705 46518 44530 176920
Eastern Europe 1721 9967 16211 30650
North America 20807 24557 14671 84198
South and Central America 3899 4946 3706 14631
Oceania 2123 2957 2811 10189
Eastern Asia 7399 11184 12145 36145
Western Asia, North Africa, Turkey 5316 7296 10028 8664 31304
Sub-Saharan Africa 8332 7435 5866 29362
Unknown 2907 14489 33829 52836
Net migration
Nordic Countries -2413 20259 1521 24052
Rest of Western Europe 5747 4421 29094 46574
Eastern Europe 65538 32518 92326 133140
North America 3185 -489 4421 15638
South and Central America 6673 3965 9047 21417
Oceania -134 -223 1063 1123
Eastern Asia 6578 23264 17878 41018 88738
Western Asia, North Africa, Turkey 16816 19849 43824 87728
Sub-Saharan Africa 5248 11284 31453 49179
Unknown -2743 -13802 -30257 -46880
1594
-78
4685
1611
7729
7239
7312
1758
8521
1732
417
2298
5417
53398
41167
2751
24163
2080
3812
2715
11995
12555
9323
1533
1970-79
58083
48479
4509
32684
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tain the following ranking in terms of net migra-
tion: 13, 35, 14 and 15 (Table 16). The fifth larg-
est sending country, Poland, figures at the top of 
this list, followed by Germany, Pakistan, Iraq, So-
malia and the Philippines. We note, in addition, 
that most Western countries display a stable and 
predictable pattern: the influx does not vary a lot 
from decade to decade. Countries in other parts of 
the world form either a similar pattern (e.g. Pa-
kistan, Turkey and India) or a pattern marked by 
sudden changes (e.g. Poland, Iraq, Somalia, the 
Philippines, Russia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran, 
China, Lithuania and Sri Lanka). What we are 
looking at here is, tentatively, the importance of 
transnational spaces versus politics, violence and 
force. The flows from Asian villages, particular-
ly in Pakistan, have been maintained through a 
complex set of contacts, most of which have a 
local foundation. A change in this direction can 
be detected for several countries in the second 
*Migrants from DDR, the separate nations Serbia and Montenegro, former Yugoslavia, South Vietnam and 
North Vietnam are excluded. 
Emigration Net 
migration
Rank net 
migration
Total Total Total Total
1970-09 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1970-09 1970-09 1970-09
Sweden 161316 24572 27843 54280 54621 149330 11986 13
Denmark 109886 25125 30330 24575 29856 107254 2632 35
United States 87775 28992 21476 21065 16242 76424 11351 14
United Kingdom 77123 20431 22926 16709 17057 66033 11086 15
Poland 60690 1176 3388 3113 53013 7277 53413 1
Germany* 49454 7815 7230 10399 24010 27191 22263 2
Pakistan 29206 5930 8292 7055 7929 9251 19955 3
Finland 24488 4801 4542 6517 8628 19813 4675 27
Serbia and Montenegro* 24205 - - - - 8810 15395 7
France 21522 4580 5181 5478 6283 17657 3865 31
Iraq 21164 35 758 5355 15016 1290 19874 4
Spain 19110 2861 3825 4745 7679 22718 -3608 268
Netherlands 19109 4256 3720 4178 6955 13166 5943 25
Somalia 18834 15 1299 5273 12247 1125 17709 5
Philippines 18755 966 4660 4154 8975 3352 15403 6
Iceland 18159 3065 4304 5490 5300 14029 4130 30
Thailand 17429 628 1810 3181 11810 3850 13579 9
Turkey 17088 2529 4219 5173 5167 3945 13143 10
Russia 16530 - - 3727 12803 1975 14555 8
Bosnia-Herzegovina 15399 - - 13397 2002 2807 12592 11
Iran 13529 544 4465 3388 5132 1409 12120 12
India 12808 2011 3372 2119 5306 3406 9402 19
China 12717 291 1318 3156 7952 3350 9367 20
Lithuania 12385 - - 460 11926 1329 11056 16
Canada 12061 3692 2516 3003 2850 10774 1287 52
Sri Lanka 11955 202 4797 4065 2891 1816 10139 18
Vietnam* 10884 665 4052 3425 2742 681 10203 17
Ethiopia 10051 950 1740 2392 4969 2769 7282 22
Chile 9201 828 4987 1645 1741 2931 6270 24
Australia 9157 2275 1498 2190 3194 8487 670 82
Immigration
Table 16. Immigration, emigration and net migration by country. The 30 largest immigration countries 
during 1970-09 (Statistics Norway).
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group. People who flee from war and conflict 
tend to maintain close contact with non-migrant 
relatives in the place of origin. The transnational 
dynamics may thus stretch beyond the first phase 
of family reunifications. A similar transition is 
bound to evolve in the East-West European mi-
gration space, although these flows differ a lot 
from the guest worker and asylum immigration. 
East-European migrants are more likely to en-
gage in circular mobility, adapting to the ebb 
and flow of economic demand (Favell 2008). 
3.2.  Formal permits
Legal settlement in Norway can be obtained on 
several grounds. Some of these official gateways 
are subject to political change, while others re-
main stable and difficult to change in a humani-
tarian responsible society. There is in this respect 
a patent asymmetry between immigration as a 
demographic event and immigration policy as a 
civil challenge. Labour immigration, for instance 
cannot be separated from other categories of im-
migration (Brochmann 2008). 
The novelty of this issue has affected both 
the political process and the acquisition of fac-
tual knowledge. An unfortunate lag exists be-
tween demographic events and the production 
of new statistics. 
We know, however, that work allowances 
dominated in the early phase when Norway 
evolved into an immigrant-receiving country (i.e. 
in the mid 1960s). A huge need for unskilled la-
bour, combined with changing regulations in oth-
er countries, steered a number of labour migrants 
from Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco and 
India to the high north. These ‘guest workers’ 
were expected, and expected themselves, to leave 
within a few years. As it turned out, life had a 
different fate in store: many remained in Norway, 
and were followed by other migrants from the 
same places (i.e. the same villages).1925 
The early phase of labour migration ended, 
at least formally, with the ‘immigration stop’ 
in 1975 (chapter 5). This led to an immediate 
change in the pattern of permits, with family 
reunification as the dominating gateway. The 
scale of immigration in these years was slightly 
reduced, but only for a short while.2026Looking 
into the 1980s and 1990s, a new flow of refu-
gees and asylum-seekers changed the context 
of immigration policy once more. Norway had 
subscribed to the United Nations’ convention on 
refugees in 1951 and the additional rules of 1967. 
Following this tradition, the country now entered 
into a permanent co-operation with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
CHR). An agreement was also struck regarding 
minor applicants, whereas other individuals and 
groups were required to demonstrate their need 
for protection. 
The levels of different permits can be doc-
umented from 1990 onwards. This registration 
shows that acceptances of refugees and labour 
migrants have developed in opposite directions, 
the former declining and the latter rapidly esca-
lating (Table 17). Family reunifications were in-
creasing until 2003, when Norway adapted to a 
norm which privileges migrants with a refugee 
status. Those with a humanitarian status were 
subjected to similar rules (exemption from main-
tenance requirement) for six and a half years, be-
tween January 1997 and May 2003. The change 
in labour migration is, as indicated, an effect 
of the EU enlargement. A second factor is the 
new border-cross provision of services within 
the EEA.
Tables 18 and 19 illustrate that permits vary 
enormously by region and country. Refugee pro-
19 An often overlooked fact is that many pioneers, 
particularly from Pakistan, have migrated to Norway 
several times (Vassenden 1997).
20 The migration volume dropped by 3 per cent from 1975 
to 1976, but then picked up again in 1977. 
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Table 17. Immigration by reason, 1990-2008. Per cent* (Statistics Norway).
*Nordic citizens are not counted, due to the common settlement space in the Nordic countries.
Work Family Refugee 
protection
Education Other 
reasons
Total
Europe 41.1 30.6 18.5 9.3 0.6 100
Asia including Turkey 4.7 52.2 31.7 11.2 0.2 100
Africa 2.3 41.8 44.2 11.6 0.2 100
North and Central 
America
25.1 55 1 16.3 1.7 100
Oceania 8.5 68.1 6.1 16.9 0.4 100
Stateless 36.6 38.8 0.5 23.4 0.9 100
Total 24.2 40.2 24.4 10.7 0.5 100
Table 18. Immigration by reason world region, 1990-2008. Per cent (Statistics Norway).
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-2008 Total
Work 8.9 13.8 13.5 43 24.2
Family reunion 36.6 42.7 47.3 35.7 40.2
Refugee 
protection
44.8 30.8 26.5 11.3 24.4
Education 9 12 12.3 9.7 10.7
Unknown 0 0 0 0 0
Other reasons 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table 19. Immigration by reason and country (selected countries), 1990-2008. Per cent (Statistics 
Norway).
Work Family Education Total
Poland 71.5 25 0.5 2.9 0.1 100
Germany 54.3 29 0.2 14.9 1.5 100
Iraq 0.1 39 60.7 0.1 0.1 100
Somalia 0 42.7 57.2 0 0.1 100
Russia 7.6 47.9 28.3 16 0.3 100
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 1.1 8.3 89.9 0.6 0 100
United 
Kingdom 54.4 39.4 0.4 3.9 1.8 100
United States 28.8 52.8 0.7 15.6 2.1 100
Thailand 0.6 93.7 1 4.5 0.1 100
Philippines 7.3 52.8 2 37.6 0.3 100
Iran 1.9 31.4 64.6 1.9 0.1 100
Lithuania 67.1 22.1 0.2 10.5 0.1 100
Pakistan 2.2 87.1 5 4.9 0.9 100
Afghanistan 0.1 35.3 64.5 0.1 0 100
Netherlands 46.2 44.6 0.2 6.9 2.1 100
China 11.8 40.8 5.5 41.7 0.2 100
Turkey 3.1 86.2 6.5 3.8 0.5 100
Vietnam 1.3 58.3 36.1 4 0.3 100
Sri Lanka 1.2 62.4 29.3 7 0.1 100
France 47.9 35.3 0.5 15.4 1 100
India 30.7 53.8 1.8 13.3 0.3 100
 Ethiopia 1 33.6 46.5 18.8 0 100
Refugee 
protection
Other 
reasons
Country report for Norway
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tection is the dominating gateway for Iraqis, Bos-
nians, Somalis and Afghans. A number of other 
groups have a lower but still notable proportion 
of refugees. These populations (e.g. from Sri 
Lanka and Vietnam) appear to move into a stage 
of secondary migration, largely through family 
reunifications. Secondary migration may also 
expand to ever-wider family circles. A further 
breakdown of the statistics in Table 19 shows that 
93 per cent of family reunifications among Iraqis 
and Afghans can be linked to refugee protection 
of a family member. Similar figures for migrants 
from Bosnia, Iran, Vietnam and Sri Lanka are as 
follows: 77, 76, 61 and 60 per cent. A third group 
of countries, notably Thailand, the Philippines 
and Russia, have many family reunifications but 
few that are triggered by refugee status.2127The 
trigger in these cases is, rather, the evolvement 
of global social spaces, where people travel and 
communicate across international borders. Put 
simply, permits among Thais, Filipinos and Rus-
sians tend to involve majority men and minority 
women (Lidén 2005).
21  The proportion of privileged reunifications is only 1 
per cent for Thailand and the Phillipines.
3.3.  Immigrant background 
˗ shades of difference
Table 20 classifies migration groups according 
to birthplace (within/outside Norway) and parent 
background (within/outside Norway). ‘True’ im-
migrants increased their proportion of the popu-
lation from 1.5 per cent in 1950 to 9.5 per cent in 
2010. The progeny of this group (‘descendants’) 
made up a tiny 0.1 per cent in 1950, increasing 
to 1.9 per cent in the following four decades. 
Some other groups have been growing as well, 
particularly people born abroad with one Nor-
wegian parent. 
A telling picture of population diversity in 
Norway is given in Figure 5. We note, firstly, 
that very few people (less than 50,000) had a 
foreign background in the early post-war years. 
The fifties, the sixties and the seventies were 
all marked by small change, although with a 
steady shift towards Non-European migration. 
Then, in the 1980s, migration began to develop 
its own momentum. This was the period when 
families were settling down to permanent resi-
dence. Equally important, immigration became 
more complex as flows of refugees and new la-
bour migrants entered the country. Some decades 
along this path, Europeans now make up 51 per 
cent of all immigrants.
Total Per cent Total Per cent Total Per cent
Total population 3888305 100 4249830 100 4858199 100
Born abroad 57041 1.5 150973 3.6 459346 9.5
Born in Norway with 
immigrant parents
2155 0.1 17325 0.4 92967 1.9
Population with immigrant 
background
59196 1.5 168298 4 552313 11.4
Other groups
Born abroad with one 
Norwegian parent
8491 0.2 17290 0.4 30766 0.6
Born in Norway with one 
foreign parent
52899 1.4 100381 2.4 206627 4.3
Born abroad with two 
Norwegian parents
10544 0.3 16004 0.4 36688 0.8
1970 1990 2010
Table 20. Migration groups by country of birth. 1970, 1990 and 2010. Total numbers and per cent 
(Statistics Norway).
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3.4.  Demographic composition 
The structure of the migrant population depends 
partly on the migration process itself (i.e. the 
selection and self-selection of migrants) and 
partly on the natural demographic development 
through births and deaths. These two develop-
ments take place simultaneously, but not along 
the same paths. Most groups go through a pro-
tracted transition whereby migration counts for 
less and less. Obviously, this also depends on 
how the migration population is defined. 
It has been common practice in Norway to 
count both migrants and their children as part of 
the immigrant population. Regular reports from 
Statistics Norway have shown key characteris-
tics at several levels of aggregation (nation, con-
tinent, Western/non-Western origin). The latest 
report of this kind (Daugstad 2008) stuck to the 
tradition even though it coincided with the in-
troduction of new concepts (chapter 2). Statistics 
Norway’s ‘internet bank’ (Statistikkbanken) has 
started to use the new option, but it does not re-
place or fully supplement the older series.
We are obviously bounded by these practices. 
Descendants are still a rather small group, and it 
shares many similarities with the parent genera-
tion. A study of six minorities (from Pakistan, In-
dia, Turkey, Morocco, Vietnam and Chile) shows 
that most descendants marry a person from the 
same ethnic background, usually a migrant. Most 
of them, like their parents, live in Oslo, Aker-
shus or (less common) another major city. Look-
ing closer at Oslo, there is no huge disparity in 
settlement geography between parents and chil-
dren: the vast majority live either in established 
immigrant communities in the inner east or in 
eastern/southern satellite towns (Søholt and As-
trup 2009). It therefore seems reasonable to in-
clude descendants in the description of minority 
populations. Of course, many descendants have 
advanced beyond their parents in terms of edu-
cation and income (Birkelund and Mastekaasa 
2009), but they are still heavily conditioned by 
their ethnic background. They are also treated 
as an integration challenge by the Norwegian 
authorities. 
3.4.1.  Sex
The sex distribution of the minority population 
has become increasingly balanced. The entry of 
labour migrants in the early 1970s reduced a pre-
vious surplus of females. An opposite irregular-
Figure 5. Number and composition of foreign-born in Norway 1950-2010 
(Statistics Norway).
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ity appeared, however, as labour migration pro-
gressed. The so-called ‘first wave of immigra-
tion’ (Tjelmeland 2003) separated husbands from 
wives, partly due to pull-factors (i.e. economic 
conditions in Norway) and partly due to push-
factors (i.e. economic, demographic and cultural 
conditions in the countries concerned). This im-
balance was rectified through family reunifica-
tions and the natural demographic development 
through births and deaths. The latest figures (Ta-
ble 21) show that males make up 51 per cent of 
the minority population in Norway. At a more 
detailed level, the proportion varies between 40 
per cent (descent in Eastern Asia) and 57 per 
cent (descent in Eastern Europe). We also note 
that Eastern Asia had a completely different pat-
tern twenty years ago, with a slight surplus of 
males. This matches the pattern in Table 19 and 
is obviously explained by a growing incidence 
of interethnic marriage.
3.4.2.  Age
The distribution of people at different ages 
changes in a similar direction (Table 22). That 
is, there are some signs of a more balanced dis-
tribution. The statistics pertaining to age do not 
allow a long-term view or a detailed division of 
nation groups. Looking at nine years, 2001 to 
2010, the proportion of children below 16 years 
declined slightly. A corresponding increase took 
place at ages between 45 and 67 years, while 
people in retirement age maintained a low pro-
portion. Again, there is no convergence across 
regions. Africans, for instance, have retained a 
wide base of children and youngsters. Viewed 
Table 21. Composition of natives and immigrants/descendants by sex. 1970, 1990 and 2010 
(Statistics Norway).
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Norwegians
Immigrants/descendants:
Nordic countries 10 951 15 598 16 701 21 388 30 868 32 172
Rest of Western European 
countries
6 041 9 199 14 972 14 283 31 829 28 893
Eastern European countries 3 484 2 244 7 202 6 180 75 842 58 428
Sub-Saharan Africa 316 278 4 764 2 384 28 912 26 476
Western Asia, North Africa, 
Turkey
999 158 20 489 13 186 40 624 32 138
Eastern Asia 593 615 14 761 12 912 34 939 51 894
Latin America 303 291 4 352 3 933 8 039 10 313
North America 3 340 4 417 4 369 5 687 4 289 5 024
Oceania 113 233 293 420 1 036 684
1970 1990 2010
Table 22. Table 3.9 Immigrants/descendants by world region and age. Per cent (Statistics Norway).
2001 2010 2001 2010 2001 2010 2001 2010 2001 2010
Europe 13.7 14 3.5 3.1 46.3 52.1 27.9 24.5 8.7 6.3
Africa 31 32.5 6.3 5.8 51.9 47.7 9.8 12.7 1.1 1.3
Asia (incl. Turkey) 29 25 6.5 6.5 49.6 48.9 13.4 17.6 1.6 2
North America 6.5 7.2 2.4 2.3 38.7 38.9 26 32.9 26.4 18.8
Latin America 19.2 12.6 6.6 4.9 52.2 54.2 19.7 25.5 2.3 2.9
Oceania 5.5 5.5 5.5 1.6 53.7 67.5 27.9 20.4 7.5 5
0-15 years 16-19 years 20-44 years 45-67 years 67 years +
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as a whole, the populations from Africa, Asia 
and Latin America are by no means balanced. 
Currently, only 1-3 per cent of these populations 
have reached the age of 67, which is the formal 
retirement age in Norway.
3.5.  Unemployment, 
employment and poverty
Successive studies have found that people of mi-
nority background are at a higher risk of unem-
ployment than Norwegians (Vassenden 1997; 
Bråthen et al. 2007; Olsen 2008). The early 1990s 
hit immigrants, particularly young immigrants, 
harder than Norwegians. It also turned out in 
the following upturn that immigrants are more 
exposed to long-term unemployment than Nor-
wegians. Looking at 1994 to 2010, a disturbing 
feature emerges: the unemployment rate among 
immigrants/descendants has fluctuated two to 
three times above the total rate. Another persis-
tent feature is a huge variation in the experience 
of different groups. All groups have followed the 
general trend towards lower unemployment, but 
some groups have remained far behind in relative 
terms. This is particularly pronounced for people 
of African descent, who had an unemployment 
rate five times above the average both in 1994 
and 2010 (Table 23).
The most significant change in the level of 
employment applies to immigrants/descendants 
from EU-countries in Eastern Europe (Table 24). 
An overall growth in the employment rate by 
14 per centage points during 2001-2008 must 
Table 23. Unemployment rate 1994-2010. Immigrants/descendants by world region compared to the 
whole population (Statistics Norway).
Nov. Nov. Nov. Feb.
1994 1998 2002 2010
Total population 4.4 2.1 2.1 2.5
All immigrants/descendants 11.3 5.7 6.1 7.9
Nordic countries 4.8 2.2 2.3 3.5
Rest of Western European countries 5 2.4 2.3 4.3
Eastern Europe 13.6 9.2 5.4 9.8
North America and Oceania 4.8 2.9 2.5 3.4
Latin America 14.8 6.7 6.1 7.9
Asia including Turkey 18.5 9.1 8.3 8.4
Africa 22.4 9.9 13.2 13.7
9.8
4.4
9.1
11.5
15.9
Nov.
2006
3.3
8.6
3.7
4.3
Total Total Men
2001 2008 2008
Total population 70.9 71.6 68.5
All immigrants/descendants 59.3 64.2 58.7
Nordic countries 73.7 75.6 73.6
Rest of Western European countries 68.1 73.4 66.6
EU-countries in Eastern European 60 73.5 67.8
Rest of Eastern Europe 56.6 63.2 61.1
North America and Oceania 55 65.7 59.3
Latin America 62.3 66.1 62.1
Asia including Turkey 52.5 56.8 51.1
Africa 46.2 49.7 42.8
76.4
65.9
72.1
71.5
63.2
55.4
Women
2008
74.6
69.3
77.5
78.2
Table 24. Employment rate by world region and gender. Immigrants/descendants compared to the 
whole population (Statistics Norway).
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be seen in the context of politics, but also in the 
context of selective mobility. Many young crafts-
men have been drawn to the tempting prospects 
of the Norwegian labour market. We find a con-
centration of these groups in volatile industries 
such as construction, low-tech manufacturing 
and personal services. Not surprisingly, many 
have been seriously affected by the recent finan-
cial crisis, both compared to Norwegians and to 
immigrants from Asia, Africa and Latin America 
(Statistics Norway 2010).
Further, while all groups have experienced 
growing employment in the long run, there is 
also a striking continuity in the difference across 
groups. A key factor in this respect is the econom-
ic activity of women. Some European groups 
(e.g. Swedes, Finns and Germans) have employ-
ment rates above 70 per cent, while others (e.g. 
Somalis, Pakistanis, Moroccans and Turks) have 
rates well below 50 per cent. Somali women 
make an extreme case; only 25 per cent of this 
group is formally employed (Table 25).
Experience in the labour market is often seen 
as a door opener to other fields, and thus as a 
basis for integration. A more careful approach 
suggests that employment is a latent rather than 
a manifest ‘fault line’. It depends on group char-
acteristics a well as place characteristics whether 
employment has knock-on-effects in the housing 
market, the field of politics, leisure activities, etc. 
What is clear, though, is that employment has a 
direct bearing on income and poverty. Groups 
with low employment rates have, with no ex-
ception, high poverty rates. The opposite applies 
to a number of European countries (Denmark, 
Sweden, Germany, United Kingdom and Bos-
nia-Herzegovina), but not to Poland. Immigrants 
from Poland expose a rare combination of high 
employment and high poverty. This obviously 
reflects the elusive character of the flows. Nor-
wegian media have presented numerous ‘hor-
ror stories’ from the cross-border labour market 
that has evolved in the geopolitical context of 
the EEA. Many migrants from Poland and the 
Baltic states appear to languish in underpaid and 
unattractive jobs. The demand side of the market 
Table 25. Employment rate by country and gender. Immigrants/descendants compared to the whole 
population (Statistics Norway).
Total Men Women
2008 2008 2008
Total population 71.6 74.5 68.5
All immigrants/descendants 64.2 69.3 58.7
European countries:
Denmark 70.5 75 65.5
Finland 70.9 69 72.2
Sweden 80 81.1 78.8
Germany 75.6 80.2 70
United Kingdom 70.3 78 60.5
Poland 73.3 76.9 64.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina 66.2 68 64.4
Other countries:
Pakistan 48.2 63.1 32.3
Vietnam 64.7 68.3 61.5
Iran 59.7 62.7 56
Sri Lanka 68.8 76.9 61.4
Turkey 54.7 63.7 42.8
The Philippines 62.5 74.2 60.1
India 63.4 69.5 56.1
Morocco 49.2 55 41.4
Somalia 35.7 44.6 25.1
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Table 27. Household equivalent income below 60 per cent of mean income (EU-scale). One 
single year (2006) and persistent over three years (2004-2006). Immigrants/descendants 
compared to the whole population. Per cent (Daugstad 2008, based on data from Statistics 
Norway).
1996 2002 2008
Total population 12 11 12
All immigrants/descendants 28 27 31
Immigrants from Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America 36 33 36
People with refugee background 34 36 39
Table 26. Household equivalent income below 60 per cent of mean income (EU-scale). 
Immigrants/descendants compared to the whole population. Per cent (Source: Statistics 
Norway).
10 8 2.2
29 25 2.3
34 31 2.5
European countries:
Denmark 13 9 1.9
Sweden 15 10 1.8
Germany 18 12 1.9
United Kingdom 12 9 2
Russia 32 31 2.4
Poland 37 17 1.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina 18 19 2.5
Pakistan 38 38 3.4
Vietnam 23 22 2.8
Iran 27 30 2.3
Irak 52 53 2.8
Sri Lanka 19 17 3
Turkey 36 35 2.9
Somalia 64 65 2.5
2004-
2006
Average 
household 
Size
Total population
All immigrants/descendants
Immigrants from Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and 
Latin America
Other countries:
2006
Table 29. Share of individuals in households that receive social assistance. Immigrants/
descendants compared to the whole population. 1996, 2002 and 2008 (Statistics Norway).
1996 2002 2008
Total population 7 5 4
All immigrants/descendants 28 22 14
Immigrants from Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and 
Latin America
40 29 19
People with refugee background 61 42 30
1996 2002 2008
All immigrants/descendants 63 67 75
Immigrants from Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and 
Latin Amer-ica
56 62 73
People with refugee background 46 54 64
Table 28. Employment income as dominant income source. Share of population 1996-2008. 
Immigrants/descendants compared to the whole population (Statistics Norway).
Country report for Norway
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includes employers and recruitment agents who 
come into play as brokers of information and op-
portunities (see Elrick and Lewandowska 2008). 
Poverty is also a real and significant prob-
lem for many large families, and even for groups 
with high fertility rates. The following picture 
appears to apply (Table 26 and 27): Immigrants 
of Western descent have small families and low 
poverty rates. Many groups from other parts of 
the world have large families and high poverty 
rates. Pakistanis, as an example, have a pover-
ty rate (EU-scale) at 38 per cent and an aver-
age household size at 3.4 (compared to 2.2 in 
the whole population). But the exceptions loom 
large, and should not be neglected. Immigrants 
from Sri Lanka and Vietnam tend to have large 
families, sometimes with three generations un-
der one roof. These groups seem to reduce the 
risk of poverty through rapid and lasting labour 
market integration. 
There is, moreover, a correspondence be-
tween poverty and refugee status. Refugees and 
asylum-applicants are worse off than labour mi-
grants and dependants. This relative drawback 
has become increasingly visible since the mid 
1990s (Table 28), although one cannot easily as-
sess the interplay between gateways and national 
background. Refugees from former Yuogosla-
via, for instance, may have had some advantages 
(e.g. in terms of skill and language) compared 
to their Asian and African counterparts. What 
is comforting, anyhow, is a marked shift in the 
sources of incomes. Labour income used to be 
less important than social assistance and other 
benefits. Now, the picture is opposite (Table 28 
and 29), although some groups lag behind. So-
malis and Iraqis receive 35 respectively 52 per 
cent of their income through employment even 
after 3-9 years in Norway (Kirkeberg 2008).
A final point concerns poverty duration. Most 
groups, including Norwegians, are marked by 
sizeable mobility in and out of poverty. Such tran-
sitions are strongly associated with life-course 
events, whereas persistent poverty is more a 
question of educational disadvantage, lack of 
experience, social immobility and inactivity. 
Some of the figures presented in Table 3.14 are 
in this respect quite grim: almost two thirds of 
the Somali group and more than half of the Ira-
qi group remained in poverty (EU-scale) during 
2004-2006 (Table 27, second column).
3.6.  Education
Summary statistics that lump all residents togeth-
er can easily disguise demographic change. The 
distortion imposed by newcomers is one prob-
lem; another is the relative performance of dif-
ferent indicators. The age profile of the minority 
population implies that large cohorts are yet to 
advance very far in their careers; they are still 
students, or have just completed a degree. Hence, 
educational indicators are likely to give a more 
optimistic picture of demographic change than 
indicators of employment, poverty and income. 
The trends in figure 6 indicate massive change 
across generations. Children of immigrants tend 
to split in two groups, one with high education-
al ambitions and one that fails to complete sec-
ondary school (Birkelund and Mastekaasa 2009, 
Fekjær and Brekke 2009). The former group is 
disproportionately drawn towards disciplines 
that pay dividends in the labour market, such 
as medicine, pharmacy, engineering, econom-
ics and science (Schou 2009). Descendants and 
immigrants alike do, on the other hand, strug-
gle to perform at the same level as the Norwe-
gian majority, partly due to the skewed selection 
(Kolby and Østhus 2009). There is also a marked 
ethnic divide in terms of educational choice and 
achievement: certain ethnic groups (e.g. Indians, 
Iranians, Tamils and people of Vietnamese back-
ground) are far ahead of other groups (Fekjær 
2006; Schou 2009). This diversity is part of the 
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background for the pattern in table 29. Any meas-
ure of meritocratic success/failure (in this case 
educational level) at the level of world regions is 
bound to reflect great variation. More important 
still is the dynamics of upward mobility, which 
fail to emerge in cross-sectional data. Or, to put 
it in concrete terms, the disparity between Nor-
wegians and immigrants from Asia, Africa and 
Latin America is reproduced through new im-
migration. A more detailed interpretation of table 
30 is difficult due to missing data.2228
22  The registration of educational level is based on three 
sources: i. ordinary registration based on education in 
Norway, ii. registration of previous education through 
survey, iii. transmission of information from country of 
origin. 
3.7.  concluding remarks
The factors that shape migration have changed 
over time, with additional effects on the de-
velopment of the minority population. Many 
groups have become more balanced in demo-
graphic terms, partly through family reunifica-
tion and partly through fertility and mortality. 
Many groups have also managed to climb the 
social ladder, both within and (more pronounced) 
across generations. Some other groups, however, 
remain heavily dependent on welfare, even after 
many years in Norway. This invites a number 
of questions concerning socio-economic integra-
Figure 6. Share of people 19-24 years in higher education. Immigrants born abroad and descendants 
compared to national average (Statistics Norway).
1995
Total population 2.9 26.1 51.4 19.6 4.1 0.2 29.6 41.3 24.8
Norwegians 1 27 52.5 19.6 0.4 0.1 30.2 43.9 25.2
Nordic countries 28 15.2 33.6 23.2 16.9 0.2 22.7 32.2 27.9
28.6 9.1 32 28.6 19.4 0.2 18.5 29 32.5
Eastern Europe 58.9 8.8 19.9 12.4 49.4 0.3 19.6 16.7 14
Asia, Africa, Latin America 37.1 12.5 35 15.3 30.2 1.6 33 19.8 15.5
Primary 
school
No 
edu-cat
ion
Unknow
n
Rest of Western Europe, North 
America and Oceania
2007
Primary 
school
Sec. 
school
Universi
ty or 
college
Sec.sc
hool
University 
or college
Unknown 
or no 
education
Table 30. Educational level 1995 and 2007. Immigrants/descendants compared to the whole 
population and native Norwegians (Statistics Norway).
Country report for Norway
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tion and residential location: are there ‘spatial 
traps’ in the major cities? Or, more positively, 
do certain locations facilitate socio-economic in-
tegration? The NODES project attempts to ap-
proach these questions both from a macro and 
a micro level of analysis. 
4.  Policy analysis related 
to immigrant settlement 
and integration
Susanne Søholt
Integration policies have developed over time 
since the start of the new immigration in the late 
1960s. Policy development has been a response 
to the interpretation of the volume and charac-
ter of the challenges and problems that followed 
the immigration. The situation was new, and it 
took some time before immigration resulted in a 
conscious immigration and integration policy. At 
the outset, the discussion about the policies for 
immigration control and integration were highly 
connected. Later, it was argued that the high level 
of universal welfare rights and services, in con-
junction with the accessibility for immigrants to 
legally stay, influenced the need for a control of 
immigration (Brochmann in debate on immigra-
tion September 7, 2010. Arr. The North in focus). 
However, in the late 1960s and the begin-
ning of the 1970s as in 2010, the focus was/is 
on how to manage immigration with the desired 
integration. In the NODES Project, the overall 
question is whether integration and inclusion pol-
icies have contributed to increasing or decreas-
ing ethnic differences in the housing market and 
whether it has influenced residential segregation 
or desegregation.
The objective with this chapter is to present 
and discuss policies related to immigrants’ settle-
ment and integration. First, there is a presentation 
and discussion of the birth and development of 
this new policy area following the immigration 
of the 1960s. Next, main subareas in this policy 
field are presented and discussed. The chapter 
ends with a short summary of the chapter, in 
which dividing lines in the integration debates 
are highlighted. 
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4.1.  Introduction
In many ways, the actual experience with im-
migration and integration has proven the wis-
dom of the early works of Thomas and Znaniecki 
when they analysed the Polish immigration to the 
United States at the beginning of the 19th cen-
tury (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918-1920/1996). 
“Becoming” became a tool for understanding 
the social processes that took place when im-
migrants established themselves in the United 
States. This perspective had importance for un-
derstanding the immigrants’ adaption to Ameri-
can society and to how Americans and Ameri-
can society changed as a result of immigration 
and what the immigrants brought with them. The 
important lesson to be learned here is that it is 
difficult to know the effects and consequenc-
es of immigration beforehand. According to the 
Norwegian sociologist Brochmann, most of the 
European countries receiving immigrants had no 
experience when it came to formulating their 
immigration policies (Brochmann 2003:155). 
The same can be said for integration policies, 
though Norway had some experience with trying 
to assimilate the Sami people. In previous years, 
the authorities had not bothered much about the 
adaption and integration of immigrants, as the 
labour immigrants were purely seen as tempo-
rary workers. It can be said that it came as a sur-
prise when they turned out to be human beings 
with needs, feelings, aspirations, a need for love 
and care, etc. Moreover, as it turned out they 
were not temporary, but stayed on. However, 
the manifest social problems that followed the 
first wave of labour immigrants forced integra-
tion onto the agenda. In Norway, housing was 
one of the main concerns. 
The development of immigration and inte-
gration policies in Norway had been intermin-
gled before they developed into separate policy 
areas in the 1990s. There were four White Papers 
from the late 1960s and beginning of the 1970s 
to the end of the 1980s that focused primarily 
on immigration policy (Report No. 45 (1968-
1969) to the Storting “On labour market poli-
cy”; Report No. 39 (1973-1974) to the Storting 
“On immigration policy”; Report No. 107 to the 
Storting (1975-1976) “On the halt on immigra-
tion and efforts related to immigration issues”; 
Report No. 39 (1987-1988) to the Storting “On 
immigration policy”). There is a shift in policy 
between the first White Paper and the ones that 
follow. While the first White Paper embraced a 
liberal immigration policy, the next ones focused 
on the need for immigration control. The first 
underscored that international contacts and ex-
change should meet as few restrictions as possi-
ble. It went on to further state that the individual 
worker and employer should have as much free-
dom as possible to enter into employment con-
tracts (p. 63). It additionally said that it would be 
more common for people to cross borders, not 
only as tourists but for longer stays. This was fol-
lowed by a statement that a border crossing and 
a choice of where to stay were part of the ordi-
nary freedom of choice that people would want 
to claim in the future. The paper stated that this 
development must be regarded as natural and 
desirable (p. 64). The next White Paper was the 
first to directly discuss immigration policy. In this 
paper the government wanted to continue its lib-
eral immigration policy, but in combination with 
immigration control. The argument for this con-
trol was that Norway was too small to absorb too 
many immigrants without the usual subsequent 
social problems. The White Paper from 1975-76 
went further and introduced a temporary halt on 
immigration for unqualified workers, which was 
made permanent from 1981. The objective was 
that immigration should not exceed the possi-
bilities for securing acceptable living conditions 
for immigrants to Norway. The Agency for Im-
migrant Housing (state level) was established in 
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1976 to try and solve the immigrants’ housing 
problems. The Agency for Refugee Housing was 
established a few years later in 1979. 
4.1.1. Integration and policy development
The White Paper that introduced the halt on im-
migration in 1975 also debated integration. Ac-
cording to this paper, it was up to the immigrants 
to decide in what way they wanted to connect 
to Norwegian society (p. 6). Immigrants could 
choose between being assimilated into the na-
tional population, be more loosely integrated or 
leave the country. It was emphasised that the in-
tegration path implied that immigrants should be 
able to maintain and develop their own culture 
and religion in Norway. In fact, that was the in-
troduction of multiculturalism in Norway. The 
first White Paper focusing primarily on integra-
tion policy was not launched until 1996 and was 
labelled “About immigration and the multicultur-
al society”. In this report, integration policy was 
defined as the objectives and measures aimed at 
encouraging integration and participation in the 
multicultural society. These intentions should be 
embedded in all policy areas and should include 
the whole population (p. 10). The main objec-
tive in the policy was that everybody, regardless 
of background, should have the same rights and 
duties to participate in society and have the pos-
sibility to use their competencies (p. 8). A mul-
ticultural society was defined by its cultural di-
versity. The concept was interpreted to include 
an active acceptance and adaption of greater di-
versity as it concerned values, expressions, views 
and ways of life. Receiving an education in one’s 
mother tongue has been a tool for maintaining 
identity and diversity. According to the law on 
education, pupils with a mother tongue other than 
Norwegian have a right to a special education 
in Norwegian, and if necessary, an education in 
their first language as well (Ministry of Edu-
cation and Research). How this is practised in 
the municipalities varies. In 2005, the city of 
Oslo closed down special education in Norwe-
gian. The result was that only 6 per cent of the 
pupils were educated in their mother tongue in 
2010.2329The argument for concentrating on the 
training in the Norwegian language was simple: 
all pupils shall learn Norwegian. It is expected 
that all children should be able to follow ordi-
nary teaching in Norwegian. 
The second White Paper on integration from 
2003 expressed a more nuanced view on inte-
gration and diversity. The message was that the 
integration policy should be directed to integrate 
immigrants (first generation) into society, while 
the policy for diversity includes all people liv-
ing in Norway. The message behind this was that 
descendants who are born in Norway are not in 
the target group for the integration policy, but 
for the policies on inclusion, as they are part of 
a diverse society. The concept of a diverse Nor-
wegian society underscores that there are and 
should be many (accepted) ways to be and de-
velop as a Norwegian.
An important dilemma in a multicultural and 
diverse Norwegian society is the border between 
support for ethnic groups, religious societies, etc. 
versus support for individuals’ rights to go their 
own way, which stands in opposition to tradi-
tions within the ethnic communities. In 2010, the 
dominant understanding in mainstream society is 
that traditions and practises in ethnic communi-
ties and families should not override the individ-
ual right to choose one’s own life. This includes 
violations such as circumcision and forced mar-
riages, but also the right to decide on education, 
career and way of life. There are dividing lines 
in the debates taking place in relation to an un-
23 City of Oslo, Department for Culture and Education, 
case document 201002757-3. July 8, 2010. In 2010, 
there were 20,000 pupils with minority backgrounds 
in primary school in Oslo. 
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derstanding of equality, from the former “being 
alike” to “equal opportunities” to “adapted op-
portunities to be able to reach similar results if 
desired”. In the last White Paper (2003-2004), 
it is emphasised that the government is working 
for an equality which is understood as putting 
an equal value on people with different back-
grounds and not an equality understood as sim-
ilarity. Since the 1970s the climate in the policy 
debates has changed from emphasising assimi-
lation in ways of living to two-way integration 
and embracing a multicultural society to diver-
sity in everyday life connected with assimilation 
to core values in society. The aftermath of 9/11 
has given fuel to distancing the Muslim popula-
tion and including all immigrants in the Muslim 
category. As a result, there is more public/media 
pressure to motivate visible ethnic minorities to 
assimilate to core values, ways of living and ways 
of looking in public life (Report to the Storting 
no. 49 (2003-2004): 62; Aften October 6, 2010).
During the 40 ˗  50 years of immigration, im-
migration and integration policies have been in-
termingled, contested and debated by those who 
oppose it and those in favour of it. In 2010, the 
government’s policy on integration and inclusion 
builds on equality, solidarity and justice. Every-
body should have the same rights and duties to 
contribute and participate in the work society. To 
succeed with integration, the government claims 
that the immigration policy has to be controlled 
and restricted. That control includes the asylum 
policy, as well as the policy for family reunifica-
tion, marriage to foreigners, visas, foreign work-
ers, etc. Immigration rules for workers from the 
EU are regulated by the EEA agreement. The aim 
of integration and inclusion is that you should 
not be able to tell an individual’s ethnic origin 
from their socioeconomic status. To be able to 
include all immigrants and their descendants in 
the universal welfare system, it is believed that 
the input (volume of immigrants) has to be lim-
ited for society to be able to absorb the immi-
grant population into the labour market, which 
is the cornerstone of the welfare state. The ar-
gument is roughly the same in 2010 as it was 
in the 1970s, although the volume has increased 
almost 10 times.2430As immigration and ethnic 
residential segregation in the metropolitan area 
has increased, the question of social cohesion has 
become more urgent. The anxiety for and fear 
of parallel societies has given rise to a demand 
for policies that could handle these questions.
The responsibility for these policy areas has 
changed over the years. In 2010, immigration 
policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Justice and the Police with the Directorate of 
Immigration. The Ministry of Children, Equal-
ity and Social Inclusion is responsible for inte-
gration together with the Directorate of Integra-
tion and Diversity.
4.2.  Integration and 
inclusion ˗ interconnected 
but separate policy fields
As mentioned above, the integration policy has 
become more comprehensive over the years, and 
can be characterised by two main tracks ˗  integra-
tion and inclusion. The first is for the integration 
of newcomers. The second is about the inclusion 
of everybody in society, be they the elderly, dis-
abled persons or ethnic minorities. Descendants 
are part of the inclusion policy, which is about 
how to make society work for all in a society 
characterised by diversity. This statement is fol-
lowed by a more concise use of the concepts. In 
new political documents, descendants in Norway 
are not labelled as immigrants, but as part of the 
24 The 47,405 immigrants in Norway on December 
31, 1975 increased to 489,273 by January 1, 2010. 
Immigrants from the other Nordic countries are 
excluded. The increase of immigrants from the other 
Nordic countries was only 2.5 during the same period, 
from 25,169 to 63,040 persons. 
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population with an immigrant background.2531In 
everyday speech, it is doubtful however that peo-
ple would know the difference. 
The integration policy covers:
 – Earmarked integration programmes and ac-
tivities mainly for newly settled refugees and 
their families. 
 – Activities to integrate marginalised groups 
such as illiterate groups, mostly non-work-
ing women.
The inclusion policy covers:
 – Laws, action plans, programmes and activi-
ties to adapt the ordinary society to a more 
diversified population. For example, public 
services, equal access to housing and the job 
market, etc. And vice versa, policies to adapt 
and include all residents to the existing con-
ditions in Norway. 
 – Access to and adaption of ordinary welfare 
services and benefits for people with a le-
gal stay. 
While the immigration policy covers all im-
migrants, the primary focus of the earmarked in-
tegration policy is for refugees and their fami-
lies, while the inclusion policy should include all. 
However, few activities are directed towards la-
bour immigrants. This is the fact, even though the 
share of immigrants with refugee backgrounds 
is decreasing compared to labour immigrants. In 
2008, the share of new immigrants with a ref-
ugee background was only 10 per cent (Østby 
October 12, 2010, speech in Rommen school).2632 
4.2.1.  Integration policies
As mentioned above, the integration policy has 
been developed to target newly arriving refugees. 
The relevant policy areas for the housing condi-
25  Statistics Norway uses Norwegian born with immigrant 
parents. 
26 Østby is the senior researcher on immigration at 
Statistics Norway.
tions of refugees are the asylum policy, the set-
tlement policy, the policy for the integration of 
refugees into the labour market and the policy 
for residence permits. 
Asylum policy
The asylum policy is part of the immigration pol-
icy. Nonetheless, the special character of the life 
situation and prospects of asylum seekers draw 
one’s attention towards integration. The expecta-
tions of the asylum seekers are to obtain permis-
sion to stay. In 2009, 42 per cent of the asylum 
seekers received this permission (Directorate of 
Immigration 2010a).
To support the life situation of the asylum 
seekers staying in reception centres, they receive 
training to ease their integration into society if 
they get permission to stay. Even so, language 
training (250 hours) and the possibility of work 
for asylum seekers has been on and off over the 
years. In 2010, language training and informa-
tion programmes about core values in society and 
how to live in Norway are mandatory. The 10 per 
cent of asylum seekers with a known identity can 
apply for work. Only those living in the recep-
tion centres are eligible for economic and other 
kinds of support. In 2009, about 50 per cent of 
asylum seekers lived in reception centres organ-
ised in ordinary housing in ordinary neighbour-
hoods (Søholt and Holm, 2009). The objective 
of this policy is manifold. Apart from allowing 
the possibility for a more normal life, one inten-
tion is to build capacity for living in and taking 
care of a “Norwegian” housing situation, in ad-
dition to the experience of local participation. 
The government’s ambition is that the stay in 
the asylum reception centres should be as short 
as possible. In 2009, the average length of stay 
was 12 months (median). 
National immigration and integration pol-
icies meet the municipal integration policy 
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through the asylum reception centres. The cen-
tres are located all over Norway in both urban 
and rural areas, with the location being decided 
through bids in the market. The growth and de-
cline of reception centres are totally connected to 
the arrival of asylum seekers, as the municipali-
ties have little influence on their establishment 
and location. On the contrary, they have to offer 
health and school services to the asylum seekers, 
for which they get economic compensation from 
the state. The money is not ticketed. 
Settlement policies
Refugees are free to settle where they want if 
they can support themselves and find housing. 
If not, they are settled in a municipality after an 
agreement between state and local authorities. 
Until 2010, refugees have not been encouraged 
to find housing by themselves as part of the set-
tling procedure. The municipalities have little 
influence on the location of the reception cen-
tres, but they have sovereignty when it comes 
to the settlement of refugees, which has always 
been and still is voluntary for the municipalities. 
The municipalities receive economic compensa-
tion for five years as motivation for settling the 
needed number of refugees. The money is not 
ticketed, but after 2004 settlement is followed by 
an obligation to offer introduction programmes 
to the refugees. 
Until the beginning of the 1990s, most of the 
refugees were settled in southern Norway, from 
Trøndelag County and southwards. The increase 
in refugees following the war in Bosnia-Herze-
govina contributed to a need for more housing. 
From that point on, refugees could be settled all 
over Norway in all municipalities.
The system for settling refugees was changed 
in 2001 (Ministry of Local Affairs 2000). The 
background for this was a stable lag between 
the need for and the actual settlement, with too 
many refugees waiting too long in the reception 
centres for a new home. The objectives with the 
changes were to ease the settlement process, to 
motivate and support the municipalities to take 
on this job and to lay the groundwork for a sta-
ble and swift settlement practise. One strategy 
was the establishment of a national committee 
(state and municipalities), which should decide 
on next year’s need for settlement and distribute 
the relevant number of refugees among the vari-
ous counties. On the county level, the regional 
office of the Directorate of Immigration, together 
with The Norwegian Association for Local and 
Regional Authorities, is responsible for a pro-
posal of distribution of the refugees to the mu-
nicipalities. The criteria for distribution between 
counties and municipalities should be popula-
tion, the refugees’ wishes of where to live, ex-
periences with settlement and conditions in the 
labour market. Another strategy was to target 
the settlement around 20 central areas in all the 
regions of Norway. The ambition was to reduce 
refugees’ further mobility to central areas, build 
liveable ethnic communities and spread the pre-
sumed settlement burden to more municipalities.
The table 31 shows the number of munici-
palities that have settled refugees over a 10-year 
period. The number of settled refugees varies 
due to the arrival of asylum seekers, number of 
granted residence permits and local conditions. 
The main strategy for settling refugees has been 
to try to find them accommodation in the same 
region where they stayed in the asylum centres. 
The sprawl of the reception centres has contrib-
uted to a widespread settlement. Of the approxi-
mately 430 municipalities in Norway, the num-
ber of municipalities which have agreed to settle 
refugees has varied between 158 in 1993 to 280 
in 1994, whereas the number of settled refugees 
varied between 2 513 (1996) and 11 628 (1994). 
A later study which included the years from 1997 
to 2007 documented that between 205 and 314 
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municipalities have accepted the request to set-
tle refugees every year (Steen, 2008). In 2010, 
325 municipalities were asked to settle refugees, 
while only 255 had accepted before the end of 
June (Directorate of Integration and Diversity 
2010). The ups and downs in the number of re-
quests for the housing of refugees varies with the 
increase and decrease of asylum seekers. About 
10 per cent of the municipalities rejected the of-
fer to settle refugees, while the same amount 
were never asked, mainly because the munici-
palities were too small and geographically iso-
lated (Steen 2008). The experience so far is that 
in years with a high request for settlement, the 
municipalities are reluctant to accept to settle all 
of them. But nevertheless, they usually succeed 
in settling more refugees than in previous years 
(Steen 2008; Søholt and Holm 2010). 
Even though there are ambitions that the ref-
ugees should be able to exert some influence on 
where they are settled, it has proven that this prin-
ciple has been overruled in times in which there is 
a mismatch between the need for and the supply 
of housing. In practise, it is probably more ac-
curate to say that the asylum seekers who obtain 
permission to stay are settled in a municipality 
based on the principle of “no or little choice”. In 
a report to the Storting, there were worries that 
there was a tendency among the municipalities to 
pick the refugees they wanted to settle (Ministry 
of Local Affairs 2000 ˗ 2001). The result is that 
refugees who are assessed as being troublesome 
have to wait longer in the reception centres. The 
reluctance to settle refugees might be connected 
to the municipalities’ obligations to offer intro-
duction programmes, interpretation and health 
services, as well as school and kindergarten to 
refugee children. 
Integration programme
The Introductory Act came into effect in 2003. 
The law requires the municipalities to provide 
introduction programmes for various groups of 
new arrivals. Newly arrived and settled refugees 
who are outside the labour market have the right 
and obligation to participate in an individually 
tailored qualification programme on a full-time 
basis for two years, with a total of 2,700 hours. 
Participation is linked to payment of a specific 
benefit which is treated as salary and not as a 
social allowance. Once in the programme, the 
refugees also have rights to housing allowances 
and other welfare arrangements if needed. The 
programme works when it comes to capacity 
and competence building for the labour market 
or further education. Figures from 2008 showed 
that 53 per cent of the participants who finished 
their programme in 2008 transitioned to work 
or education (Directorate of Integration and Di-
versity 2008). Statistics Norway’s annual moni-
toring of refugees one year after completing the 
programme revealed that 65 per cent of the refu-
gees who left the programme in 2006 were in-
volved work or education in 2007. The intro-
duction programme seems to take good care of 
newly arrived refugees and their families. Since 
the introduction programme came into existence, 
the centralisation of refugees has slowed down 
Year Municipalities Refugees 
1990 268 4 531
1991 191 3 907
1992 167 3 564
1993 158 3 049
1994 280 11 628
1995 255 5 489
1996 203 2 513
1997 174 2 594
1998 189 3 046
1999 253 6 738
2000 266 4 446
Table 31. Settlement practise 1990 ˗2000. 
Number of municipalities and number of settled 
refugees (Source: Report to the Storting no. 17, 
2000-2001). 
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(Høydahl 2009). If the refugees move from their 
first municipality, they lose the right to partici-
pate in an introduction programme.
However, other immigrants with poor lan-
guage competency, a poor education background 
and no or only a limited relation to the labour 
market are not in the target group for the inte-
gration programme, although there are special 
programmes for women with low language skills 
in Norwegian and no work experience. These 
programmes are not obligatory, and one has to 
apply to attend. 
Residence permit
Once they are let into the country, all types of 
regular immigrants can acquire a permanent resi-
dence permit after three years with valid provi-
sional residence or a labour permit. Asylum seek-
ers who receive permission to stay can ask for a 
permanent permit after the provisional three-year 
residence permit. 
Does the integration policy have any 
impact on the housing and settlement 
pattern among the refugees?
The various aspects of the integration policy tar-
geted at refugees seem to contribute to help adapt 
the refugees to the Norwegian housing market. 
The settling policy, together with the introduc-
tory programme, has been proven to keep refu-
gees in the districts and slow their trying to move 
to more central areas. The obligatory participa-
tion in the introductory programmes push refu-
gees into education or work activities, something 
which underpins an independent housing career 
over time. The integration policy is targeted at 
refugees, though very little includes the labour 
immigrants who form the majority of the immi-
grants. There has been little effort expended to 
obtain any knowledge of their living and hous-
ing conditions. 
4.2.2.  Inclusion policy
The policy for inclusion is about democracy, 
equal rights and possibilities for all people in 
society. It is about making diversity work, in 
which people with different cultural and religious 
backgrounds become included in society under 
equal conditions in the housing market, in the 
neighbourhood, in the housing cooperative, in 
the education system, in the labour market, etc. 
The question is whether these types of policies 
have any impact on ethnic residential segrega-
tion/desegregation or contribute to levelling out 
ethnic differences in housing conditions. 
Citizenship and naturalisation
The main rule for attaining Norwegian citizen-
ship for immigrants is in connection to the prin-
ciple of jus soli (right of the soil). This implies 
that first and foremost the rights of the appli-
cants are connected to territorial stay and not to 
ancestral or family ties (jus sanguinis: the right 
of blood). There are a set of demands to attain 
citizenship. The applicants must document their 
identity, be at least 18 years old, live in Norway, 
have stayed in Norway for at least 7 out of the 
last 10 years, have an unblemished record and 
been able to end former citizenship if possible. 
For reasons of national belonging, Norway does 
not accept dual citizenship. As of 2008, there 
Table 32. New citizenship by region. 1977˗2009. Per cent. N=224,619 (Source: Statistics Norway).
Nordic and other 
Western countries
Eastern 
Europe
Africa, Asia with 
Turkey, Latin 
America
Total
13 18 69 100
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have been new requirements added in relation 
to acquiring some knowledge of the Norwegian 
language and society, either by documentation of 
training or by tests. In 2009, roughly 50 per cent 
of the approximately 11,000 new citizens had ar-
rived for reasons of family reunification. Over 
the last few years, the Iraqis and Somalis have 
formed the largest national groups (Directorate 
of Immigration 2010a). From 1977˗2009, about 
225,000 individuals have attained Norwegian cit-
izenship (table 32).2733The majority of them have 
originated from Africa, Asia with Turkey and 
Latin America.
To contribute to the new citizens’ inclusion 
in and belonging to Norwegian society, a vol-
untary ceremony/ritual was offered from 2006, 
which is in line with the new law on citizenship. 
When it comes to children born in Norway 
with immigrant parents, the principle of jus san-
guinis overrides the principle of jus soli. To be-
come a Norwegian citizen, the mother or the fa-
ther of the child needs to have Norwegian citi-
zenship. If not, a child born in Norway has to 
wait until the age of 18 to apply for citizenship. 
This was problematised in a public meeting in 
the most segregated suburb of Oslo in October 
2010.2834Young immigrants said that because nei-
ther of their parents had achieved Norwegian 
citizenship because of irregularities with immi-
gration law or the police, the children were being 
punished. The lack of Norwegian citizenship had 
consequences for their daily life. For example, 
they could not take part in tours abroad with their 
school because they lacked a valid passport. They 
wanted to integrate, they spoke the language, 
they were active in education, but they felt they 
27  http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/02/statsborger/tab-2010-
05-27-03.html. Statistics Norway.
28  The Ministry for Children, Equality and Social 
Inclusion was invited to a public meeting in which the 
intention was to listen to what people in the suburbs 
thought was good about living in these areas and what 
could be improved. The framework for the meeting was 
integration. 
were not being fully let into Norwegian society. 
A former study of immigrants’ residential 
patterns in Oslo showed that “naturalised” immi-
grants, those with Norwegian citizenship, tended 
to choose housing careers other than those cho-
sen with foreign citizenship. These “naturalised” 
immigrants were more reluctant to move to the 
suburbs, where they could become homeown-
ers at a modest price (Blom 2002). Since many 
did follow this track, more and more immigrants 
have settled here. As a result, these suburbs have 
become the most immigrant dense city districts 
in Oslo and Norway. 
Political rights 
Norwegian citizenship gives the eligibility to 
vote in the national elections. In elections on the 
local level, the main requirements are a registered 
residency for the last three years. Nordic citizens 
can vote as long as they register before the end 
of June in the year of the election. The interest in 
voting is lower among the immigrant population 
than among ethnic Norwegians. In the last elec-
tion for Parliament in 2009, 52 per cent of immi-
grants (with the right to vote) voted, compared to 
76 per cent of all possible voters.2935Immigrants 
with Norwegian citizenship participate more of-
ten in local elections than immigrants with for-
eign citizenship. In the local elections in 2007, 
37 per cent of immigrants with Norwegian citi-
zenship voted, compared to 28 per cent among 
those without citizenship (Bergh, Bjørklund and 
Aalandslid 2008). 
Rights to welfare
All people with a legal stay in Norway are en-
titled to social and welfare benefits. People in 
need can apply for social economic support ac-
29  http://www.ssb.no/emner/00/01/10/vindinnv/main.
html.
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cording to the Norwegian Act relating to social 
services. The amount of sick pay and unemploy-
ment benefits is dependent on the individual’s 
salary and previous contribution in the regular 
labour market. Regardless of whether they have 
citizenship, legal residents receive universal ben-
efits that are not needs tested such as child and 
cash benefits for parents who stay at home with 
children under three years of age. Day care is 
open for all under the same conditions, and ob-
ligatory school is free for all children, even those 
without a legal stay. 
According to the Immigration Act, illegal 
residents are entitled to emergency aid until the 
concerned person leaves the country. 
Support to ethnic and religious communities
Economic support to ethnic and religious organi-
sations is a way to implement the political vision 
that the ethnic minority population should be able 
to maintain and develop their culture and reli-
gion in Norway and to ease their social partici-
pation in society. There are various possibilities 
for economic support from the national and local 
level. The objectives for national support to lo-
cal immigrant organisations are to increase im-
migrants’ access to widespread social networks 
and to improve immigrants’ capabilities to voice 
their interests toward local authorities. The city 
of Oslo has developed its own policy on diver-
sity and integration. This policy includes support 
to ethnic minority organisations and comprehen-
sive work in the municipality to develop Oslo as 
an open, inclusive city which is free from racism 
and discrimination. Oslo is a pilot city in the Eu-
ropean development programme: “Intercultural 
Cities ˗ Governance and Policies.”
When it comes to religious organisations 
and communities, they can apply for econom-
ic support as long as they have more than 500 
members. The support is per capita. In 2010, the 
amount was a little less than 50 Euros per capita. 
Laws against discrimination
Norway passed its law against discrimination in 
2005, with the intent to prevent indirect and di-
rect discrimination in all areas of society. The law 
prohibits discrimination because of ethnicity, na-
tional origin, descent, colour, language, religion 
and philosophy of life. The year before, the three 
housing laws were amended to include articles 
against discrimination when applying for a home 
and as a reason for dismissal. The most impor-
tant impact of these laws is probably the signal 
that discrimination is illegal and that all people 
in Norway should be treated equally regardless 
of origin, etc. For the individual, the law makes 
it possible to protest against unequal treatment, 
though there has been much discussion as far as 
how easy this is to prove in court. 
Housing: From tailored to mainstream policies 
A lack of housing was one of the main arguments 
behind the halt on immigration in 1975. Still, the 
halt did not solve the problem. When the labour 
immigrants wanted to bring their wives and es-
tablish their families here, a condition for family 
reunification was obtaining a decent home be-
forehand. In the 1970s, the Ministry for Local 
Affairs granted NOK 4 million to the city of Oslo 
for special housing for the immigrants. In 1976, 
just after the immigration halt, the state agency 
for Immigrant Housing (Sibo) was established. 
The objective was not to produce ticketed hous-
ing to immigrants, but to improve their housing 
conditions and ease their access to the ordinary 
housing market. Sibo worked with municipalities 
and housing associations to help include immi-
grants in their ordinary work and to inform im-
migrants about conditions in the housing market. 
Another strategy was to buy old blocks of rental 
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flats in the centre of Oslo, which were undergo-
ing extensive urban renewal. SIBO renewed the 
buildings and all the tenants, including those with 
an immigrant background received an improved 
housing standard and the possibility of buying 
their flat, which was organised in a housing coop-
erative. Another strategy was to build new hous-
ing, preferably in areas with a low density of im-
migrants. A maximum of half of the flats were 
offered to immigrants on the condition that they 
became members of the actual housing associa-
tion running the housing cooperative. The rest 
of the flats were distributed to members in the 
housing association who were willing to trade 
their existing flat for a new one. The traded flats 
anywhere in Oslo, whether they were rented or 
owned, were then distributed to the immigrants. 
A third strategy was to offer loans or grants for 
loans to make it possible for immigrants to buy a 
home. As the agency worked to obtain dwellings 
all over Oslo, their activity contributed somewhat 
to help desegregate the immigrant population in 
the city (Blom 2001). 
While SIBO did not subsidise the rent for la-
bour immigrants, the twin agency for refugees, 
which was established in 1979, had another poli-
cy. The refugees received far better housing with-
out having to pay the actual costs. While the 
refugees were cared for in many different ways, 
the labour immigrants had to take care of them-
selves. The two agencies were merged in 1988 
and closed down in 1992. After the merger, the 
new company focused on obtaining work for 
settling refugees. There was no special policy 
to monitor the housing careers of former labour 
immigrants and their families. 
When the Agency for Immigrant and Refu-
gee Housing was closed down in 1992 after 12 
years of activity, about 6,700 households had 
received help in becoming homeowners. In ad-
dition, NOK 47.5 million was granted for in-
dividual housing loans through an agreement 
with a private bank. The Ministry of Local Af-
fairs emphasised the importance of a continuing 
concern for immigrants’ integration into hous-
ing and neighbourhoods (Report to the Storting 
no. 50 (1991-92):4). It was argued that hous-
ing and neighbourhoods were important ways 
to integrate immigrants in times with increas-
ing unemployment. With the closing of Sibo, 
the housing policy for ethnic minorities changed 
from tailor-made to mainstream. The exception 
was the municipalities’ responsibility for the first 
settlement of refugees. Apart from that, ethnic 
minorities are treated as any other citizen. They 
can ask for help with housing if they are in dif-
ficulty. If not, they have to manage the housing 
market by themselves. 
To prevent the exclusion and marginalisation 
of ethnic minorities in the housing market, the 
ongoing Action Plan for Inclusion (Ministry of 
Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, 2010) 
has measures and indicators to monitor the hous-
ing conditions of ethnic minorities. The indica-
tors are the share of immigrant households or de-
scendants who receive housing allowance or are 
homeless. Since 2006, immigrants constitute an 
increasing part of households receiving a hous-
ing allowance (from 21 (2006) to 39 per cent 
(2009)). Very few descendants receive a housing 
allowance. In the same period, their share con-
stituted an increase from 0.2 (2006) to 0.6 per 
cent (2009). The output of the indicator can be 
interpreted in two ways. The immediate interpre-
tation is that the share of immigrant households 
with a mismatch between income and housing 
costs is increasing. This is in line with the gen-
eral increase in the mismatch between the devel-
opment of income and housing prices (see Ch. 
2). Moreover, the indicators support the knowl-
edge that immigrants have lower incomes than 
the majority and face a higher risk for persis-
tent poverty (Bhuller and Aaberge, 2010). The 
other interpretation is that the widespread use 
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of housing allowances shows that immigrants 
know about the possibilities for economic sup-
port to cover their housing costs and that they in 
fact do apply for such support. This implies that 
immigrants are included in the welfare system 
and that the conditions for the housing allow-
ance fit the economic housing conditions among 
the immigrant population. The conditions for the 
housing allowance have been changed over the 
last few years. Today, the intention is to meet 
the needs of poor people’s housing conditions. 
Before the change, the amount of receivers of 
the minimum (state) pension and single parents 
was overrepresented. 
When it comes to homelessness, the share of 
homeless people born outside Europe and other 
Western countries has been stable since 1996 at 
approximately 13 per cent. The actual number 
of homeless people has also been stable at about 
6,000. This implies that the majority of the in-
creasing number of immigrants is finding their 
way into the housing market.
Urban policies
Since the 1990s, both Oslo and some other towns 
have initiated urban area programmes in neigh-
bourhoods with a high concentration of residents 
with ethnic minority backgrounds. The intention 
has been to improve the general level of living 
and underpin the processes for social cohesion. 
The area programmes in the suburbs of Oslo are 
comprehensive and have a 10-year perspective 
(see also Ch. 2). While the policy focused on 
the immigrants’ living conditions in connection 
to housing in the 1970s, the focus has shifted to 
living conditions and the social effects of eth-
nic residential segregation at the beginning of 
the 21st century. In the 1970s, the policy means 
were mostly physical. In 2000, the problem is 
defined as segregation and possible parallel so-
cieties. Both the type of policy and policy means 
that may reduce unwanted segregation and sup-
port social cohesion across ethnic background are 
much more diffuse and uncertain than a mere 
physical upgrading of neighbourhoods. 
Indicators
The government has worked out a set of indica-
tors to follow how inhabitants with an immigrant 
background perform in the Norwegian society 
(Proposition to the Storting no. 1 2010-2011). 
The indicators are: participation in the labour 
market and level of income, education, child 
care language, health and care, police, proba-
tion and justice, elections, housing, culture and 
media, and the state as employer (in a multieth-
nic society). 
Does the policy for inclusion have any 
possible impact for housing and settlement 
patterns among the immigrant population?
All legal immigrants and their descendants are 
included in general welfare arrangements. Only 
unemployment and sick pay are dependent on 
their former participation in the labour market. 
Immigrants and ethnic minorities are encouraged 
to take part in local elections after a three-year 
stay, regardless of citizenship. Whether society’s 
formal arrangements for inclusion and anti-dis-
crimination have had an impact on ethnic mi-
norities’ ambitions and activities in the housing 
market is uncertain. But it certainly helps that 
they are supported economically if they cannot 
provide for themselves. However, register stud-
ies have proven that naturalisation corresponds 
with homeownership and moving patterns to ar-
eas with modest prices. Naturalisation is an indi-
vidual decision about establishment and settling 
down that has been followed by efforts to be 
part of and invest in the ordinary housing mar-
ket. Today, there are no special arrangements for 
helping ethnic minorities in the housing market, 
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and they have to cope just like everybody else. 
When in need, they are met with the same criteria 
for municipal help as others with problems. Yet, 
since there are more poor people among the im-
migrant population and because they more often 
face discrimination, they are overrepresented in 
municipal housing (see Ch. 2). The urban area 
policies have been directed towards improving 
the immigrant dense areas. Except for the for-
mer state agency which helped to improve the 
immigrants’ housing situation, there has been no 
or only a limited urban or housing policy with 
the means to change the pattern of segregation. 
4.3.  conclusion
This chapter has focused on policies of integra-
tion and inclusion. In the first part, the develop-
ment of these policy areas is discussed. In the 
next part, some subareas with integration and in-
clusion policies are presented. The intention is to 
highlight the possible impact on ethnic minori-
ties’ housing conditions and patterns. 
The aim with the introduction of the policy 
areas has been to focus on the development of 
this policy and to present important changes and 
dilemmas. In the case of Norway, the immigra-
tion and integration policy was handled in the 
same manner as when the new labour immigra-
tion wave started in the late 1960s. The charac-
ter of the integration policy was coloured by the 
problems encountered following the immigra-
tion. From the beginning, the main problem has 
been housing and the related living conditions. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the state ran a special 
agency for immigrant and refugee housing. From 
the beginning of the 1990s, the housing prob-
lems following immigration were embedded in 
the general work of the municipalities for house-
holds with housing difficulties. As time went by, 
the immigration/integration policy was divided 
into three policies with different responsible min-
istries: the immigration control policy, the poli-
cy for labour immigrants and the policy for the 
integration of refugees and the inclusion of all, 
including descendants, into a diverse society. 
The primary principle for integration and in-
clusion is that all residents with a legal stay shall 
have the same or equal rights, duties and pos-
sibilities as ethnic Norwegians. However, there 
have been three interconnected and non-ending 
debates following integration. First: Whether 
people with an ethnic minority background shall 
have the same rights, the necessary possibilities 
for achieving satisfactory results or the same re-
sults as the majority. Second: Whether to support 
ethnic and religious communities or individuals. 
Since the last White Paper in 2003-2004, the fo-
cus has been on the right of the individual with 
a minority background to choose his/her way of 
living and life career in opposition to family and 
ethnic traditions. Third: Whether the ambition of 
the integration and inclusion policy is assimila-
tion or integration. In 2010, it seems as if the 
policy is a mix between diversity in everyday 
life and a claim for assimilation to core values 
as a way to sustain the welfare state and under-
pin social cohesion across ethnic backgrounds. 
The subsequent parts of the chapter describe 
subareas in the integration and inclusion policy 
which might influence the housing conditions 
and careers of ethnic minorities. The question 
is whether conditions for asylum seekers and 
refugees lay paths which motivate an independ-
ent housing career. Moreover, whether the in-
clusion policy is inclusive enough to encourage 
ethnic minorities to move to and stay in ordinary 
neighbourhoods in terms of ethnic composition. 
In Norway in 2010, ethnic minorities’ housing 
conditions have become roughly the same as the 
majority, but the residential patterns differ. In the 
metropolitan and some other urban areas, the 
majority and ethnic minorities have developed 
segregated residential patterns. 
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5.  Migration flows and 
settlement patterns
Terje Wessel
We noted in chapter 4 that refugees and asylum 
seekers have been subjected to increasing settle-
ment regulations. These changes have affected 
the distribution of migrants within Norway, al-
though a pattern of urban concentrations remains. 
A significant breaking point occurred in the 
early 1980s, with the influx of refugees and the 
subsequent diffusion strategy. Labour migration 
in the 1970s was largely concentrated to the ma-
jor cities, and almost entirely to the southern/
eastern part of Norway. The various settlement 
policies, including the ‘whole nation strategy’, 
brought people of foreign descent to many small-
er communities. By the end of the 1990s, all mu-
nicipalities had at least some immigrants (Broch-
mann 2003). At this point, Norway experienced 
a massive centralization of the population. Young 
adults moved in vast numbers from peripheral re-
gions to the major urban areas, particularly Oslo, 
Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger, Kristiansand and 
Tromsø. Compulsory settled immigrants repre-
sented in this situation a demographic counter-
weight, although a minor one. 
The representation of the immigrant popu-
lation in Norwegian municipalities is shown in 
Figure 7, and some of the major changes in ta-
ble 33. The first measure is the well-known dis-
similarity index (the ‘D index’), which refers 
to the differential distribution of two population 
groups across geographical units, and which var-
ies from 0 (equal representation in all units) to 
100 (complete separation in geographical space). 
The two groups in this case are immigrants/de-
scendants3036and Norwegians. We further show 
the concentration of immigrants compared to-
30 The term ‘immigrants’ covers both groups in the 
remaining chapter.
the population as a whole. What we measure, 
to be precise, is the share of municipalities with 
a location quotient above 1 (i.e. a greater repre-
sentation of immigrants in the municipality than 
the representation of all inhabitants). The third 
measure is the share of immigrants with a resi-
dence in Oslo respectively the Oslo region. Fi-
nally, we also include the location quotient for 
these two entities.3137 
The 1980s were marked by a weak concen-
tration of immigrants. Moving to the 1990s, we 
note a more complicated pattern. In this decade, 
a general dispersal occurred outside the Oslo re-
gion. The Oslo region had a declining represen-
tation according to the location quotient, but not 
according to the share of immigrants. In other 
words: the growth of the immigrant population 
was weaker than the centralization/relocation 
of the majority population. Finally, a pattern of 
broad dispersion appeared during 2000-2010. 
Looking closer at the figures, several processes 
appear to converge in the same direction: first, a 
continuous centralization of the majority popu-
lation; second, a ‘spillover’ effect from existing 
immigrant clusters; third, a dispersal to mono-
ethnic majority communities; fourth, a growth 
of new immigrant clusters.
5.1.  Migration among refugees
Secondary migration, i.e. migration away from 
the first settlements, represents a major challenge 
in Norway. The peripheral regions have a homo-
geneous ethnic structure, a low density of people 
and a scarce set of opportunities and facilities. 
The natural environment is often harsh and bar-
ren, with cold climate and long dark winters. It 
is not surprising that people from the southern 
hemisphere choose to leave these places. One re-
31  The municipality division changed many times during 
1980-2010. All calculations are based on the 2010 
division, which included 430 municipalities.
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port (Seland Forgaard 2005), analyzing 1994 to 
2003, found that close to 50 per cent of all set-
tled refugees move from the settlement munici-
pality within five years (Table 34). This figure 
varied widely, from below 20 per cent in Oslo 
to around 90 per cent in Finnmark up north (Se-
land Forgaard 2006). Significantly, some later 
reports reveal a less dramatic picture. The level 
of mobility during the two first years is less than 
half of what it used to be, as we can see from 
table 34. Relatively more refugees move in the 
following years, but the net effect appears to be 
positive: there has been a marked stabilization 
of the refugee population. A relevant point here 
Figure 7. Representation of immigrants in Norwegian municipalities. 2008 (Daugstad 2008).
1980 1990 2000 2010
D index (between immigrants and Norwegians) 32,2 33,9 30,6 26
Share with a location quotient > 1 8,5 8,5 7,4 9,2
The municipality of Oslo: share of all immigrants 29,1 32,8 33,6 29,1
The Oslo region: share of all immigrants 41,8 45,2 45,3 41,8
The municipality of Oslo: location quotient 2,61 3,03 2,96 2,41
The Oslo region: location quotient 2,07 2,19 2,08 1,81
Table 33. Concentration/dispersal of immigrants in Norway 1980-2010. Based on municipalities 
(Statistics Norway, The internet bank).
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concerns the unsettled character of the group. 
Refugees tend to remain mobile many years af-
ter arrival in the host nation. Høydahl (2009), 
for instance, observes a mobility level around 
10 per cent four to seven years after settlement. 
Overall mobility in the majority population is, 
by comparison, 4 per cent.
The shift towards lower migration appears 
to be linked to the settlement reform. It is not 
a perfect timing between the reform (2003) and 
the first signs of stabilization (2001-2002), but 
this can be explained by a protracted political 
process: many municipalities introduced parts 
of the new programme or the whole programme 
before 2003 (Høydahl 2009). What is more dif-
ficult to assess is the impact of different policy 
instruments. One interesting detail here concerns 
the number of involved municipalities, which de-
clined from 370 in 2000 to 210 in 2007 (Hidle 
and Vangstad 2008). Fewer and larger settlement 
municipalities secure, on the one hand, a certain 
integration capacity at the local level, and, on the 
other hand, a larger basis for the creation of im-
migrant communities. Which counts most cannot 
be decided from migration statistics. 
Refugees are of course a diverse group of 
people. The level of mobility varies according 
to many factors, especially gender, family situ-
ation and national background. Single men are 
more mobile than single women, and both these 
groups are more mobile than couples with chil-
dren. National background is important in two 
senses. First, various groups have a different de-
mographic composition, which affects the level 
of mobility. Second, some groups are drawn to-
wards Oslo to a greater extent than others. Some 
figures for the 2003 cohort are suggestive: 49 per 
cent of those who moved in the Somali group 
ended up in Oslo (2008), compared to 41 per cent 
among Afghans, 19 per cent among Iraqis and 12 
per cent among Russians (Tsjetsjenians) (Høy-
dahl 2009). Previous research (Seland Forgaard 
2005) indicates that Bosnians, Serbs, Albanians 
(from Kosovo) and Iranians resemble Russians 
˗ a small proportion move from the settlement 
municipality to Oslo. 
5.2.  Migration in the entire 
immigrant population
Immigrants have, until recently, not been treated 
as a separate category in the national migration 
Table 34. Secondary migration among refugees, measured in relation to settlement muncipality. 
Cohorts. Per cent (Høydahl 2009).
Per cent who moved out of the settlement municipality
Cohorts Year of 
settlement
Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
1998 6 17 27 35 40 45
1999 7 17 30 42 48 53
2000 7 18 30 40 47 52
2001 7 16 26 33 39 45
2002 5 12 21 29 35 41
2003 5 8 15 23 31
2004 4 8 14 23
2005 5 6 13
2006 4 7
2007 4
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statistics. Current knowledge is therefore based 
on specific reports. 
Most of these reports show a centralizing pat-
tern of mobility. Vassenden (1997) found that Os-
lo received ten times more immigrants through 
internal mobility (net migration) than any other 
municipality during 1991 to 1995. The level of 
mobility varied a lot between groups, and so did 
the centralizing tendency. One particular group, 
Iranians, accounted for a substantial part of net 
migration to Oslo. Interestingly, this group ap-
pear to have changed its pattern of mobility (see 
previous section). Other groups (e.g. Pakistanis 
and Moroccans) had a preceding concentration 
to Oslo, and did not relocate to suburban mu-
nicipalities or other places in Norway. 
The attraction of Oslo is somewhat moder-
ated by Østby (2004). He shows that ‘non-refu-
gees’ (i.e. people who arrived as labour migrants, 
family members of labour migrants or students) 
tend to head directly for Oslo or remain in other 
municipalities. He also observes a declining lev-
el of secondary migration in this diverse group, 
comparing 1992 to 1997 and 1998 to 2003. 
Seland Forgaard (2006) uses the tradition-
al distinction between ‘western’ and ‘non-west-
ern immigrants’ (see chapter 2), comparing both 
groups with the Norwegian majority. Her results 
reveal a difference in mobility, which increases 
with geographical level (Figure 8). Non-western 
immigrants have (2005) a level of mobility which 
is 77 per cent above the Norwegian majority at 
the lowest level (municipalities), increasing to 
121 per cent at the highest level (parts of the 
country). She further emphasizes that immigrants 
follow the same migration routes as Norwegians. 
The main receiving counties are all located in the 
Eastern and Southern part of the country: Oslo, 
Akershus, Østfold, Buskerud and Vestfold. Im-
migrants are thus contributing to a more central-
ized pattern of settlement in Norway. Third, the 
Oslo region is a major destination for moving 
immigrants. This applies not only to the core 
municipality (Oslo), but also to the surrounding 
belt (Lørenskog, Skedsmo, Sørum, Gjerdrum, 
Ullensaker, Fet, Bærum and Asker). 
The report by Seland Forgaard covered only 
30 municipalities. Statistics Norway has now, 
since 2008, presented net migration for all im-
migrants and descendants. An outlook on this 
pattern (net migration) is given in Figure 9. It 
shows a distinctive zero-sum game between los-
Figure 8. Mobility among immigrants and Norwegians, 2005 (Seland Forgaard 2006, 
Table 1).
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ing and gaining municipalities. The Oslo region 
is definitely on the gaining side.
5.3.  Segregation of immigrants 
in the Oslo region
Oslo is characterized by a complex ethnic situa-
tion. Some places exhibit a wide range of cultural 
and social groups alongside tolerant and pro-di-
versity attitudes. Other places are rife with ten-
sions over demographic change and place iden-
tity. Then there is a large landscape of ‘host com-
munities’, marked by high social status and lib-
eral values, located largely in the western sub-
urban belt.
This geography impinges on ethnic segrega-
tion as a social issue: people in different parts 
of the city may see segregation, alternatively, as 
a key challenge and a non-issue. Some experi-
ence segregation on a daily basis; others take a 
detached and disinterested view of the matter. 
Much of the interplay between ethnic groups 
can also be seen in the context of economic 
change. The first wave of labour immigration 
coincided with a rapidly declining manufactur-
ing base and, subsequently, the emergence of 
an oil-driven service economy. Immigrants from 
third world countries were, almost without ex-
ception, integrated into low-skilled and unskilled 
segments of the labour market. Their location 
Figure 9. Net migration among immigrants. Municipalities 2009 (Statistics Norway and the Norwegian 
mapping Authority).
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in the city was determined partly by their eco-
nomic position, partly by their lack of hous-
ing rights 3238and partly by their status as single 
males. One particular place in the city, Oslo in-
ner east, soon crystallized as a hub for arriving 
migrants. This was a run-down working class 
area which had been deprived through decades 
of social filtering. The new ethnic settlements 
can thus be described in multiple terms as a re-
flection of occupational class, housing market 
position, ethnicity and gender. Moreover, much 
of the succeeding history concerns the relative 
attraction of Oslo inner east. We shall soon re-
turn to these details. Let us first look at a higher 
geographical level.
Table 35 presents segregation measures at the 
municipal level. The D index for all immigrants 
rose by 10 per centage points between 1980 and 
2000, largely through a process of centraliza-
tion, i.e. a concentration to the core municipal-
ity (Massey and Denton 1988). This was partly 
a compositional change, as Asian and African 
minority groups increased their share of the to-
tal immigrant population. Similar effects may 
account for part of the modest decline in the D 
index during 2000 to 2010. We suspect, however, 
that the latter change reflects a ‘real’ diffusion 
from the core municipality to the suburban belt. 
Our present data do not allow a breakdown on 
specific national groups, nor a review of popu-
32 Early on, immigrants were excluded from municipal 
housing. Very few had the opportunity to buy a flat in 
the co-operative sector. If they had the money, and if 
they headed for the major co-operative society (OBOS, 
they would anyhow have to wait their turn. The queue 
in the 1970s could be several years.
lation dynamics (i.e. mobility, fertility and mor-
tality). What we can say, at least, is that Oslo 
inner east has been replaced by Groruddalen as 
the major hub for minority settlement. Grorud-
dalen is a broad valley east and north of the in-
ner city. It consists of approximately 130,000 
inhabitants, distributed across numerous satellite 
towns. Most of the housing stock was built in the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, following a municipal 
plan from 1950. The area has a large proportion 
of owner-occupied flats (both co-operatives and 
condominiums) (Guttu et al. 2008). The technical 
standard is generally good, and has been modi-
fied through continuous investments. It is an area 
which, in short, offers a decent space standard, a 
rich recreational environment and, not the least, 
a share in the ‘property owning society’. Some 
sub-areas have a mixture of house types and at-
tract different social groups. Some other sub-
areas lack detached and semi-detached housing, 
which might contribute to out-mobility. There 
are also problems of overcrowding, despite a 
high proportion of spacious homes. Guttu et al. 
(2008) emphasize a set of relationships between 
immigrant background and overcrowding, child 
density and overcrowding, and low educational 
attainment and overcrowding. 
A glimpse into the changes is given in table 
36. This analysis is carried out at two geographi-
cal levels, first with 37 units and then with seven 
units. The first one consists of 15 townships in 
the core municipality (Oslo) and 22 municipali-
ties in the surrounding region (Akershus). It is a 
suitable division, although it does not capture the 
finer details of dispersal and clustering. Average 
Table 35. Segregation measures for the Oslo region 1980-2010. Municipalities/townships (Statistics 
Norway, The internet bank).
1980 1990 2000 2010
D index between immigrants and Norwegians 15.2 22.1 25.3 21.7
The municipality of Oslo: share of immigrants in the region 69.8 72.7 74.1 69.5
The municipality of Oslo. location quotient within the region 1.26 1.38 1.42 1.33
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population size of municipalities and townships 
in 2010 was 24,400 in Akershus and 38,800 in 
Oslo. The second division is based on more or 
less ‘natural’ morphological characteristics, us-
ing three radial divisions (the inner city, the in-
ner suburbs, the outer suburbs) and three sec-
tor-based divisions (west, east/north and south). 
We notice, in the first row, a fluctuating lev-
el of segregation between Norwegians and all 
immigrants. A dispersal occurred between 1995 
and 2000, and further between 2005 and 2010, 
whereas 2000 to 2005 was marked by concentra-
tion. The change between 2005 and 2010 is like-
ly to reflect a combination of refugee settlement 
and secondary migration from other regions. It 
follows logically that declining secondary migra-
tion is a plausible factor behind dispersal in later 
years. But to repeat, we also spot a redistribution 
of immigrants within the region. Oslo inner east 
has reduced its share of all immigrants since the 
late 1990s, in a period of growing population 
density (see the location quotient in table 36). 
A first stage of dispersal includes suburban dis-
tricts and townships within the municipality of 
Oslo (Groruddalen, Østensjø and Søndre Nord-
strand). A second stage appears to include ‘over-
spill areas’ north and east of Groruddalen. These 
areas (Romerike) experience a marked growth 
in the location quotient. Grorudalen, while still 
a major inflow area, has entered a more stable 
development. 
A remarkable feature in table 36 concerns the 
sinking proportion of immigrants in the western 
suburbs. This is a vast area, comprising 332,000 
inhabitants, and it remains a slightly isolated part 
of the city. It is a part of the region which holds the 
key to a further reduction in segregation levels. 
Ethnic segregation in the Oslo region has 
Table 36. Segregation measures for the Oslo region 1995-2010. Municipalities/townships and 
collections of municipalities/townships (Statistics Norway, The internet bank).
1995 2000 2005 2010
D index (all immigrants versus Norwegians) 28.9 26.8 30.0 27.6
Share of all immigrants:
Oslo inner east 22.0 20.3 16.8 15.9
Oslo inner west 8.8 8.1 7.3 7.9
Groruddalen 20.3 21.8 25.1 23.8
Østensjø and Søndre Nordstrand 11.0 12.0 12.5 11.2
Western suburbs/municipalities 23.8 22.3 20.5 20.8
Romerike 8.0 9.2 11.4 13.7
Follo 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.2
Location quotient: 
Oslo inner east 2.23 2.05 1.68 1.46
Oslo inner west 1.21 1.12 1.02 1.07
Groruddalen 1.64 1.8 2.11 2.05
Østensjø and Søndre Nordstrand 1.47 1.60 1.68 1.54
Western suburbs/municipalities 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.70
Romerike 0.38 0.44 0.55 0.63
Follo 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.55
Note: Western suburbs include four townships in Oslo (Nordre Aker, Vestre Aker, 
Ullern, Nordstrand) and two municipalities in Akershus (Bærum and Asker). A rest 
category of the immigrant population, approximately 0.4 per cent, is not counted. One 
part of this group lives in the core of the city; another part lacks a location address.
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not been thoroughly studied. Some data have 
been presented for a larger area, covering Oslo, 
Akershus and parts of the neighbouring coun-
ties Østfold, Buskerud and Vestfold (Pettersen 
2003). The remaining analyses have been re-
stricted to the municipality of Oslo or to sub-
areas within Oslo. 
Tables 37 and 38 are based on two studies 
by Svein Blom at Statistics Norway. Table 37 
reports changes in segregation measures for non-
western immigrants during 1988 to 2006 at the 
level of census tracts, which is the most refined 
division available. We note here a substantial 
growth in the D index between 1988 and 1998, 
and a stable situation between 1998 and 2006. 
A somewhat different index, the isolation index, 
grew throughout the whole period, but at a stag-
nating pace. Contrary to the D index, the isola-
tion index takes into account the relative size of 
the minority and majority populations. It shows, 
in statistical terms, the probability that members 
of a particular group (here: ‘non-western immi-
grants’) will meet members of the same group in 
their own census tract. It is obvious that this index 
has changed its path of growth: it is now only af-
fected by the size of the non-western population.
Table 37 looks at segregation across 92 sub-
areas. This division has recently been constructed 
by analysts in the municipality of Oslo. It is an 
attempt to differentiate between localised com-
Table 38. D index between minority groups and Norwegians in the municipality of Oslo, 1998 and 
2008. Based on 92 neighbourhoods (Source: Blom 2009).
Table 37. Segregation between non-western immigrants and Norwegians in the municipality of Oslo. 
Based on census tracts 
Share of 
population
Isolation 
index
D index
1988 6.5 13.0 38.5
1993 10.2 20.1 41.2
1998 13.0 25.7 43.7
2001 15.7 29.0 43.7
2003 16.9 30.4 43.1
2005 18.2 32.3 43.1
2006 18.9 33.2 43.0
Note: The number of census tracts changed in 1998, 
from 477 to 552.
Share Share
1998 2008 1998 2008
Non-western immigrants 38.3 36.4 13.0 20.6
Selected countries:
Pakistan 49.3 53.6 3.2 3.6
Somalia 47.1 44.3 0.6 1.7
Sri Lanka 57.3 64.1 0.7 1.3
Poland 23.4 20.8 0.3 1.2
Iraq 43.6 43.8 0.3 1.1
Turkey 48.7 51.0 0.8 1.0
Morocco 45.8 45.3 0.8 1.0
Vietnam 53.2 49.2 0.7 0.9
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munities or neighbourhoods, based on physical 
and social characteristics. The period of analysis 
is 1998 to 2008.
A weak tendency towards desegregation can 
be seen in these data. The non-western minority 
population has apparently spread over a larger 
part of the city. However, we also note that dif-
ferent minority groups have different patterns. 
Two of the largest groups, Pakistanis and Tamils, 
have become more segregated. Some other large 
groups, Somalis and people from Vietnam, have 
dispersed from their initial settlements. Yet other 
groups, e.g. Iraqis and Moroccans, have main-
tained a stable level of segregation.
The location quotient (i.e. the share in each 
sub-area divided by the share in the municipality) 
for 16 national and continental groups is shown 
in table 39. A key point, again, is the distinc-
tion between suburban and inner-city location. 
Some ‘old’ immigrant groups, such as the Pa-
kistanis, the Turks and the Indians, are greatly 
over-represented in eastern and southern suburbs 
(Groruddalen, Østensjø and Søndre Nordstrand). 
The same is true for several groups with a shorter 
immigrant history: the Tamils, the Afghans, the 
Iraqis, the Iranians, the Ethiopians and the Viet-
namese people. One recent group, the Somalis, 
differs notably. This group exhibits a more ‘tra-
ditional’ location pattern, with a high concentra-
tion in Oslo inner east. The main explanation 
is probably that they live in municipal housing, 
which are highly concentrated to Oslo inner east. 
Aalandsli (2009) has recently analysed im-
migrant settlement in the eastern and southern 
suburbs. He emphasizes that most groups have 
a long experience as immigrants in Norway. The 
proportion of immigrants with at least 15 years 
of residence is 33 per cent for the nation and 40 
Table 39. Concentration (location quotient) of minority groups. Districts in Oslo 2010 (Oslo 
municipality: population statistics).
Location quotient
Inner Inner Grorud- Western Østensjø,
Population east west dalen suburbs S. Nordstr.
Non-western immigrants 117514 1.08 0.49 1.87 0.36 1.33
Former Yugoslavia 8597 1.09 0.59 1.79 0.34 1.40
Rest of Eastern Europe 3076 1.05 1.36 0.81 0.94 0.97
Turkey 5991 0.73 0.31 2.50 0.16 1.46
Africa north of Sahara 7235 1.45 0.37 1.71 0.26 1.34
Ethiopia/Eritrea 3910 0.94 0.44 2.01 0.47 1.14
Somalia 11572 1.93 0.43 1.28 0.30 1.13
Rest of Africa south of Sahara 5949 1.10 0.68 1.58 0.54 1.17
Afghanistan 2514 1.03 0.36 2.47 0.24 0.82
Sri Lanka 7221 0.39 0.07 3.29 0.09 1.09
India 3684 0.66 0.72 1.85 0.39 1.73
Iraq 6837 1.34 0.29 1.94 0.28 1.16
Iran 5344 0.87 0.82 1.68 0.48 1.32
Pakistan 21203 0.77 0.09 2.26 0.15 2.01
Vietnam 5575 1.21 0.46 2.03 0.23 1.19
Rest of Asia 13579 1.06 0.84 1.35 0.76 1.00
South and Middle America 5227 1.34 1.30 1.14 0.56 0.85
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per cent for Oslo. Similar figures for Pakistan-
is, Turks and Vietnamese people in the eastern/
southern suburbs vary between 51 and 80 per 
cent (Table 40). This clearly indicates that many 
families have dispersed to new areas as part of 
a housing career. It fits conveniently with the 
evidence provided by Blom (2002), who stud-
ied immigrant settlement and mobility in great 
detail. He showed that non-western immigrants 
who moved from Oslo inner east to the satellite 
towns (i.e. the eastern/southern suburbs) were 
better off than some comparable groups (among 
them internal movers in the inner east). He thus 
depicted dispersal from initial settlements as a 
voluntary move, arising from housing needs and 
increasing expectations. It was not, as it were, a 
displacement from gentrifying areas (ibid). 
Blom was not able to utilize the housing sur-
vey of 2001. Without such data, he could on-
ly vaguely indicate the importance of housing 
tenure. Non-western immigrants were, he sug-
gested, moving from rental housing in the inner 
east to owner-occupied housing in the satellite 
towns. Norwegian households who made the 
same move were, by comparison, often home 
owners. This would explain a net economic dif-
ference: the latter group had a lower income than 
stayers and internal movers (within Oslo inner 
east). In other words: an upward move in the 
non-western population might correspond to a 
downward move in the Norwegian population. 
Such a pattern, if it proves to exist, clearly af-
fects the context of integration in Oslo.
Much of the prevailing evidence, including 
Blom’s research, highlights a classic relationship 
between relocation/dispersal and socio-econom-
ic status. To quote a UK study: “Migration gives 
spatial form to social stratification” (Simpson et 
al. 2008:168). Yet, the Oslo pattern also contains 
some peculiar features. One group, the Tamils, 
has become strongly segregated despite success-
ful integration into the labour market and the ed-
ucational system (see chapter 3). The Pakistani 
group has developed in Oslo over 40 years. It 
is spread over many districts and townships, but 
not the western part of the city. Only 1 per cent 
of the group lives in Oslo inner west! Iranians, 
by contrast, has a much higher representation in 
the western districts. Economic integration in this 
group appears to trigger a more profound dis-
persal throughout the inner and the outer zone. 
As a whole, the pattern clearly points beyond a 
pure economic rationale. The additional factors 
behind clustering/dispersal include cultural mo-
tives, urban experience, demographic behaviour 
(i.e. fertility/mortality) and, not the least, inter-
group relations. At present, there is not much 
knowledge about any of these factors.
Table 40. Share of the minority population in the eastern and southern suburbs with at least 15 years 
of residence in Norway. Selected groups (Aalandsli 2009).
Søndre
Bjerke Grorud Stovner Alna Nordstrand
Pakistan 51 58 63 61 66
Somalia 13 25 23 22 22
Turkey 49 49 51 64 63
Iran 50 45 43 55 68
Iraq 8 21 14 11 24
Morocco 48 55 - 67 59
Vietnam 69 70 69 80 78
Sri Lanka 51 44 58 53 -
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6.  conclusions
The objective of this country report is to contex-
tualise the national conditions for the immigra-
tion and integration of immigrants into Norway. 
This includes a description of the main traits of 
the Norwegian welfare state and to some degree 
the ideology behind it. To understand these con-
ditions, the special policies developed to con-
trol immigration and ease immigrants’ adaption 
to take part in society are discussed. The char-
acteristics and analysis of the migration flows 
into, out of and within Norway and the urban 
areas yields a picture of where immigrants and 
descendants find access to liveable conditions 
when settling in Norway. 
6.1. The solidarity principle 
˗ a cornerstone of the 
Norwegian welfare system
Historically, Norway is characterised by high 
income equality, low unemployment and wide-
ranging and inclusive welfare arrangements. If 
you are in need, you should get economic and 
other kinds of help or assistance from the pub-
lic sectors. This principle builds on mutual reci-
procity. It is only sustainable if all the members 
of society perform according to one’s means. 
The social welfare arrangements build on a com-
plex combination of public social insurance and 
redistribution. The redistribution policies have 
become more selective, for instance in housing 
policy, social services and elderly care. Norway 
nevertheless remains a state-dominated welfare 
nexus. A large part of the benefit system is de-
pendent on or attached to labour activity, and is 
difficult to alter. The union movement sees this 
system as a key historical achievement, and de-
fends it with unyielding force.
The union movement also played a major 
role during the downturn years in the 1990s. A 
contract (‘the solidarity alternative’) between la-
bour, capital and government brought Norway 
back on track, with low unemployment and great 
internal demand, within the span of five years. 
A combination of political commitment, mutual 
trust and economic resources facilitated this tra-
ditional approach. Today, there are signs of strain. 
Many of the growing industries, both consumer 
services and business services, have a low union 
density and a market-based approach to wage. 
This has made it difficult to maintain a low level 
of inequality. A redistribution in favour of rich in-
dividuals and families is particularly pronounced 
in the fast-changing Oslo region. Part of this re-
gion, the municipality of Oslo, faces a difficult 
poverty problem. Non-western families in par-
ticular are often locked into poverty for a long 
period of time. Much of the problem appears to 
lie in a weak relation to the labour market. 
All demographic groups in Norway are 
strongly encouraged to participate in waged 
work, as part of the ‘social insurance policy’. 
The patterning of gender in the labour market is, 
in this respect, a key concern. Female employ-
ment has been rising rapidly since the 1970s. 
A ‘male breadwinner’ model has thus been re-
placed by a ‘dual earner’ model. The majority of 
mothers continue to work after child-birth, often 
in full-time position. Their decision is supported 
by three welfare state arrangements: an inclusive 
system of child care, a generous maternal/pater-
nal leave system and a tax system based on joint 
taxation for spouses. The present gender order is, 
however, also marked by occupational segrega-
tion. Women are poorly represented in specific 
industries, for instance crafts industries and fi-
nance, and in upper-level positions.
Work and its institutions are important parts 
of the Norwegian integration context. This is 
partly an ideological issue, related to a deep-
seated work ethic. But it is also a practical is-
sue: many sorts of welfare statistics show that 
work ‘pays’.  
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6.2. Immigration to Norway
People have immigrated to Norway for hundreds 
of years.  A new immigration flow in the late 
1960s gained increasing strength over the follow-
ing decades. This flow was different for two rea-
sons: it brought people from distant continents, 
with different values and practices, and it had a 
larger volume than previous flows. Currently, 
immigrants and their offspring make up 11,4 per 
cent of the population. Approximately 51 per cent 
originate in Asia, Africa, Latin America or Tur-
key. East Europeans have increased their share 
to 25 per cent. 
There have been several shifts in the offi-
cial gateways to Norway. The first one appeared 
in the mid 1970s, when labour migration was 
succeeded by family reunifications. A new flow 
of refugees and asylum-seekers emerged in the 
1980s, and has continued in wax and wane ever 
since. The enlargement of the European Union 
brought a new wave of labour migration, with 
Poland rising to the top of the immigration statis-
tics. Finally, there is also a new type of reunifica-
tions, involving transnational marriages between 
majority men and minority women.
The immigrant population has ‘matured’ in 
two senses. First, it has become more balanced 
in demographic terms, partly through immigra-
tion of women and partly through natural pop-
ulation change (i.e. births and deaths). Second, 
many groups have climbed the social ladder. 
These groups are marked by an increasing lev-
el of employment and a high educational moti-
vation. The participation in higher education is 
particularly high among descendants from In-
dia, Iran, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. Some other 
groups, however, lag behind. This is not only a 
question of residence in Norway. Individuals in 
some groups exhibit a lack of integration (e.g. a 
combination of high poverty, low employment 
and low participation in higher education) even 
after many years in Norway. There is, in other 
words, a marked ethnic divide in the pattern of 
economic and social integration.
6.3. Policy analysis related to 
immigrant settlement and integration
Since the new immigration in the 1960s, there has 
been an ongoing policy development regarding 
immigration control, integration and inclusion. 
When it comes to integration and inclusion, the 
question has been what is necessary to accom-
plish in order to adapt the immigrants and their 
families to the expectations of participation in 
education, work and organisational life in Nor-
way. Later, there has also been a focus on how 
services and welfare arrangements have to adapt 
to a multicultural population. The policy devel-
opment has been rather pragmatic and incremen-
tal. Simultaneously, there has been a growing de-
bate about social integration and adaption to core 
values in everyday life such as gender equality. 
It seems as if the later policies towards the in-
tegration of refugees have worked rather well. 
Refugees are settled all over Norway and their 
mobility towards central urban areas has slowed 
down, which is in accordance with Norway’s 
labour market and regional policy. It is more 
difficult to verify if the comprehensive inclu-
sion policy has had any impact on housing and 
settlement patterns. However, in Oslo, naturali-
sation has proven to correspond positively with 
homeownership and moving to the suburbs. The 
various public economic arrangements to help 
people keep their home, regardless of tenure, 
have probably been of importance. 
6.4. Housing for all in the 
owner-occupied market
The housing market in Norway is dominated by 
homeownership, and has a low level of regula-
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tion. Only 23 percent of all households rent their 
dwelling and only five percent live in munici-
pal social housing. This implies that the ethnic 
minorities have plan on ownership early in their 
career in Norway to be able to buy a satisfactory 
place to live. The result is a high share of home-
owners compared to other countries. Sixty-three 
percent of the ethnic minorities own their home 
compared to 75 percent of the whole population. 
Access to homeownership meets less discrimi-
nation than rentals. The access to cooperative 
housing is the most regulated, and is where one 
meets with the least amount of discrimination. 
Conditions in the housing market have contrib-
uted to heavy segregation in the metropolitan 
area. Those who do not manage to cope with the 
owners market in urban areas face difficult and 
expensive situations in the private rental mar-
ket. There is no longer any special policy to care 
for ethnic minorities in the housing market, ex-
cept for the first settlement of refugees. Other-
wise, ethnic minorities are treated on par with the 
majority population. The most important policy 
means for households are probably the housing 
allowance. There has been an increase in the 
number of recipients of housing allowances, es-
pecially among ethnic minorities, which reflects 
a tightening in the household economy. Another 
tool, comprehensive area programs, is targeted 
at immigrant-dense city districts and neighbour-
hoods. The intention is to improve the level of 
living, reduce majority out-migration and attract 
majority households to these areas. 
6.5. Migration flows and 
settlement patterns in Norway 
Immigrant settlement in Norway has dispersed 
over the last decade. A new introduction pro-
gram, effectuated in 2003, appear to have sta-
bilised the refugee population, possibly through 
the creation of new multi-ethnic clusters. A paral-
lel but rather different process takes place in the 
Oslo region. Immigrants have spread from the 
inner city to the inner suburbs and further to the 
outer suburbs. This expansion has a contained 
form: it is directed towards low-priced and me-
dium-priced homeownership districts north and 
east of the city. The high-price western districts 
are scarcely affected by the relocation dynamic. 
The importance of geographical scale looms 
large in the Oslo data. We sense that new clusters 
are created at a low geographical level. What is 
more, some old immigrant groups continue to 
cluster at a high geographical level. This applies 
for instance to the large Pakistani group.
Further research should focus partly on mac-
ro-level constraints (e.g. housing and settlement 
policies), partly on micro-level behaviour (e.g. 
fertility and mobility), partly on cultural values 
(e.g. preservation of customs and language), and 
partly on discrimination and inter-group relations 
(e.g. selective mobility in the Norwegian ma-
jority). 
All in all, the immigration to Norway has 
proved successful in many ways even though 
there are problems and challenges. The majority 
of the immigrants are finding their way into the 
labour market, and are able to take care of their 
living situation, though more often with public 
support than the majority. However, Norway is 
in a special situation in terms of immigrants in-
tegrating into the housing system by becoming 
homeowners. Still, they have developed a differ-
ent mobility pattern than the majority. When liv-
ing in the metropolitan region, they are concen-
trated in certain areas. This segregation pattern 
is now perceived to be among the most serious 
challenges following immigration. 
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1.  The Finnish welfare system 
Mari Vaattovaara, Saara Yousfi & Timo M. 
Kauppinen
1.1.  The birth of Finland 
– the youngest of the 
Nordic welfare states
Finland has been an independent nation for less 
than one hundred years. Before that, it was a 
Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire from 1809 
to 1917 and part of the Swedish Kingdom from 
the 12th century onwards. Its peripheral location 
between the two big powers has been interpret-
ed as a significant societal factor and as a major 
boost to its efficiency, its early internationaliza-
tion and even the growth of the telecommunica-
tions sector (Vaattovaara 2009).
The egalitarian tradition dating back to the 
beginning of the last century has a profound in-
fluence not only on income distribution, but also 
on the educational ethos. The Finnish educational 
system has never been as selective as the British, 
French or German systems with its principle of 
equal opportunities for all social classes through-
out the country (Mäkelä 1999: 157). The results 
are particularly impressive, as Finland has been 
ranked first in the OECD’s PISA evaluations. 
Furthermore, the participation of females in ed-
ucation and work is among the highest in Eu-
rope. This is considered a unique phenomenon, 
and has again been related to the small size of 
the country and its specific location between two 
great powers. Finland as a nation, cannot afford to 
exclude any stratum of the population (Jutikkala 
1965; Kuusi 1968; Alapuro 1985; Mäkelä 1999).
National-level politics have thus had a pro-
found influence on the Finnish political system. 
The very existence of the welfare state relies on 
a kind of national uniformity ˗  equality being un-
derstood in the framework of cultural uniform-
ity, or even like˗mindedness. Thus, the top-down 
political approach to issues related to welfare, 
segregation and housing is deep-seated and has 
a long tradition in the political system of the 
country. In a situation in which the nation has 
been able to raise the level of education and the 
standard of living and improve housing condi-
tions and the quality of available services for all, 
national political guidance has not met with any 
strong resistance. 
Finland has experienced rapid changes in the 
decades since the 1960s. These developments 
were triggered by extensive societal changes. 
The first of these relates to the late but rapid in-
dustrialisation accompanied by the relatively fast 
growth in wealth. The subsequent rapid process 
of urbanisation and the improvement in hous-
ing standards provided a good basis on which 
to reinforce the structures of the welfare state. 
Unlike in many European countries, most peo-
ple in Finland lived in the countryside until the 
1950s. At that time the private sector employed 
more than half of the working population and 
accounted for 40 per cent of the national output. 
At the same time, GDP per capita (5,782.72 dol-
lars) was less than two thirds of that of Sweden 
(9,113.92 dollars). 
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Overall, investments in the welfare model 
were made at a time of rapid urbanisation, in-
ternationalisation, and growth not only in pub-
lic services but also in trade. The share of trade 
in the GDP grew fivefold, and that of industry 
threefold in 50 years. However, Finland has nev-
er experienced a phase in which industry was the 
biggest employer, and this has affected the de-
mand for labour in different parts of the country. 
Agriculture had become more effective by the 
1960s, and there were fewer job opportunities in 
rural areas. This led to massive internal migra-
tion as well as to emigration. Within ten years, 
about one million of the 4.5-million population 
had moved away from rural areas to the bigger 
cities. Moreover, tens of thousands of people a 
year emigrated to Sweden in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (see Chapter 3.1.1 for more about 
labour migration to Sweden). 
There were also major changes in the GDP, 
which grew at an average annual rate of 5.2 per 
cent from 1950 to 1974. The achievement of 
prosperity made the extension of the welfare state 
possible in the 1960s and smoothed out the ine-
quality until the end of the 1980s. The proportion 
of social expenditure of the GDP increased from 
9.4 per cent to 24.6 per cent between 1960 and 
1990. The rapid increase was attributable to the 
expansion of social rights and services, and this 
phase could be called the “construction” phase 
of the Finnish welfare state. 
In sum, Finland’s development into a Nor-
dic welfare state happened late, but relatively 
rapidly compared to the other Nordic countries. 
Finland had reached the average Nordic level by 
the end of the 1980s.
1.1.1. The basic postulations of 
the Welfare state – small income 
differences and full employment 
The Finnish welfare system provides a wide 
range of public services and a relatively high 
level of income security to all permanent resi-
dents (see Sarvimäki 2008). In most cases, eli-
gibility for benefits does not depend on nation-
ality or residence status. Residence-based ben-
efits include the national pension, labour-mar-
ket subsidy (unemployment allowance unrelated 
to previous employment), housing allowances, 
family benefits and minimum-level sickness in-
surance and parental allowances. Some benefits 
have further conditions, mainly related to resi-
dence duration. 
Overall, the scope of the social policy is 
broad. The model implies a strong public-ser-
vice sector distributing welfare services and ben-
efits to all families in need. The welfare sys-
tem is based on a high degree of universalism, 
which means that residents are entitled to basic 
social-security benefits and services regardless 
of their background and socio-economic posi-
tion (Kautto et al. 1999). These benefits include 
health care, child day care and free education. 
The ideological cornerstone behind the welfare 
state is equality among individuals regardless 
of their demographic, socio-economic or ethnic 
characteristics. As Magnusson Turner (2010: 12) 
points out, the welfare policy is “comprehensive, 
i.e. it includes everybody in contrast to residual 
welfare regimes”. It is said that strong universal-
ism is behind the strong public support of wel-
fare policies. However, some benefits such as 
labour-market subsidy, housing allowance and 
social assistance, are means-tested, meaning that 
the financial situation of the household affects 
the level of benefit.
One of the basic postulations of the welfare 
system in Finland has been the assumption of 
almost full employment. Everyone is supposed 
to have a positive relation to work and conse-
quently a right to social security. The social-se-
curity benefits are designed to give support dur-
ing short periods of unemployment, but not for 
longer periods and not for more widespread un-
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employment-related problems. Many benefits, 
such as the basic pension, parental allowances 
and unemployment allowances are earnings-re-
lated. The income differences have been kept 
moderate through progressive taxation and in-
come redistribution. 
The Finnish welfare system is also charac-
terised by the prevalence of dual-career house-
holds. Unlike in most European countries, where 
the increase in women’s employment-participa-
tion rate has explained much of the growth in 
labour supply, women in Finland have enjoyed 
high levels of employment for quite some time 
and there are no differences between married 
and single women.139Women’s participation in 
working life is facilitated by an extensive day-
care system that guarantees a place for children 
under school age. The right to day care applies to 
all children regardless of their parents’ employ-
ment situation and it is therefore seen as a way 
of providing equal developmental opportunities 
to all children. 
Housing has also traditionally had a central 
role in the Finnish welfare state. According to the 
Finnish Constitution, it is the duty of the public 
authorities to promote everyone’s right to hous-
ing, and to support attempts by individuals to 
find housing on their own initiative. The state 
has had a strong influence in the formation of 
the housing market and not only in establishing 
the high-standard home-ownership system but 
also in the social-housing sector. Over half of the 
rental dwellings in Finland are state-subsidised 
in terms of construction. 
Social welfare is financed from different 
sources. In 2008, employers’ earnings-related 
payments made the biggest contribution (38.4 
per cent). The state finances the basic social-se-
curity benefits and gives funding to the munici-
1  However, there is a wage gap between the genders, 
which increases significantly during the first ten years 
after labour-market entry and accounts for most of the 
life-time increase in the gender wage gap (Napari 2008).
palities (25.1 per cent of the expenditure). The 
municipalities share in the financing of social 
expenditure has been increasing (18.6 per cent 
in 2008). The municipalities finance social and 
health services and certain social-assistance ben-
efits through taxation, central government trans-
fers and fees paid by clients. The insurance con-
tributions paid by employees accounted for 11.2 
per cent of the costs (see Lehto et al. 2002; Char-
acteristics of... 2007; Arajärvi and Palotie-Hei-
no 2010).
Thus, the inputs to the welfare system, in 
other words the means of supporting the mod-
el, are manifold, with strong state involvement. 
The political commitment to full employment, 
together with high female employment, univer-
sal and free education up to the university level, 
health care, and a relatively even income distri-
bution in terms of both wages and disposable 
income is strong. 
1.2.  changes in the welfare 
state and economic structures
The golden years of the Finnish welfare state 
were during the 1980s. There was almost full 
employment and the standard of living was ris-
ing quickly. This positive economic development 
was combined with annual increases in most in-
dicators of welfare-state expenditure. Prior to the 
economic restructuring of the 1990s, the prob-
lems related to unemployment were structural 
and affected the rural areas. Due to the rapid in-
dustrialisation and urbanisation, unemployment 
remained low in the urban areas, the rates in the 
various neighbourhoods of Helsinki varying be-
tween 0.4 and 2.1 per cent in 1990, for instance. 
1.2.1.  Economic restructuring and 
changes in the labour market 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Finland faced 
the worst recession to affect the OECD coun-
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tries since the Second World War. Within just a 
few years, the unemployment rate was the sec-
ond highest in the EU. The main reason for this 
was the collapse of the Soviet market, which 
had accounted for 20 per cent of Finnish ex-
ports. GDP declined by 12 per cent over the 
period 1991˗1993, and the unemployment rate, 
measured as the per centage of the labour force 
claiming unemployment benefits, rose from four 
per cent to 21 per cent between 1990 and 1994. 
This situation led to a financial crisis and large 
cuts in public expenditure. There is no longer 
full employment, unemployment has stagnated 
at the EU average level, and seems to have be-
come permanent. Men were more severely af-
fected than women during the recession years 
of 1990˗1994, unemployment being more se-
vere for men on account of differences in the 
various employment sectors (Table 1). Accord-
ing to the Labour Force Survey, the unemploy-
ment rate peaked from 3.6 to 18.2 per cent for 
men, and from 2.7 to 14.9 per cent for women. 
The recession, together with changes in the 
economic structure and the arrival of immigrants, 
resulted in the proliferation of short-term em-
ployment. Unfortunately, the employment sta-
tistics prior to 1997 do not cover that. Table 2 
traces the recovery and reveals the gender dif-
ferences. The proportion of people in permanent 
employment increased from 82 to 85 per cent af-
ter the recession. However, the increase for men 
was five per centage points but less than three 
per centage points for women. There is a gen-
eral upward trend of part-time working among 
both men and women, which increased from six 
to eight per cent, and from 15 to 18 per cent, 
respectively. 
The continuous high unemployment rate is 
problematic for the Finnish economic structure. 
To some extent it is due to the restructuring and 
the rapid changes in skill requirements. Increased 
productivity reduces the demand for labour in 
many traditional industries. The forest industry 
is a good example of this. The companies may 
continue to grow, but nowadays the growth tends 
to be in their overseas operations. The Finnish 
economy is export-intensive: exports account-
ed for 36 per cent of the GDP in 2008, whereas 
the average in the Euro area was 17 per cent 
(OECD 2010). However, the export fields are 
not labour-intensive.
Trade unions and employer organisations 
have a strong influence in the Finnish labour 
market. There has been a tradition of coopera-
tion between the major players ˗ trade unions, 
employer organisations and the government ˗ in 
the development of working life and technolog-
ical reforms. Since 1968 they have followed a 
comprehensive incomes-policy agreement, TU-
PO, the aim of which is to control the devel-
opment of wages and employment terms. The 
TUPO agreements used to include social-policy 
Table 1. The labour-market position, 1989˗2009 (Statistics Finland, Labour Force Survey 2010).
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2005 2009
Population, 
15–64 years 
(1000)
Total 3 351 3 367 3 383 3 393 3 403 3 409 3 465 3 496 3 547
Men 1 688 1 696 1 704 1 711 1 717 1 720 1 751 1 767 1 793
Women 1 664 1 671 1 679 1 682 1 686 1 689 1 714 1 729 1 754
Unemployment 
rate (%)
Total 3.2 6.7 11.8 16.5 16.7 15.5 9.8 8.5 8.4
Men 3.6 8.1 13.7 18.2 18.3 15.8 9.1 8.3 9.0
Women 2.7 5.2 9.6 14.5 14.9 15.1 10.6 8.7 7.6
Employment 
rate (%)
Total 74.1 70.0 64.7 60.6 59.9 61.1 66.9 68.0 68.3
Men 76.7 71.5 65.7 61.5 61.1 63.1 69.4 69.5 68.8
Women 71.4 68.4 63.8 59.6 58.8 59.1 64.3 66.5 67.9
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reforms such as the development of private em-
ployee pension schemes, extended annual hol-
idays and shortened working hours, but these 
old-style agreements are not likely to continue. 
The challenges for the future include increasing 
flexibility and diversity within the labour market 
and in collective-bargaining practices. 
1.2.2.  The knowledge-based society
There was a rapid turnaround in the Finnish econ-
omy in the mid-1990s, following the end of the 
recession. However, this rapid recovery differed 
from earlier periods of rapid growth in at least 
two ways. Firstly, the new economic growth is 
regionally selective: the strong population and 
job increases have taken place only in a few ur-
ban regions ˗ first and foremost in the Helsinki 
region..240The annual increase in employment at 
the end of the 1990s was four per cent, which 
at the time put Helsinki among the three fast-
est growing metropolitan areas in Europe. De-
2  The Helsinki region consists of the municipalities 
of Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen in the 
metropolitan area, and the municipalities of Hyvinkää, 
Järvenpää, Kerava, Kirkkonummi, Mäntsälä, 
Nurmijärvi, Pornainen, Sipoo, Tuusula and Vihti. 
spite the slight slow-down, the region remains 
among the fastest growing in Europe, measured 
in terms of population, employment and Gross 
Value Added per capita (Laakso and Kostiainen 
2007; Vaattovaara 2009).
Secondly, the areas of economic growth have 
changed. The net growth in employment from 
1960 to 1990 was based on an increase in the 
number of jobs in the public sector, which tripled. 
The private sector declined, in relative terms. 
The new economic growth, from the 1990s on-
wards, is based on growth in the private sector 
˗ in knowledge-intensive industries, telecom-
munications and business-to-business services. 
These industries have been largely responsible 
for the growth in GNP (5.1 per cent a year on 
average), at a speed that clearly exceeds that in 
the US (3.1), Japan (4.4 per cent) and the EU 
(2.6). The leading edge of the growth has been 
the ICT sector, led by Nokia, which has become 
the world market leader in mobile communica-
tions. Indeed, Helsinki and Finland, on account 
of Nokia, have been held up as one of the best 
examples of the development of an information 
society (Castells and Himanen 2002). Accord-
ing to Statistics Finland, up to one third of wage 
Table 2. Employees by gender and type of work contract, yearly averages, 1997˗2009 (Statistics 
Finland 2010).
1997 2000 2005 2009
employees total (1 000) Total 1846 2016 2098 2123
Men 925 1011 1038 1029
Women 922 1006 1060 1094
permanent work total (%) Total 81.6 83.5 83.4 85.4
Men 84.3 86.9 87 89.4
Women 78.9 80.1 79.9 81.6
temporary work total (%) Total 18.3 16. 4 16.5 14.6
Men 15.6 13.0 12.9 10.6
Women 21.0 19.9 20.0 18.4
Women 5.8 5.2 5.4 5.0
part-time work total (%) Total 10.4 12.0 13.1 13.3
Men 5.9 7.2 8.0 7.9
Women 15.0 16.9 18.1 18.4
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earners were engaged in information-related oc-
cupations in 1980, increasing to 44 per cent in 
1995 but then levelling off. Consequently, Fin-
land has transformed from a northeastern pe-
riphery, largely dependent on the forestry, pulp 
and paper industries, and public services, to one 
of the world’s leading information societies by 
any standards.341 
The positive economic development of Finn-
ish society has its foundations in the education 
system, which is based on the Nordic welfare 
model. The main form of national policy to sup-
port the development of industrialisation and the 
creative and knowledge industries has been to 
raise education levels. The main aim until 1975 
was to create an industrial society, and thereby 
to advance economic growth through industri-
alisation. This was followed by the introduction 
of regional policies, from 1976 to 1988, and the 
creation of a strong, equal welfare society. As a 
result, educational institutions were spread re-
gionally as part of a strong regional policy. The 
expansion of the university network from three 
to twenty universities in various cities and towns 
helped to establish public financing institutions 
for business-oriented research and development 
(Vartiainen 1998). 
The Finnish educational ethos is part of a 
long egalitarian tradition dating from the begin-
ning of the last century. Finns tend to value edu-
cation highly, regardless of their socio-economic 
background. Consequently, whereas teachers in 
many European countries are faced with attend-
ance resistance from disadvantaged segments of 
society, the resistance in Finland has so far been 
similar in comprehensive schools across all so-
cial strata (Jutikkala 1965; Alapuro 1985; Mäkelä 
1999). Whether there have been any changes in 
3  The United Nations Technology Advancement 
Index (TAI) puts Finland in the leading position in 
technological development. Finland has also been at the 
top of the International Data Corporation’s information 
society index (ISI) as long as it has existed.
attitudes towards education due to the recent so-
cietal changes remains an open question.
1.2.3.  Income inequality and poverty
The new economic growth emphasises the role of 
high-level education as a labour-market resource. 
With new growth at the upper end of the social 
scale, new social and spatial divisions are emerg-
ing. As a result, some population groups benefit, 
but the less-educated, working-class groups are 
left behind. Earlier educational differentiation in 
the Helsinki region, for example, is thus gradu-
ally breeding both unemployment and income 
differentiation (Vaattovaara 1998; Vaattovaara 
and Kortteinen 2003). As Vaattovaara and Kort-
teinen (2003: 2142) note: “The bimodal growth 
is not a sign of a new bimodal tendency of de-
velopment in the use of labour but, rather, is the 
result of a phase of development linked with a 
structural shift in the demand for labour. Ac-
cording to this interpretation, it is currently a 
period of economic restructuring and a struc-
tural shift during which the demand and the sup-
ply of labour only poorly meet”. There is a clear 
contrast to the former historical shift away from 
agriculture to industrial work during the 1960s 
and 1970s in that the rural population was able 
to move to the new occupations with little or no 
additional education. This appears not to be the 
case in the current situation – the educational gap 
is too wide. Thus, a new kind of polarisation is 
emerging: there is simultaneous growth in the 
non-working population and in the highly skilled 
(Vaattovaara and Kortteinen 2003).
Regardless of the measure, income polarisa-
tion declined during the 1960s and 1970s, and 
remained almost constant during the1980s until 
the turning point in the 1990s (Table 3). There 
was a modest increase in equality during the de-
pression years of 1990˗1994 when the Gini co-
efficient of disposable income rose from 20.2 
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to 21.1 per cent and the unemployment rate in-
creased rapidly from 3.2 to 16.6 per cent. The 
modest increase in inequality is attributable to 
the fact that although the depression caused a dis-
tinct fall in real household income, government 
income transfers almost fully compensated for 
the shortfall (Mattila-Wiro 2006: 3). 
The inter quintile ratio, in other words the 
ratio of incomes in the highest quintile to those 
in the lowest, shows the same trend as the Gini 
coefficient. The disposable income of the upper 
quintile declined from five-fold to three-fold ver-
sus the lowest quintile, but then increased back 
to a ratio of almost four to one (see Table 3). 
The proportion of total income in the upper 
decile has increased over the last ten years. The 
increase in disposable income is, in fact, concen-
trated within the top one per cent, amounting to 
122 per cent from 1990 to 2001. The compa-
rable growth rate was only one per cent in the 
first decile, and seven per cent in the second. 
The overall growth rate was 19 per cent. The 
income inequality has thus far persisted in the 
2000s (Riihelä 2009: 27, 32). Although pover-
ty in Finland remains low compared with oth-
er OECD countries (Figure 1), it has worsened 
during the last twenty years, and there are wider 
regional disparities to the benefit of the metro-
politan area (OECD 2010: 113˗115). 
The main factor that has driven up the relative 
proportion of top incomes since the mid-1990s 
is the increase in importance of capital income. 
The 1993 Finnish tax reform is one of the key 
factors responsible for this trend. The differen-
tial taxation of labour and capital income created 
a situation in which the share of top capital in-
come increased and progressivity declined. The 
relative poverty rate has increased over the same 
period, while top incomes have soared (Matti-
la-Wiro 2006: 3; Riihelä 2009). The increase in 
capital income also increased inequality in Swe-
den in the 2000s (see Swedish chapter 1.2.3). 
The proportion of people on a low income 
has increased regardless of the poverty line. With 
Table 3. Income dispersion in Finland since 1966, including capital gains, in decile groups according 
to disposable income per consumption unit (Statistics Finland 2010).
Year Gini coefficient, Interquintile Income Income
%, Disposable share ratio shares, shares, 
income (S80/S20) Decile 1+2 Decile 10
1966 30.9 4.9 8.0 23.8
1971 26.7 3.9 9.1 21.4
1976 21.5 3.0 10.7 18.4
1981 20.5 2.9 10.6 17.5
1987 19.7 2.7 11.3 17.6
1990 20.2 2.8 11.4 18.1
1992 19.9 2.7 11.6 18.2
1994 21.1 2.9 11.4 19.1
1996 22.3 3.0 11.0 19.8
1998 24.8 3.4 10.3 21.5
2000 26.7 3.7 9.9 23.3
2002 25.6 3.6 9.9 22.0
2004 26.6 3.8 9.7 22.8
2006 27.3 3.9 9.5 23.3
2008 26.8 3.8 9.5 22.8
Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States
202
the low-income line at 60 per cent of the median 
equivalent income, poverty increased from eight 
per cent in 2000 to 14 per cent in 2008 (Eurostat 
2010). The relative poverty rate has thus almost 
doubled during the last 15 years, the fastest rate of 
increase in all the OECD countries (Moisio 2010; 
OECD 2008). However, the earnings of the poor-
est group, i.e. the first income decile, increased 
by nine per cent between 2000 and 2007. More-
over, if poverty is measured on indicators that 
reflect the relative deprivation of commodities 
regarded as necessary by the majority (CONCE), 
or on indicators measuring respondents’ subjec-
tive feelings of problems in making ends meet 
(SCARCITY), there seems to have been a di-
minishing trend over the years 1995, 2000, 2005 
and 2010 (Ritakallio 2010). A sensible explana-
tion for these contradictory findings is based on 
the nature of the growth in poverty: growth in 
relative income poverty is not linked primarily 
to deprivation in consumption either objectively 
or subjectively, but to growth in income differ-
entials, especially between middle-income and 
low-income households. Overall, income trans-
fers and taxation have been effective in reduc-
ing income differentials in the Nordic countries, 
and have helped to reduce poverty rates even if 
these countries are close to the OECD average 
in terms of factor income (Kautto et al. 1999). 
The reduction is losing ground, however, as the 
increase in the level of basic social benefits has 
lagged 30˗40 per cent behind the increase in the 
general income level (Moisio 2010). The result 
is that a bigger proportion of people living on 
social benefits has slid beneath the relative pov-
erty threshold tied to the median income (ibid).
Relative income poverty has become more 
severe. The biggest change in the composition is 
the deterioration in the position of unemployed 
households and families with small children (Ri-
ihelä 2009). A turning point was the reform of 
unemployment insurance in 1994 (see the sec-
tion on social welfare), which is also visible in 
Figure 2. Incomes have risen in all socio-eco-
Figure 1. Income inequality from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s (OECD 2010).
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nomic groups, but more among employers and 
the self-employed. 
The risk of poverty differs by population 
group. It is more than 40 per cent for the el-
derly (Table 4), an increase on the 24 per cent 
recorded in 1996. The differences between sin-
gle women and single men are only minor, but 
single people as a group face a high risk (33 per 
cent). Single parents with dependent children are 
also severely at risk (25 per cent). The propor-
tion of children living in households vulnerable 
to poverty was a little under five per cent of all 
children in 1990, rising to as high as 13 per cent 
in 2008 (Eurostat 2010).
According to Suoniemi and Rantala (2010), 
the distribution of lifetime income has widened, 
and income mobility decreased between the late 
1990s and the early 2000s. The drop in mobility 
is largest among the youngest age groups and 
the probability of staying in the lowest income 
decile has increased.42 
Riihelä (2009) found substantial region-
al convergence in relative income levels from 
1966 to the mid-1980s. Since then the relative 
regional disparities have remained constant. He 
also noted the same U-shaped regional pattern 
of inequality over the period as in the whole 
country. The relative regional differences have 
diminished, and individual income inequality has 
become the dominant feature of the overall in-
come distribution. 
4  Household members are placed in a socio-economic 
group on the basis of their activity in the previous 12 
months. Upper-level employees are in administrative, 
managerial, professional and related occupations, 
and lower level employees are in clerical and sales 
occupations. 
Figure 2. Household disposable income by socio-economic group4, in euros at the 2008 value 
(Statistics Finland 2010).
Table 4. The per centage risk of poverty among different household types in 2008: on the scale this 
means more than 60 per cent below the median income (Eurostat 2010).
Household type Finland EU27 Sweden Norway Denmark
TOTAL 13.6 16.5 12.2 11.3 11.8
One adult older than 65 years 40.3 28.0 26.8 31.7 21.3
Single female 33.2 27.8 27.4 35.2 25.5
Single male 32.5 23.0 22.3 23.2 24.7
One adult younger than 64 years 28.9 24.2 24.0 28.1 26.8
Single parent with dependent children 24.9 35.2 26.8 21.5 16.0
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1.2.4.  Social welfare
The construction of the Finnish welfare state ben-
efitted from a long period of favourable eco-
nomic development and stable public economy 
from the 1960s until the 1980s. These conditions 
changed dramatically when Finland experienced 
an exceptionally deep economic recession during 
the first half of the 1990s (see Kalela et al. 2001). 
The 12-per-cent decline in GDP over the period 
1991˗1993 and the dramatic, rapid increase in 
the unemployment rate raised the GDP share of 
social expenditure by one third (Figure 3). The 
financial crisis required extensive cuts in public 
expenditure, a major proportion of which con-
cerned social services and health. The basic so-
cial-welfare structures were largely untouched, 
but there were reductions in most benefits and 
services (Lehto et al. 2002). One of the conse-
quences was that Finnish social insurance be-
came increasingly employment and earnings-
based (Niemelä and Salminen 2006).
Finnish social expenditure amounted to 48.6 
billion euros in 2008. Without taking inflation 
into account there was a 2.3-per-cent increase 
in expenditure over the previous year. Over the 
Figure 3. Social-security expenditure in 1980˗2008 as a proportion of GDP (Arajärvi and Palotie-Heino 
2010).
Figure 4. Social-security expenditure by category in millions of euros, at 2008 prices (Arajärvi and 
Palotie-Heino 2010).
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long term, pensions have accounted for the larg-
est increase in expenditure (Figure 4). Old age 
accounted for the largest share of social expend-
iture followed by sickness- and health-related 
spending. The proportion of social expenditure 
of the GDP has been slightly below the average 
of the EU15 countries since the turn of the cen-
tury, below Sweden and Denmark but above or 
at a similar level with Norway (26.3 per cent in 
2008). However, social-protection expenditure 
per capita in terms of purchasing power has been 
consistently lower than in Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway (Arajärvi and Palotie-Heino 2010). 
As a result of changes introduced since the 
recession of the 1990s there is an increased level 
of means testing in the provision of welfare ben-
efits. Figure 5 illustrates this in the case of un-
employment benefits. In 1993, the basic flat-rate 
unemployment benefit was divided into a basic 
allowance that was not means tested for those ful-
filling the employment conditions, and a means-
tested job-seekers allowance for those who did 
not, or who had received the earnings-related or 
the basic allowance for the maximum 500 days. 
The change was of particular relevance to the 
long-term unemployed and those without work 
histories, such as young people and immigrants. 
Social welfare has also been tightened by in-
creasing the use of ‘activation’ policies. The rap-
id economic recovery in the mid-1990s did not 
lead to a corresponding decrease in unemploy-
ment, which was becoming increasingly long-
term. This, in conjunction with membership of 
the European Union, brought about a new activa-
tion discourse in Finnish employment and social 
policy (Keskitalo 2008). This stronger empha-
sis on activation ˗ removing work disincentives 
and enforcing the unemployed to work ˗ came 
to Finland at the turn of the century, which was 
later than in many other European countries. In 
the case of social welfare, basic benefits have in-
creased slowly in comparison to the development 
of earnings, which has led to increased income 
poverty. New eligibility rules have also been in-
troduced. For example, recipients of unemploy-
ment benefits may be required to take activation 
courses or to seek further education. These rules 
target the young and the long-term unemployed 
Figure 5. Recipients of different types of unemployment allowance per month, January 1985 – 
December 2008 (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland and the Financial Supervisory Authority)
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in particular. However, some of the recession-
related cuts were mitigated in the 2000s, and 
social welfare in Finland is still on the average 
European level. 
The aging of the population will place addi-
tional demands on the social-welfare system in 
the future. The proportion of employed persons 
was at its highest in 1950. It has decreased since 
then, and the proportions of students and pen-
sioners in particular have grown. The national 
dependency ratio543 during the worst years of the 
depression in 1994 was 1.5, which means that 
there were 150 outside of the labour force per 
100 employed persons. The current the ratio is 
1.2 on average (Table 5), ranging from around 
one in the main city regions to above two in ar-
eas of high unemployment. 
The age-group-related dependency ratio, or 
the dependency quota, expresses the relation be-
tween the naturally dependent and those usually 
in employment (20˗64 years). The dependency 
quota was exceptionally high (85) in 1960 be-
cause of the effects of large-scale emigration on 
the population structure. Currently it is around 
66. Rapid changes are predicted: the dependency 
quota is expected to be as high as 81 in 2020 and 
more than 91 in 2030. This will put further pres-
sure on the structure of social welfare in general. 
1.3.  Future challenges 
The Finnish welfare state is currently facing new 
5  The economic dependency ratio describes how many 
people are dependent on benefits per those who are 
productive in the labour force. 
challenges related not only to income differenc-
es, unemployment and social welfare in general, 
but also to the additional structural changes to 
the welfare model that will come about in the 
near future. International migration is a case in 
point. Immigration has been increasing in the 
major Finnish cities since the 1990s, and this 
has influenced the social and spatial differentia-
tion processes within these regions. This trend 
is predicted to continue, and to have tremen-
dous effects on the population composition of 
the largest cities. According to the new popu-
lation forecast, there will be 186,000 more in-
habitants in the Helsinki metropolitan area by 
2030, of which 130,000 are predicted to be na-
tive speakers of foreign languages (Vieraskiel-
isen väestön... 2010: 6, 14). 
Secondly, there is the ageing of the popula-
tion, which in per centage terms will be a fast-
er process than in any other European country 
during the next 20 to 30 years. According to the 
Ministry of Finance (2006: 14), not only will the 
dependency ratio change, the number of people 
of working age will start to decrease in 2010, 
and the number of people in employment will 
start to decline in 2015.
The ageing of the population is increasing-
ly challenging in terms of the financing of wel-
fare policies as the demographic and economic-
dependency ratio becomes more unfavourable. 
Major external threats include the impact of glo-
balisation on the labour market, and the devel-
opment of European integration (Niemelä and 
Salminen 2006).
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1992 1994 2000 2009 2020 2030
Economic 
dependency ratio* 1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.2
Dependency quota** 74.5 79.7 84.8 74.8 67.1 63.5 64.4 65.6 65.2 66.3 81.1 91.2
*The ratio of those dependent on social welfare to the numbers employed. 
**The ratio of the naturally dependent (0˗19 years and 65+ years) to the working-age population 
(20˗64 years).
Table 5. Dependency ratios in 1940˗2009, with predictions until 2030 (Statistics Finland 2010)
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2.  Finnish housing markets
Saara Yousfi, Katja Vilkama 
& Mari Vaattovaara
2.1.  The Finnish housing stock 
Finland has about 2.8 million dwellings, which is 
about 522 dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants. Sin-
gle-family houses make up nearly half of the 
housing stock, attached dwellings (terraced or 
town houses) account for 14 per cent, and dwell-
ings in multi-storey residential blocks for 44 per 
cent (Statistics Finland 2010).
Owner-occupancy and rental are the two 
main forms of housing tenure. Owner-occupancy 
is the most common type, accounting for 59 per 
cent of the housing stock in 2008, whereas rent-
al accounted for 30 per cent. Home ownership 
is either direct, generally referring to detached 
housing,644or indirect in the form of housing-
company shares in the case of apartment blocks. 
In the latter case, the owner of each individual 
apartment is a shareholder in the housing com-
pany, which manages the property and is a self-
governing economic unit. Shareholders are enti-
tled to decide about matters affecting the control 
and use of the apartment block in accordance 
with the number of shares they own. Despite the 
formal legislative differences, the ownership of 
shares in a housing company is generally consid-
ered equivalent to direct ownership in the Finn-
ish housing market (Karlberg and Victorin 2004: 
58). Detached property constitutes slightly over 
half (55 per cent) of all owner-occupied hous-
ing, and condominiums amount for 45 per cent. 
The rental-housing sector comprises private 
rental accommodation and state-subsidised so-
cial housing. There is a relatively small amount 
of private rental accommodation, only 13.5 per 
cent of the housing stock, whereas social housing 
6 Detached housing is generally in private ownership, but 
can be also owned by a housing company. 
accounts for 16.8 per cent. The proportion of so-
cial housing is among the highest in Europe: the 
median for the EU-27 countries is 9.4 per cent, 
and in only seven countries, including Finland, 
does it exceed 15 per cent (Eurostat 2010; see 
Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). 
Two per cent of the Finnish housing stock 
comprises right-of-occupancy and part-owner-
ship dwellings, which lie somewhere between 
rental and owner-occupied housing. Both are 
rather new forms of tenure, which were intro-
duced on the Finnish housing market at the be-
ginning of the 1990s and the beginning of the 
2000s, respectively.
Table 6 shows the distribution of tenure types 
on the national level and in the Helsinki region. 
There are significant differences between the ru-
ral and urban areas. The proportion of owner-oc-
cupied housing is notably smaller in the major 
urban areas, and particularly in Helsinki, than on 
the national level, and the proportion of rental 
housing is correspondingly higher: only 45 per 
cent of the housing stock in Helsinki is owner-
occupied, including condominiums and detached 
housing. Social housing accounts for up to 22 per 
cent of the entire housing stock. The proportion 
of owner-occupied housing in the metropolitan 
area is close to 50 per cent, and as high as 67 
per cent in the Helsinki region. Almost a quar-
ter of the Finnish housing stock is situated in the 
Helsinki Region.
The late urbanisation of Finland is evident in 
the housing stock (Figure 6). The overwhelming 
majority of Finnish housing (90 per cent) was 
built after the Second World War, and particularly 
since the 1970s. The mass migration from rural 
to urban areas in the 1960s created an increasing 
housing shortage and a growing need to develop 
state-led housing construction. Construction, in 
terms of volume of completed dwellings, peaked 
in the 1970s and 1980s: almost one third of the 
multi-family housing blocks were built during 
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Tenure N % N % N % N %
Owner-occupied 1 638 732 59 144 977 45 263 614 49 90 372 67
  A house 894 960 32 11 192 3 38 162 7 48 583 36
  A flat 743 772 27 133 785 41 225 452 42 41 789 31
Rented 824 164 30 144 351 45 213 991 40 31 087 23
  Private rental 374 803 14 73 771 23 98 788 19 12 924 10
  Social rental 449 361 16 70 580 22 115 203 22 18 163 13
Right of occupancy 32 308 1 6 632 2 13 871 3 2 952 2
Other 272 721 10 28 150 9 41 127 8 10 691 8
Total 2 767 925 100 324 110 100 532 603 100 135 102 100
National Helsinki Helsinki Metropolitan Area Other Helsinki Region
Table 6. Dwellings according to tenure type, 2008 (Statistics Finland 2010).
Figure 6. Finnish housing stock by type of building and year of completion (Statistics Finland 2010) 
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the 1970s. The peak was a decade earlier in Hel-
sinki, in the 1960s, when large new residential 
areas began to spring up along the city borders. 
Almost 20 per cent of Helsinki’s housing stock 
was built in the 1960s.
Unlike in Norway, where housing produc-
tion has adjusted to a series of changes in hous-
ing preferences (e.g., from large-scale to small-
scale construction, see Norwegian chapter 2.2), 
large-scale high-rise building has been predomi-
nant in Finland, and especially in the metropoli-
tan area.745The bulk of housing production in the 
1960s and 1970s comprised multi-family apart-
ment blocks (61 per cent and 56 per cent of the 
new dwellings, respectively; see Figure 6), and 
in Helsinki as much as 92 per cent of all hous-
ing construction in the 1960s, and 83 per cent 
in the 1970s, comprised apartment dwellings. 
This stock is currently by far the least energy-
efficient in the entire housing stock. The invest-
ments required to reconstruct the whole stock 
were enormous. 
There is increasing interest in smaller-scale 
housing, particularly in the metropolitan area, 
according to research findings on people’s pref-
erences and the continuous and rapid growth in 
peripheral areas ˗ the suburbanisation process. 
However, the vast majority of the housing stock 
in the metropolitan area still comprises multi-
family dwellings. 
2.2.  Access to different 
types of tenure
2.2.1.  Owner-occupied housing
There are no specific rules determining access 
to owner-occupied housing in Finland, the de-
7  However, most of the housing built immediately after 
the Second World War was detached housing. The war 
had resulted in a housing shortage together with a lack 
of resources. A standardised, simple detached house 
model was created to provide a quick solution. 
termining factor being the prospective buyer’s 
purchasing power. 
Unlike in many other EU member states with 
their special mortgage institutions, owner-occu-
pied housing consumption in Finland ˗ in terms 
of renovation and acquisition ˗  is financed largely 
by private banks and the owners’ own resources. 
The most common way of obtaining finance is 
to take out a bank loan, which the state subsi-
dises through reduced tax liability on the interest. 
The state also eases access to owner-occupancy 
through special savings programmes and guar-
antees, which are targeted at young, first-time 
buyers (see subsection 2.3.2  for more details). 
The banks have the right to assess the financial 
standing of prospective buyers and to determine 
their eligibility for a housing loan. 
Owner-occupied detached housing is taxed 
in accordance with a property-value taxation 
scheme, which adds to overall acquisition and 
living expenses. Residents of owner-occupied 
flats pay a monthly maintenance charge that cov-
ers maintenance and heating costs, and water 
supply. 
Prices of owner-occupied housing have in-
creased significantly since the latter half of the 
1990s. This has made it increasingly difficult for 
families to buy owner-occupied flats, not to men-
tion detached property, in urban areas. There are 
wide differences in property prices between the 
major urban areas, smaller cities and rural coun-
try towns. Price differentials have also increased 
within the urban areas since the end of the re-
cession of the early 1990s (for the outcomes of 
the price differentiation see subsection 2.4.1). 
The typical amortisation period for personal 
housing loans increased during the 1990s, and 
nowadays is between approximately 20 and 25 
years, against around 30 years in Denmark, for 
example. There are also notable differences in the 
interest on housing loans: 75 per cent of hous-
ing loans in Denmark are at fixed interest rates, 
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whereas 97 per cent of Finnish loans are tied to 
floating interest rates (Housing market... 2010; 
Kannas 2010).
2.2.2.  Private rental housing
Providers of private rental accommodation in-
clude private companies, banks, insurance com-
panies, and foundations or non-profit associa-
tions. However, individuals who buy property as 
an investment and rent it out on the open market 
own about two thirds of the private rental stock 
(Housing market... 2010). Rented units are there-
fore often located alongside owner-occupied 
units in buildings owned by housing companies.
Rent control was gradually relaxed in the 
private sector in the early 1990s, and was abol-
ished in 1995. However, according to the Act 
on Residential Leases (1995/ 481), the amount 
of rent should be reasonable. The act also speci-
fies responsibilities and rights between property 
owners and tenants. 
In general, access to private rental accommo-
dation is not regulated. Owners have the right to 
allocate their rental dwellings according to their 
own criteria, as long as they are not in conflict 
with anti-discrimination legislation. In most cas-
es, a refundable deposit, often equivalent to two 
months’ rent, is required as a prerequisite for 
signing the contract. Owners of private rental 
accommodation also have the right to check the 
credit rating of prospective tenants beforehand. 
In many cases, the advertising and distribu-
tion of vacant rental dwellings is in the hands 
of estate agents hired by the owner. Individual 
access to private rental accommodation is thus 
influenced by several potential gatekeepers, not 
to mention income level and the ability to pay 
the required rent and deposit. 
The increasing level of rents and the need to 
pay a deposit restrict access to private rental ac-
commodation among lower-income households, 
particularly in the major urban areas. There may 
be other more direct forms of discrimination, but 
there has been no systematic study on ethnic and 
socioeconomic discrimination in the private rent-
al market in Finland.
2.2.3.  Social housing 
How social housing is defined varies widely in 
different European countries (see e.g., Whitehead 
and Scanlon 2007). In Finland it is a question of 
the state-subsidised provision of rental housing 
though public and private non-profit organisa-
tions for people who meet the eligibility criteria. 
The dwellings are generally owned and man-
aged by municipalities, social-housing compa-
nies owned by the municipalities, or non-profit 
housing companies846and organisations. By law, 
there are no differences in the allocation of dwell-
ings among the different providers, although the 
municipalities and companies owned by them 
tend to carry the biggest responsibility for pro-
viding housing for the most marginalised low-
income households. 
Access to social housing is means-tested. Eli-
gibility depends on the social and financial cir-
cumstances of the applicant in terms of house-
hold income, assets and the urgency of the need 
for housing. The Council of State sets the up-
per income limits annually in relation to family 
size and region of the country. The limits were 
rather generous, and approximately 75 per cent 
of the population qualified (Varady and Schul-
man 2007: 321). Compared with other European 
countries, the upper income limit was relatively 
high, and upwardly mobile tenants were allowed 
to remain in social rental accommodation even if 
their income later exceeded the set limits. 
Income limits were abolished in April 2008, 
8 Many non-profit housing companies also own and 
manage accommodation rented on the private market 
(for profit). 
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and the selection of tenants is now based solely 
on the urgency of the housing need. The first pri-
ority is given to applicants with the most acute 
need, including homeless persons and families, 
households living in extremely crowded condi-
tions, and people moving home to start a new job. 
The Housing Finance and the Development Cen-
tre of Finland advises municipalities and other 
providers of social housing on the categorisation 
of applicants into one of three groups according 
to their housing need. If two or more households 
have similar needs, priority is given to those with 
less income. Capital assets are also taken into 
consideration, and there are still upper limits that 
restrict the eligibility of wealthier households.
According to the legislation, the allocation of 
accommodation should aim to create and main-
tain socially balanced living environments in so-
cial-housing estates. Several “hard-to-let” house-
holds should therefore not be placed in the same 
building, or in the same neighbourhood (Arava- 
ja korkotuki... 2008: 18). In some cases there-
fore, the principle of prioritisation is neglected 
in order to prevent the spatial concentration of 
the most vulnerable households in the same es-
tates. This has significance particularly for the 
residential patterns of immigrants, as the munici-
palities may use their right to breach the prin-
ciple of urgency in order to prevent residential 
segregation. Applicants for social housing are 
not put in a queue, which makes the selection 
of tenants less transparent. Accommodation is 
usually allocated on a case-by-case basis, which 
leaves much room for discretion on the part of 
individual social-housing providers. 
As in Denmark, the level of rents in the Finn-
ish social-housing sector is based on the cost-re-
covery principle, meaning that all maintenance 
and capital construction costs are covered by 
tenants’ rents. Rent levels therefore vary sig-
nificantly depending on the age, location and 
construction costs of the housing estate. Some 
municipal social-housing companies adjust the 
rents in order to keep them at a reasonable level 
in all of their estates. Unlike in some other Euro-
pean countries (see e.g., Whitehead and Scanlon 
2007), Finnish social-housing rents are thus not 
linked to the income of the residents. The non-
profit principle guarantees that the state subsidy 
covering the production of social housing ends 
up with the residents. 
In general, rents in the social-housing sec-
tor have remained below the level of rents in 
the private sector. Many municipalities have a 
renovation schedule that keeps the dwellings in 
a relatively good condition. Pre-rental deposits 
are also usually much lower, or non-existent, for 
social housing, which makes it more accessible 
to low-income households. Furthermore, social 
housing is a more secure form of tenure than pri-
vate rental accommodation: once a dwelling has 
been allocated the tenants are entitled to reside in 
it as long as they wish, provided that they pay the 
monthly rent and do not disturb their neighbours. 
Social housing is the best option for many 
immigrant households whose level of income 
and assets may not enable them to rent from the 
private sector, or to buy into owner-occupancy. 
According to the legislation on refugee recep-
tion, municipalities are specifically obliged to as-
sist refugee households to find accommodation. 
In practice, this usually means assigning them a 
dwelling in social housing owned and managed 
by the local municipality.
According to the Housing Finance and the 
Development Centre of Finland, more than 
200,000 households annually apply for social 
housing, and almost one third of the applications 
are successful. In Helsinki however, where the 
housing market situation is very tight, the suc-
cess rate is less than 20 per cent (Housing mar-
ket... 2010).
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2.2.4.  Part-ownership and right-
of-occupancy housing 
Part-ownership and right-of-occupancy housing 
lie somewhere between owner-occupancy and 
tenancy. The purpose of these two new tenure 
types is to bring home ownership within the reach 
of lower-middle class families that could not oth-
erwise afford to buy into owner-occupancy in 
the private market. 
Residents in these dwellings initially pur-
chase a small proportion of the shares, usually 
up to 15˗20 per cent, and the remainder are held 
by the housing company (Laki vuokra-asunto-
jen... 232/2002). The main difference between 
the two new tenure types is that in the case of 
part-ownership residents may later purchase the 
rest of the shares, after a fixed period, and thus 
become owner-occupants, whereas right-of-oc-
cupancy dwellings cannot be transformed into 
owner occupancy (Housing market... 2010), al-
though residents have the right to reside in them 
as long as they wish. 
In addition to buying into the scheme, res-
idents pay a monthly charge that covers the 
maintenance costs of the building. The charge 
is based on the cost-recovery principle as in the 
case of social housing, and is often equivalent 
to a monthly rent. Both of these new types of 
housing have been criticised on account of the 
cost to residents, who may end up paying more 
for their housing than if they lived in their own 
property or in social housing. 
When residents of right-of-occupancy dwell-
ings move out, the sum they paid to ‘buy into’ 
the scheme is redeemed, with appropriate adjust-
ments according to the construction cost index. 
In the case of part-ownership, residents have the 
right to sell their apartments on the private mar-
ket once they have achieved full owner-occupant 
status. The price is then no longer regulated (Os-
aomistusasunnot 2010).
Access to part-ownership and right-of-oc-
cupancy housing is means-tested in accordance 
with the same legislation that applies to social 
housing. Eligibility is therefore based on the so-
cial and financial circumstances of the house-
holds and the urgency of their housing need. In 
general, would-be residents are not eligible for 
right-of-occupancy or part-ownership housing 
if they own a dwelling that meets reasonable 
housing standards in the same municipality, or 
have the means to acquire one (Housing mar-
ket... 2010). Eligible residents are selected from 
a waiting list on the basis of their requirements 
in terms of the size and location of the desired 
dwelling. 
2.3.  Policies focused on 
accessibility, affordability 
and creditworthiness
Housing has been an integral part of Finnish wel-
fare policies since the 1960s. The aim has been 
to provide affordable, decent-standard housing 
for all residents. According to the Constitution 
of Finland, the municipalities have the duty to 
promote everyone’s right to housing, and to sup-
port attempts of individuals to find housing on 
their own initiative (Ministry of the Environment 
2010). The state has a strong influence on the 
housing market, not only in supporting the high-
standard home-ownership system, but also in the 
area of social housing. Over half of the rental 
accommodation is state-subsidised. 
The Finnish housing policy supports both the 
supply and the consumption side of the housing 
market. The provision of state subsidies is the 
most visible mechanism used by the national and 
the local governments to increase the produc-
tion of reasonably priced housing, and to sup-
port the renovation of the existing housing stock 
(see Huovinen et al. 2010). 
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2.3.1.  Production-support mechanisms
The main mechanisms through which the hous-
ing policy supports production include govern-
ment loans, guarantees and interest subsidies. 
State-subsidised housing production is financed 
through loans from the state or private finan-
cial institutions at favourable state-subsidised 
interest rates. This form of support is nowadays 
mainly directed towards the building of social 
rental dwellings, right-of-occupancy dwellings 
and part-ownership housing. The construction 
of owner-occupied housing and market-oriented 
rental dwellings is privately financed (Housing 
market... 2010).
The state-subsidised housing loan system, 
called ARAVA, dates back to 1949. The goals 
of the initial legislation were not social, but rather 
aimed at increasing housing production and re-
flected the notion of filtering (Bengs and Loik-
kanen 1987: 83). The idea was that support of the 
wealthier upwardly-mobile households would 
indirectly benefit lower-income households as 
the previous dwellings of the wealthy became 
vacant. Thus, in the early years, eligibility for 
state-financed dwellings was not restricted by 
income, and as a result about half of the popu-
lation in partly state-financed condominiums be-
longed to the highest social groups (ibid). Almost 
70 per cent of state-financed loans were given 
to owner-occupiers during the first two decades 
of the scheme (Table 7).
Social-housing administration and regula-
tions were revised in the mid-1960s, and eligi-
bility for state loans was broadened (Bengs and 
Loikkanen 1987: 87). There was a significant 
increase in the production of rental dwellings, 
the aim being to build 500,000 dwellings in the 
following ten years. The objective was not only 
to serve the needs of the industrialisation and ur-
banisation process, but also to support the con-
struction industry per se. The decision to distrib-
ute housing production to all parts of Finland was 
an integral part of†the regional industrial policy 
(Hainari 2010), the success of which is reflected 
in the high GDP-investment ratio. State support 
of housing production was significant during the 
urbanisation and construction boom of the late 
1960s and early 1970s, and covered some 70 
to 80 per cent of all housing production (Juntto 
1990: 257˗258). It was a period in which there 
were significant changes in construction meth-
ods and building types throughout Europe, and 
much of the new production constituted high-rise 
multi-family apartment buildings (see Table 7). 
There has been a substantial reduction in 
state-subsidised housing production since the 
1980s (Table 7 and Figure 7), meanwhile state-
subsidised construction is being channelled al-
most entirely to social housing, and right-of-oc-
cupancy and part-ownership housing. 
There was a further increase in state-financed 
Table 7. Dwellings financed by state-subsidised loans, 1949˗2007 (Statistics Finland 2008).
1949– 
1970
1971– 
1980
1981– 
1990
1991– 
2000
2001– 
2007 Total
Housing corporations 106 798 103 048 42 271 6 486
Detached private houses 54 471 70 612 38 901 7 735
Social rental housing 66 205 113 960 80 854 55 608 9 768
Dwellings for the elderly .. 22698 11833 8634 2 641
Other special housing 2 535 1 248 1 420 2 444 2 776
Right-of-occupancy dwellings .. .. .. 23 314 4 894
Student dwellings 2 700 11 897 11 048 7 068 3 062
Total 232 709 323 463 186 327 111 289 23 141
35 775
876 929
258 603
171 719
326 395
45 806
10 423
28 208
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social-housing production in the 1990s in sup-
port of the construction industry. The industry 
was hit hard by the severe economic depres-
sion of the early 1990s, which had led to a sud-
den fall in the prices of owner-occupied hous-
ing and a subsequent dramatic drop in housing 
production. The state support of the social hous-
ing saved the construction industry from a com-
plete shutdown.947Deregulation of the tenant re-
lationship, which started at that time, increased 
the supply of private rental dwellings. By 1995, 
rents were no longer regulated. The per centage 
of social-housing production, decreased again 
after the economic recovery, reaching a low of 
ten per cent in 2007. However, in 2008 the state 
decided to increase subsidies for housing produc-
tion again in order to boost the economy during 
the recession years.1048In total, 42 per cent of all 
housing currently in use was financed with the 
help of state-supported loans. A large propor-
tion of these dwellings, namely those built in 
the 1960s˗1970s, will be released from the rent 
restrictions during the next couple of decades as 
9  State-subsidised construction accounted for 31 per 
cent of total housing construction in 1990. This figure 
increased to 84 per cent five years later despite the 
significant decrease in absolute numbers.
10 State-subsidised housing production covered 19 per 
cent of the construction of new dwellings in 2008, and 
peaked at 63 per cent in 2009. 
their loans are paid off. This may reduce the size 
of the social-rental stock in the future.
Housing policy since the 1990s has focused 
more on the renovation and restructuring of older 
estates, and unlike in many other European ur-
ban areas, demolition is rare in Finland. In re-
cent years, state-financed and interest-subsidised 
housing production has been channelled mostly 
to regional growth centres, and is targeted on 
housing provision for special groups such as the 
homeless, the elderly and people with mental 
or physical disabilities. The emphasis has also 
shifted from direct state loans (stopped in 2007) 
to interest subsidies, and to state guarantees for 
private loans. 
The support for social-housing construction 
has directly affected the most vulnerable groups, 
and those in the greatest need, through the in-
creased supply of rental accommodation. Cost 
and quality control are inherent in the scheme: 
the Housing Finance and Development Cen-
tre of Finland has to approve all proposed con-
struction and renovation development in order to 
safeguard standards of architectural design and 
quality, and to promote geographical and social 
integration with the environment (Housing mar-
ket... 2010). 
Figure 7. Housing production in Finland since 1950, number of starts (laine 2010).
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2.3.2.  Consumption support
Finnish government support of housing con-
sumption is in the form of housing allowances, 
tax incentives, tax relief on mortgage payments, 
and various grants and guarantees.
Housing allowances
The purpose of the housing-allowance schemes 
is to ensure that housing costs remain at a rea-
sonable level for the whole population. Housing 
support includes an allowance for pensioners, a 
housing supplement for students and a general 
housing allowance, and is available to house-
holds in need, regardless of the tenure type. 
The general housing allowance is means-test-
ed and is intended to give low-income house-
holds access to affordable housing. The upper 
income limits that determine eligibility are rather 
low. For instance, a single person living in Hel-
sinki is not eligible if his or her gross income 
exceeds 1,575 euro per month. The income limits 
vary according to family size and region, and are 
set annually by the national government.
The amount of the monthly allowance de-
pends on housing costs, the size and age of the 
dwelling, family size, and the household’s in-
come and assets. In any case, it is at most 80 
per cent of what are considered reasonable hous-
ing costs, the maximum limits of which are set 
each year by the government. Twelve per cent 
of households received the general housing al-
lowance in 2008, one per cent less than in 2000. 
Of the recipients, 94 per cent lived in rented ac-
commodation and six per cent in owner-occu-
pied dwellings (Kelan asumistukitilasto... 2009).
Social assistance provided by the municipali-
ties supplements housing allowances and is in-
tended to help low-income households to man-
age their housing costs. The general allowance 
in larger cities, especially in the Helsinki region, 
typically covers such a small proportion of hous-
ing costs that low-income households need fur-
ther assistance. The municipalities apply discre-
tion in giving assistance and the rules regarding 
‘reasonable’ housing costs differ.
Tax incentives and special incentives 
for young first-time buyers
State support for homeowners is largely in the 
form of tax incentives. The State subsidises per-
sonal housing loans through tax relief on mort-
gage interest. A personal housing loan from 
a bank typically covers approximately 70 per 
cent of the price of the dwelling (Housing mar-
ket... 2010), although there are various guaran-
tees available that make it possible to finance a 
higher proportion. 
There are also tax incentives for first-time 
buyers wishing to move up the housing ladder 
in the form of exemption from the asset trans-
fer tax that is usually payable on all transfers 
of housing or property ownership. Young first-
time buyers are eligible for extra state support 
through the ASP saving scheme. Anyone aged 
between 18 and 30 years who does not own a 
home may join the scheme, which entails sav-
ing at least ten per cent of the acquisition price 
of their prospective dwelling over a period of at 
least two years. The state then subsidises the in-
terest on the housing loan for the first ten years 
(Housing market... 2010). 
Other incentives
The Housing Finance and Development Centre 
of Finland also gives repair and energy grants 
for the renovation and repair of individual apart-
ments and apartment buildings. The grants are 
mostly for renovation that caters for the needs 
of the elderly and disabled, lift construction and 
improvements in energy efficiency.
Figure 8 illustrates the total amount of state 
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support for housing production and consumption 
in Finland during the years 1991˗2009. In mon-
etary terms, housing allowances made the biggest 
contribution to housing affordability in Finland. 
2.4.  Housing outcomes
2.4.1.  Affordability
House prices have increased significantly in Fin-
land in recent years, most notably in the metro-
politan area. Nevertheless Finnish housing costs 
are around the average European level (Table 8). 
The increase in prices has led to severe housing-
affordability problems among some low-income 
and newly established households, particularly in 
the major growth areas of the country. 
Until the end of the 1980s, housing costs ac-
counted for about 20 per cent of household ex-
penditure, then increasing to an average of 25 per 
cent by 1994. The increase affected all income 
groups at the turn of the century, but particularly 
those in the first quintile who were faced with 
housing costs amounting to over 40 per cent of 
their disposable income, a level that has persisted 
(Table 9). At the same time, households in the 
highest quintile spend, on average, 18 per cent of 
their disposable income on housing, the national 
average being 17 per cent (Table 10). Housing 
expenses in the metropolitan area are about 1.3 
times the national average, and are most favour-
able in rural municipalities. 
Tenants spend a higher proportion of their 
income on housing than homeowners. The old-
est and youngest age groups spend, on average, 
27˗33 per cent of their disposable income on 
housing, which is more than the other age groups 
(Statistics Finland 2010). The elderly and sin-
gle-parent families spend over 31 per cent, and 
households with two adults with or without chil-
dren around 20 per cent. Without the general 
housing allowance housing costs would account 
for 61 per cent of disposable income among those 
in rented accommodation, but with the support 
the figure is 28 per cent. 
Figure 8. State expenditure on housing support, 1991˗2009, in millions of euros (Laine 2010).
Table 8. Harmonised indices of consumer prices 
(HICP): housing costs including water, electricity, 
gas and other fuels (Eurostat 2010).
2000 2005 2010
European Union (27 countries) 156.34 146.31 152.75
European Union (15 countries) 153.26 143.18 :
Denmark 182.6 193.47 176.89
Finland 158.31 151.56 155.62
Sweden 194.49 181.69 167.16
Table 9. Housing costs as a proportion of 
disposable income by income group (Statistics 
Finland).
1. income 
quintile
2. income 
quintile
3. income 
quintile
4. income 
quintile
5. income 
quintile
1985 28.92 22.97 19.61 17.76 15.76
1990 31.41 24.62 20.65 18.85 16.42
1995 32.25 25.44 21.39 19–00 15.96
1998 40.62 30.29 25.73 22.44 17.63
2001 39.02 30.24 23.97 21.37 16.4
2006 37.11 29.25 25.03 22.4 17.61
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The unevenly distributed increases in hous-
ing costs have also influenced the spatial pat-
terns of tenure segmentation in the major urban 
areas since the mid-1990s. According to Lön-
nqvist and Vaattovaara (2004), for instance, the 
prices of shareholder apartments in the cheapest 
housing areas of Helsinki are, in real terms, low-
er than they were in the 1960s, whereas prices 
in and around the centre have increased sharp-
ly. City-centre housing was three times as ex-
pensive as housing in the cheaper suburbs in 
2001 (Lönnqvist and Vaattovaara 2004). There 
has also been a change in the relationship be-
tween house prices and the distance from the 
centre, which is no longer directly proportional. 
Prices have increased significantly not only in 
the centre, but also west of the centre, and along 
the border with Espoo, where many high-tech 
companies have set up offices (ibid). This has 
increased segmentation in the housing market, 
and influenced the patterns of socio-spatial and 
ethnic segregation in the metropolitan area (see 
also Chapter 5).
2.4.2.  Tenure segmentation
The distribution of households across housing 
and tenure types is affected by income and family 
composition. About 37 per cent of owner-occu-
pied property comprises two-person households, 
and 31 per cent single-person households, where-
as the corresponding figures in the rental sector 
are 25 and 59 per cent. The majority of people 
living alone (62 per cent) are housed in apart-
ment blocks, whereas detached housing domi-
nates among all other household types. How-
ever, 85 per cent of households in Helsinki live 
in apartments, including 61 per cent of families 
comprising four or more people.
There are differences in tenure segmentation 
between foreign nationals and Finnish citizens. 
This is partly attributable to differences in age 
and family structures, and partly to differences 
in income levels. High immigrant concentration 
in major urban areas also helps to explain the 
proportion of immigrants in rented accommo-
dation, which is in any case the most prevalent 
housing type in urban areas. How much of the 
segmentation is caused by discrimination and 
the role of different gate-keepers are open ques-
tions. However, there are also clear differenc-
es in tenure distribution among the immigrant 
groups (Table 11). 
Tenure-type distribution among Nordic and 
West European immigrants closely resembles 
that of Finnish nationals: 56 per cent of Nordic 
migrants and 53 per cent of West Europeans own 
their homes. The most noticeable difference ap-
pears among immigrants from Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca: less than seven per cent are owner-occupiers, 
and a smaller proportion live in private rental 
accommodation than among the other groups. 
In fact, most of them (74 per cent) live in social 
rental dwellings. Within this group, the division is 
Table 10. Household housing costs by tenure type and region in 2006 (Statistics Finland 2010b).
Disposable 
income, €
Housing 
costs, €
Shortage 
of debts, €
Housing 
loans, €
Housing costs' 
share of 
disposable 
income, %
All tenure types
Whole country 22 847 3 894 1 066 15 478 17
Helsinki metropolitan area 27 491 4 999 1 464 19 416 18.2
Owner-occupied
Whole country 25 533 3 442 1 476 22 031 13.5
Helsinki metropolitan area 33 256 4 305 2 411 33 642 13
Rented housing
Whole country 17 150 4 797 203 1 669 28
Helsinki metropolitan area 20 545 5 786 312 2 086 28.2
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even more clear-cut: almost 80 per cent of Soma-
lis live in social rental housing, and more than 95 
per cent altogether live in rented accommodation, 
whereas 60 per cent of North Africans and West 
Asians live in social rental housing (Table 11).
Housing segmentation among immigrants 
tends to change the longer they stay in their 
new host country. In 2008, only 14 per cent of 
all foreign nationals owned a house, and 17 per 
cent owned a flat (see Table 11). However, the 
corresponding figures for people born outside of 
Finland but who had been in the country long 
enough to gain Finnish citizenship were 28 and 
25 per cent. This suggests that the prospects of 
home ownership among immigrants improve 
over time. Recent research conducted by Lin-
nanmäki-Koskela and Niska (2010) supports this 
assumption: the longer immigrants stay in Fin-
land, the more likely they are to change from 
rental housing to owner occupation (ibid.).1149 
The income level of households living in 
rental housing is notably lower than those liv-
ing in other types of accommodation (Figure 
9). The segmentation of the housing market is 
more marked among non-Finnish households, 
which are over-represented in social-rental ac-
commodation in all income groups. Even among 
11  According to the research findings, of the immigrants 
who had arrived in Finland between 1989 and 1993, 
only 24 per cent were living in owner-occupied 
accommodation in 1997, rising to 30 per cent in 2004, 
and 40 per cent in 2007. Ascent up the housing ladder 
is thus slow, and the speed varies among the different 
nationalities (Linnanmäki-Koskela & Niska 2010). 
Figure 9. Tenure types by income deciles among non-Finnish households and all households 
(Statistics Finland 2010c).
Nationality
Owns a 
house
Owns a 
flat
Private 
rental
Social 
housing Other Total
Finnish 46.4 26.8 10.6 12.6 3.5 100
Foreign nationals in total 13.8 17.4 20.8 43.1 4.9 100
Nordic 35 21 20.5 17.2 6.3 100
West European 23.3 29.9 23.2 17 6.7 100
East European 13.6 15.7 19.8 46.3 4.6 100
North African or West Asian 3.6 9.4 22.3 60.4 4.3 100
Sub-Saharan African 1.8 4.8 16.8 73.6 3.1 100
Asian (other than West Asia) 11.6 23.1 21.9 38.5 5 100
Latin American 13.7 28.5 25.7 27.1 5 100
North American & Australian 21 30.2 26.2 16.3 6.2 100
Total* 45.5 26.6 10.9 13.4 3.5 100
Tenure type in 2008
Table 11. Tenure segmentation in 2008 by nationality (Statistics Finland 2010c).
* Excluding institutionalised and homeless persons
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the highest income decile almost ten per cent of 
households with foreign members live in social 
rental housing, compared with only two per cent 
of native households (Table 12). Home owner-
ship is more rare among the fifth decile group 
of households with foreign nationals than among 
the lowest two deciles of native households, both 
on the national level and in the Helsinki metro-
politan area. Thus, income level is not the only 
factor explaining the differences in tenure seg-
mentation between immigrant and native popu-
lations.
2.4.3.  Housing quality
Overcrowding and occupant density
There have been dramatic decreases in occupant 
density in Finland. However, Finnish dwellings 
are relatively smaller than dwellings in other Eu-
ropean countries. The average area of the Finnish 
housing stock in 2002 is 77 m2 ˗ falling to 71 
m2 in the Helsinki region and 68 m2 in the met-
ropolitan area. By way of comparison, the av-
erage area in Denmark is 109 m2, and 98 m2 in 
the Netherlands (Lappalainen et al. 2002). These 
differences persist even though there are no real 
differences in household size. 
In 2008, the average living space per per-
son in Finland was 38.6 m2, or 1.8 rooms . This 
is mostly attributable to the high proportion of 
smaller housing units in the housing stock: 24 
per cent of all homes had just one or two rooms, 
and 44 per cent had three or four rooms, exclud-
ing the kitchen (Table 13). There are also differ-
ences in occupant density between family types. 
In Helsinki, for instance, the decrease in occupant 
density has not been as marked in larger fami-
lies as in single-person households (Lankinen 
and Lönnqvist 2010).
Housing standards and amenities
In general, the standard of housing is very high 
in Finland compared to the EU average (Table 
14). A very small per centage of Finnish house-
holds live in conditions of severe deprivation in 
terms of overcrowding and poor amenities,1250 
and the numbers have continued to fall since 
the turn of the century. Deprivation is very rare 
among owner-occupiers, amounting to only 0.4 
per cent among those with a mortgage or housing 
loan (Eurostat 2010). The rate of severe housing 
deprivation is slightly higher among households 
living in private rental accommodation, but still 
only 1.9 per cent. What is noticeable is the lower 
rate (1.4 per cent) among households living in 
social housing than among those in the private 
rental market (1.9 per cent). The Finnish policy 
of state-subsidised housing construction has thus 
kept the standard of social housing high. 
On the Nordic level, Finland has lower rates 
of deprivation than Sweden, for instance, where 
3.4 per cent of private tenants and 6.6 per cent 
of state-subsidised tenants live in conditions of 
severe deprivation. These rates are partly attrib-
utable to the overcrowded immigrant households 
with poor amenities.
2.5.  The current housing policy
When Finland became a welfare society the state 
input in housing policy started to increase, reach-
ing peak levels during the construction boom of 
the 1960s and 1970s, and the recession years of 
the early 1990s. There have been changes in state 
control of the housing markets, and in support 
for housing construction since the 1990s. Reg-
ulation of private rental markets was abolished 
in the early 1990s, and the production of social 
housing has been concentrated more in econom-
12  Poor amenities include a leaking roof, the lack of a 
bath/shower or indoor toilet, and a lack of light. 
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Table 12. The representation of income groups in different types of accommodation among native 
households and households with foreign nationals (Statistics Finland 2010c).
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Table 14. Severe housing deprivation by tenure status (Eurostat 2010).
Table 15. Dwellings by amenities in 1960˗2008 (Statistics Finland).
Table 13. Occupant densities, 1950˗2008 (Statistics Finland).
Year
Persons per
 100 rooms
Floor area per 
dwelling, m2
Floor area 
per person
Number of 
1 – 2
rooms
3 – 4 5 +
1950 152 . . . . 57.3 33.2 9.4
1960 131 51.0 14.3 48.6 41.8 9.6
1970 103 60.0 18.9 37.2 45.8 16.5
1980 78 69.0 26.3 29.8 46.6 23.1
1990 67 74.4 31.4 25.0 46.2 28.1
2000 60 76.5 35.3 24.5 45.0 29.5
2002 58 77.0 36.3 24.5 44.6 29.9
2003 58 77.3 36.7 24.4 44.5 30.1
2004 57 77.6 37.1 24.4 44.3 30.3
2005 57 78.1 37.5 24.1 44.2 30.6
2006 57 78.4 38.0 24.0 44.0 30.9
2007 56 78.8 38.3 23.9 43.8 31.2
2008 55 79.1 38.6 23.8 43.7 31.4
Owner occupied, no 
mortgage or housing 
loan
Owner occupied, with 
mortgage or housing loan
Private rental Social housing
2004 0.5 0.7 2.2 1.4
2005 0.7 0.1 2.9 2.3
2006 0.3 0.3 2.2 2.3
2007 0.5 0.3 1.9 1.6
2008 0.2 0.4 1.9 1.4
EU15 1.2 2.4 8.2 7.4
EU27 1.8 8.9 9.2 12.2
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008
Dwellings total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sewer 52 74 90 97 99 98
Piped water 47 72 89 95 98 98
Flush toilet 35 61 84 93 95 97
Warm water 23 52 80 90 96 97
Bathing facilities 16 39 68 88 99 99
Central heating 31 56 80 89 92 93
Sauna .. .. 30 42 48 53
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ic growth centres, and targeted mostly at groups 
in special need. The policy emphasis has shifted 
to questions related to climate change and the 
aim to create and maintain socially, economi-
cally and environmentally sustainable residen-
tial areas. The growing need to increase housing 
production in urban areas, to promote the ener-
gy-efficient and socio-economically sustainable 
renovation of the housing stock in the suburbs 
and to prevent further urban sprawl has been a 
topic for lively discussion in the 2000s. 
According to current government policy, 
“The aims of the housing policy are to ensure 
a socially and regionally balanced and stable 
housing market, to eliminate homelessness and 
to increase the supply of moderately priced land 
for construction” (Ministry of the Environment 
2010). The programme for tackling long-term 
homelessness in 2008˗2011 has been very suc-
cessful. The concrete and quantitative target to 
build 1,250 new homes for the long-term home-
less has been met and even exceeded ˗ approx-
imately 1,600 new homes are expected to be 
available by the end of 2011.
In 2007, the Government launched a new 
policy covering the development of the Helsinki 
metropolitan area. The major plans include in-
creasing housing production, enhancing the in-
ternational competitiveness of the Helsinki re-
gion, and coordinating a coherent immigration 
policy. This is the first time that immigration is-
sues have been discussed in conjunction with the 
wider questions of housing and urban develop-
ment on the national level. Unlike the other Nor-
dic countries, Finland has, until recently, lacked 
a national “Big City” policy.
3.  Immigration flows, policies 
and practices in Finland
Hanna Dhalmann & Saara Yousfi
3.1.  The development of immigration 
3.1.1.  A country of emigration until the 1980s
Due to its late industrialisation and relatively 
strict migration policy after the Second World 
War, Finland has not experienced major immi-
gration flows. Changes in the political climate 
and the labour-market situation in recent decades 
have resulted in increasing foreign migration, but 
the proportion of residents born outside of Fin-
land, at just 4.4 per cent in 2009, is still consid-
erably lower than in the other Nordic countries.
Finland’s immigration history has been af-
fected, first of all, by its geopolitical position 
between the East and the West (Paananen 1999; 
Forsander et al. 2004). There were relatively 
many foreign residents during the first decades 
after independence in 1917, most of whom came 
from Russia/ the Soviet Union and other nearby 
countries such as Sweden and Germany (Lepola 
2000: 40). However, the number of foreigners 
started to decline after World War II. Finland 
also protected itself actively from new foreign 
migration. In particular, the refugee policy was 
viewed as a sensitive foreign-policy issue that 
was part of the power struggle between the East 
and the West, and it was therefore better not to 
get involved (ibid: 44˗45). 
Another reason for the low level of immi-
gration flow was the constant over-supply of 
domestic labour, which was attributable to high 
labour-force participation among women, large 
age groups after the Second World War, and eco-
nomic restructuring from agriculture to industry 
and services. Finland lost a substantial part of its 
territory to the Soviet Union as a result of the 
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war, and needed to resettle nearly 10 per cent of 
its population. These evacuees were given agri-
cultural land, which resulted in small farm sizes 
and threatened the livelihood of people living in 
the countryside. Mechanisation in the agriculture 
and forestry industries in the 1950s and 1960s 
further decreased the demand for labour in these 
sectors, leaving a large proportion of the popula-
tion to seek a living elsewhere.
The above-mentioned developments con-
tributed to the mass emigration of tens of thou-
sands of people. This labour migration, most-
ly to Sweden, was facilitated by The Common 
Nordic Labour Market Act signed in 1954. On 
average, almost 21,000 people a year emigrated 
in 1960˗1979. The most intensive period was 
1969 and 1970, when more than 53,000 people 
left, resulting in net population loss of around 
40,000 (Figure 10). 
Even in the 1970s, out-migration from Fin-
land followed the employment trend in Sweden. 
Many migrants returned after a couple of years 
and immigration to Finland consisted mainly of 
these Finnish returnees. In fact, there were more 
immigrants from the Nordic countries than from 
the rest of the world. The focus of the Finn-
ish migration policy was therefore on reducing 
emigration and attracting Finnish returnees. Fin-
land received its first refugees in the 1970s when 
around 200 people from Chile and 100 people 
from Vietnam were allowed into the country for 
humanitarian reasons at the request of UNHCR.
3.1.2.  Changing migration flows ˗ 
from emigration to immigration
The direction of migration changed in the 1980s 
when Finland started to receive more immigrants 
than it lost through emigration (see Figure 10). 
An average 12,000 people a year came into the 
country, but it should be noted that most of these 
were still Finnish returnees from Sweden. Remi-
gration and marriage to a Finnish citizen were the 
main reasons for moving to Finland (Forsander 
2002). Humanitarian immigration from South-
East Asia continued, and in 1986 the Finnish Par-
liament set a quota limiting the number of refu-
gees Finland would commit to receiving annually 
to 100, although this was raised to 500 per year 
in 1989. Refugees were also admitted through 
an asylum procedure, but the number of appli-
cants was rather insignificant (Mykkänen 1998). 
The proportion of immigrants in the total 
Figure 10. The migration balance (Statistics Finland 2010c).
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population was still low in the mid-1980s, at 
only one per cent. Changes in the migration pol-
icy, mostly resulting from the changes in the po-
litical climate and the labour-market situation, 
led to rapid growth in foreign immigration in 
the 1990s. The biggest changes compared to the 
situation in the 1980s were in the structure of 
the immigration. In other words, the flow from 
the Nordic countries slowed down whereas there 
was a substantial increase in numbers from Af-
rica, Western Asian and, in particular, Eastern 
Europe (Figure 11). 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union had a 
big impact on Finnish foreign and migration pol-
icy (see Lepola 2000: 46). It meant opening the 
eastern border to immigration and establishing 
more active relations with other European coun-
tries. There were also signs of a labour shortage in 
the biggest Finnish cities at the end of the 1980s, 
which further boosted the demand for a more lib-
eral migration policy. Finland’s accession to the 
Council of Europe (1989), the European agree-
ment on human rights (1990) and membership 
of the European Union (1995) all affected Finn-
ish legislation concerning immigrants. 
One notable alteration to the migration pol-
icy concerned the remigration of Ingrian Finns. 
In 1990, President Koivisto issued a statement 
granting returnee status to ethnic Finns living in 
the Soviet Union. This mainly concerned Ingrian 
Finns whose ancestors had moved to ‘Ingerman-
land’, a region in North-West Russia, in the 17th 
century. They were thus acknowledged as eth-
nic Finns, but were not descendants of Finnish 
citizens. Nevalainen (1991: 297) assigns labour-
force related motives to the changes in official 
opinions concerning the remigration of Ingrian 
Finns. He mentions the pressure to liberate Finn-
ish migration policy, glasnost in the Soviet Un-
ion and the topicality of “the Ingrian issue” as 
reasons affecting the decision. 
Ingrian Finns were regarded as normal re-
turnees at first, not subject to any special legis-
lation, but a law was introduced in 1996 setting 
out more detailed criteria (Laki ulkomaalaislain... 
511/1996): at least two of the returnee’s grand-
parents had to be ethnic Finns. Against all expec-
tations, the returnees’ knowledge of the Finnish 
society, culture and language was often inad-
equate. In order to promote integration and to 
facilitate their reception in municipalities, since 
2003 Ingrian Finns have been required to com-
plete a re-entry orientation programme prior to 
their arrival in Finland, and to have proficiency 
in Finnish or Swedish equal to the A2 level (ba-
sic ability) of the European Council’s Common 
European Framework. They must also have pre-
arranged accommodation in Finland. 
Figure 11. Immigration to Finland in 1987˗2008, volumes by regions of origin (Statistics Finland). 
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Returnees from the former Soviet Union, 
Russia and Estonia formed a significant propor-
tion of the ‘supply-driven’ immigration in the 
recent flow (see Figure 11), and by 2004 Fin-
land had received approximately 25,000 Ingrian 
returnees (Tanner 2004: 3). Remigration among 
ethnic Finns has thus created a sizable Russo-
phone minority in the country. Applications for 
residence on the grounds of Ingrian returnee sta-
tus are no longer accepted, but outstanding ap-
plications are processed according to the old law. 
The first group of asylum seekers arrived 
in Finland from Somalia in 1990 followed by 
groups from other countries: there were 18,292 
applications for asylum between 1990 and 1999. 
By far the biggest groups came from the former 
Yugoslavia, Somalia and the former Soviet Un-
ion, and some hundreds came from Iraq, Turkey 
and Iran. The annual refugee quota was raised 
from 500 to 650 at the end of the decade. 
Even if the immigrant population grew nota-
bly in the 1990s, it remained considerably small-
er than in the other Nordic countries. For exam-
ple, around 14,700 people obtained a residence 
permit through Finnish refugee and asylum pro-
cedures or related family reunification in 1987–
1997, compared to 37,300 in Norway, 61,700 in 
Denmark and 200,800 in Sweden (Lepola 2000: 
49). It should also be noted that the first policy 
definition and long-term political White Paper 
on immigration and refugee policy were pub-
lished as late as in 1997 (Hallittu maahanmuut-
to... 1997: 93; see also Leitzinger 2008). 
3.1.3.  A continuing increase in immigration
The number of immigrants has continued to grow 
significantly in the 2000s. The annual number of 
arrivals is almost 22,000 with net migration ris-
ing to 15,000 in both 2008 and 2009. The pro-
portion of immigrants in the population therefore 
doubled from 1.3 per cent at the beginning of the 
1990s to 2.6 per cent in 2000, and 4.4 per cent 
in 2009. The bulk of them settled in the Helsinki 
region and other major urban areas, where the 
proportion was higher than the national average: 
in Helsinki, for instance, the share of foreign citi-
zens in 2009 was 6.7 per cent.
There were also some changes in the struc-
ture of immigration in the 2000s. There has been 
little labour migration to Finland compared with 
many other western industrial countries. The re-
cruitment of foreign labour started on a small 
scale during the 1980s, but stopped on account 
of the deep recession of the 1990s (Forsander 
and Ekholm 2001: 112–113). It started again 
at the beginning of the 2000s when ICT-driv-
en economic growth and the ageing population 
structure resulted in labour shortages in certain 
trades (e.g., ICT, construction and health care). 
This also shifted the orientation of the migration 
policy towards attracting foreign labour. For the 
first time the labour-market goals in the Immi-
gration Policy Programme that became effec-
tive in October 2006 were consonant with views 
supporting migration for humanitarian reasons. 
Foreign students were also considered potential 
Table 16. Granted residence permits by category in 2006˗2009 (Maahanmuuttoviraston... 2010).
Employed 
persons
Self-
employed 
persons
Of 
Finnish 
origin
Students Other 
grounds
Family 
tie
Family to 
Finnish 
citizens
Total
2006 2 872 58 368 3 196 2 186 3 495 621 12 787
2007 5 280 68 374 3 810 2 710 4 321 708 17 287
2008 5 930 67 395 4 496 2 934 5 069 715 19 606
2009 2 883 57 474 3 993 2 497 4 574 730 15 208
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members of the labour force. In line with the new 
immigration policy, labour migration to Finland 
started to grow in 2007–2008, but the volumes 
decreased again in 2009 due to the economic 
recession (Table 16).
Despite the changes in political attitudes to-
wards encouraging labour migration, it is still 
highly regulated. Foreigners who are not EU citi-
zens or the equivalent and intend to take up paid 
employment in Finland need a residence permit 
for an employed person. They have to apply for 
and receive the permit abroad. Eligibility for such 
permits is assessed in accordance with the need 
for foreign labour for the work in question. If it 
is a field in which there is domestic unemploy-
ment it might be rejected. This consideration of 
labour availability in the domestic market does 
not apply to upper or middle managers, vari-
ous experts or seasonal workers, for example. 
The assessment also covers the adequacy of the 
working conditions, whether the potential em-
ployer is authorised to employ people, and the 
adequacy of the foreigner’s livelihood, especially 
in the case of part-time work. The Finnish work-
permit procedure has recently been the subject 
of political debate, viewed in some quarters as 
complicated and obscure (Government migra-
tion... 2006), and in others such as the trade un-
ions, as necessary.
The amount of humanitarian immigration al-
so increased slightly in the 2000s. The annual ref-
ugee quota was raised to 750 in 2001, but was not 
filled every year. The number of asylum seekers 
grew from a yearly average of 1,800 in the 1990s 
to almost 3,300 in the 2000s. However, there has 
been a decrease in the proportion of positive de-
cisions (from 36 per cent to 22 per cent) (Finnish 
Immigration Service 2010). In general, Finland 
has tried to weaken its attraction as a destination 
country in order to minimise groundless appli-
cations. One motivating factor in this was the 
notion that asylum seekers receive more finan-
cial support in Finland than in the other Nordic 
countries (see Näkökulmia... 2009: 28).
All in all, the number of granted asylums 
has been very small in Finland, only 508 during 
1990˗2009 although over 13,000 have been giv-
en a residence permit on protection and several 
other grounds. The main countries of origin of 
these people are Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia: 
those granted asylum, and their reunified family 
members, 28 per cent originate from North Afri-
ca and West Asia, 28 per cent from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 22 per cent from Eastern Europe, and 20 
per cent from other Asian countries. 
Family formation continues to be a signifi-
cant factor in attracting foreigners to Finland in 
the 2000s, as it has been throughout Finland’s im-
migration history. Between 25 and 33 per cent of 
immigrants arriving during the 1990s were mar-
ried to a Finn by the end of their first year. This 
applied especially to those coming from OECD 
countries (47 per cent of the men and 32 per 
cent of the women), and only to a minor extent 
to those from Finland’s neighbouring countries 
(five per cent) and third-world countries (five per 
cent of the men and one per cent of the women) 
(Hämäläinen et al. 2005). The annual number 
of marriages between Finnish and non-Finnish 
citizens remained constant during the 1990s and 
2000s: between 1,200 and 1,400 Finnish women 
and 1,300˗1,600 Finnish men married a foreign 
partner. Nevertheless, only about 700 new resi-
dence permits were granted each year as a re-
sult of these multicultural marriages (Statistics 
Finland 2010).
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3.2.  Features of the 
immigrant population 
3.2.1.  Countries of origin 
The notable growth in immigration to Finland 
has resulted in some changes in the structure 
of the immigrant population. There has been a 
slight increase in numbers from the other Nor-
dic countries, but in relative terms there was a 
sharp decline from 45 per cent in 1990 to only 
15 per cent in 2009 (Figure 12). The biggest 
relative growth was in immigration from other 
European countries, from 33 to 50 per cent, and 
the proportion of non-European immigrants in-
creased from 22 to 35 per cent.
The highest proportion of immigrants comes 
from Sweden, Russia, Estonia and the former So-
viet Union (Figure 11, Table 17). This has been 
the case since 1992 when they comprised 60 per 
cent of all arriving immigrants, although this has 
fallen to 35 per cent in recent years. 
There has been less of an immigration flow 
from Germany, Norway, the USA, Great Britain 
and Spain, and the further away the country, the 
smaller is the stream (e.g., China, Thailand and 
Somalia). The net migration figures are some-
what different, however. Most permanent foreign 
residents come from Russia, Turkey and Soma-
lia, whereas most of those from other countries 
are passing through. For example, since Finland 
joined the EU, remarkably large numbers of West 
Europeans have come and gone making Finland 
a net loser in terms of population flow (Table 17). 
The differences in the length of stay are mostly 
attributable to the differing reasons for moving 
to the country.
Parental country of birth is not included in 
the official statistics. Information covering the 
whole population of foreign origin, including the 
descendants of immigrants, is thus currently best 
obtained from statistics on the foreign-language-
speaking population. These statistics do not in-
clude Swedish speakers, however, as Swedish 
is the second official language of Finland. The 
biggest foreign-language-speaking groups are 
Figure 12. The geographical composition of Finnish residents born abroad, 1990˗2010 (Statistics 
Finland).
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Russians (51,683) and Estonians (25,096), fol-
lowed by English and Somali speakers (about 
12,000). A comparison of the immigrant and the 
foreign-language-speaking populations shows 
that in 2009 there were at least 26,000 people 
who were born in Finland but had a non-native 
mother tongue (Table 18). However, these figures 
include children with at least one native Finnish 
parent who are registered as having a language 
other than Finnish as their mother tongue, as 
registration is based solely on parental declara-
tion. The registration of language matters most-
ly when the child starts school because the law 
guarantees the right to learn one’s mother tongue. 
3.2.2.  Demographic features 
The age structure of immigrants differs from that 
of native Finns. Around 17 per cent of residents 
born in Finland are over 65 years of age, the pro-
portion dropping to five per cent among those 
born abroad, and only one per cent among groups 
from Asia and Africa. The proportion of work-
ing-age people is 19 per centage points higher 
among immigrants than among the Finns, and 
there are big differences in age structures among 
the immigrant groups (Figure 13).
In terms of gender, the structures of the immi-
grant and the Finnish population are quite simi-
lar. However, in contrast to Sweden and in line 
with the common gender composition among 
international immigrants, there are slightly more 
male than female foreign citizens living in Fin-
land. One reason for the difference is that the 
immigrant population is small in number, and 
the reasons for immigration are country-specif-
ic and partly related to gender. There are more 
males among the immigrants from Western Eu-
rope (70 per cent), North America and Oceania 
(64 per cent), as well as from North Africa and 
Table 17. Received immigrants and net migration during 1987˗2009 from the main countries of origin 
(Statistics Finland 2010)
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Western Asia (63 per cent). However, females 
dominate in the main immigrant groups: 59 per 
cent of Russians and 53 per cent of Estonians, 
thereby stabilising the aforementioned bias. Of 
the female immigrant groups, Russians (16,617) 
and Estonians (13,443) remain the biggest but 
Thais (3,895) stand out in third place. The high-
est proportion of foreign women marrying Finn-
ish men come from these groups. 
3.2.3.  Socioeconomic features
At the end of the 1980s, the socioeconomic posi-
tion of immigrants was, on average, better than 
that of native Finns: they were relatively more 
likely to work as officials, entrepreneurs or ex-
perts. Moreover, the first refugees found employ-
ment relatively easily: 93 per cent of the adult 
refugees admitted in 1979˗1986 were employed 
after the integration training. 
Table 18. Population composition in Finland in 2009
Country of birth, total 5 351 427  Languages, total 5 351 427
 Finland 5 118 244  Finnish 4 852 209
 Foreign country total 233 183  Swedish 290 392
 Foreign languages total 207 037
 Former Soviet Union 47 307  Russian 51 683
 Sweden 30 966  Estonian 25 096
 Estonia 21 761  English 12 063
 Russian Federation 7 339  Somali 11 681
 Somalia 7 110  Arabic 9 682
 China 6 591  Kurdish 7 135
 Iraq 6 180  Chinese 7 078
 Thailand 6 108  Albanian 6 736
 Former Yugoslavia 6 074  Vietnamese 5 313
 Germany 5 770  German 5 276
 Turkey 4 890  Thai 5 143
 United Kingdom 4 367  Turkish 5 068
 Viet Nam 4 251  Persian 4 548
 Spanish 4 252
 The groups with more than 4000  The groups with more than 4000 
Figure 13. The age distribution of immigrants by region of origin in 2009 (Statistics Finland 2010c).
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The situation changed in the 1990s with the 
increase in immigration and the coincident eco-
nomic recession and mass unemployment (For-
sander 2001: 60˗61). Relatively unstable jobs 
replaced the more stable ones, and immigrants 
were at the forefront of this development (For-
sander 2002: 140˗144). As a result, the employ-
ment situation declined quickly among both es-
tablished and more recent immigrants. The un-
employment rate among foreign nationals rose 
to three times as high as the overall rate (Sal-
menhaara 2008: 15). The situation has improved 
somewhat in recent years (around 18 per cent in 
2008) on account of the economic recovery, but 
the unemployment rate is still more than double 
that of native Finns (around 8 per cent in 2008). 
In addition to having a higher unemploy-
ment rate, immigrants are more likely than na-
tive Finns to work in jobs that do not correspond 
to their educational level, and in low-wage sec-
tors such as cleaning, transportation and cater-
ing. Their labour-market position is also often 
volatile: fixed-term contracts, part-time jobs and 
discontinuous careers are common, particularly 
among women (Forsander et al. 2004). Immi-
grants are also more likely to be outside of the 
labour force: 60 per cent of those of working-age 
had jobs in 2008, the relative per centage among 
native Finns being 75 (Figure 14; Table 19).
There is an ethnic hierarchy in the labour 
market. People born in Nordic and other Western 
countries are the most successful, whereas those 
moving to Finland mainly for humanitarian rea-
sons have the highest unemployment rates. In ad-
dition, the employment rate, in other words, the 
proportion of those of working age in employ-
ment, is highest among immigrants from Nordic 
(71 per cent) and Western European (61 per cent) 
countries, and lowest among those from Africa 
and Western Asia (slightly over 40 per cent). 
The generally improved economic situation in 
the 2000s had a positive effect on the employ-
ment situation among all immigrant groups. East-
ern Europeans and Sub Saharan Africans faced 
the biggest change with a 20-per centage-unit 
reduction in unemployment (Table 19). 
Even if immigrant entrepreneurship is low in 
Finland in international terms, it is on a higher 
level (16 per cent) than among natives (10 per 
cent). Immigrant entrepreneurs are typically in 
the wholesale trade, professional services or the 
food and restaurant business. The higher levels 
Figure 14.  The main types of activity by country group in 2008 (Statistics Finland 2010c).
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Table 19. The main types of activity in 1999 and 2008 (Statistics Finland 2010c).
Table 20. Work-income deciles in 2005 and 2008: per centages of people by national decile groups 
(Statistics Finland 2010c).
Year 1+2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total (N)
2005 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2685582
2008 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2793940
2005 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2637580
2008 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2725099
2005 19 12 12 10 9 9 9 8 11 4672
2008 18 11 12 10 9 10 11 9 10 4905
2005 18 12 11 9 7 7 8 10 20 6565
2008 18 11 11 8 8 7 8 11 20 8194
2005 26 15 17 13 8 7 6 4 4 22734
2008 21 15 19 14 9 8 7 5 4 33330
2005 48 17 14 7 4 3 3 2 2 3614
2008 41 18 17 8 5 4 3 2 2 5415
2005 42 20 17 8 5 4 3 2 1 2773
2008 35 19 20 10 6 3 3 2 1 4757
2005 30 17 16 10 5 4 4 4 9 4954
2008 29 17 19 10 5 4 5 5 6 8756
2005 35 18 14 8 7 4 3 4 7 757
2008 31 17 16 9 6 5 5 5 7 1189
2005 21 11 12 8 6 6 7 11 18 1457
2008 21 12 11 8 6 6 7 10 19 1641
North America, Australia, 
Oceania
Latin America
Rest of Asia
Sub Saharan Africa
North Africa, Western Asia
Eastern European
Other Western European
Nordic countries
Finland
Total
Country group Income deciles
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of entrepreneurship are attributed to the employ-
ment difficulties on the open labour market in-
novativeness, and the willingness among immi-
grants to take risks (Maahanmuuttajayrittäjyys... 
2007: 22˗25).
The relatively weak employment situation of 
immigrants naturally affects their economic well-
being. Approximately half of immigrant families 
with children were on a low income in 2005, 
compared with 20 per cent among native Finns 
(Hämäläinen et al. 2005; Lapsi- ja... 2007). The 
prevalence of single parenthood and large fami-
lies also increases the poverty risk among certain 
immigrant groups. For example, single mother-
hood is significantly more common among So-
mali (43 per cent), Vietnamese (40 per cent) and 
Russian (27 per cent) women than among native 
Finns (17 per cent) (Martikainen 2007). 
Immigrants with a refugee background have 
significantly lower incomes than both the na-
tive population and immigrants from Nordic 
and Western European countries (Table 20). 
This concentration in the lowest income groups 
is also evident in the statistics on social assis-
tance: around 10 per cent of Estonians, 21 per 
cent of Russians, and 38 per cent of the immi-
grants with a refugee background were in receipt 
of it in 2000, compared with only four per cent of 
the overall population (Hämäläinen et al. 2005; 
Paananen 2005).
4.  Integration policies and 
legislation in Finland
Katja Vilkama & Saara Yousfi 
4.1.  Integration policy
The Finnish integration policy was developed to 
provide national guidelines for the local proce-
dures supporting the integration of the increas-
ing immigrant population. The drafting of the 
policy was in line with Finland’s responsibilities 
as a new EU member state since 1995. The Inte-
gration Act (Act on the Integration... 493/1999) 
came into force on 1 May 1999, and has been 
modified several times in the past ten years. Prior 
to 1999, Finland had no official, national inte-
gration scheme and immigrants were dealt with 
according to existing legislation.
The Finnish Integration Act defines integra-
tion as “the personal development of immigrants, 
aimed at participation in working life and society 
while preserving their own language and cul-
ture”, and as including “the measures taken and 
resources and services provided by the authori-
ties to promote and support such integration, 
and consideration for the needs of immigrants 
in planning and providing other public servic-
es and measures” (Amendment 1215/2005).1351 
The Finnish integration policy could be char-
acterised as pluralistic. However, it has also been 
criticised for its implicit assimilative goals (see 
e.g. Kerkkänen 2008). The main responsibility 
for adaptation is placed on the immigrants. The 
authorities have a duty to pursue the realisation of 
equal opportunities and to promote ethnic equal-
ity in their work, but there is much less focus on 
the adaptive role and responsibilities of the ma-
jority population in the processes of structural, 
13  This dual scope of integration (responsibilities and the 
acculturation of immigrants, and the responsibilities and 
procedures provided by the authorities) is differentiated 
in the original Finnish version.
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cultural and social integration. 
The Integration Act defines the duties and re-
sponsibilities of different actors, and the practical 
implementation takes place at national, local and 
personal levels. The state lays down the overall 
guidelines and provides financial resources for 
the implementation of the policy. Municipali-
ties are requested to draft their own local inte-
gration programmes, specifying the action plan 
and the goals on the local level. The integration 
plans of individuals and families are the key tool 
on the personal level. All immigrants who are 
registered in a Finnish municipality, have been 
in the country for less than three years and are 
not gainfully employed have the right to an in-
dividual integration plan for three years (since 
2006, for five years in special cases). In practice, 
refugees, approved asylum seekers and Ingrian 
returnees have been the three main target groups.
The local immigrant offices draw up the per-
sonal integration plans in cooperation with the 
individuals concerned, the local social office and 
the local employment office. The plans usually 
include information on Finnish society, and give 
guidance on how professional or degree qualifi-
cations obtained abroad can be updated to meet 
the requirements of the Finnish labour market. 
Different types of job training and language in-
struction form the key elements in updating ex-
isting skills and qualifications and facilitating 
entry into Finnish working life. In special cas-
es the integration plan also include instruction 
in reading and writing, or independent studies 
for a comprehensive-school or upper-secondary-
school diploma or a professional qualification. 
Obtaining employment and achieving financial 
independence from the state ˗ through various 
kinds of courses and training ˗  are the main aims 
of the integration policy. The Integration Act is 
less explicit in other domains such as housing 
and culture (Government Report 2002: 43). Lo-
cal programmes take a more diverse approach, 
however, including both employment-related 
measures and the provision of other services.
The integration of children usually happens 
through normal school activities and day care. 
However, the municipalities are obliged to or-
ganise special tuition for immigrant children to 
prepare them for the basic education, and to pro-
vide instruction in their own native language and 
religion if their parents so request. Immigrants 
have also been given preparatory training for 
basic vocational education since 1999, the aim 
being to give students the linguistic, cultural and 
other skills required in the transition to voca-
tional education. 
According to the Integration Act, integration 
procedures should start as soon as possible af-
ter the immigrant has arrived in Finland, ideally 
within two-to-three months. This is very difficult 
to comply with in practice, however, and there 
is often another long wait for language courses.
4.2.  Settlement and spatial 
dispersal policies 
Whereas the national integration policy empha-
sises the pluralistic goals of maintaining immi-
grants’ and ethnic minorities’ own languages and 
cultural traits, the settlement policies are more 
assimilative in nature. Immigrants are free to 
choose their place of residence, but the state and 
many municipalities are quite explicit in wish-
ing to avoid ethnic residential segregation and 
to promote spatial assimilation.1452The govern-
ment advises the municipalities on the desired 
policy goals and sets the legal framework, but 
the municipalities independently decide on pol-
icy implementation.
The government drafted a framework pol-
icy on immigration and refugee reception in 
1997 advising the municipalities to prevent res-
idential segregation. The municipal authorities 
14  However, in most cases there is very little explicit 
reasoning on why dispersal is a major target. 
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were asked to ensure that the allocation of so-
cial housing would not lead to overly dense, or 
very small residential concentrations of immi-
grants, and that all neighbourhoods would main-
tain a socially and ethnically mixed population 
structure (Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös...1997: 
20). The same featured in the 2006 Immigration 
Policy Programme (Government Migration pol-
icy... 2006: 28).
All the major cities have incorporated the 
national guidelines on spatial dispersal into their 
local integration programmes, although the mu-
nicipalities differ in their approach to how vig-
orously the goal is pursued. The spatial disper-
sal of immigrants is realised through munici-
pal housing policies and urban planning. The 
allocation of social and public housing is the 
strongest direct measure influencing immigrant 
residential patterns, whereas town planning and 
zoning, in other words, land-use allocation and 
other housing-policy measures (see Chapter 2), 
are more indirect. 
Refugees and asylum seekers are the two 
groups most strongly targeted by the state 
and the municipalities with regard to their 
accommodation.1553Other immigrant groups fall 
within the scope of spatial-dispersal policies in 
a more indirect way.
The state provides accommodation for asy-
lum seekers at refugee reception centres (dis-
persed around the country) until their application 
is processed.1654Those who are granted a resi-
dence permit are directed to a specific munici-
pality and entitled to integration measures. The 
Finnish policy since 1988 has been to disperse 
refugees throughout the country. It was a measure 
15 Ingrian Finns used to be included in the groups 
receiving special treatment, but since 2003 proof of 
accommodation has been a prerequisite for receiving 
a residential permit. 
16  Asylum seekers are free to find other accommodation 
outside the reception centre if they wish, but in that 
case (starting 2010) they do not receive help with their 
living expenses. 
that was introduced as a solution to the grow-
ing problem of finding suitable housing in the 
Helsinki metropolitan area and Turku (the ma-
jor receiving cities) (Pakolaisten kuntiin...1988; 
Kokkarinen 1993). The numbers of refugees re-
mained small in the 1970s and 1980s, and there 
was no need to settle them outside of the biggest 
cities until then. The aim of the dispersal policy 
was to make refugee reception services an inte-
gral part of the mainstream social services in the 
municipalities. It was also emphasised that mu-
nicipalities receiving refugees should be able to 
provide adequate services to support integration, 
including opportunities for education and work. 
However, the sudden increase in the numbers 
of refugees and asylum seekers created a need 
to open up the policy and to include all Finnish 
municipalities. As a result, some refugees have 
been settled in small rural municipalities with 
few job opportunities and inadequate integra-
tion measures. Some researchers claim that the 
wider objectives of the regional policy have in-
fluenced the decision to disperse refugees and 
refugee reception centres throughout the country 
(Ahlberg-Leinvuo 2005). The Finnish dispersal 
policy is akin to the Swedish “Whole of Swe-
den” policy, which influenced its design in the 
first place (Kokkarinen 1993: 35). However, the 
Swedish policy was relaxed in July 1994, having 
failed to deliver the desired outcomes.
4.3.  citizenship and naturalisation
Finnish citizenship can be acquired at birth by 
descendants of Finnish citizens (jus sanguinis) 
and, under certain circumstances, through being 
born in Finland, regardless of parental nationality 
(jus soli). It is also possible to apply for citizen-
ship through naturalisation based on residence 
in Finland (jus domicili). 
In the case of naturalisation, the applicant 
must provide reliable proof of identity and meet 
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the following six general requirements, namely 
that he or she:
• has reached the age of 18 or was married 
before doing so,
• has been permanently resident and domiciled 
in Finland for the last six years without in-
terruption, or for eight years after reaching 
the age of 15, the last two years without in-
terruption, 
• has not committed any punishable act nor 
had a restraining order issued against him 
or her (integrity requirement),
• has not materially failed to provide mainte-
nance or to meet pecuniary obligations un-
der public law,
• can provide a reliable account of his or her 
livelihood,
• has satisfactory oral and written skills in the 
Finnish or Swedish language, or instead of 
oral skills similar skills in the Finnish sign 
language. 
The Nationality Act (359/2003) contains cer-
tain provisions granting exceptions to these re-
quirements. Such exceptions are frequently ap-
plied: in January 2008, exception to the resi-
dence, language or integrity requirement was 
granted in over 35 per cent of the cases, most 
frequently to the integrity requirement. On the 
other hand, even if someone meets all the require-
ments, naturalisation will be refused if it con-
flicts with the best interests of the Finnish State.
The 2003 Nationality Act allows dual or mul-
tiple nationality. However, someone with dual 
nationality may lose Finnish citizenship at the 
age of 22 if he or she lacks sufficiently close ties 
to Finland. The number of applications for Finn-
ish citizenship increased sharply when the new 
Nationality Act came into force. Those who had 
lost Finnish citizenship or who were descendants 
of Finnish or former Finnish citizens were given 
until May 2008 to regain it by making the ap-
propriate declaration. 
Table 21 shows the number of successful ap-
plications for Finnish citizenship in 1990˗2008 
Nordic 
countries
Other 
Western 
European
Eastern 
European
North 
Africa, 
Western 
Asia
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
Other 
Asia
Latin 
America
North 
America, 
Australia, 
Oceania Total
1990 1 139 147 154 92 34 72 41 50 1 729
1991 1 542 225 206 151 28 122 45 67 2 386
1992 1 039 51 293 85 40 119 48 11 1 686
1993 954 42 293 81 34 166 39 6 1 615
1994 745 36 212 60 27 121 32 11 1 244
1995 772 31 200 90 20 115 27 3 1 258
1996 1 092 18 238 176 31 239 30 6 1 830
1997 1 545 38 366 246 55 367 46 8 2 671
1998 4 170 68 1 025 657 600 829 70 13 7 432
1999 4 824 66 1 452 388 1 330 343 34 11 8 448
2000 3 032 65 1 267 491 452 378 68 14 5 767
2001 2 783 70 1 062 482 324 428 80 11 5 240
2002 3 116 60 1 180 557 326 537 92 5 5 873
2003 4 626 91 2 705 630 338 437 63 61 8 951
2004 7 035 170 3 951 1 201 312 601 105 168 13 543
2005 5 897 140 3 211 918 544 325 64 157 11 256
2006 4 628 99 2 149 993 579 217 35 82 8 782
2007 4 994 118 2 389 1 038 592 303 45 84 9 563
2008 6 967 160 3 303 1 479 764 346 69 163 13 251
Table 21. Successful applications for Finnish citizenship by former citizenship, 1990˗2008 (Statistics 
Finland)
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by country of former citizenship. The impact of 
the allowing of dual citizenship since 2003 is 
clearly visible in the figures. The table also indi-
cates the different migration histories (the length 
of stay) of the immigrant groups. The number of 
naturalisations increased in each group after the 
required six years of residence. The number of 
applications for citizenship declined significantly 
in 2009. One reason for this may have been the 
new stricter language requirements, which re-
sulted in more negative decisions with regard to 
citizenship applications in the preceding years. 
Ten per cent of applications were rejected in 2009 
(Maahanmuuttoviraston...2010).
The requirement to have satisfactory written 
and oral skills in Finnish or Swedish in order to 
be granted Finnish citizenship puts pressure on 
the providers of the language courses that are 
an important part of the integration scheme. The 
language requirements also put some immigrant 
groups in a disadvantaged position, specifically 
illiterate refugees and single stay-at-home moth-
ers of large families. 
4.4.  The rights and 
benefits of immigrants
Over and above its official integration policies, 
Finland also complies with international agree-
ments concerning the rights of foreign residents. 
The Non-Discrimination Act, effective since 
2004, forbids all kinds of discrimination. The 
Act applies not only to recruitment and work-
ing conditions, but also to career advancement, 
training, access to self-employment and other 
means of livelihood. In order to ensure that they 
receive the services to which they are due, and 
that they will be fully understood, immigrants 
have the right to use an interpreter in administra-
tive matters. Linguistic equality is also promoted 
through producing and translating brochures and 
forms covering the services offered by the vari-
ous authorities in the main minority languages.
Political rights
Nordic and EU nationals have the right to vote in 
municipal elections. Nationals of all other coun-
tries may vote if they have lived in Finland for 
more than two years before the election. They 
are also eligible to stand for election as members 
of the municipal councils (Kuntalaki 365/1995). 
Voting in parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions is restricted to Finnish citizens. 
Immigrants have the right to join and estab-
lish associations, and to apply for and receive 
public funding for their non-governmental organ-
isations or associations. The state is committed 
to supporting immigrant initiatives and to pro-
moting the civic activities of cultural minorities 
(Gov. Immigration Policy 2006: 16).
The right to work
All foreigners who have a permanent residence 
permit are entitled to work in Finland. Integra-
tion measures introduced by the state and the 
municipalities support immigrant entry into the 
labour market.
Non-Finns who have been granted a tem-
porary residence permit are entitled to work, al-
though there are certain restrictions covering de-
gree students, as well as asylum seekers with a 
temporary residence permit issued on the basis of 
the Aliens Act (301/2004), section 511755(Issuing 
residence permits in cases in which aliens can-
not be removed from the country), for example. 
Asylum seekers have the right to work out-
side of the refugee reception centre after three 
months have passed since the submission of the 
application for asylum. The aim is to encourage 
17  Prior to 2009, asylum seekers who were allowed to 
stay on a temporary basis because it was not possible 
to send them back to their countries of origin (Aliens 
Act 301/2004, section 51) had no right to work at all. 
This strongly affected their chances of integrating into 
Finnish society, and left them dependant on social 
assistance.
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active participation and to prevent marginalisa-
tion during the application process.
The Aliens Act (301/2004) was amended in 
2006 in order to promote the entry of students 
from the so-called third-world countries into the 
Finnish labour market, making it easier for those 
who graduate to obtain a temporary work permit. 
Foreigners have the same rights and duties as 
Finns in working life. However, there have been 
a number of cases in recent years in which the 
legal rights of foreign workers have been vio-
lated by private entrepreneurs.
Rights to housing
Immigrants and foreign nationals living in Fin-
land have the same rights to housing as Finns (for 
more on the functional structure of the housing 
market in Finland see Chapter 2). All residents 
are entitled to apply for social housing, regard-
less of their nationality. Foreign nationals have 
been able to buy and possess property and apart-
ments since the turn of the 1990s. 
Rights to social security and other social services 
Eligibility for Finnish social-security benefits 
provided by the Social Insurance Institution of 
Finland (KELA) is based on residence in Finland. 
All permanent residents are eligible regardless of 
their nationality. Immigrants or asylum seekers 
who have been granted a temporary permit (e.g., 
degree students, exchange students and asylum 
seekers with temporary permits on the basis of 
the Aliens Act’s section 51), are not usually eli-
gible, although there are some exceptions. KELA 
issues a decision on eligibility for social-security 
benefits when someone moves to Finland (Act on 
the Implementation of the Social Security Leg-
islation 1573/1993).
The reception of refugees, asylum seekers 
and beneficiaries of temporary protection in-
cludes accommodation, social assistance, essen-
tial social and health-care services, interpretation 
services and other help to cover their basic needs. 
Work and study activities may also be arranged.
Immigrants who have not been able to find 
gainful employment are, with certain exceptions, 
entitled to integration assistance, which consists 
of financial support of those who cooperate in the 
drawing up of an individual integration plan and 
participate in the measures and services agreed 
upon. The aim is to ensure that the immigrant 
has a secure means of support for the duration 
of the plan (see the section on integration pol-
icy). The assistance consists of labour-market 
support under the Unemployment Security Act, 
and social assistance under the Act on Social As-
sistance (1292/2002). Immigrants are not enti-
tled to general labour-market support during the 
three-year period, except in the form of integra-
tion assistance. Table 22 shows the amount of 
monthly integration assistance granted. In addi-
tion, immigrants are usually entitled to the gen-
eral housing allowance if they meet the relevant 
requirements. 
Table 22. Finnish welfare support for unemployed immigrants and asylum seekers from 1.2.2010 
onwards (Amendment to the Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers 
65/2010)
€/month Basic welfare support, 
i.e. integration 
assistance
Asylum-seeker support 
(reduced by 30 per cent)
Asylum-seeker support 
when food is offered 
(reduced by 79 per cent)
Single adult 417 292 88
Married, co-habiting 355 248 75
Child allowance, differs 
with number and age
263 184 55
Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States
238
Financial assistance for asylum seekers de-
creased by 30 per cent of the minimum amount 
of the regular integration assistance in February 
2010. The cut was introduced in an attempt to dis-
courage groundless applications. For example, a 
single adult asylum seeker could now be granted 
€ 292 per month in social assistance, which is 
supposed to cover food, clothes, transport and 
other daily expenses. If he or she is entitled to 
have meals at the refugee reception centre the 
financial assistance is reduced by 79 per cent of 
the general integration assistance, even if he or 
she does not live or eat at the centre (Table 22).
The cut in integration assistance has been crit-
icised on the grounds of false reasoning (see e.g., 
Thors 2009; Turvapaikanhakijoiden... 2010). De-
spite the relatively generous support for asylum 
seekers compared with some other European 
countries, Finland has received relatively few: 
1,505 applications were received in 2007 com-
pared with 36,207 in Sweden, with its lower fi-
nancial support (Sutter 2009). The reduction in 
financial support may well make asylum seek-
ers more passive by forcing them to stay at the 
reception centres and restricting their opportuni-
ties to integrate into society (Thors 2009; Turva-
paikanhakijoiden... 2010).
4.5.  The effects and monitoring of 
the integration-policy practices
On the European level, Finnish policies and inte-
gration legislation rank well above the EU aver-
age (see Migrant integration policy index 2007). 
The policy goals are certainly quite ambitious, 
but the implementation varies greatly among the 
local municipalities. In many cases the funding 
is insufficient, which has had an impact on the 
quality and scope of the integration measures 
provided for unemployed immigrants (see Val-
tioneuvoston selonteko kotouttamislain...2002; 
Männikkö 2010). The monitoring of the out-
comes of the measures has also proved to be 
inadequate, although some municipalities have 
been very proactive in developing monitoring 
mechanism (Männikkö 2010). 
According to the questionnaire1856sent to the 
municipalities by the Ministry of the Interior in 
2009, the use of individual integration plans that 
should, by law, be drafted for unemployed im-
migrants varies, and some municipalities do not 
prepare them at all. In general, if the plans exist, 
they usually focus on the needs of an individu-
al migrant, rather than the whole family (Män-
nikkö 2010). Co-operation between different ad-
ministrative sectors within the municipalities has 
sometimes also influenced the effectiveness of 
the integration measures, given the possible frag-
mentation of knowledge about them over differ-
ent sectors. In general, the municipalities that 
responded to the questionnaire considered the 
programmes to be a relevant part of their overall 
decision-making. At best, they appear to increase 
awareness of the importance of integration, and 
to enhance the shared commitment to consider 
the needs of immigrants in the production of 
public services (Männikkö 2010; see also Val-
tioneuvoston selonteko kotouttamislain... 2002).
The Ministry of the Interior has worked to 
improve the monitoring of the effects of integra-
tion programmes and policy practices. In 2009 
it launched a project to develop a set of indica-
tors that could be used in the future to meas-
ure the policy impacts in the field of integration 
and ethnic relations (Kotouttamisen ja etnisten... 
2009). Other European and Nordic experiences 
were closely monitored in the development of 
the indicators. A survey of existing immigrant 
services and their use was carried out in order 
to assess the municipalities’ experiences and de-
18 The questionnaire was designed to assess the quality 
and scope of local integration programmes and practices 
in different-sized municipalities. It was sent to a sample 
of 30 municipalities, of which 28 responded and had 
written local integration programmes.
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velopment needs. With regard to housing, ap-
proximately 60 per cent of the municipalities 
rated their housing services and their capability 
to respond to immigrant needs as good or very 
good, whereas around 20 per cent found them 
to be quite poorly or very poorly organised (Ko-
touttamisen ja etnisten... 2009: 48).
Immigrants were also surveyed regard-
ing their own experiences of the integration 
procedures.1957According to the results, many do 
not know enough about the meaning and pur-
pose of the practices. However, those who had 
taken part had found them quite helpful, partic-
ularly for learning Finnish or Swedish, and get-
ting to know Finland and the Finnish people. A 
smaller minority, 32 per cent of the respondents, 
had managed to get work through the integra-
tion measures (Maahanmuuttajabarometrin lop-
puraportti 2009: 41–44). Although immigrants’ 
employment opportunities have increased in Fin-
land, in general, unemployment is still consider-
ably higher and employment rates lower among 
many immigrant groups than among native Finns 
(see Chapter 3, Table 19; Myrskylä 2010). This 
indicates that the current integration measures 
are not sufficient to promote labour-market in-
tegration among immigrants. Nevertheless, re-
cent research has shown that the measures in-
troduced since 1999 have had positive outcomes 
on the earnings and employment opportunities of 
immigrants who have taken advantage of them 
(Sarvimäki and Hämäläinen 2010). Research al-
so shows that immigrants’ employment oppor-
tunities tend to improve over time (Forsander 
2002; Linnanmäki-Koskela 2010).
The Finnish government is currently discuss-
ing new amendments to the integration law that 
19 A questionnaire was sent to 300 individuals of 
Russian, Chinese, Thai and Turkish origin, of which 
94 responded. Snowballing techniques produced an 
additional 87 respondents through members of the 
regional advisory boards of ethnic relations. 
would extend the services to all immigrants ˗ 
currently they are available mainly to recent ar-
rivals who are unemployed. The outcomes of 
the policy of spatial dispersal have also raised 
political discussion. The current voluntary basis 
of refugee reception in the municipalities has led 
to problems because the number of refugees and 
asylum seekers who have been granted a resi-
dence permit based on subsidiary or humanitar-
ian protection has exceeded the number of place-
ments offered by the municipalities. This has led 
to homelessness and longer waiting times at the 
refugee reception centres, which in turn has lim-
ited the availability of integration assistance. At 
the beginning of 2010 there were almost 600 
asylum seekers with residence permits waiting 
to be allocated to municipalities. Having received 
their residence permit, refugees are supposed to 
move from the centres to municipal placement 
organised by the state. They are free to look for 
accommodation themselves, but it has proved 
difficult to find housing in the private market 
without the help of the authorities. Attempts were 
made in 2010 to solve the problem by increasing 
the level of financial reimbursement to the mu-
nicipalities (Männikkö 2010: 5). The aim is to 
encourage more municipalities to take refugees 
from the reception centres, but the voluntary ba-
sis of refugee reception as such has not changed. 
Overall, Finland has been relatively late in 
developing its integration and settlement policies 
in comparison with the other Nordic countries. 
To a large extent the policies were formulated in 
response to a changing societal situation, and in 
that sense the approach has been reactive rather 
than proactive. The latest Government Migration 
Policy Programme, launched in 2006, is a clear 
exception in its proactive approach. In general, 
the experiences and examples of other Nordic 
and European countries, Sweden in particular, 
have influenced Finnish integration and settle-
ment policies.
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5.  Regional settlement 
patterns and migration 
dynamics among 
immigrants in Finland
Saara Yousfi & Katja Vilkama 
5.1.  Settlement patterns
The rapid increase in international migration 
flows has influenced the ethnic and linguistic 
structures of the population in Finland. However, 
there are clear regional differences in settlement 
patterns. The majority of immigrants and their 
descendants are concentrated in the main cities 
and along the southern and western coasts, and 
to the east along the Russian border (Figure 15). 
In terms of numbers, 51 per cent of foreign na-
tionals live in the county of Uusimaa, nine per 
cent in Varsinais-Suomi and seven per cent in 
Pirkanmaa. In total, 67 per cent of all foreign-
ers lived in these three counties comprising the 
three main urban regions in 2009, compared with 
only 44 per cent of Finns. 
The regional patterns of immigrant settle-
ment have changed somewhat in the last two 
decades, a development that can be best de-
scribed in terms of the changes in the numbers of 
foreign-language speakers: there has been more 
than a tenfold increase from 19,488 in 1989 to 
207,037 in 2009. All Finnish municipalities had 
some non-native speakers in 2009, and 26 had 
more than 1,000.2058At the same time, less than 
one per cent of the population in 137 munici-
palities were immigrants, which is significantly 
less than ten years previously, when 277 mu-
nicipalities belonged to this category, and three 
municipalities had no immigrants. 
The regional distribution of immigrants has 
20  In total, there were 348 municipalities in Finland in 
2009, of which 108 were categorised as cities and 240 
were other types of municipalities. 
followed the same pattern as the general urban-
isation process. The foreign population in the 
main regional centres, particularly university cit-
ies of innovation, is above the national average 
(Figure 16). Population growth has been the most 
rapid in Uusimaa, where natural growth, inter-
nal secondary migration and immigration have 
increased the population by over 15,000 people 
from the year before. Growth in the Tampere 
region, Eastern Uusimaa and Tavastia Proper is 
mainly due to internal migration, and in North-
ern Bothnia to the high birth rate. The econom-
ic recession has recently weakened the demand 
for labour, and the mobility of the labour force, 
resulting in a slump in interregional migration. 
The proportional settlement structure of the 
foreign-language-speaking population has devel-
oped quite evenly since 1990, even though the 
total number of immigrants has increased (Fig-
ure 16). Figure 17 shows the relative change in 
settlement patterns. However, it should be borne 
in mind that the relative change may give an ex-
aggerated picture given the fact that the absolute 
numbers of immigrants are small.
Overall, the geographical distribution of im-
migrants is primarily determined by the location 
of the major urban areas, although the refugee-
dispersal policy has also had a clear impact on 
the regional distribution, as Figures 15˗17 show. 
The policy has extended the spatial distribution 
to the more sparsely populated regions, which 
might not otherwise have attracted immigrant 
households. There are refugee households in all 
regions, although the total numbers vary. 
The southern counties of Uusimaa, Varsinais-
Suomi and Pirkanmaa, as well as the sparsely 
populated northern and eastern counties of Lap-
pi and Kainuu, were the most active providers 
of municipal placements for refugees in 2008 
(Table 23). The biggest cities refused to offer 
any placements, or drastically reduced the num-
ber in 2009 compared to previous years. The 
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main urban areas have taken in rather high num-
bers of immigrants through secondary migration 
from smaller municipalities, and this has affected 
their capacity to take refugees from the recep-
tion centres. Consequently, many municipalities 
have criticised the policy of spatial dispersal be-
cause of the effects of secondary migration. The 
state subsidises the costs of refugee reception 
for the first three years, but no longer than that, 
even though integration takes a much longer time 
(Männikkö 2010, 5). Relocation to bigger cities 
may also mean starting the integration process 
from scratch.
5.2.  Migration within Finland
There has been more migration activity among 
the non-native than among the native population 
during the last 20 years (Table 24), although the 
rates have increased among both groups since 
the mid-1990s. The migration rate among im-
migrants has been 1.5 to 5.0 times higher than 
among native Finns since 1990 onwards, in 
terms of movement over municipality borders. 
The recession period in the early 1990s, together 
with the arrival of many new immigrants, gave 
a strong push to inter-municipality immigrant 
migration, whereas the native Finns had a more 
stable period. The migration rates of native Finns 
have varied in the past ten years from 4.6 to 5.2 
per cent, the corresponding figures among im-
migrants being 7.4 and 8.1 per cent. The overall 
rate has remained stable in the 2000s despite the 
economic turbulence.
Data from Statistics Finland gives more de-
tailed information about the internal migration 
of immigrants on the regional level (NUTS 3). It 
summarises inter-municipal migration by coun-
try groups for the periods of 1999˗2003 and 
2004˗2008, and provides separate data on out- 
and in-migration flows for the county capitals 
and regions. County capitals refer to the major 
Figure 15. Settlement patterns among the foreign-language-speaking population, total volumes in 
1989, 1999 and 2009 (Statistics Finland 2010).
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Figure 17. Changes in the relative distribution of the foreign-language-speaking population in 
1990˗1999 and 2000˗2009 and the proportion of foreign-language speakers in 2009 (Statistics Finland 
2010c).
Figure 16. The distribution of speakers of languages other than Finnish, Swedish and Saami relative 
to the national average in 1989, 1999 and 2009 (Statistics Finland 2010).
Country report for Finland
243
Table 23. Refugees received by the municipalities by region, 2008.
Refugees 
by quota
Applicants for asylum, 
favourable decisions
Family 
reunifications Total
Uusimaa 65 345 223 633
Itä-Uusimaa 16 9 11 36
Varsinais-Suomi - 119 42 161
Satakunta - 5 - 5
Kanta-Häme 34 4 1 39
Pirkanmaa 39 29 91 159
Päijät-Häme 17 19 4 40
Kymenlaakso 44 79 23 146
Etelä-Karjala 7 27 - 34
Etelä-Savo 65 1 1 67
Pohjois-Savo 31 5 1 37
Pohjois-Karjala 17 36 47 100
Keski-Suomi 39 9 9 57
Etelä-Pohjanmaa - - 1 1
Pohjanmaa 92 14 36 142
Keski-Pohjanmaa 10 - - 10
Pohjois-Pohjanmaa 9 90 33 132
Kainuu 72 72 8 152
Lappi 127 42 26 195
Ahvenanmaa 21 3 - 24
Whole country 705 908 557 2 170
Table 24. Inter-municipal migration by country of birth in relation to economic changes (Statistics 
Finland 2010).
Native Finns Immigrants
Internal migrants (N) Migration rate (%) Internal migrants (N) Migration rate (%)
1990 174 875 3.3 3405 5.2
1992 148 171 3.0 12705 14.8
1994 193 733 3.9 7143 7.1
1996 210 244 4.2 7657 6.9
1998 229 556 4.6 9562 7.6
2000 234 099 4.6 10034 7.4
2002 245 344 4.9 12125 8.0
2004 253 318 5.0 13029 7.8
2006 258 594 5.1 14944 8.0
2008 252 003 4.9 17789 8.1
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cities, 20 in total. Some of them are too small to 
have surrounding urban regions, however. 
There are notable differences in migration 
rates between the different country groups and 
in the direction of internal migration. In gen-
eral, the migration patterns of the natives and 
non-natives differ significantly, with the excep-
tion of the other Nordic groups whose migra-
tion behaviour resembles that of native Finns. 
Among all of the immigrant population, 42 per 
cent of the inter-municipal migration has been 
between county capitals, compared with 25 per 
cent among native Finns. Similarly, 64 per cent of 
the migration within Finland has been to county 
Table 25. Inter-municipal migration during 2004˗2008 by country group, per cent (Statistics Finland 
2010c).
From To To To
county capitals county-capital regions other county regions
Finland,  
N=1 289 231
County capitals 25 12 14
County capital regions 10 4 4
Other county regions 16 3 13
Other Nordic, 
N=17 145
County capitals 25 12 15
County capital regions 9 3 3
Other county regions 16 3 14
Other Western 
European, 
N=5 668
County capitals 42 12 12
County capital regions 8 2 2
Other county regions 12 2 7
Eastern 
European, 
N=26 247
County capitals 40 9 11
County capital regions 8 2 2
Other county regions 16 2 10
North 
American, 
Oceanian, 
N=2 454
County capitals 49 12 10
County capital regions 9 2 2
Other county regions 11 2 4
All foreign 
born  
N=76 488
County capitals 42 9 11
County capital regions 8 2 2
Other county regions 14 2 9
North African, 
West Asian, 
N=8 880
County capitals 54 8 8
County capital regions 8 1 1
Other county regions 15 1 5
Other African, 
N=5 293
County capitals 70 3 6
County capital regions 9 0 1
Other county regions 9 1 1
Other Asian, 
N=8 302
County capitals 56 8 9
County capital regions 7 2 2
Other county regions 10 1 5
Latin 
American, 
N=1 416
County capitals 50 10 10
County capital regions 9 2 2
Other county regions 13 2 4
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capitals, as opposed to 50 per cent among the 
native Finns. These capitals are growth areas 
that receive various kinds of regional support 
and have specialised labour markets with more 
job and training opportunities that attract immi-
grants. However, at the same time they also lose 
residents, mainly to the surrounding regions. In 
other words, there is a process of regionalisation, 
which is much stronger among native Finns than 
among immigrants.
Half of the inter-municipal migration of 
Finns and other Nordic people is to the county 
capitals, and 30 per cent to rural municipalities, 
compared with about 63 per cent and 23 per cent, 
respectively among other Western and Eastern 
Europeans. The differences between Western and 
Eastern Europeans are small, but Western Euro-
peans are slightly more urban-oriented. North Af-
ricans and Asians move predominantly (75 per 
cent of the time) towards the county capitals, and 
only 15 per cent to rural areas, whereas North and 
Latin Americans are a little more likely to move 
to the surrounding regions of the county capi-
tals. The biggest difference appears among those 
born in Sub-Saharan Africa: 88 per cent of their 
moves are to the county capitals and only four 
per cent to the surrounding regions (Table 25). 
The inter-group differences in migration are 
partly attributable to the initial placement of im-
migrants and asylum seekers. The dispersal pol-
icy and the problems with municipality place-
ment despite having a residence permit have 
forced asylum seekers to move to remote lo-
cations with limited job opportunities for short 
periods of time. Many quota refugees have al-
so been initially settled in smaller municipali-
ties throughout the country. Secondary migra-
tion from rural towns to major urban areas has 
been common among refugee households (Kok-
ko 2002; Ahlgren-Leinvuo 2005). The dispersal 
policy has thus encouraged the active migration 
of some immigrant groups. The social networks, 
and the better study and work opportunities have 
attracted immigrants from smaller municipali-
ties to urban areas, as they attract young peo-
ple in general. 
Figure 18. The settlement pattern of Russians, Estonians and Somalis in 2008 (Statistics Finland).
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In conclusion, the main destinations for in-
ternal migrants are the metropolitan area includ-
ing the Helsinki region and the rest of Uusimaa, 
followed by Turku, Tampere and Oulu and the 
surrounding regions. Nordic immigrants are con-
centrated in the main cities, and also in Swed-
ish-speaking regions such as the Åland Islands 
and along the western coast. Eastern Europeans 
are the most widely dispersed groups, but even 
then, 65 per cent of them are concentrated in 
ten cities. The most highly concentrated are the 
Somalis, 74 per cent of them living in the met-
ropolitan area. Russians are concentrated in the 
biggest cities and in small municipalities close 
to the Eastern border, whereas Estonians favour 
more southern locations. Marriage with Finnish 
spouses has a strong influence on the regional 
location of immigrant groups, thereby function-
ing as a distributive factor (Figure 18). 
5.3.  Ethnic residential 
segregation in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area: a case study
5.3.1.  Changing dynamics 
The Helsinki region is the biggest urban area in 
Finland, housing a quarter (1.3 million) of Fin-
land’s total population of 5.3 million, and slightly 
less than half of all foreign nationals. The region 
comprises 14 municipalities, of which the three 
core cities of Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa, to-
gether with Kauniainen, make up the metropol-
itan area. The remaining ten municipalities are 
smaller in terms of population, forming a kind 
of semi-circle around the capital, to which they 
are closely linked through common labour and 
housing markets. 
The Helsinki metropolitan area has grown 
significantly during the last two decades both 
by economic standards and in population (see 
e.g., Laakso and Kostiainen 2007; Vaattovaara 
et al. 2010). New jobs and migration are con-
centrated in the largest city regions, and Helsin-
ki in particular has grown into one of Europe’s 
leading centres of information and communi-
cation technology (see e.g., Vaattovaara 2009). 
At the same time, house prices have increased 
significantly, as in many other European cities 
that have thrived economically (Musterd et al. 
2009). This has resulted in new forms of spatial 
differentiation as socio-economic and spatial di-
vides have begun to open up (Vaattovaara and 
Kortteinen 2003; Kauppinen et al. 2010). The 
new economic growth emphasises the role of 
high-level education as a labour-market resource, 
which along with increasing income differences 
has accentuated socioeconomic differentiation 
within certain population categories (Vaattovaara 
and Kortteinen 2003).
Changes in the socioeconomic structures 
have coincided with a high increase in the inflow 
of international migrants both from abroad and 
from other Finnish municipalities (see the previ-
ous section). As a result, the metropolitan area is 
becoming increasingly diverse and multi-ethnic, 
which directly affects the patterns and processes 
of ethnic and socioeconomic segregation. 
The three cities in the metropolitan area ˗ 
Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa ˗ aim to prevent so-
cioeconomic residential segregation by means 
of social and tenure mixing, housing and so-
cial policies, and urban planning. Social mixing 
is emphasised most notably in Helsinki, which 
has had such policies since the 1970s. The poli-
cies followed international examples, but were 
also influenced by the national ethos of egali-
tarian welfare politics. A socially and spatially 
balanced city structure has been perceived as 
a basis for a just and equal society (Mäenpää 
et al. 2000: 27˗29, 176; Vaattovaara and Lön-
nqvist 2003). The aim to prevent ethnic segre-
gation was incorporated into the existing mix-
ing policies in all three cities during the 1990s, 
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when it became evident that the proportion of 
immigrants was rising steeply in the metropoli-
tan area. The aim has been restated strongly in 
local politics in recent years as the residential 
concentrations of immigrants have kept increas-
ing despite attempts at dispersion. In general, the 
fear seems to be that the increasing spatial con-
centration of immigrants will result in further 
segregation between the well-off and the poor, 
trigger racism and social problems and increase 
marginalisation, thereby hindering immigrants’ 
integration into Finnish society (see e.g., Dhal-
mann and Vilkama 2009; Helsingin asunto-ohjel-
ma... 1998: 90˗92; Helsingin asunto-ohjelma... 
2000: 62).
In 2010, 8.1 per cent of residents in the Hel-
sinki region spoke a language other than Finn-
ish or Swedish2159as their mother tongue (Table 
26). In comparison to other Nordic capital re-
gions, the proportion of immigrants is still low, 
although the increase in numbers and proportions 
21  Swedish speakers comprise an old cultural and linguistic 
minority in Finland. Their share of the population in the 
Helsinki metropolitan area has diminished substantially 
in recent decades (see e.g., Kepsu & Westerholm 
2005). In Helsinki and Vantaa, the proportion of 
foreign-language-speaking residents has exceeded the 
proportion of native speakers of Swedish. 
has been rapid in the last two decades. The pro-
portion of native speakers of foreign languag-
es has increased from less than one per cent in 
1985 to the current 8.1 per cent, which is among 
the fastest in Europe in relative terms (Sauk-
konen 2007: 13). The vast majority of immi-
grants and their descendants live in the cities of 
Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa, and the number of 
immigrant households in the other municipalities 
in the region remains very low (see Table 26). 
For instance, the proportion of foreign-language-
speaking residents in Helsinki reached more than 
ten per cent in 2010, whereas in most of the sur-
rounding municipalities it remains close to, or 
below, three per cent. 
The focus in the following sections of this 
chapter is on the current patterns and process-
es of ethnic residential segregation in the Hel-
sinki metropolitan area. The increasing ethnic 
diversity is not yet a significant element in the 
population growth in the wider Helsinki region 
outside the core cities of Helsinki, Espoo and 
Vantaa. However, the surrounding municipalities 
are linked to the production of ethnic residen-
tial segregation in the metropolitan area through 
the process of residential mobility. The out-mi-
Table 26. The proportion of foreign-language-speakers in the Helsinki metropolitan area 1.1.2010 
(Statistics Finland). 
City / Helsinki region Population 1.1.2010
City / Helsinki region
Total Foreign-language- speakers Foreign nationals *
N N % N %
Helsinki 583 350 59 573 10.2 41 735 7.2
Espoo 244 330 21 240 8.7 13 926 5.8
Vantaa 197 636 17 969 9.1 10 845 5.6
Kauniainen 8 617 326 3.8 265 3.1
Helsinki Metropolitan Area in total** 1 033 933 99 108 9.6 63 690 6.2
Other Helsinki Region*** 301 433 8 502 2.8 5 780 1.9
Helsinki Region in total 1 335 366 107 610 8.1 69 470 5.3
Finland 5 351 427 207 037 3.9 155 705 2.9
* Statistics on foreign nationals are from 1.1.2009, except for Helsinki and Finland 1.1.2010
** Helsinki Metropolitan Area includes the cities of Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen
*** Helsinki Region includes the metropolitan area region and 10 surrounding municipalities
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gration of Finnish families to areas of detached 
housing in the surrounding municipalities has a 
significant effect on the ethnic segregation pat-
terns in the metropolitan area.
5.3.2.  The composition of the foreign-
language-speaking population in 
the Helsinki metropolitan area
The ethnic and cultural composition of the for-
eign-language-speaking population is rather di-
verse. In 2009, 42 per cent of the foreign-lan-
guage-speaking residents were of East European 
origin (native speakers of Baltic languages, Rus-
sian and other East European languages), 16 per 
cent had a West European, American or other An-
glo-Saxon background,2260and the remaining 42 
per cent had a non-Western background (Table 
27). Russians, Estonians and Somalis comprised 
the biggest single groups of native speakers of 
foreign languages, followed by speakers of Eng-
lish, Arabic, Chinese and Kurdish. 
The immigrant categories in the metropolitan 
area reflect the immigrant population in Finland 
as a whole (see Chapter 3). However, there are 
some regional differences in patterns of residen-
tial location among the migrant groups. Africans 
are by far the most concentrated group, more than 
70 per cent of them living in Helsinki, Espoo or 
Vantaa (Table 27; see also subsection 5.2). Na-
tive speakers of West European and Asian lan-
guages are also rather concentrated, with more 
than half of them living in the metropolitan area. 
East Europeans and Russians, on the other hand, 
are the most widely dispersed, and Russians in 
particular are over-represented in the border ar-
ea of Eastern Finland (see see also Raento and 
Husso 2002; Heikkilä and Pikkarainen 2007). 
Table 27 shows the rapid growth in the differ-
ent categories of foreign-language-speaking pop-
22 This refers to all native speakers of West European 
languages including French-, Spanish- and English-
speaking groups with non-European origins. 
ulations in the metropolitan area, which in all cat-
egories significantly outnumbered the increase in 
the numbers of Finnish and Swedish speakers in 
the 2000s. The highest growth was among na-
tive speakers of Asian and North African lan-
guages, with a total increase of more than 130 
per cent in 2000˗2009. This rapid growth trend 
is mostly attributable to the high inflow of new 
immigrants directly from abroad.2361Secondary 
migration from other Finnish municipalities is 
also quite significant among some groups (see 
chapter 5.2. and Figure 19). Natural population 
growth is another factor contributing to the rapid 
increase in immigrant populations in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area. Most of the groups are young 
in terms of age structure, and the fertility rates 
among some of the women are much higher than 
among the native population (Martikainen 2007).
International and internal migration and a 
high natural growth rate among some catego-
ries have changed the composition of immigrant 
populations in the metropolitan area since the 
1990s, and the number of migrants born outside 
Europe in particular has increased notably in rela-
tion to other groups. The number of immigrants 
of European origin, including Russians, has also 
continued to increase, whereas the number of 
Nordic migrants remains fairly low (Figure 20).
5.3.3.  Residential patterns among 
the foreign-language-speakers
Figure 21 illustrates the residential patterns of 
foreign-language-speaking households in the 
metropolitan area. They are generally overrep-
resented in the residential suburbs with rail and 
metro connections. The highest concentrations 
are in eastern Helsinki, eastern Vantaa and cen-
23 Finland took an active approach to immigration 
during the 2000s, and labour migration in particular 
has increased noticeably during the past five years (see 
Chapter 3).
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Table 27. The composition of the population on 1.1.2009, and population growth in 2000˗2009, in the 
Helsinki metropolitan area by native language and continent (Statistics Finland). 
Figure 19. Population 
growth (per cent) of 
foreign-language-
speaking populations in 
the metropolitan area 
by native language and 
continent, 2000˗2009 
(Statistics Finland).
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Immigration Migration from other Finnish municipalities Natural growth
Figure 20. 1The 
composition of the 
immigrant population in 
Uusimaa 1990˗201024 
(Statistics Finland). 
24 Uusimaa county comprises the Helsinki region (excluding the municipality of Sipoo) and five neighbouring 
municipalities. Almost all of the immigrant population resides in the metropolitan area, however. Data registered on 
31.12.1990, 31.12.1999, and 31.12.2009. 
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tral Espoo. On the neighbourhood level,2562the 
highest concentrations peaked at 26.6 per cent 
in 2010, although there are smaller areas and 
residential blocks with much higher levels. In 
this respect, the residential concentration of im-
migrants in the Helsinki metropolitan area could 
still be described as a fine-scale mosaic of multi-
ethnic pockets, in contrast to the full-scale im-
migrant-dense neighbourhoods that are common 
in Swedish urban areas and, to a lesser extent, 
in Denmark and Norway. 
The spatial patterns are nevertheless very 
visible and stable. Once established, immigrant 
concentrations have continued to grow in size 
because of natural growth and selective migra-
tion among both native and immigrant house-
25 The mean neighbourhood population size in the 
metropolitan area, excluding unpopulated areas, is 3,900 
persons. 
holds. There has been a consistent increase in 
the proportions of non-native residents in all of 
the current concentration neighbourhoods since 
the mid-1990s, of over ten per centage points in 
most areas. At the same time, coastal and north-
ern areas in particular remain almost completely 
untouched by ethnic diversity. 
Tables 28 and 29 show the differences in ten-
ure structure in the metropolitan area in relation 
to the different proportions of foreign-language-
speaking residents in neighbourhood subareas. 
There is a clear pattern of tenure segmentation: 
the proportion of immigrant residents increases 
in direct relation to the proportion of social hous-
ing. In areas with the highest immigrant concen-
trations (25 per cent or over, Table 28), social 
housing accounts for more than 60 per cent of 
the housing stock, on average, and when right-
of-occupancy dwellings are included the propor-
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0.3 -   6.3   (135)
Figure 21. Proportions of foreign-language-speaking residents in the Helsinki metropolitan area, 
1.1.2010 (Helsinki Region Statistics 2010).
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tion of state-subsidised housing exceeds 70 per 
cent. Conversely, the proportion of owner-occu-
pied housing is low (18 per cent). On the other 
hand, owner occupation is the dominant form of 
tenure in areas with the lowest levels of immi-
grants. This category includes practically all ar-
eas of detached housing in the metropolitan area. 
There is also an interesting differentiation in 
the age structure of the housing stock in the areas 
with different proportions of immigrant residents 
(Table 29). Immigrant-dense neighbourhoods in 
other Nordic countries tend to be situated in resi-
dential areas that were built during the construc-
tion boom years of the 1960s and 1970s. The 
highest proportions of foreign-language-speak-
ing residents in the metropolitan area of Helsin-
ki, however, are to be found in the suburbs that 
were developed in the late 1980s and 1990s ˗ at 
the time when immigration to Finland began to 
increase (see also Kauppinen 2002). These new 
housing areas had an abundance of vacant rental 
dwellings that could be used to house new im-
migrant families. Due to the severe recession at 
the time, there was a downturn in private con-
struction, thus the new areas were largely state-
subsidised and had unusually high proportions 
of social housing.
The neighbourhoods built in the 1960s and 
1970s also typically have high proportions of 
immigrant families. The majority of the housing 
stock in areas with 20˗25 per cent of foreign-
language-speaking residents consists of high-rise 
or low-rise multifamily housing built during this 
period. On the other hand, very little of the hous-
ing in neighbourhoods with lower-than-average 
immigrant populations was built in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and more than a third of it dates back 
to before World War II. The affluent residential 
areas in the city centre belong to this category. 
With regard to socio-economic indicators, 
 
Percentage of native 
speakers of foreign Owns Owns Private Social Right of Dwellings
 languages in n'hood the house the apartment rental housing occupancy Other Total (N)
0-5% 18 47 16 8 2 9 100 134 106
5-10% 5 44 23 16 2 9 100 233 183
10-15% 2 36 14 37 5 5 100 89 653
15-20% 1 38 14 40 3 4 100 39 907
20-25% 1 34 10 49 3 3 100 23 007
over 25% 1 17 7 64 9 2 100 8 946
Total 7 42 19 22 3 8 100 528 962
* Data on Kaunia inen i s not included
Tenure type 31.12.2008 *
Table 28. Tenure composition in the Helsinki metropolitan area according to the proportion of foreign-
language-speaking residents, 31.12.2008 (Statistics Finland). 
Table 29. Dwellings by year of completion in the metropolitan area, according to the proportions of 
foreign-language-speaking residents, 31.12.2008 (Statistics Finland; SeutuCD 2009)  
Percentage of native 
speakers of foreign before 1940- 1960- 1980- 2000- Dwellings
 languages in n'hood 1940 1959 1979 1999 2008 Unknown Total (N)
0-5% 13 18 28 27 13 1 100 135 604
5-10% 20 12 32 24 11 0 100 233 773
10-15% 2 8 31 42 18 0 100 90 137
15-20% 0 1 58 31 10 0 100 39 787
20-25% 0 1 62 31 6 0 100 23 358
over 25% 0 1 23 71 5 0 100 8 954
Total 13 12 34 29 12 0 100 532 117
* Data  on Kaunia inen i s  not included. Data  source for Hels inki : Seutu CD 2009
Dwellings by year of completion 31.12.2008 *
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areas with high proportions of immigrant resi-
dents tend to fall below the average level of the 
metropolitan area. Most of the high-concentra-
tion areas have low proportions of highly educat-
ed residents (Figure 22), and higher-than-aver-
age unemployment (Kortteinen and Vaattovaara 
1999; Kauppinen et al. 2010). Income levels are 
also somewhat lower in areas with higher-than-
average proportions of immigrant residents. Ta-
ble 30 shows the employment-income distribu-
tion of residents according to the proportions of 
foreign-language-speakers, based on the national 
income deciles of residents in Finland. A higher 
proportion of residents in the high-concentration 
neighbourhoods falls into the first and second in-
come deciles than in areas with lower proportions 
of immigrants. However, the difference is most 
pronounced among the highest income groups. 
Only between five and seven per cent of resi-
dents in areas with an immigrant population of 
more than 15 per cent earned enough to belong 
to the highest income decile in 2008, as opposed 
Figure 22. The proportion of over 15˗year-olds with a higher university degree (M.Sc. or PhD.) in the 
Helsinki metropolitan area, 1.1.2009 (Helsinki Region Statistics 2010)
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Percentage of native 
speakers of foreign
languages in n'hood 1 & 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
0-5% 16 8 7 6 7 8 10 13 24 100
5-10% 16 10 9 8 9 9 11 12 16 100
10-15% 16 11 10 9 10 10 11 11 12 100
15-20% 19 13 11 11 10 10 10 9 7 100
20-25% 19 12 11 11 11 10 10 9 7 100
over 25% 22 13 12 12 10 10 9 7 5 100
Total 17 10 9 8 8 9 10 12 17 100
Work income deciles
Table 30. Employment-income composition in the Helsinki metropolitan area according to the 
proportions of foreign-language-speaking residents, 31.12.2008 (Statistics Finland): the income 
deciles are based on the national levels of residents in Finland.
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to 24 per cent in the areas with the lowest level 
of immigrants. In total, 17 per cent of the popu-
lation in the metropolitan area belonged to the 
highest income category in 2008.  
5.3.4.  Ethnic hierarchies in 
the housing market
The housing-market positions of different immi-
grant groups vary greatly in the metropolitan ar-
ea, as in the whole country. Rental accommoda-
tion is the most common housing type among all 
immigrant households, although dependency on 
social housing differs greatly among the different 
categories. The level of social housing in certain 
categories, Sub-Saharan Africans in particular, is 
very high (76 per cent, Figure 23). In contrast, 
it is much lower among those with a West-Eu-
ropean background, who closely resemble Finn-
ish- and Swedish-speaking residents in terms of 
their distribution among different tenure types. 
Dependency on social housing varies between 
44–55 per cent in other immigrant categories, 
North African and Middle Eastern households 
taking the second highest position. Owner occu-
pancy is rather rare among immigrant households 
in the metropolitan area, in comparison with the 
Finnish- and Swedish-speaking population. 
The segmentation of housing tenure has di-
rect spatial effects on segregation patterns. The 
more well-off groups, particularly highly skilled 
migrants and those coming from Western coun-
tries, mostly live outside of the concentration 
areas shown in Figure 21 and tend to settle in 
the better-off neighbourhoods around the centre 
of Helsinki, and in the western parts of Helsin-
ki city and Espoo (Kauppinen 2000; Kepsu et 
al. 2009: 106˗107). On the other hand, refugees 
and other low-income migrant groups, who are 
highly dependent on social housing, tend to be 
more concentrated and to live in neighbourhoods 
with higher proportions of immigrant house-
holds. This differentiation is visible in Figure 
24, which shows the proportions of immigrant 
groups living in areas in which more than 20 
per cent of the residents are non-native. None 
of the categories is highly concentrated exclu-
sively in these areas. Only 17 of the 426 sub-
areas has more than a 20-per-cent share of im-
* Russian and other languages of the former Soviet Union (excluding the Baltic languages) 
** including other or unknown tenure types.
Figure 23. The distribution of households by housing tenure and native language in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area, 31.12.2008 (Statistics Finland).
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migrant residents. 
The differences in tenure dependency are also 
clearly visible in the segregation indexes, meas-
ured here as a dissimilarity index between the 
native and immigrant residents (Table 31). Dis-
similarity indexes are measured on the sub-area 
level with an average population size of 2,400 
inhabitants, excluding unpopulated areas. Sub-
Saharan categories, which are the most depend-
ent on social housing, are the most highly segre-
gated from native Finnish residents: 51 per cent 
of them (or of the native Finns) would have to re-
locate for the spatial dispersal of the two catego-
ries to be identical. Other groups are less highly 
segregated, the lowest levels being among native 
speakers of West European languages. 
Figure 24. The proportions of immigrant groups living in areas in which more than 20 per cent of the 
residents are foreign-language-speaking, 1.1.2009 (Statistics Finland).
Table 31. Index of dissimilarity between native Finnish and foreign-language-speaking residents in 
the Helsinki metropolitan area, 1.1.2000 and 1.1.2009 (Statistics Finland) .
Absolute Relative
2000 2009 change change %
All foreign languages 0.27 0.27 0.01 2.8
Baltic languages 0.37 0.31 -0.06 -16.3
Russian* 0.35 0.32 -0.02 -6.9
West-European languages 0.22 0.21 -0.01 -4.5
East-European languages 0.35 0.36 0.01 3.8
North-African & the Middle Eastern 
languages 0.32 0.36 0.04 13.2
Sub-Saharan languages 0.52 0.51 0 -0.3
Other Asian languages 0.32 0.32 0 -1.2
Other or unknown languages 0.44 0.43 -0.02 -3.7
Index of dissimilarity
* & including other languages from the former Sovier Union, except the
Baltic languages
Finnish- or Swedish-speaking 
population vs. speakers of…
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In general, the segregation patterns remained 
stable throughout the 2000s. The biggest per cent-
age increase in dissimilarity (13%) was between 
the native Finns and immigrants from North Af-
rica and the Middle East. Nevertheless, the index 
remains at a very modest level, well below the 
segregation rate between speakers of Sub Saha-
ran African languages and native Finns. 
There was a decrease in segregation in the 
2000s between native Finns and speakers of the 
Baltic languages and, to a lesser extent, of Rus-
sian as well as West European languages. By in-
ternational standards, all the indexes show very 
modest levels of segregation between the native 
population and the different immigrant groups.
As the above tables and figures illustrate, 
there are signs of an ethnic hierarchy in the 
housing-market position of the different immi-
grant categories. Some groups have a free choice 
of residential location and tenure type, whereas 
others are more constrained. However, prelimi-
nary longitudinal studies on the housing careers 
of immigrants in Finland show that, in time and 
in all immigrant categories, there is a tendency 
to move to owner-occupied housing as careers 
advance and the levels of disposable income in-
crease (Linnanmäki-Koskela and Niska 2010). 
At the same time, the ethnic hierarchy may level 
out, which might influence the spatial patterns 
and processes of residential segregation in the 
near future. However, thus far, there are no de-
tailed longitudinal studies on immigrants’ hous-
ing careers and their impact on segregation pat-
terns in Finland.
In conclusion, the current levels of ethnic 
residential segregation are still rather modest in 
the Helsinki metropolitan area. The emerging 
spatial patterns are rather persistent, however. It 
is likely, given the current processes of migration 
and segregation, that the level of residential con-
centration among immigrants will increase in the 
near future. According to population estimates, 
the proportion of foreign-language-speaking res-
idents will reach almost 20 per cent in Helsinki by 
the year 2030, and more than 15 per cent in the 
Helsinki region (Vieraskielisen väestön... 2010). 
This will have direct effects on the patterns and 
processes of ethnic and socio-spatial segregation 
within the metropolitan neighbourhoods in the 
coming years. However, the reasons behind the 
segregation patterns and processes are complex 
and dynamic, and it remains to be seen how they 
will influence this spatial differentiation in the 
near future. These outcomes and processes will 
be studied in more detail in further sub-projects 
within the NODES research project.
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6.  conclusions
Finland has experienced rapid changes in recent 
decades, which were triggered by extensive so-
cietal changes. The first change, as described in 
this report, was related to the late but rapid in-
dustrialisation, together with the relatively rapid 
increase in wealth. The accompanying process 
of urbanisation and the notable rise in housing 
standards provided a good basis on which to re-
inforce the structures of the welfare state. Unlike 
in many European countries, the bulk of the pop-
ulation lived in the countryside until the 1950s. 
Moreover, whereas many European cities were 
established in terms of form and structure at the 
turn of the 1900s, the capital of Finland, Helsin-
ki was still a tiny city at that time. The popula-
tion of the whole region was only 138,000, and 
82,000 of the residents were located within the 
city of Helsinki – the heart of the present-day 
city region. Thus the emergence of Finland as a 
welfare state was late but rapid. 
The second major societal change derives 
from the changing economic structure. Finland, 
particularly the Helsinki region, has become one 
of Europe’s leading centres of growth in infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) 
in recent decades. A massive structural change 
has taken place in the economy of the country. 
The downside of this development is the shift 
in labour demand, resulting in unemployment 
– a phenomenon that was almost non-existent 
for decades.
We have shown in this report how the pro-
portion of non-native residents in Finland is not 
only notably lower but has also increased dec-
ades later than in the other Nordic countries. The 
late industrialiasation together with the late ur-
banisation would seem to be obvious explana-
tions for this development. However, the rela-
tively strict migration policy after World War II 
also had an influence. 
The number of non-native residents has 
grown significantly during the last couple of 
decades. This change, again, could be related 
to developments in the labour market as well 
as to changes in the migration policy. Immi-
gration to Finland has been mainly other than 
work-related. The main immigration flows have 
come from neighbouring countries: Russia, Es-
tonia and Sweden. These groups have often set-
tled where there are good connections from their 
country of origin, which is reflected in the spatial 
distribution of the immigrant population within 
the country. Immigrants are regionally concen-
trated in the major urban areas, along the south-
ern and western coasts, and in the east near the 
Russian border. 
The immigration flow gathered pace during 
the worst years of the recession, and continued 
side in conjuction with the massive economic 
shift. This has influenced immigrants’ labour-
market integration: their overall unemployment 
rate is high and they are more often employed 
in temporary or low-wage jobs. However, there 
are significant differences in socio-economic po-
sition between the groups: almost 60 per cent of 
immigrants from northern Africa and western 
Asia belong to the three lowest income deciles, 
whereas Western Europeans have a higher in-
come level than the population in general. Fin-
land has a net migration surplus among eastern 
European and the less affluent Asian and Afri-
can groups. Immigration among the more afflu-
ent Westerners is usually temporary in nature.
The clear ethnic hierarchy in the Finnish la-
bour market affects the housing-market position 
of the different ethnic groups. In addition, the 
reasons for migration influence the housing po-
sition of immigrants at the time of their arrival. 
Refugee households are assumed to need assis-
tance in finding accommodation, and are directed 
towards municipal social housing. The same ap-
plied to the other large immigrant group, Ingri-
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an Finns, prior to 2003. In total, 43 per cent of 
households comprising foreign nationals live in 
social rental housing (46 per cent of the foreign-
language-speaking households), which is signifi-
cantly higher than the 13 per cent among the na-
tive population. Dependency on social housing is 
more common in the Helsinki metropolitan area, 
with 48 per cent of immigrant households liv-
ing in social rental accommodation. Immigrants 
from Western Europe, other Nordic countries and 
the Americas are more likely to live in private 
rental accommodation or as owner occupiers.
Dependency on social housing has two sig-
nificant outcomes with regard to immigrants’ 
housing conditions and their spatial location. 
Firstly, those who cannot afford owner occu-
pancy are usually better off living in munici-
pal social housing than renting privately. Social-
housing apartments are usually in good condi-
tion and the rent level is generally lower than 
in the private market. Private rental levels have 
increased in the major urban areas in particular 
following deregulation in 1995. Secondly, the 
uneven dispersal of social-housing estates across 
urban neighbourhoods affects the residential pat-
terns of immigrant households. The highest con-
centrations of immigrants are in neighbourhoods 
with high proportions of social housing. Conse-
quently, immigrant groups that are most depend-
ent on social housing are the most spatially seg-
regated from the native population.
On the Nordic level, ethnic residential segre-
gation is so far rather modest in Finland, which 
is mostly attributable to the relatively small num-
ber of immigrants. In addition, housing and inte-
gration policies aimed at preventing segregation 
have influenced immigrant residential patterns 
both nationally and locally. 
On the national level, the regional distribu-
tion of immigrants is influenced by the refu-
gee-dispersal policy. There are even immigrant 
households in some of the smaller, sparsely popu-
lated municipalities where the native population 
is declining. However, not all municipalities have 
volunteered to take in refugees, and the number 
of offered placements is often small. Second-
ary migration to bigger cities has become com-
mon, and is challenging in terms of providing 
housing and integration support for the relocat-
ing families.
On the local level the municipalities have 
been advised to prevent ethnic residential seg-
regation. How this is implemented in practice 
varies, as the municipalities are autonomous in 
terms of deciding on their local policies. The Hel-
sinki metropolitan area promotes social and eth-
nic mixing in the form of housing allocation and 
zoning practices that diversify the tenure stock 
in neighbourhoods. As a result, the residential 
concentrations of immigrants form a mosaic-
like pattern that differs from the full-scale neig-
bourhood-level concentrations in other Nordic 
countries. The highest concentrations of immi-
grant households are in certain housing estates 
and apartment blocks. Despite the relatively low 
segregation levels however, residential concen-
tration continues to expand in the Helsinki met-
ropolitan area. 
Increasing concentrations of immigrants in 
social housing reflect wider changes in the hous-
ing market. Housing policy has traditionally been 
an integral part of the Finnish welfare system, and 
the state has had an important role in support-
ing housing production and consumption. The 
ethos and strategy have emphasised universal-
ism: state subsidies have been used to raise the 
housing level of the entire population. The social 
setting has now changed. Since the 1990s, state-
subsidised housing production has been directed 
more towards groups with special needs, such as 
the elderly and the disabled. At the same time, 
some parts of social rental housing are becom-
ing marginalised. Moreover, social differences 
between urban neighbourhoods and their rela-
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tive positions in the local housing market have 
arisen. Some municipalities and neighbourhoods 
are able to attract affluent households, whereas 
the high-rise residential estates of the 1960s and 
1970s in particular have become less desirable. 
Growing social differentiation, the aging 
of the population and increasing ethnic diver-
sity ˗ as described in this report ˗ challenge the 
social-welfare and housing policies in Finland. 
Previously well-functioning practices are under 
debate and subject to revision. Any cuts in so-
cial-welfare expenditure and changes in the so-
cial-housing sector will have direct impacts on 
the social wellbeing and housing conditions of 
the less affluent. Immigrants are in a particular-
ly vulnerable position in this respect because of 
their relatively large numbers among the lowest 
income groups. Societal changes, together with 
possible changes in the policy framework, may 
therefore affect patterns of social and ethnic resi-
dential segregation in the future. 
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1. Welfare in the 
Nordic countries
Terje Wessel
Department of Sociology and Human 
Geography, University of Oslo
The Nordic countries Denmark, Finland Nor-
way and Sweden are small economies which 
have reached a fairly similar stage of develop-
ment. All four boast a combination of generous 
welfare entitlements and rapid economic growth. 
They appear to constitute a more or less stable 
model of welfare capitalism, the ‘Nordic model’, 
which occupies a special place in international 
welfare research. The ‘Nordic model’ is typically 
described as an outlier, distinguished by greater 
equality than any other model. This legacy has 
evolved over decades through the diffusion of 
policies and institutions within the region, with 
Sweden at the forefront, Denmark and Norway 
not far behind, and Finland a ‘late developer’ 
(Arter 2008).  Although the timing has varied, all 
four countries have introduced welfare reforms 
in the aftermath of economic growth. It is also 
increasingly recognised that welfare entitlements 
and policy structures form part of the basis for 
sustained growth.
At least four welfare-state principles lie be-
hind the ‘Nordic model’. The first one, univer-
salism, implies that welfare is a civic right: ac-
cess to basic social security does not rely on 
labour-market position, although some entitle-
ments are based on earnings. The second prin-
ciple involves an effort to minimize market-de-
pendency: welfare is provided primarily through 
public engagement, and covers social security, 
social services, health, education and, to some 
extent, housing. Most schemes are designed to 
enhance equality of opportunity or equality of 
outcome, hence equality is the third principle. Fi-
nally, solidarity, is the ‘glue’ that holds the model 
together: risk-pooling and redistribution depend, 
in the end, on mutual attachment between indi-
viduals and groups.
The relevance of this model is partly con-
firmed in the country reports. A major achieve-
ment, which the summary measures reveal, is 
a level of poverty in the Nordic countries that 
is far below the OECD average. More detailed 
analyses document a massive redistributive ef-
fect through taxes and transfers, much larger than 
in Southern and Central Europe. Taxes and trans-
fers also play a crucial role in the general dis-
tribution of income. Income statistics, however, 
are no longer a dazzling showcase for the Nor-
dic model. Net income inequality (after taxes 
and transfers) has been rising in fits and starts in 
Finland, Norway and Sweden. The changes are 
mainly concentrated at the top of the distribution, 
but also to some extent (Finland) at the lower end. 
According to some research results, the growing 
inequality is linked to industrial change, both the 
loss of manufacturing industries and the expan-
sion of advanced business services. 
The redistributive impact of the Nordic mod-
el is particularly pronounced among single par-
ents and couples with children. These groups 
have access to a number of benefits (child allow-
ances, benefit to single parents, parental leave) 
and services (child care, day care for schoolchil-
dren, health care) that put them in a better posi-
tion than similar groups in Southern and Cen-
tral Europe. There is nevertheless a high poverty 
rate among single parents, particularly in Sweden 
and Finland. Pensioner poverty, which used to 
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be a major problem, has declined sharply in all 
four countries.
Redistribution of income occurs not only 
through taxes and transfers, but also through 
labour relations and labour-market institutions. 
The salaries of highly skilled middle-class work-
ers are held down, whereas the wages of the 
lower paid are raised, all in the name of solidar-
ity. In-work poverty is thus a minor problem in 
the Nordic countries, although it varies by age 
and gender. 
The labour market and the welfare state are 
complementary parts of the Nordic model. This 
is seen most clearly in the protracted effort to 
raise levels of female employment. There is a 
close connection between the growth in welfare 
(both services and benefits) and female entry into 
the workforce. In 1990 all the Nordic countries 
stood out in international employment statistics, 
with female participation rates of above 65 per 
cent. The economic recession in the early 1990s 
brought a change, however. Female employment 
fell dramatically in Finland and Sweden, and has 
remained at a lower level in Sweden. The reces-
sion had less of an effect in Denmark and Nor-
way, which had regained their economic strength 
by the end of the decade. Both countries have 
now surpassed Sweden in terms of female em-
ployment. 
Economic downturn is a recurrent experience 
in the Nordic countries. The large-scale crisis in 
the 1990s was preceded by industrial decline in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and succeeded by the dot-
com collapse in 2000 and the current financial 
crisis. These historic events and trends consist-
ently reflect the open character of the Nordic 
countries, although the individual responses have 
been different. Denmark preceded the others in 
the introduction of liberal economic policies, and 
faced a high level of unemployment for more 
than a decade. Finland and Sweden took a sim-
ilar course later, particularly in terms of labour-
market policy. Norway has joined the others in 
the move towards active labour-market policies 
(the ‘work line’), but not in the move towards 
welfare cuts. Norway is thus an idiosyncratic 
case.  Abundant oil and gas revenues have made 
it possible to maintain or even expand the scope 
of transfer programmes and services, which to 
some extent has enabled the country to offset 
expanding unemployment.   
Finland, too, has diverged from its Nordic 
neighbours. Successful export performance in 
the 1980s laid the foundation for a rapid expan-
sion in welfare provision. As the Soviet Union 
was its main trading partner, however, everything 
changed in 1990˗91. The collapse of the Soviet 
market sent Finland into the deepest recession 
in its history. A sharp decline in GDP was fol-
lowed by escalating unemployment, welfare cuts 
and a collapsing banking sector. A strong focus 
on research and development, and subsequent 
growth in advanced services, helped the country 
out of the slump. Some of the problems remain, 
however. Current challenges include public debt, 
persistent high unemployment and new pockets 
of inequality. 
Economic developments, including globali-
sation, have affected welfare policies in the Nor-
dic countries. The basic structure of the welfare 
model nevertheless remains intact. This model 
derives its legitimacy from both mass and elite 
levels. However, it rests on a shakier basis than 
previously. The most critical factor, perhaps, is a 
tendency towards fragmentation of labour-mar-
ket interests. The expanding industries tend to 
rely on individual contracts rather than collec-
tive agreements and general rules, which makes 
it difficult to enforce a floor on wages throughout 
the economy. In other words, the growth of in-
come inequality in Finland, Norway and Sweden 
is not merely a question of distributive policy. 
Current research indicates that growing, or 
a heightened level of wage inequality, has a ‘re-
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sidual’ form: there is higher inequality among 
workers with similar characteristics (gender, age 
and education, for example). Rising inequality 
does not, apparently, imply an expanding gen-
der gap. There remain gender differences, but 
they have narrowed during the current stage of 
economic and political integration. Occupational 
segregation is a much more persistent problem: 
a large proportion of women end up in female-
dominated industries and occupations.
The Nordic model can be seen as a platform, 
or a general orientation. It refers to the way wel-
fare is produced at the intersection between state, 
market and households. In more explicit terms, 
there is no Nordic model in housing or regional 
policy. There are also differences in the construc-
tion and relevance of different programmes: so-
cial assistance has been of higher significance in 
Finland than in Denmark, Norway and Sweden; 
absence from work due to sickness has been con-
sistently higher in Norway and Sweden than in 
Denmark and Finland; the provision of child care 
lags behind in Finland, and employers make a 
larger financial contribution in Finland and Swe-
den than in Denmark and Norway.
Details such as these may have a bearing on 
ethnic segregation in the individual countries. 
The bigger comparative picture is more diffi-
cult to determine. Looking at several conditions 
(employment/unemployment, poverty, inequali-
ty, welfare provision), and counting two decades, 
a split pattern emerges: the opportunity to com-
bat ethnic segregation has been better in Den-
mark and Norway than in Finland and Sweden. 
Denmark, on the other hand, was worse off than 
Norway and Sweden in the 1980s.  
2. The significance of housing 
policies for immigrants’ 
housing options 
Hans Skifter Andersen
Danish Building Research 
Institute, Aalborg University
The analyses of housing policies and markets in 
the Nordic countries reveal considerable differ-
ences in the position of immigrants in the hous-
ing market. In Norway immigrants tend to live in 
owner-occupied dwellings or in private rental ac-
commodation, whereas in Denmark and Finland 
they are concentrated in social housing, and espe-
cially in Denmark are seldom owner occupiers. 
Immigrants are more evenly spread in Sweden, 
but a large proportion are in rental accommo-
dation. Compared to the whole population, the 
distribution of immigrants in terms of housing 
tenure is the most uneven in Denmark and Fin-
land, and the least uneven in Norway.
An overview of housing 
policies and conditions
The differences in housing conditions can be as-
cribed to the differences in the housing markets 
in the different countries, and in the policies that 
have shaped and regulated these markets. 
Sweden was among the first of the Nordic 
countries to stress housing as a social good, with 
equal opportunities for everyone. However, sub-
sidies have been successively abolished since 
the beginning of the 1990s, and what is left has 
changed from production support to consump-
tion support. The Swedish housing market has al-
so been deregulated. Norway, on the other hand, 
has shown a strong political preference for own-
er occupation in the form of home ownership or 
housing co-operatives. The housing policy has 
thus been to support lower-income groups and 
in particular first-time buyers to acquire prop-
erty, whereas the social housing sector is very 
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restricted. Housing in Denmark is split between 
owner occupation among the more well-to-do 
and rental accommodation. Even if social hous-
ing is available to all income groups, the propor-
tion of occupants with lower incomes is high 
and increasing. The Finnish housing policy has 
catered to the needs of the weaker groups in 
society to a greater extent than the Danish and 
Swedish policies. 
The variation in housing policy over the years 
has contributed to the differences in housing sys-
tems. Sweden has the lowest rate of owner occu-
pation followed by Denmark; Norway and Fin-
land have the highest ownership of detached 
property; Sweden and Denmark have the larg-
est rental sectors and the largest social and pub-
lic housing, respectively; Norway has the small-
est rental sector, and a very small proportion of 
social rental accommodation. The proportion of 
private rental accommodation in the four coun-
tries varies between 13 and 20 per cent.
Norway has the relatively smallest housing 
supply measured as the number of dwellings per 
1,000 inhabitants. One explanation for this could 
be the heavy prioritisation of owner occupation, 
which some population groups cannot afford. Is 
the lower Norwegian supply a result of the very 
limited support for social housing? In terms of 
the number of rooms per inhabitant, however, 
Norway has the same coverage as Denmark and 
Finland, which is attributable to the fact that more 
Norwegian dwellings have four rooms or more. 
Finland has more small dwellings. Sweden has 
the largest number of rooms per habitant, mostly 
because of a larger stock of dwellings.
Housing costs and subsidies
As a result of differences in prices and rents 
the share of consumption expenditures used for 
housing also varies between the countries. Be-
fore subsidies the highest proportion of house-
hold disposable income goes to housing in Den-
mark and Sweden, the lowest in Norway, with 
Finland in between.
Net housing costs are influenced by the 
amount of subsidies used to support consumption 
and production. Denmark and Sweden have had 
higher subsidy levels than Norway and Finland, 
although there are big differences in the kinds of 
subsidies that are given. Individual housing ben-
efits are very small in Norway, and at a higher and 
similar level in the other three countries. Produc-
tion support is also quite low in Norway, at its 
highest in Denmark and in Sweden, and some-
where in between in Finland. Finally, tax subsi-
dies are by far the most prominent mechanism 
in Norway, and the least prominent in Finland, 
where the main mechanism at the state budget 
level is individual housing benefit, followed by 
tax-deductible interest on housing loans. 
The subsidies given in the countries also vary 
concerning what tenures are supported and the 
degree of means tests that is if there are condi-
tions for getting support concerning housing need 
and income. To what extent subsidies reach the 
poor or are spread out between all income levels 
is much dependent on means test and on what 
tenures are supported. If the housing market is 
segmented it is important if tenures for the poor 
are supported more than tenures for the rich.
According to Eurostat (EU-SILC) survey 
data on the extent to which people find hous-
ing costs a financial burden, net housing costs 
are the most burdensome in Finland, followed 
by Sweden and Norway, whereas 75 per cent of 
the Danish respondents felt that they were not a 
burden. Thus, despite the high costs, especially 
for owner-occupied housing, the subsidy system 
has reduced the net costs so much that only a 
few people feel financially stretched. Rent con-
trol also plays a role here.
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Determinants of immigrants’ 
opportunities on the housing market
Income is the most influential factor governing 
the choice of housing type. Many immigrants 
belong to low-income groups, which limits their 
opportunities on the housing market. Moreover, 
it has been shown in several studies that they of-
ten lack good contacts with landlords and have 
difficulties finding out how the housing market 
works. They are also exposed to discrimination 
in housing, indirectly when access is determined 
by administrative rules, and directly when it is 
determined by discretion. The large differences 
in regulation and support for different types of 
tenure in the four countries affect immigrants’ 
access to housing.
Social and public housing 
Immigrant access to social housing is determined 
by general rules covering the allocation of vacant 
dwellings and the amount of housing at the dis-
posal of the local authorities to allocate to low-
income groups. 
Access to social housing has been very easy 
in Denmark. Moreover, local authorities are, in 
principle, obliged to provide housing for people 
who are homeless, including refugees, and this 
accounts for over 25 per cent of all vacant dwell-
ings. However, access has become more diffi-
cult in recent years following the introduction 
of new allocation rules on estates where many 
immigrants already reside. Sweden also has an 
open allocation system based on waiting lists, but 
some housing companies apply different crite-
ria. Access in Finland is based on urgent hous-
ing needs. Availability is very limited in Nor-
way, and access is based on very strict criteria 
concerning acute housing needs in combination 
with waiting lists. On account of the problems 
immigrants face in the housing market, they are 
overrepresented in municipal housing. 
In principle, social housing in Denmark is af-
fordable to everyone because of the cost-related 
setting of rents combined with supply subsidies 
and housing benefits. However, the recent reduc-
tions in welfare benefits for newly arrived immi-
grants have made it very difficult for this group 
to survive financially. Rent setting and subsidies 
also make it affordable to live in social hous-
ing in Finland. However, the decentralisation of 
rent setting in Denmark, Finland and Norway 
means that rents vary very much between hous-
ing estates, and some may be less affordable. In 
Sweden the ‘semi-privatisation’ of social hous-
ing may lead to higher rents and a little less af-
fordability. A higher correlation between rental 
levels and housing quality is to be expected in 
Sweden than in Denmark and Finland. The mu-
nicipalities’ autonomy in setting rents for social 
housing in Norway has resulted in market prices 
in the Oslo metropolitan area, where tenants are 
dependent on housing allowances, often com-
bined with social allowances. 
In 2010, the Swedish Government presented 
a bill that will alter the role of public housing. 
The social dimension will probably be strength-
ened, and at the same time the current rent-setting 
system will be abolished. Rents will be closer to 
market levels, and public housing will be more 
in line with social housing. 
Private renting
Access and affordability may vary in the private 
rental sector depending on the extent of regula-
tion. Rent control results in lower rents, but at 
the same time produces queues that are not to 
the advantage of immigrants.
The strong rent control in large parts of the 
Danish market tends to limit immigrants’ access 
to rental accommodation, because most immi-
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grants lack contacts with landlords, and some 
landlords are reluctant to let to immigrants. There 
is no longer any rent control in Norway. The mar-
ket is dominated by small private landlords with 
one or two properties, who tend to avoid taking 
immigrants as tenants. However, the number of 
professional rental agencies is increasing in Os-
lo and some other urban areas. These organisa-
tions offer a variety of accommodation, which is 
available to immigrants. The private rental sector 
is the only option for newly arrived immigrants 
who cannot afford to buy a house or a co-oper-
ative dwelling. Finland has also abolished rent 
control, and the increasingly professionalised pri-
vate rental sector based on allocation by market 
mechanisms should guarantee immigrants’ ac-
cess if they can pay the rent. Sweden still has 
some rent regulation, which may well be abol-
ished in the near future. In some municipalities 
private landlords can join a central housing al-
location service, but they are not obliged to so 
personal contacts with landlords are important. 
There is evidence of discrimination against im-
migrants.
Rent regulation in Denmark and Sweden 
keeps the level of rents below the market rate. 
This applies especially to Denmark, but rents 
vary and are very low in some areas and very high 
in others. Rents in Sweden are below the market 
level, particularly in attractive inner city areas. 
Co-operative housing
Co-operatives in Denmark differ very much from 
those in Sweden and Norway, and they are rare 
in Finland. Access to Danish co-operatives has 
been very difficult for immigrants because of the 
strict price control and the allocation power of the 
boards, which prioritise family and friends. Pric-
es have risen in recent years, in some places up to 
the market level, which in principle should make 
it easier for immigrants who can pay the prices. 
Access to co-operatives in Norway is based on 
the market, combined with seniority. Applicants 
have to be formally accepted by the boards, but 
there is not much scope for discrimination. Al-
location is market-based in Sweden.
All four countries give residents in co-op-
erative dwellings tax relief on the interest pay-
able for personal loans, but only Norway gives 
general production support and direct support 
for special groups to buy co-operative dwellings. 
Finland, Norway and Sweden also provide hous-
ing benefits based on general principles, whereas 
Denmark only supports pensioners. On the other 
hand, the lower prices for co-operatives in Den-
mark have made them more affordable.
Owner-occupied housing
Access to owner-occupied housing in all four 
countries is free and based on market forces. Af-
fordability depends on property prices, finance 
systems, tax support, supply support and loca-
tion. Denmark has an efficient financing system, 
and has kept interest rates low for the last ten 
years. Loans with delayed amortisation were in-
troduced in 2004, but prices soared as a result. 
Norway is the only country with supply support 
and means-tested financial support for owner oc-
cupiers, although Finland has special support for 
first-time buyers. Norway and Sweden provide 
individual housing benefits to those in owner-oc-
cupied housing. All countries give tax benefits, 
which are higher in Norway than in the other 
countries, and the lowest in Finland. 
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3.  The development 
of immigration 
Saara Yousfi
Department of Geosciences and 
Geography, University of Helsinki
The immigration policy of a state has a strong 
impact on its demography, culture, economy and 
politics. The primary focus is on control, in other 
words rules and procedures governing the selec-
tion and admission of foreign citizens. Integra-
tion is sometimes seen as one aspect of the policy, 
and could indeed affect the conditions of arriving 
and residing immigrants, as well as the number 
and composition of immigrants migrating to a 
particular country. Work and housing conditions, 
welfare provisions and educational opportunities 
are also essential parts of the welfare state that 
affect and are affected by immigration and in-
tegration policy.
There are both similarities and differences in 
immigration selectivity across the Nordic coun-
tries. The composition of country-specific migra-
tion flows is closely linked to three main factors. 
First of all, historical ties and geographic proxim-
ity have shaped much of the migration exchange, 
and both cultural values and language issues have 
made a difference. Secondly, the presence of eco-
nomic push and pull factors, shaped by uneven 
economic development, and differences in in-
dustrialisation and urbanisation processes, have 
resulted in varying demand for labour in the four 
countries over time. Thirdly, geopolitical realities 
have had a major impact on immigration poli-
cies, which in turn have fostered different views 
on refugee immigration in particular.
Sweden maintained a policy of neutrality 
during the Second World War, while Denmark, 
Norway and Finland were involved in it. This 
was one basic reason why migration to Sweden 
started at that time as the country took in sub-
stantial numbers of refugees during and after the 
war. The effects of the war were felt long after the 
peace treaties were signed. This was the case in 
Finland in particular, where the cautious foreign 
policy let to a reluctance to admit immigrants 
en masse, and until the end of the 1980s, only 
small numbers were accepted and given permis-
sion to stay. Sweden, Norway and Denmark, in 
contrast, welcomed immigrant labour. Norway 
and Denmark joined NATO at the beginning of 
1949, whereas Sweden and Finland kept their 
neutrality. Nevertheless, all four countries de-
veloped similar types of social-democratic wel-
fare state during the 1950s and 1960s, and main-
tained close relationships despite differences in 
their geopolitical positions.
Even though migration has been a world-
wide phenomenon for many centuries, the Nor-
dic countries were still ethnically homogenous in 
the 1940s. As elsewhere in Europe, the Second 
World War put people on the move (King 1993). 
Although remaining neutral, Sweden supported 
the other countries involved in their survival and 
recovery by helping and receiving refugees, for 
example. Soon after the war, major decisions 
were made to establish a free movement area 
within the Nordic region. 
The Nordic countries have enthustiastically 
supported the international community in find-
ing common solutions to international problems. 
They have all ratified and implemented the 1951 
United Nations Convention related to the status 
of refugees, and the 1967 Protocol, and have 
long traditions of involvement in international 
refugee protection schemes.
Immigration in the four countries was most-
ly intra-Nordic until labour demand rapidly in-
creased in the 1960s bringing substantial num-
bers of labour migrants to Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway. Increases in demand and business op-
portunities led firms to actively search for labour, 
and it was easy for foreigners to get permission 
to come and search for work. Labour migration 
Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States
272
was mainly from various parts of Europe, includ-
ing Turkey. Although this labour-driven policy 
ended in the 1970s, refugee and family-related 
immigration brought even bigger numbers of im-
migrants, including non-Europeans. It was dif-
ferent in Finland, mostly due to the country’s 
late industrialisation and urbanisation. Unlike its 
Nordic neighbours, the country suffered from 
an oversupply of labour, and for many decades 
delivered substantial numbers of emigrants, in 
particular to Sweden. Finnish-Swedish migra-
tion peaked around 1970.
The 1980s was a period of refugee migration, 
and Sweden, Denmark and Norway took in sub-
stantial numbers from third-world countries. A 
new era started in 1989˗91 with the raising of the 
iron curtain and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. The influx of immigrants from Eastern 
Europe started to make an imprint in Finland, 
too. At the time, because of the international and 
economic climate, Finland also felt obliged to 
open up its borders to foreign migration. By then, 
post-war migration had led to the introduction of 
immigration and integration laws and practices 
in the other Nordic countries, but in Finland the 
decisions were very much ad hoc. The number 
of arriving immigrants was still small in rela-
tion to the other Nordic countries in the early 
1990s, but large in relation to earlier immigrant 
numbers. However, the economic recession that 
followed was challenging in terms of immigrant 
integration and welfare-state procedures. Labour 
migration increased in all of the Nordic coun-
tries in the early 2000s, not least because of the 
new immigration regulations. The enlargement 
of the European Union in 2004–2007 heralded 
yet another era with the expansion of the move-
ment region and the subsequent effects on fam-
ily reunification.
The numbers of immigrants have grown in 
the last ten years, 1999–2009, with a 105-per-
cent increase in Sweden, an 81-per-cent increase 
in Finland, and a 56-per-cent increase in Norway. 
Denmark introduced new tougher regulations in 
2001, which led to a reduction in immigrants in 
2001–2003, but there was still a 34-per-cent in-
crease in 2009 compared with 1999. In terms 
of numbers, the strongest immigrant flow was 
to Sweden, which received more than 100,000 
immigrants in both 2008 and 2009 although on 
the per-capita level the flows into Norway and 
Denmark were of a similar or even bigger vol-
ume. Figure 1 depicts the historical trends in 
immigration to the Nordic countries from the 
1950s until 2009 (see Table 1 in the Appendix 
for a more detailed timeline).
Figure 1. Immigration to the Nordic countries in1950˗2009 per 1,000 inhabitants (Statistics Denmark, 
Statistics Finland, Statistics Norway, Statistics Sweden)
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Nowadays, the majority of immigrants origi-
nate from other Nordic and EU countries, even 
though the numbers coming from outside the EU 
have increased. Free movement in Europe has 
affected the Nordic countries since they joined 
the European Community (Denmark in 1972) or 
the European Economic Area (Finland, Norway 
and Sweden in 1994, with Finland and Sweden 
acceding to the European Union in 1995). The 
main change has been in the proportion of im-
migrants from other European countries, partic-
ularly Eastern Europe. An increase in the num-
bers of refugees continues to be the dominating 
pattern in Sweden. According to the respective 
national statistics, the proportion of the popula-
tion of foreign-origin is highest in Sweden at 14 
per cent, almost the same in Norway and in Den-
mark at around 10 or 11 per cent, and lowest in 
Finland at slightly over four per cent (Table 1).
The origins of the immigrants differ some-
what in the four countries. Turks constitute the 
largest group in Denmark followed by Germans, 
Iraqis and Poles. The biggest groups in Finland 
are Russians and Estonians, followed by Soma-
lis, whereas in terms of net migration to Norway, 
the biggest come from Poland, Germany, Paki-
stan and Iraq. Immigrants from Bosnia and Iraq 
have dominated the influx in Sweden since 1990. 
Of the immigrant stock, about 300,000 originate 
in western Asia, including Turkey and northern 
Africa, about 300,000 were born in Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, and around 270,000 were born 
in the neighbouring Nordic countries. 
The reasons for migration correlate strong-
ly with the countries of origin. With the excep-
tion of Sweden, labour migration within the EU 
25 is now a dominating feature, representing 48 
per cent of the total migration from non-Nor-
dic countries in 2008 in Norway, for example 
(Figure 2). 
How immigrants perform on the labour mar-
ket is one of the fundamental questions related to 
integration. Employment and earnings are most-
ly used as measures of performance. Earnings 
Table 1. Proportion of residents of foreign origin in the Nordic countries, 1.1.2010 (Statistics Denmark, 
Statistics Finland, Statistics Norway, Statistics Sweden)
Figure 2. Permanent migration by category of entry in 2008, percentage of the total population (OECD 
2010)
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Born outside the country 9.8 4.4 10.8 14.3
Born outside the EU 7.3 2.8 7.3 9.2
Total proportion of non-nationals 6 2.9 6.9 6.5
Non-EU nationals 3.9 1.9 3.8 3.6
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alone do not reflect the success of migration, but 
they do correlate with occupational outcomes 
and directly affect housing options. Immigrants 
are at a higher risk of poverty in all the Nordic 
countries althoug the level of risk depends to 
some extent on the time since arrival and the 
reason for immigration. The country of origin 
as well as the immigration policy at the time of 
entry have also been found to influence the dis-
tribution of immigrants on the labour market as 
well as their relative economic success. 
4. Becoming multiethnic 
 ˗integration and 
settlement policies
Susanne Søholt
Norwegian Institute for Urban 
and Regional Research
Immigration and integration policies are strongly 
interconnected in the four Nordic countries. It 
is claimed that a too generous immigration pol-
icy challenges the sustainability of the Nordic 
universal welfare state. The somewhat differing 
national political discourses have produced dif-
ferent immigration and integration policies over 
the years (see the Appendix, Table 2 for a more 
detailed description of policy changes). Den-
mark, for example, introduced a strict immigra-
tion policy, followed by a strict integration policy, 
measures that should not attract new immigrants. 
Norway is also moving towards a more restric-
tive immigration policy, albeit in combination 
with a more generous integration policy. Sweden 
still has the most generous immigration policies.
The national debates have vacillated between 
economic and humanitarian arguments in the 
process of determining what type of multieth-
nic society to strive for. The issue nowadays, as 
it was when a halt on immigration was called 
in the mid-1970s, concerns how many and what 
kinds of immigrants can be brought in and inte-
grated into the Nordic welfare states. Successful 
integration and inclusion imply immigration and 
integration regimes that do not threaten social 
cohesion or economic sustainability. Regardless 
of the political standpoints, immigrants should 
become active participants in working life with 
a view to economic independence, gaining self-
respect and sharing responsibilities. To this end, 
Denmark is attempting to shift the mix by facil-
itating labour-market-oriented immigration and 
restricting entry among other groups, such as 
family reunification and quota refugees. In terms 
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of family reunification, both Denmark and Nor-
way have set a minimum age and demand docu-
mented evidence of being able to support the new 
family. Denmark has recently introduced a points 
system and Norway requires satisfactory accom-
modation arrangements. Danish employers are 
given financial incentives to take on immigrants, 
and Sweden also has various schemes to encour-
age employers in this regard. By way of a work 
incentive, immigrants in Denmark receive less 
generous social allowance than native Danes. 
Integration or assimilation? 
A recurrent question in the political debate con-
cerns the preferred type of multiethnic society. 
In what ways should immigrants be assimilated 
or integrated? Sweden and Norway took the first 
steps towards multiculturalism in the 1970s al-
lowing immigrants to choose whether to be as-
similated into the national population or to main-
tain and develop their own language, religion 
and cultural affiliation. Later, Finland followed 
suit. However, waves of intensive debates on 
immigration and integration have changed the 
political climate in all four countries. The result 
is a more explicit policy that supports diversity 
and the inclusion of individuals rather than eth-
nic groups or communities. Values concerning 
gender equality and the rights of children remain 
non-negotiable.  
The characterisation of policy in terms of 
ideals helps in distinguishing the different and 
crossing trajectories in the Nordic countries. As 
mentioned, Sweden and Norway used to lean to-
wards multiculturalism, with the active recogni-
tion of various ethnic subgroups. Later reforms 
have put Sweden on the path to civic integration, 
with no recognition of sub-groups. Denmark is 
moving towards ethnic assimilation and the pri-
macy of ethnos (majority) over demos, also with 
no recognition of sub-groups. Current policies in 
Norway and Finland have elements of civic inte-
gration, multiculturalism and ethnic assimilation. 
However, Norway, Sweden and Finland have 
recognised a special status to indigenous people 
and national minority groups, among others the 
Sami people, the Rom and Romani people, Jews, 
persons of Finnish decent in northern Sweden 
and Norway and persons of Swedish decent in 
Finland. In Denmark, the German minority in the 
South is considered a national ethnic minority. 
Introduction programmes – social 
engineering to support integration
All four countries have developed some type of 
introduction programme in order to speed up 
the integration of refugees into education and 
the labour market. Finland includes unemployed 
recently arrived immigrants in the target group, 
the objective being to give them support and 
the means to become financially independent. 
The programmes last between 18 and 36 months, 
or less if the person in question becomes self-
supporting. All programme participants receive 
some kind of financial support. There has been 
a change in Sweden and Norway from needs-
based support (social allowance) to a fixed al-
lowance that is the same for everyone.The inten-
tion being to align the terms of this support with 
ordinary incomes. The objective is to encourage 
those in the introduction programme to earn more 
money without losing any of their allowance. 
These programmes are voluntary for refugees 
in Sweden, whereas in the other countries par-
ticipation is obligatory for members of the tar-
get group in need of financial support. The state 
reimburses the municipalities the costs they in-
cur in running the programmes, thus motivating 
them to develop good introduction programmes 
and procedures and to settle refugees.
The real test of the programme is whether it 
gives refugees and recently arrived immigrants 
access to the labour market. Swedish studies have 
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indicated that the compulsory refugee-dispersal 
policy practised in 1985˗1994 was counterpro-
ductive in terms of labour-market integration. 
In Norway, however, there has been a modest 
increase in employment among settled refugees 
who participated in the first programmes. Wheth-
er this is attributable to the programme, the refu-
gees’ origin or the time of settlement is uncertain. 
Given the strong connection between labour par-
ticipation and moving up the housing ladder, we 
hope to provide up-to-date information on this 
decisive question later in the NODES project. 
Settlement policies
The introduction and settlement of refugees are 
part of the same programme in Norway and Swe-
den although unlike Norway, Sweden allows ref-
ugees to settle anywhere provided that they are 
able to find accommodation on their own. The 
main principle in all four countries is to distribute 
and settle refugees in municipalities according 
to an annually agreed state-municipal placement 
scheme. Refugees settling in Denmark, Norway 
and Finland have little or no choice of where to 
live, and in Denmark they are obliged to stay in 
the same place for the first three years. In princi-
ple, those arriving in Sweden, Finland and Nor-
way are free to settle where they wish, but they 
would have to find their own accommodation. In 
Norway the main requirement is to be financially 
independent and in no need of the introduction 
support. Sweden gives refugees the most free-
dom in terms of where to settle, and after three 
months they become the responsibility of the 
municipality in which they live. Municipalities 
in Denmark are obliged to settle refugees in ac-
cordance with a regional quota system, whereas 
in Norway and Finland municipalities are still 
autonomous in this regard. 
Citizenship
There are similarities and differences in citizen-
ship requirements in the Nordic countries. The 
similarities concern having a confirmed identi-
ty and a current residence permit, being at least 
18 years of age, and having no criminal record. 
Denmark also requires applicants to be able to 
provide for themselves. The required period of 
residence before applying for citizenship is short-
est in Sweden with five years for immigrants 
and four years for refugees, whereas in Denmark 
the demand is nine and eight years, respective-
ly, without a break. With regard to children, the 
principle of decency operates in all four coun-
tries, meaning that the citizenship of the parents 
determines the citizenship of the children. 
The main differences in citizenship require-
ments relate to tests and ceremonies. Sweden 
makes no demands. Norway requires tests or 
documented training on social issues and lan-
guage, whereas in Denmark it is necessary to 
pass the tests. Finland only requires satisfactory 
performance in language tests. The Danish tests 
are so difficult that the number of successful ap-
plications has decreased. Denmark also requires 
a vow of allegiance and loyalty, whereas Norway 
offers a voluntary ceremony. Sweden and Fin-
land generally allow dual citizenship, whereas 
Denmark and Norway do not. 
Acquisition of citizenship varies among the 
four countries. Denmark and Sweden expe-
rienced a decrease in absolute terms between 
1998 and 2008, whereas there was an increase 
in Finland, and to a lesser degree in Norway. In 
relation to the resident population, Sweden and 
Norway are both accepting a higher number of 
citizenship applications per inhabitant than Fin-
land and Denmark. In 2008, Sweden was top of 
the EU 27, with Norway just behind, whereas 
both Finland and Denmark were below the EU 
average. Sweden was also the country granting 
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the highest number of new citizenships in relation 
to the size of the resident foreign population.163
Immigration and integration policies help to 
contextualise the dynamics between the Nordic 
welfare states and ethnic residential segregation 
and desegregation. How this works will be fur-
ther studied within the NODES project. 
1  Eurostat Statistics in focus. 36/2010. 
5. Migration flows and 
settlement patterns 
Roger Andersson
Institute for Housing and Urban 
Research, Uppsala University
A characteristic of all the Nordic countries except 
Denmark is a low overall population density. For 
a long time there have been regional policies in 
place in order to counteract this structural feature, 
in other words to assist regions that experience 
de-population. The direction of internal migra-
tion has been mainly from rural and peripheral 
areas to bigger cities, in particular to the capital 
regions. It is not surprising that immigration has 
followed the same basic pattern.
“At the regional level, the capital areas and 
major cities have been most attractive destina-
tions for immigrants to the Nordic countries. 
The concentration of immigration to the same 
cities where the native population is moving in 
the country-internal migration process thus ac-
celerated the urbanisation process.” (Eðvarðs-
son et al. 2007)
As Eðvarðsson et al. point out in their study 
of immigration and settlement changes between 
1988 and 2004, immigrants to the Nordic coun-
tries follow the general historical and interna-
tional tendency in that they are pro-urban and 
are concentrated in metropolitan areas. Indeed, 
they are twice more likely to settle in the Nor-
dic capitals than elsewhere in the four countries. 
The country reports reveal considerable dif-
ferences in both the regional and local distribu-
tion of minorities. The relative concentration in 
the capital area is very high among particular 
immigrant categories and lower in other, which 
has something to do with the migration period, 
the reasons for the migration and the immigrant 
placement policies in force. In Finland, for ex-
ample, 82 per cent of the Somali speakers reside 
in the Helsinki metropolitan area, compared with 
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only 41 per cent of the Russian-speaking pop-
ulation. Moreover, Stockholm County in Swe-
den houses over 60 per cent of all immigrants 
born in Peru and Eritrea, 50 per cent or more of 
those born in Turkey, Greece, Chile, Morocco 
and Ethiopia, but only around 10 per cent of 
those born in Vietnam, Bosnia and other parts 
of the former Yugoslavia.
Some of the immigration-related policy 
measures, especially that concerning refugee dis-
persal, should be seen from a double perspec-
tive: the aim is to support regional policy and 
also to avoid further spatial concentration (seg-
regation) of minorities in the capital area and 
in other major cities. All four countries indeed 
pursue active dispersal policies involving vari-
ous degrees of compulsion (little room for choice 
for the individual asylum seeker or refugee, or 
even for the municipality), which have, indeed, 
contributed to making most municipalities in the 
Nordic countries more multicultural. As expect-
ed, secondary migration has been the subject of 
discussion, especially in Norway and Sweden. 
The typical pattern is for refugees, who are set-
tled in the northern sparsely populated areas of 
Scandinavia, to relocate to cities further south 
within a year or two.
Immigrants show higher rates of geograph-
ical mobility than the native Nordic residents. 
This is attributable to the differences in age dis-
tribution (the most recent arrivals – like internal 
migrants – are at their most mobile at between 
20 and 35 years of age), and also the fact that 
the housing they are allocated during their first 
years in the new country does not suit their needs.
The numbers of immigrants differ quite a lot 
across the Nordic countries, being the highest in 
Sweden and the lowest in Finland. Nevertheless, 
residential segregation is a hot political topic in 
them all, especially in the larger cities. Sweden 
and Denmark have substantial numbers of immi-
grants living in large housing estates built in the 
1960s and 1970s, but Finland (Helsinki) has no 
such large concentrations:  one might perhaps re-
fer to a mosaic of emerging multi-ethnic places in 
the Finnish case (some of these are also relative-
ly new, built in the 1980s and 1990s). The most 
immigrant-dense city district in Norway, built in 
the 1980s, has a mix of detached housing and low 
apartment blocks. The debate on ethnic residen-
tial segregation has triggered policy reactions that 
reveal both similarities and differences across 
the four countries. Finland generally emphasis-
es a housing mix as a way of combating segre-
gation, including ethnic residential segregation, 
and Sweden has launched state-led area-based 
urban programmes aimed at breaking down seg-
regation and improving levels of integration in 
immigrant-dense neighbourhoods. Similar inter-
ventions have been launched in Denmark, and 
to some extent, in Norway. There are clear dif-
ferences in rhetoric, however: Danish politicians 
talk about “ghettos” and “ghetto plans”, but this 
type of vocabulary is never used in Sweden or 
Norway. Some politicians – and the media – in 
Finland use the term ghetto in the sense of a threat 
that should be avoided. Civil servants and other 
city officials do not use this kind of rhetoric in 
their official programmes.
It is often the case that minority residents who 
cluster – or are forced to cluster – in particular 
city areas are also poorly integrated in terms of 
labour-market participation. There is an ethnic 
hierarchy in that “non-Western” immigrants are 
less well-off than other immigrants and much 
less well-off than the native workforce. It is al-
so precisely these groups that are geographical-
ly concentrated in immigrant-dense housing es-
tates. There are exceptions, however: the Tamils 
in Oslo are well integrated in terms of education, 
work and income, and at the same time score 
highly on segregation measures. 
Poor immigrant households in Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden are concentrated not on-
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ly in particular places and neighbourhoods but 
also in particular housing-market segments (so-
cial/public housing). There may, of course, be a 
causal relationship in the sense that social/public 
housing is the only option for many immigrants, 
although far from all neighbourhoods with high 
concentrations of social housing have high num-
bers of immigrants. There is also evidence of an 
ethnic hierarchy and distinct patterns of residen-
tial segregation in Norway, with its distinctly dif-
ferent housing market and high level of owner-
occupation.
Neighbourhoods and city districts heavily 
dominated by native residents are typical fea-
tures of all four areas. Earlier research has been 
preoccupied with understanding the sorting pro-
cesses from the perspective of ethnic minori-
ties and their behaviour. We hope in the future 
to give a more complete picture of the causali-
ties related to segregation in studies focusing not 
only on minority housing careers but also on 
the migratory behaviour of majority residents. It 
has been shown on the international level, and 
confirmed for Sweden, that phenomena such as 
“white flight”, and “white avoidance”, together 
with blocking strategies exercised by majority 
residents and institutions, may have a profound 
impact on patterns of ethnic residential segre-
gation.
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